

# Performance Evaluation of the Punjab Education Sector Programme (PESP2) Final Evaluation Report

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Consortium for  
Development  
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Management**



e-Pact is a consortium led by Oxford Policy Management and co-managed with Itad

## Acknowledgements

The studies that provide the evidence base for this report have been prepared by a team consisting of staff and consultants from Oxford Policy Management (OPM), the Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives (IDEAS), and the Consortium for Development Policy Research (CDPR). A full list of the background studies and their authors is included in Annex C. The lead author of this report, and the Team Leader for the evaluation, is Stephen Jones (OPM).

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FCDO was established on 2 September 2020 through a merger of DFID and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. This report refers to DFID where this is historically appropriate (i.e. for actions and activities before September 2020).

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## Executive summary

### Overview of PESP2

This report is the Final Evaluation Report of the Performance Evaluation of the Punjab Education Sector Programme Phase 2 (PESP2), which has been the UK's largest bilateral programme to support education.

PESP2 (taking account of extensions up to the time of writing) has been implemented from January 2013 to July 2021. Under the programme, the UK has allocated £426.5 million to support the Government of Punjab (GoPb) to reform and transform the delivery of education in Punjab. The programme built on the UK's previous support to education in Punjab and was designed to support Punjab Education Reform Roadmap. PESP2 aimed to achieve the impact of 'more educated people in Punjab making a social and economic contribution', with the intended outcome being to ensure that 'more children are in school, staying longer and learning more'.

PESP2 has provided a combination of sector budget support (SBS), targeted financial support, and technical assistance (TA). Specific programme components have focused on support to public–private partnerships (PPPs) through the Punjab Education Foundation (PEF) programmes with low-cost private schools; support for the rehabilitation of school infrastructure; scholarship programmes; support to special and inclusive education; and support for adolescent girls who are out of school.

### Objectives and scope of the evaluation

The objectives of the Performance Evaluation are as follows:

1. To assess what progress has been made in improving the performance of education in Punjab over the period of the PESP2 programme (with a particular focus on gender, disability, social exclusion, and poverty), and what factors explain the performance observed.
2. To identify, measure (where possible), and explain the contributions that the PESP2 programme has made to the progress achieved, including the contributions of the PESP2 components individually and collectively.
3. To identify lessons for future programmes and for enhanced improvements in the performance of Punjab's education system.
4. To provide interim reports that may assist in course corrections during the remainder of the programme's implementation, as well as to inform the final evaluation report.

Two levels of evaluation questions (EQs) have been defined for the Performance Evaluation:

**Level One EQs** relate to understanding the performance of the education system in Punjab over the period of the PESP2 programme, and the factors that have determined this performance.

**Level Two EQs** relate to understanding the contribution of the PESP2 project components (individually and collectively) to the progress tracked and analysed by the Level One EQs.

## **Methodology and evidence base**

The Performance Evaluation is based on a conceptual framework derived from the 2018 World Development Report<sup>1</sup>, which is itself based on a comprehensive review of global evidence for assessing the effectiveness and functionality of systems of education. This framework identifies four key school-level ingredients for learning: prepared learners; effective teaching; learning-focused inputs; and skilled management and governance. It incorporates accountability relationships and conditions for coherence and alignment around certain policy goals.

### **Evidence base for answering Level One EQs**

The Evaluation Team has carried out four annual rounds of data collection since 2018 to provide evidence on education sector performance, education sector policies and reforms, and public finance for education, as set out in the following paragraphs.

#### **Review of Education Sector Performance (RESP)**

The RESP analyses data on indicators of education sector performance over the PESP2 period, and assesses the evidence on progress achieved. The RESP was preceded by a data quality assessment (DQA) of administrative and survey data on education to determine which data series were of sufficient quality and completeness to enable the measurement of trends over time. The first version of the RESP was prepared in 2018 as part of the background studies contributing to IER1. A selective update based on newly available information was prepared in 2019 to contribute to IER2. As part of the Final Evaluation, the first version of the RESP has been comprehensively revised and updated.

#### **Education Policy and Reform Review (EPRR)**

The EPRR examines progress in education policy and reform implementation in Punjab during the period of PESP2's implementation. It reviews the main reform initiatives over the period, organised around the conceptual framework, which focuses on how effectively educational systems are aligned around, and coherent in relation to, learning objectives, and how well the key ingredients of learning (effective teaching, prepared learners, learning-focused inputs, and skilled management and governance) are realised at school level.

#### **Public Finance for Education Review (PFER)**

The PFER provides an assessment of trends in the education budget and expenditure over the period of PESP2's implementation (including in comparison to the period immediately before the programme), and of the quality of public finance management (PFM) for education.

#### **District Study**

The District Study (undertaken in 2019) collected evidence on the extent to which education reforms were affecting the management of education at district level (**District Education**

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<sup>1</sup> World Bank (2018)

**Management Study – DEMS**), the management and delivery of education in schools (**School Survey**), and perceptions of the education sector in communities (**Community Study**). The District Study focused on four districts purposefully selected from among those with the worst education indicators in Punjab between 2012 and 2016, but distinguishing two districts (Bhakkar and Rahimyar Khan) which had subsequently performed relatively well in improving indicators, and two (Rawalpindi and Rajanpur) which had performed badly.

## **Evidence base for answering Level Two EQs**

The first round of evaluation studies (in 2018) focused principally on assessing the results achieved through TA (including support to the Roadmap and Stocktake process) and SBS. This involved three **case studies** of particular policy areas, including the provision of support to the main organisations (curriculum, teacher training, and public examinations). The case studies were complemented by a **Review of Technical Assistance Management Arrangements**. Along with the first rounds of the RESP, EPRR, and PFER, this comprised the evidence base for **IER1**, prepared in 2018.

To contribute to IER2, produced in 2019 and drawing on the second round of the RESP, EPRR, and PFER, and the DEMS, the following evaluation studies were conducted:

- **Evaluation of support to the Punjab Education Endowment Fund (PEEF) intermediate scholarships programme.**
- **Evaluation of support to the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) National Outreach Programme (NOP) Scholarships Programme.**

For the final phase of the evaluation (in 2020/1), two rounds of the RESP, EPRR, and PFER were carried out, along with the following evaluation studies:

- **Evaluation of support to Special and Inclusive Education.**
- **Evaluation of support to the Punjab Education Foundation (PEF).**
- **Evaluation of support to School Infrastructure.**

**TA Update Study.** A first study covered the provision of TA by Cambridge Education over the period of its contract to provide TA from October 2018 to March 2020, following on from the earlier Technical Assistance Management Organisation (TAMO) arrangement. A subsequent study reviewed the performance of TA provided by the Institute of Social and Political Sciences (I-SAPS) from August 2020.

A **Programme Design and Management Review (PDMR)** focused on how PESP2 was designed and managed by DFID and FCDO.

In addition, an **Evaluation of the ‘Advancing Action for Adolescent Girls’ (A3G -Siyani Sahelian) programme** which forms part of PESP2 was produced by OPERA (outside the framework of this performance evaluation).

## Education sector performance


### Quality of data

The information available is sufficient to identify key features and some broad trends in education sector performance, including in relation to learning outcomes and education participation. However, there are significant limitations in the time periods covered and the extent to which disaggregation is possible. In addition, there are no good data to measure 'learner preparedness' in Punjab, the effectiveness of teaching, availability and use of teaching materials, or key aspects of school management and governance.

### Has access to education improved?


Progress has been made over the period of PESP2 in getting a higher percentage of children in Punjab into school, as shown by increasing participation rates (Figure 1).

**Figure 1: Participation rates for children aged 5 to 16**




Source: see Table 3. PSES/Nielsen survey results averaged where two observations in the same year.

However, the fact that net enrolment rates have not increased implies that children are not always in appropriate grades for their age (Figure 2).

**Figure 2: Net enrolment rates for children aged 5 to 16**

Source: see Table 4. PSES/Nielsen survey results averaged where two observations in the same year.

Educational access continues to be lower for those disadvantaged by location, by socioeconomic (see Figure 3) and disability status, and for girls.

**Figure 3: Participation and NER for children 5 to 16: richest and poorest quintiles**

Source: PSLM data. See Table 8 and Table 9.

There has been some success in getting more of the poorest into schools, but not always in retaining them in school. However, school closures and disruption to livelihoods resulting from

COVID-19 led to declines in participation in 2020, with the impact likely to be greatest on young children and those from disadvantaged backgrounds.

### **Have learning outcomes improved?**

Learning outcomes from available school-based data showed some improvements in the period 2014–19, with differences by location, gender, and school type, though with scores falling after this. There is clear evidence that children do learn more in school than out of it, and children in (rural) Punjab have performed above the national average as compared to other provinces and regions in the country over the period of PESP2, though achievement levels remain persistently low. However, overall the evidence on learning outcomes is insufficiently complete, representative, and disaggregated to allow firm conclusions about trends to be drawn.

### **Has equity in education improved?**

There is clear evidence of substantial differentials in education access and learning outcomes that are related to household economic status (in rural areas), and that these differentials are greater for girls than for boys. However, the data available are not sufficient to draw more detailed or nuanced conclusions, or to assess whether there have been changes in equity measures (e.g. participation rates and learning outcomes by socioeconomic status) over the period since the start of PESP2 implementation. There is also a lack of comprehensive and consistent data on children with special educational needs and disabilities in Punjab, though the data available from survey sources have improved in recent years.

### **Are learners prepared for education?**

While there was some increase in pre-primary enrolment in Punjab (though this may have been reversed in 2019 and 2020), most children of three to four years are not participating in formal learning. Early childhood development lags in regard to literacy and numeracy, while there is limited support for learning in the household, with significant differences in support provided related to wealth and location.

### **Has the effectiveness of teaching improved?**

There is insufficient evidence available to assess whether the effectiveness of teaching has improved. While teacher attendance has averaged over 85% and more qualified teachers have been hired, student-teacher ratios have fluctuated and were slightly higher in 2018 than 2012. Some evidence suggests that teachers are not sufficiently prepared to teach challenging classrooms, not fully competent in the curriculum, are unable to transfer their knowledge to students, and do not show good teaching practices.

### **Has the provision of learner-focused inputs in schools improved?**

There have been improvements in the provision of physical infrastructure and facilities in Punjab's schools – almost all schools have electricity, drinking water, toilets, and boundary walls. However, there are no comprehensive data on other learner-focused inputs, such as materials.



## **Has the management and governance of schools improved?**

Insufficient information is available to draw any clear conclusions about the effectiveness of school management and governance, and how this has changed.

## **Progress and reform of education in Punjab**

Over the period of PESP2, the GoPb has shown strong commitment to education with an increasing shift in focus from a principal emphasis on increasing enrolment to paying greater explicit attention to learning outcomes and inclusion. This commitment has been reflected in public spending which has generally continued to prioritise education, as well as an active process of development of policies, initiatives and organisational reform, and effective cooperation with the UK and the World Bank as the main external providers of financial support to the sector. It has led to increases in enrolment both in government schools and through PEF programmes with private schools, improved infrastructure and facilities in government schools, and increases in the number and qualifications of teachers. Important policy initiatives have been taken in relation to ECE and inclusive education, and in enshrining the right to education in law (though these remain to be fully implemented).

However, the lack throughout the period of a comprehensive education policy has constrained the achievement of coherence and alignment on learning objectives. This has resulted in a lack of strategic guidance for spending decisions, and unresolved issues about priorities and focus including in relation to clarifying the role of the private sector in fulfilling sector policy objectives and establishing an appropriate regulatory and partnership policy.

Up to 2018, the Roadmap provided a framework of targets, a focus for highlighting the political priority that the Chief Minister had placed on education, and a generally effective process of performance monitoring down to school level, with strong sanctions where progress was not achieved. The Roadmap and Stocktake process was effective in aligning the education system on the achievement of specific short- and medium-term targets but not in itself sufficient to guide comprehensive policy and organisational reform.

Continuing weaknesses in public financial management have also militated against ensuring resources have been allocated to address critical priorities. Only limited progress was made in implementing the model of decentralisation of education management through DEAs that was developed by the previous government, and uncertainty remains about how the decentralisation approach embodied in the PLGA 2019 will be implemented for education. The difficult fiscal context since 2018 and the impact of school closures in response to Covid-19 in 2020 (as well as the high rate of turnover in key sector leadership roles) have posed significant challenges for taking forward the implementation of reforms – though the response to Covid-19 has also stimulated awareness of alternative approaches to delivering education.

Sustaining and taking further progress in improving access to education and learning outcomes, especially in the wake of Covid-19, is likely to require a focus of action in the following areas:

- Identifying and effectively reaching (including through remedial support) children who are out of school or whose learning has been most significantly disrupted, as well as those with special educational needs and disabilities;

- Ensuring teachers (in both the government and private sectors) have adequate subject knowledge, use appropriate teaching methods, and are effectively motivated and managed;
- Ensuring effective and sustainable PPP arrangements for education, with the framework of a comprehensive policy towards private education including the appropriate regulatory and facilitating roles for government;
- Implementing a model of decentralised management of education that enables schools to control a greater share of resources while improving accountability especially to pupils, teachers and communities;

## Findings on performance of components of PESP2

**Sector Budget Support** is likely to have contributed to encouraging a focus on learning objectives and strengthening DFID's role in policy dialogue with GoPb, and may have contributed to higher education spending than would otherwise have occurred. However, continued weaknesses in public finance management, and a lack of alignment of SBS provision with the provincial budget process, means it is difficult to trace a causal link to specific results.

Both programme design flaws and weaknesses in contractor performance and DFID's response to this contributed to long delays and failure to reach intended targets for the **school infrastructure** component, though performance improved substantially following restructuring in 2018 and with part of the resources redirected to be managed by PMIU and TCF. However, the component has not succeeded in its original objective of successfully piloting and replicating new approaches and building technologies.

PESP2 funding played a critical role in enabling the **Punjab Education Foundation (PEF)** to increase enrolment in its well-run and effective programmes, and DFID's support for PEF has been important in enabling it to maintain political support. However, only limited progress has been made in building PEF's capacity (in functions such as research) and its future role and funding arrangements remain uncertain.

The **Technical Assistance (TA)** provided has generally been highly effective in producing agreed short-term outputs and responsive and flexible, but its record in contributing to sustainable organisational transformation, and addressing key governance issues for the sector, has been mixed. Effectiveness has in general improved over time and has reflected a greater attention in the selection of consultants to understanding of the local context. While TA provision has been responsive to GoPb priorities, GoPb ownership has been limited by lack of involvement in the selection of TA providers or management of TA arrangements.

PESP2 funding was effectively used by well-designed and managed **scholarship programmes** operated by PEEF and LUMS/NOP. Support was provided to building the management capacity of the LUMS/NOP but the long-term sustainability of its funding remains uncertain. PEEF scholarships were directly targeted on priority beneficiaries (including in disadvantaged districts). The targeting of support under LUMS/NOP was less clearly in line with programme priorities and its design was not focused on its originally intended role as a pilot to inform approaches for higher education scholarships.

**Siyani Sahelian** (A3G) appears to have been highly successful in developing and implementing approaches for providing remedial education and related support to reach out of school adolescent girls in rural areas of South Punjab. While it has secured some funding to allow its activities to continue after the end of PESP2, it is not clear to what extent GoPb will adopt lessons from the programme and support its scaling up.

DFID's continued engagement, commitment, and advocacy and funding of support to **special and inclusive education** has been important in ultimately enabling progress to be made towards the adoption of the IES and SEP. PESP2 contributed (through PIEP) to the successful development and adoption of the Inclusive Voucher Scheme (IVS) by PEF, but the SED component of PIEP was not successful. PESP2 support to SpED achieved limited results in strengthening its capacity and was not directly relevant to the objective of improving the extent to which the needs of most children with SEND were addressed in the education system.

The comparative performance of the main components of PESP2 is summarised in the table below. Some components of the programme (support to PEF programmes and PEEF scholarships) were highly cost effective in contributing to the goal of expanding access to education. However, these depended on providing funding through well-established programmes (to whose development DFID had previously contributed). The record of support to achieving transformational impact (e.g. organisational strengthening and improved policies and systems) varied across organisations and policy areas. The district delivery system developed under the Roadmap required substantial modification in the light of the changed approach to decentralisation favoured by the new government after 2018. Engagement with QAED was generally successful in supporting organisational reform and in piloting new approaches to CPD. The programme supported development of the IES and SED during 2019, following earlier less successful initiatives on these issues. Less progress was made in strengthening the capacity of PEF or improving the policy and financing arrangements under which it operated.

| Performance of main components of PESP2 |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Evaluation criterion                    | SBS   | TA  | Scholarships  | Special/ inclusive education  | PEF   | School infrastructure   |
| Relevance: appropriate design           | Some weaknesses: Results Area Framework (RAF) not aligned with budget calendar<br>Not designed against clear theory of change<br>Disbursement did not ensure funds were received by organisations responsible for achieving targets | TA approach flexible and responsive, and clearly aligned with priority objectives   | PEEF well-targeted at disadvantaged girls<br>LUMS/NOP targeting questionable since not used as a pilot for wider improvement of access to higher education for disadvantaged and beneficiaries already succeeding in education system | Weaknesses in design of Punjab Inclusive Education Programme (PIEP)<br><br>Subsequent focus on special education rather than inclusive education (in mainstream schools) possibly not appropriate<br><br>SBS not appropriate for supporting Special Education Department (SpED) | Sustained support to PEF and funding of its programmes has been appropriate to needs and priorities | Significant weaknesses in design relating to dependence on international contractor and community involvement in construction<br><br>Revised design of Punjab School Construction and Rehabilitation Programme (PSCR) and The Citizens Foundation (TCF) appears appropriate |
| Effectiveness: planned results achieved | Yes, in the sense that disbursement has taken place against RAF targets, but unclear how far SBS contributed to targets being achieved  | Difficult to assess because of adaptive nature around rolling work programmes and performance measures for TA related to PESP2 as a whole | Yes, but stronger <i>ex ante</i> evaluation design would have enabled measurement of impact   | PIEP did not achieve planned results for SED<br><br>While the RAF targets were largely achieved, DFID did not succeed in protecting development funding to SpED<br><br>Progress with SEP and IES in final phase   | Yes (in terms of numbers enrolled on PEF schemes)   | No: initial targets substantially reduced and long delays in implementation<br><br>Following restructuring of contract in 2019 on course to achieve revised targets   |

| Performance of main components of PESP2                |  |  |  |  |  |   |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|---|
| Evaluation criterion                                   | SBS  | TA   | Scholarships   | Special/ inclusive education   | PEF  | School infrastructure   |
| Effectiveness: transform-ational impact                | <p>By supporting progress towards Chief Minister's 2018 goals may have contributed to policy and organisational strengthening but difficult to establish this</p> <p>Failed to bring about significant improvements in PFM</p> <p>Unclear that led to increased spending on key priorities</p> | <p>Mixed picture but some significant examples of support to organisational strengthening, and development of new initiatives and policies</p> <p>Roadmap support critical to Chief Minister's vision and sector management approach</p> | <p>Support through PEEF made use of an effective programme (to whose earlier development DFID had contributed), but did not significantly strengthen the programme</p> <p>LUMS/NOP provided organisational strengthening to NOP centre but was not an effective pilot for testing approaches to improving access to higher education</p> | <p>Transformational impact depends on extent to which SEP and IES are effectively implemented</p> <p>The UK's continued emphasis on special and inclusive education, when this was not a government priority, may have contributed to subsequent increased focus from government</p> <p>Inclusive Voucher Scheme (IVS) provides model for inclusivity in PEF schools but has not been sufficiently resourced</p> | <p>Limited: supported expansion of existing PEF programmes, and initiation of IVS</p> <p>PESP2 TA has produced proposals for improving PEF's organisational effectiveness. However, progress in implementing these constrained by the lack of a clear government vision of PEF's future role, insufficient funding, and a lack of confidence in key proposals among current PEF management</p> | <p>Likely to be none, since Humqadam-School Construction and Rehabilitation Programme (SCRCP) failed to demonstrate successes in innovative approaches to school construction that are likely to be locally adopted</p> <p>PSCRCP and TCF elements effective for delivery but lack transformational potential</p> |
| Efficiency/ value for money (VFM) (cost effectiveness) | Questionable, given limited evidence that SBS contributed to achieving RAF targets, relative to size of spend  | Likely to be high, though initial implementation delays and weak performance of some support; TA arrangements generally ensured economy and efficiency   | High (especially for PEEF) based on value of transfer to beneficiaries<br>Issue for LUMS/NOP is large size of benefits to small number of recipients   | PIEP had few results relative to cost<br>TA support will have provided VFM if it leads to effective implementation of SEP and IES  | High in that PEF programmes funded were a highly cost effective way of expanding access  | Low for Humqadam (though with improved performance over final period of implementation)<br>Higher for PSCRCP and TCF.   |

| Performance of main components of PESP2 |  |   |   |   |  |   |
|---|--|---|---|---|--|---|
| Evaluation criterion                    | SBS  | TA  | Scholarships  | Special/ inclusive education  | PEF  | School infrastructure   |
| Efficiency: quality of management       | Not clear that target-setting process for RAF (and management through the Joint Results Framework) influenced results achieved | Some problems with quality of Technical Assistance Management Organisation (TAMO) management in early stages of programme but generally good<br><br>DFID contracting arrangements led to gap in provision (though timing over election period minimised disruption) | High by partner organisations<br><br>DFID could have strengthened monitoring and evaluation (M&E) to produce more robust assessment of impact | Weaknesses in management of PIEP<br><br>TA to SpED generally well-managed though some problems with TA for SEP (which were resolved)              | Provision of financial aid was effectively managed by DFID, and used and accounted for by PEF<br><br>PEF generally satisfied with provision of TA by service providers. Some reservations about quality of engagement in early support | Significant weaknesses in management by international contractor and DFID<br><br>Management performance improved after restructuring and establishment of PSCR and TCF components |
| Sustainability of results               | Varies for different reform initiatives supported through SBS  | Potentially high in some areas (Quaid-e-Azam Academy for Educational Development (QAED), IES) but affected by policy changes, e.g. Roadmap / Stocktake delivery model abandoned by new government, and potentially limited government ownership of some initiatives | PEEF model highly sustainable (and benefiting lives of recipients)<br><br>Long-term financing of LUMS/NOP remains unresolved                  | Government commitment to IES appears strong but not yet implemented<br><br>PEF has sustained IVS although no additional funding has been provided | UK support contributed to continued GoPb commitment to PEF but long-term role and secure financing (e.g. transferring funding of programmes to recurrent budget) has not been resolved   | Future maintenance may be a challenge for sustainability, especially for innovations implemented by IMC. PSCR and TCF use simpler and established models                          |

## Findings on PESP2's performance

### Relevance

The original design was based on a comprehensive vision of education reform, built on past experience and was strongly aligned with GoPb priorities and with other development partners. The abandonment of some initial elements of the design suggests these had not been firmly based on evidence. While the design emphasised the use of international TA as a way of ensuring quality, there were significant contracting delays and performance problems with both the TAMO and the TACE contractors, while the original design of the school infrastructure component was misconceived. The directing of funds through established and well-managed programmes (such as PEF and PEEF) meant that rapid results could be achieved providing direct benefits to programme participants. It is less clear that the programme was well designed to support structural and system changes. The change of government in 2018 posed significant challenges for the programme, but TA was effectively and flexibly used to support the priorities of the new government.

No full theory of change was ever articulated for the programme. Instead the logframe structure was treated as equivalent to a theory of change. The original structure of objectives in the logframe highlighted the importance of measures of system performance but defined these as outputs rather than outcomes which would have been more appropriate. The definition of key impact indicators related to economic performance and overall literacy rates was inappropriate since it was not plausible the programme could influence these over a relevant timescale. While the original design intention had been to define output indicators related to system performance, these were replaced during implementation with indicators related to the delivery of specific reforms or numbers of beneficiaries reached. While these were appropriate for activity management, there was insufficient tracking of key elements of system performance (such as the effectiveness of teaching). The weaknesses in the structure of objectives and lack of full articulation of a theory of change militated against effective strategic management of the programme.

PESP2 consistently emphasised gender and equity considerations, and many of the interventions (such as A3G, support to special and inclusive education, and PEEF scholarships for girls in priority districts) had a specific gender and equity focus, though these considerations were not systematically addressed in the design and implementation of all programme activities.

PESP2 was strongly aligned with (and helped shape) GoPb priorities up to 2018, and with the World Bank as the other main development actor in education in Punjab.

The programme design provided flexibility to adapt to changes in context through the annual planning of SBS and regular revisions to TA work plans, as well as reallocating resources between components and adjusting logframe targets through Annual Reviews. TA was used effectively to respond to the priorities of the new government in 2018 and to the impact of Covid-19. A formal mid-term review (e.g. in 2016) might have provided a useful opportunity for reflection on the main strategic issues for the programme.



## Effectiveness

Progress has been made in Punjab in improving access to education and learning outcomes and the programme provided effective support to GoPb in this process, as well as highlighting the importance of disability and inclusion and contributing to the development of the IES, as well as supporting progress in priority districts. However, weaknesses in the results framework for the programme limit the extent to which judgements can be made about the programme's contribution to education outcomes.

Support to PEF programmes and PEEF scholarships can be judged to have contributed directly to expanding access to education. The results of SBS are harder to determine because of the lack of evidence that this led to overall increases in spending on education or increases in the budgets of targeted organisations. TA has contributed to some important policy and organisational reforms that have transformational potential.

Management and governance arrangements have generally worked well to ensure effective implementation and to address problems encountered (with the exception of the slow initial progress in addressing problems with the infrastructure component). The TA providers played an important role in coordination. The record of innovative approaches has been mixed, with the extent to which pilot initiatives have led on to effective implementation strongly related to the extent of ownership.

The period up to 2018 was marked by a consistent GoPb policy direction, continuity in both GoPb leadership and the DFID team, and a favourable fiscal context. The period since 2018 has seen the new government developing its policy positions for education, severe fiscal pressures, high turnover in key leadership roles, and from 2020 the impact of Covid-19. The programme was able to respond to these challenges principally through the TA teams.

## Efficiency

The effectiveness of programme management during the period up to 2018 was facilitated by a stable DFID team and good relationships with SED. The change in government in 2018 presented a challenge (especially with the high rate of turnover of SED leadership) but DFID/FCDO has been able to respond to priorities of the new government including in relation to school infrastructure and response to the impact of COVID-19. While DFID's management of PESP2 provided considerable flexibility the lack of formalised involvement of GoPb in some programme management decisions (such as the selection of TA providers) militated against effective local ownership. Problems with the performance of contractors were encountered in relation to both TAMO and TACE. DFID responded effectively to the former but there were long delays until issues with the management of the school infrastructure component were satisfactorily resolved.

The programme was generally implemented in line with the planned budget and timetable except for the later than planned start to the provision of TA through TAMO, and long delays to the school infrastructure component. The programme has met its overall milestone objectives as set out in the logframe but these have been frequently modified and have paid insufficient attention to measuring system performance.

No comprehensive assessment of the VFM of the programme is possible. Spending on PEEF scholarships and PEF programmes was highly cost effective in reaching target beneficiaries. TA has generally been cost effective while that of SBS is questionable because of the difficulty



in establishing to what extent the provision of SBS contributed to the achievement of targets. The cost effectiveness of school infrastructure through Humqadam-SCRIP has been low, but VFM of the school infrastructure component improved substantially with the PRSCP and TCF components. However, the prioritisation of school infrastructure spending in the latter part of the programme does not appear consistent with international evidence about the most cost effective ways of improving learning outcomes, and the severe funding pressure faced by other parts of the education system at the time.

## **Sustainability**

Results achieved in expanding access to education through support to PEEF and PEF should yield sustainable results for the pupils benefiting, and school infrastructure constructed by PMIU and TCF should be sustainable while there are more challenges for the sustainability of infrastructure built under Humqadam-SCRIP. Strengthened policies and systems may be sustained for reforms to CPD, the IES and information flows from schools. Sustainability depends on continued GoPb commitment and prioritisation which is uncertain in some areas (e.g. for PEF, decentralisation model) and may be threatened by continuing fiscal pressure and the impact of Covid-19, which will have set back progress achieved in access, participation and learning.

The flexible provision of TA in the final phase of the programme has contributed to sustainability, but this largely depends on the extent to which transformational impact has occurred (which the programme could have targeted and measured more directly) and future political commitment.

PESP2 was developed in line with agreed GoPb priorities and has been responsive to changes in priorities including following the change of government in 2018, particularly through the responsive use of TA. Challenges to ownership reflected both factors internal to GoPb, and features of programme design and management – such that GoPb felt it had limited influence over some components and decisions. The programme had little structured engagement with civil society, reflecting the top-down accountability model within the education sector.

## **Impact**

Implementation problems with Humqadam-SCRIP had a negative reputational effect and contributed to DFID temporarily embargoing communications about DFID's education sector work. The Roadmap model was replicated in other sectors through the SMU.

## **Conclusions: the contribution of PESP2**

Over the period from the start of 2013 to the middle of 2018, DFID, through the PESP2 programme, built on a long track record of engagement in Punjab to support the Chief Minister's strong commitment to improving access to, and the quality of, education. The Roadmap and Stocktake process provided the main instrument for driving and monitoring improvements in the education system, and PESP2 played a central role in implementing this, including encouraging a stronger emphasis on learning outcomes. PESP2 provided a combination of SBS, direct financial support, and TA to support the achievement of targets set out (from 2015) in the Chief Minister's 2018 Education Goals (Figure 9). After the change of government following the July 2018 elections, which led to the abandonment of the Roadmap

model, DFID/FCDO worked with the new government (particularly through TA provision under PESP2) to help support its development of policies and initiatives in a period of fiscal stress, followed by the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic.

The overall design approach of the programme was appropriate to achieve its key initial objectives of supporting the achievement of increased enrolment in education, and provided valuable flexibility especially in relation to SBS and TA (which successfully supported many policy and organisational reform initiatives). Spending through established and effective programmes from PEF and PEEF provided cost effective ways to boost access and learning.

The programme was less well-designed to focus on and achieve systemic improvements. While the original logframe structure correctly emphasised the importance of tracking the performance of key elements of the education system (such as the effectiveness of teaching, and the quality of school governance), during implementation more emphasis was placed on tracking the implementation of specific reforms and high level results. Without the monitoring of results achieved in improving the delivery of key elements of learning, and in the absence of a fully articulated theory of change, it is difficult to trace the causal impact of support through PESP2. Better tracking of system performance and management against a fully articulated Theory of Change might have provided clearer guidance for strategic decisions for the programme – especially through a formal mid-term review.

PESP2's contribution was also constrained by some design and implementation weaknesses for specific components, including school infrastructure, which suffered from major delays and cost escalation, and SBS which was insufficiently well-integrated with the budget process, while also not succeeding in ensuring that weaknesses in PFM were addressed. Better integration would have required stronger alignment with the budget calendar and process, and with a medium term budget framework (the lack of which was one aspect of the PFM weakness).

The record of support to achieving transformational impact (e.g. organisational strengthening and improved policies and systems) varied across organisations and policy areas. The district delivery system developed under the Roadmap required substantial modification in the light of the changed approach to decentralisation favoured by the new government after 2018. Engagement with QAED was generally successful in supporting organisational reform and in piloting new approaches to CPD, including potentially transformational changes towards a much more flexible and cost-efficient CPD model. The programme supported development of the IES and SED during 2019, following earlier less successful initiatives on these issues. Less progress was made in strengthening the capacity of PEF, or improving the policy and financing arrangements under which it operated.

## **Lessons**

### **Lesson on the Roadmap and stocktake process**

1. The Roadmap and Stocktake process was an effective driver of education sector performance, at least in the specific context of Punjab and the Chief Minister's management style and strong commitment to education. Elements of this approach are likely to be widely applicable. This includes the strong focus on clearly defined and measurable targets, and programmes of action to support their attainment. However, the effectiveness of the approach was constrained by the absence of a broader sector policy

framework to guide priorities and choice of targets, and the weakness of PFM, and it is less clear that it was appropriate to achieve more complex policy objectives.

## **Lesson on SBS**

2. SBS needs to be strongly focused on PFM improvement and effectively aligned with the budget (both in its timing and the process for setting priorities) to have the best prospects of achieving impact.

## **Lessons for support to scholarship programmes**

3. There should be a clearer articulation of the objectives of scholarship programmes, and how these can be achieved (i.e. the theory of change), especially the wider social objectives beyond the direct benefits to those awarded scholarships.
4. Equity and inclusion objectives (including those related to gender and disability) should be explicitly incorporated into scholarship programme design.
5. Monitoring, evaluation, and learning should be built into the programme design from the start, and should be linked to building the capacity of partners in these functions. These functions should support a robust VFM framework.

## **Lesson from support to special and inclusive education**

6. The experience with DFID/FCDO's commitment to addressing special and inclusive education suggests that long-term sustained engagement and advocacy can ultimately yield progress even when an issue is not initially accorded a high priority by the partner government.

## **Lesson from support to PEF**

7. PEF's experience has continued to demonstrate the viability and effectiveness of well-managed and designed PPP arrangements in education, but also their vulnerability in the absence of a clear long-term government strategy and sustainable funding arrangements.

## **Lessons from support to school infrastructure**

8. Large-scale infrastructure programmes pose particular challenges and require particular skills for effective procurement and contract management by the agency commissioning them. This must be recognised and effectively addressed throughout the design and implementation process, including in the design of contract arrangements.
9. Effective accountability mechanisms (including active media scrutiny) are required to prompt awareness of stakeholder concerns and encourage remedial action. The more transparency there is in providing information about performance, and communicating stakeholder concerns, the greater are the incentives for problems to be addressed.
10. There can be important trade-offs between the objective of rapid delivery and a focus on encouraging innovation in construction. If innovation is agreed by stakeholders to be an important priority, the design of the programme should ensure that there is a well-designed

lesson-learning and piloting process that is subject to effective stakeholder review and expert scrutiny. If the priority is rapid results, using simple, tried and tested approaches may be best, even if these have acknowledged weaknesses.

## **Lessons for programme design and management**

11. Learning-focused support to education requires a focus on the performance of key functions (including the effectiveness of teaching, the environment for learning and the quality of school management and governance). An appropriate structure of objectives for education reforms should emphasise measures of the performance of these functions which should be reflected in the logframes of programmes providing development assistance to these reforms.
12. The articulation of a theory of change (informed by an appropriate conceptual framework), and programme management that is strongly informed by it, may encourage more rigorous attention to be given to key steps in the causal chain by which results are achieved, and hence may improve programme management. The conceptual framework used for the evaluation has proved to be a useful analytical tool for assessing education information and classifying education reform programmes and initiatives.
13. Initiatives that are justified as, and intended to be, pilots of new approaches need to have effective engagement and ownership from key stakeholders, and also need to be appropriately (and explicitly) designed and managed to maximise the likelihood of success.
14. Gender and equity considerations should be systematically addressed in all aspects of programme design and management.

## **Recommendations to the Government of Punjab**

The recommendations to GoPb originally made in IER1 remain valid, in that it should:

- 1) Develop an improved policy framework for the education sector that is evidence-based and sets out clearly defined medium-term objectives, and that articulates the actions and (in particular) public spending required to achieve these objectives.
- 2) Ensure a strong focus within this policy framework (and in other specific programme actions) on gender, equity, and inclusion to address continuing inequalities in education access and performance. This may include additional data collection and analysis to help improve policy, including on so far relatively neglected issues such as learner preparedness (e.g. the influence of health, nutrition, and the home and social environment on learning prospects).
- 3) An education evidence and information strategy framework should be developed. This strategy should ensure that all information held by government organisations is, so far as feasible, made available for independent analysis, and that a culture of using evidence systematically to inform government policy decisions is fostered. The strategy should emphasise continuing to strengthen information on education sector performance, especially the quality and coverage of information on learning, including to allow a more

detailed understanding of the influence of poverty and social factors on learning achievements.

- 4) Ensure that the quality of PFM for education is improved, in particular with a view to improving the rate of budget execution for the non-salary and development budget, and to ensuring the policy framework to guide spending decisions is clear. The main elements of a PFM reform process should include:
  - a) development and annual updating of a costed sector plan to provide directions to SED and other education sector organisations;
  - b) strengthening the budget process through budgeting based on strategic plans, the inclusion of budget demands from lower tiers, and the introduction of appropriate costing mechanisms and challenge functions at SED;
  - c) SED should also consider piloting school-based budgets in some districts, to allow for greater transparency and better financial management;
  - d) the FMC should be re-established in SED to continue the reforms on internal audit, the production of budget execution reports, and general improvements in PFM for education service delivery; and
  - e) SED and PMIU should play a stronger role in the oversight and coordination of donor-funded programmes, including reporting against a common government-led monitoring framework.

In addition, GoPb should:

- 5) Resolve outstanding issues relating to the role of PPPs in education, and the regulatory relationship with private education providers.
- 6) Ensure that teachers in both government and private schools have adequate subject knowledge, use appropriate teaching methods, and are effectively motivated and managed, and develop and track measures of teacher effectiveness.
- 7) Take forward effective implementation of the Inclusive Education Strategy, Special Education Policy, and Early Childhood Education Policy.
- 8) Resolve outstanding issues relating to the decentralisation of education sector management, with a strong emphasis on strengthening the management role and capacity, and effective local accountability, of schools and head teachers.
- 9) Build on initiatives (such as the ALP and Taleem Ghar) that have been developed in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, with a view to providing more effective online and offline teaching resources and options.
- 10) Ensure sufficient stability and effectiveness in the senior management of key sector organisations.

## Recommendations to FCDO

FCDO's future programmes are likely to be significantly smaller in financial terms than past support. In this context, it may be difficult to justify the direct financing of services (as with the funding of PEF programmes, the provision of SBS, and indeed contributions to ongoing scholarship programmes) with no clear system transformational impact. This also highlights the importance of having clear strategic objectives to guide intervention, based on a robust and fully articulated theory of change that identifies ways in which development assistance can best be used to support a more effective and inclusive learning-oriented education system. It should be recognised that this may involve difficult trade-offs. For example, funding of scholarship programmes may be straightforward to justify in terms of direct (transformational) impact on lives, while not in itself bringing about organisational or policy change.

The following approach is therefore recommended for future FCDO support to education:

- 1) Programmes should be developed around addressing well-defined problems and should be based on a fully articulated theory of change (specifying causal pathways and identifying critical assumptions, including those relating to ownership) that focuses where possible on using well-evidenced ways of supporting transformation through capacity development and policy reform. This theory of change should explicitly articulate the factors that affect the performance of key functions for an effective, learning-oriented education system, and be reflected in a structure of objectives (and logframe) that emphasises these.
- 2) Where evidence on what will work best is lacking and initiatives need to be developed and tested, research should be supported and pilot initiatives undertaken based on a rigorous design, and with a clearly specified pathway to scale-up and adoption that is agreed with key stakeholders.
- 3) Programmes should use TA that is managed through a clearly structured long-term agreement with GoPb and partner organisations that promotes local ownership and engagement but that also ensures an emphasis on agreed transformational objectives. They should have a strong M&E focus on tracking progress against these objectives, as well as on the effective delivery of specific TA outputs and the quality of relationships with partner organisations, while providing sufficient flexibility to adapt to changing needs, evidence, and context.
- 4) TA providers should be selected based on their proven ability to work effectively in the local context and to mobilise both high-quality (in both educational, technical, and 'soft' consultancy skills terms) international and local expertise, and to provide effective support both to policy development and implementation.
- 5) Targeted financial support should be made available to complement the TA provided in order to: (i) fund research and pilot initiatives where appropriate; (ii) selectively provide resources where these can be used to achieve high development impact, especially in conjunction with transformational reforms; and (iii) to help resolve key delivery bottlenecks for improving organisational and system performance. This may in principle be delivered through the government budget or in parallel to it, depending on the specific context and problem being addressed. Funding may also be provided to NGOs and CSOs where there is a clear strategic rationale for this in relation to the theory of change governing the intervention.



- 6) The programme should have a strong emphasis on improving access to, and the use and sharing of, information, including a focus on the use of information by parents and communities, as well as for school management, and on building knowledge through research and communication (for instance through providing funding for research, with clear governance arrangements to ensure what is funded is responsive to both government and civil society needs).
- 7) The programme should be actively managed by FCDO with a view to developing and implementing a joint vision with government and other stakeholders for key elements of the education sector, and to take account of both opportunities and challenges, including those posed by political change.
- 8) The technical focus of support should take account of both international experience and local evidence on what is likely to be effective, as well as taking forward selected promising initiatives from previous support. This is likely to include the following:
  - a) a strong focus on gender, equity, and inclusion, both in the specific choice of areas of action and in the way that activities are designed and managed;
  - b) supporting and improving the effectiveness of teachers through an emphasis on improved classroom practice, with appropriate supportive tools, strengthened accountability for performance, and incentives linked to evidence of teaching effectiveness;
  - c) strengthening school-level management and governance, including for the planning and use of financial and staff resources;
  - d) supporting community and parental engagement – in particular through sharing information about school performance and learning effectiveness; and
  - e) building on the successes of PPPs in education (for instance through PEF) to establish sustainably financed and managed models that ensure effective regulation where this is appropriate.

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## List of abbreviations

|      |   |
|------|---|
| 6MA  | DFID Six-Monthly Assessment Survey                      |
| ADP  | Annual Development Plan                                 |
| AEO  | Assistant Education Officer                             |
| ALP  | Accelerated Learning Platform                           |
| APF  | Assessment Policy Framework                             |
| ASC  | Annual School Census                                    |
| ASI  | Adam Smith International                                |
| ASER | Annual Status of Education Report                       |
| ATF  | Access to finance                                       |
| A3G  | Advancing Action for Adolescent Girls (Siyani Sahelian) |
| CARE | Covid-19 Accelerated Response for Education             |
| CCSI | Community Committees for School Infrastructure          |
| CDPR | Consortium for Development Policy Research              |
| CEF  | Comprehensive Evaluation Framework                      |
| CEO  | Chief Education Officer                                 |
| CIDA | Canadian International Development Agency               |
| CPD  | Continuous professional development                     |
| CSO  | Civil society organisation                              |
| DAC  | Development Assistance Committee                        |
| DDEO | Deputy District Education Officer                       |
| DEA  | District Education Authority                            |
| DEMS | District Education Management Study                     |
| DEO  | District Education Officer                              |
| DFID | UK Department for International Development             |
| DLI  | Disbursement-linked indicator                           |
| DQA  | Data quality assessment                                 |
| DRC  | District Review Committee                               |

|       |  |
|-------|--|
| DSD   | Directorate of Staff Development                   |
| DTE   | District Teacher Educator                          |
| ECE   | Early childhood education                          |
| EFO   | Externally financed output                         |
| EMIS  | Education management information system            |
| EPRR  | Education Policy Reform Review                     |
| EQ    | Evaluation question                                |
| ESP   | Education Sector Plan                              |
| EVS   | Education Voucher Scheme                           |
| FAS   | Foundation-assisted schools                        |
| FCDO  | UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office    |
| FMC   | Financial Management Cell                          |
| FY    | Fiscal year  |
| GER   | Gross enrolment ratio                              |
| GoPb  | Government of Punjab                               |
| IASP  | Insaf Afternoon School Programme                   |
| ICF   | International Climate Fund                         |
| IDEAS | Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives |
| IER1  | First Interim Evaluation Report                    |
| IER2  | Second Interim Evaluation Report                   |
| IES   | Inclusive Education Strategy                       |
| ITA   | Idara-e-Taleem-o-Aagahi                            |
| ITSP  | Innovative Teacher Support Package                 |
| IVS   | Inclusive Voucher Scheme                           |
| KII   | Key informant interview                            |
| KPK   | Khyber Pakhtunkhwa                                 |
| KPSP  | Khadim-e-Punjab Schools Programme                  |
| LND   | Literacy and Numeracy Drive                        |

|       |  |
|-------|--|
| LUMS  | Lahore University of Management Sciences                   |
| M&E   | Monitoring and evaluation                                  |
| MEA   | Monitoring and Evaluation Assistants                       |
| MICS  | Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey                          |
| NER   | Net enrolment ratio  |
| NGO   | Non-governmental organisation                              |
| NOP   | National Outreach Programme                                |
| NSB   | Non-salary budget  |
| NSP   | New Schools Programme                                      |
| OECD  | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development     |
| OOSC  | Out-of-school children                                     |
| OPM   | Oxford Policy Management                                   |
| PASL  | Provincial Assessment of Students' Learning                |
| PBS   | Pakistan Bureau of Statistics                              |
| PCR   | Project Completion Report                                  |
| PCTB  | Punjab Curriculum and Textbook Board                       |
| PEC   | Punjab Examination Commission                              |
| PEEF  | Punjab Educational Endowment Fund                          |
| PEF   | Punjab Education Foundation                                |
| PEIMA | Punjab Education Initiatives Management Authority          |
| PERR  | Punjab Education Reform Roadmap                            |
| PESP1 | Punjab Education Sector Project 1 (World Bank, DFID, CIDA) |
| PESP2 | Punjab Education Sector Programme, Phase 2 (DFID/FCDO)     |
| PESP3 | Punjab Education Sector Project 3 (World Bank)             |
| PESRP | Punjab Education Sector Reforms Programme                  |
| PFER  | Public Finance for Education Review                        |
| PFC   | Punjab Finance Commission                                  |
| PFM   | Public finance management                                  |



|        |  |
|--------|--|
| PIEP   | Punjab Inclusive Education Programme                           |
| PIP    | Performance Improvement Plan                                   |
| PISA-D | Programme for International Student Assessment for Development |
| PITB   | Punjab Information Technology Board                            |
| PIU    | Project Implementation Unit                                    |
| PKR    | Pakistani rupees   |
| PLGA   | Punjab Local Government Act                                    |
| PMIU   | Programme Monitoring and Implementation Unit                   |
| PML-N  | Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)                                 |
| PMS    | Performance Management System                                  |
| PPP    | Public–private partnership                                     |
| PSC    | Private School Census  |
| PSCR   | Punjab School Construction and Rehabilitation Programme        |
| PSES   | Punjab School Education Survey (Nielsen Survey)                |
| PSLM   | Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey        |
| PSSP   | Public School Support Programme                                |
| PSU    | Primary Sampling Unit  |
| PTI    | Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf                                       |
| QAED   | Quaid-e-Azam Academy for Educational Development               |
| RAF    | Results Area Framework   |
| RESP   | Review of Education Sector Performance                         |
| SBA    | School-based assessment  |
| SBS    | Sector Budget Support  |
| SCR    | School Construction and Rehabilitation Programme               |
| SD     | Service delivery   |
| SED    | School Education Department                                    |
| SEND   | Special educational needs and disabilities                     |
| SEP    | Special Education Policy                                       |

|        |  |
|--------|--|
| SIF    | School Improvement Framework                                 |
| SMC    | School Management Committee                                  |
| SMU    | Special Monitoring Unit                                      |
| SOPs   | Standard operating procedures                                |
| SpED   | Special Education Department                                 |
| SSU    | Secondary Sampling Unit                                      |
| STEM   | Science, technology, engineering and mathematics             |
| STR    | Student–teacher ratio  |
| STRIDE | Sustainable Transition and Retention in Delivering Education |
| TA     | Technical assistance   |
| TACE   | Technical Assistance for Construction and Engineering        |
| TAMO   | Technical Assistance Management Organisation                 |
| TCF    | The Citizens Foundation                                      |
| TEACH  | Teaching Effectively All Children                            |
| TEP    | Transforming Education in Pakistan                           |
| TPV    | Third Party Verification                                     |
| VFM    | Value for money  |

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Purpose and objectives of the evaluation

The objectives of the Performance Evaluation of Phase 2 of the Punjab Education Sector Programme (PESP2), as set out in the terms of reference, are:

1. to assess what progress has been made in improving education in Punjab over the period of the PESP2 programme (with a particular focus on gender, disability, social exclusion, and poverty), and what factors explain the performance observed;
2. to identify, measure (where possible), and explain the contributions that the PESP2 programme has made to the progress achieved, including the contributions of the PESP2 components, individually and collectively;
3. to identify lessons for future programmes and for enhanced improvements in Punjab's education system performance; and
4. to provide interim reports that may assist in course corrections during the remainder of programme implementation, as well as to inform the Final Evaluation Report.

This is the Final Evaluation Report for the Performance Evaluation and addresses the first three objectives, with a view to providing an overall assessment of progress in Punjab's education system, the contribution of PESP2 towards achieving this, over the period since PESP2 began in January 2013, and to identify lessons for education reform (and donor support to it), that are of relevance both for Pakistan and internationally. This report draws on a large number of evaluation studies conducted since August 2017 (see Annex C), including two interim evaluation reports (IER1 and IER2), produced in 2018 and 2019, respectively, which provided recommendations aimed at strengthening programme implementation.

## 1.2 Target audience and stakeholders for the evaluation

The target audience for this evaluation comprises the following stakeholder groups:

- education officials and policymakers in Punjab, and elsewhere in Pakistan;
- civil society organisations (CSOs), especially those focusing on education and promoting social and economic inclusion (for instance for women, the disabled, and the poor);
- academics and researchers working on the education sector in Punjab, the rest of Pakistan, and internationally;
- the wider general public in Punjab, including as parents, pupils, educators, concerned citizens, and tax payers;
- FCDO, to help inform the UK's future engagement in supporting the improved effectiveness of education systems (in Punjab, the rest of Pakistan, and internationally);
- the UK Parliament, and UK taxpayers and citizens concerned with understanding the effectiveness of UK's development programmes; and
- other international development and donor agencies engaged in supporting education system reform.

A Use and Influence Plan for the evaluation is included in Annex D.

### 1.3 Scope of the evaluation

Two levels of EQs were defined for the Performance Evaluation:

**Level One EQs** relate to the performance of the education system in Punjab over the period of the PESP2 programme; the policy and organisational reforms undertaken; and the factors that have determined this performance, including public finance for education.

**Level Two EQs** relate to assessing the contribution of the components of PESP2 (individually and collectively) to the performance of the education system. All components of PESP2 have been covered by the evaluation.

The full set of EQs that have guided the evaluation is set out in Box 1 (Level One EQs), Box 2 and **Box 3** (Level Two EQs).

The scope of the evaluation covers all of the components of the PESP2 programme (as set out in Chapter 2) and covers the whole period of implementation (up to January 2021).

### 1.4 Evaluation timing and process

The Performance Evaluation began in August 2017. The Inception Report was completed in January 2018. IER1 was completed in December 2018. IER2 was completed in November 2019. A draft of this Final Evaluation Report was submitted to FCDO in December 2020 and a (remote) presentation of draft findings and recommendations to stakeholders was made on 11 February 2021.

As described in Section 4.4, the main evidence to answer the Level One EQs was obtained through studies of available data on education sector performance (the RESP), studies on policy and organisational reform (the EPRR), and analysis of public finance for education (the PFER). As shown in Table 1, each of these studies was initially carried out to inform IER1, and they have been updated annually in each subsequent phase of the evaluation. In addition, the District Study involved primary data collection to assess the extent to which education reforms were influencing district education management and schools, as well as to understand how the education system was perceived at the community level.

**Table 1: Timing of studies of main PESP2 components (Level One EQs)**

| Components      | IER1 (2017/18) | IER2 (2018/19) | Final (2019/20) | Supplementary (2020/21) |
|-----------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| RESP            | X              | X              | X               | X                       |
| EPRR            | X              | X              | X               | X                       |
| PFER            | X              | X              | X               | X                       |
| District Study: |                |                |                 |                         |
| DEMS            |                | X              |                 |                         |
| Community Study |                |                | X               |                         |
| School Survey   |                |                | X               |                         |

Evaluation studies have also been carried out covering the main components of PESP2 (see Section 4.5), to contribute to addressing the Level Two EQs. Table 2 summarises the timing

of the main evaluation studies.<sup>2</sup> In addition to studies focused on specific components, a review of PESP2 programme design and management issues has also been carried out as part of the final evaluation phase.

**Table 2: Timing of studies of main PESP2 components (Level Two EQs)**

| Components                                    | IER1 (2017/18) | IER2 (2018/19) | Final (2019/20) | Supplementary (2020/21) |
|---|----------------|----------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| RA  | X              |                | X               | X                       |
| Support to Roadmap and Stocktake              | X              |                |                 |                         |
| SBS   | X              |                |                 |                         |
| School infrastructure                         |                |                | X               | X                       |
| Scholarship programmes                        |                | X              |                 |                         |
| Special and inclusive education               |                |                | X               |                         |
| Punjab Education Foundation                   |                |                | X               |                         |
| Programme Design and Management Review (PDMR) |                |                | X               |                         |

The selection of the first round of evaluation studies was informed by DFID's interest in evaluating the performance of TA and SBS as part of the first phase of the evaluation. The study on school infrastructure was delayed to the final phase because of implementation difficulties encountered by the component, so that the evaluation could assess how far these had been resolved. The study on support to PEF was also delayed till the final phase because of uncertainties about government policy towards PEF.

The completion of the first phase of the evaluation (IER1), as well as the ending of the main TA contract (with Adam Smith International (ASI)) coincided with a change of government following provincial elections in July 2018. IER1 was therefore able to provide recommendations for the follow-on TA contract and to guide DFID's engagement with the new political government in Punjab, as well as recommendations to the new government. IER2 covered the first year of the new government and provided recommendations to DFID related to its effective engagement. Each of the component evaluation studies also produced recommendations. A consolidated list of recommendations produced over the whole course of the evaluation is included in Annex E.

## 1.5 Report structure

The remainder of this report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 describes the context of implementation including the main political developments in Punjab over the period of the programme, the organisational arrangements for the education sector, and development

<sup>2</sup> More details are provided in Annex C.

cooperation. Chapter 3 summarises the programme, including its initial design, subsequent developments in implementation, the allocation of programme expenditure and the theory of change. Chapter 4 presents the evaluation methodology. Chapter 5 provides evidence on the performance of the education system in Punjab over the period of PESP2. Chapter 6 examines education policy and sector management arrangements, and Chapter 7 progress with education reform initiatives. Chapter 8 reviews public private partnerships and the performance of the Punjab Education Foundation (PEF). Chapter 9 analyses public finance for education. Chapter 10 presents an assessment of the performance of the components of PESP2, and Chapter 11 the evaluation findings in relation to the performance and contribution of PESP2. Chapter 12 presents conclusions in the form of overall assessments of progress in the education sector in Punjab and PESP2. Finally, chapter 13 provides lessons and recommendations.

Additional material is included in the annexes. Annex A contains the terms of reference for the evaluation. Annex B presents the summary evaluation framework. Annex C lists the evaluation studies that provide the evidence base. Annex D sets out the Use and Influence Plan for the evaluation, including the communications events and products generated so far. Annex E lists the recommendations produced over the whole of the evaluation. Annex F summarises the main secondary data sources used for the RESP and the findings of the DQA of these sources. Annex G presents the analysis of trends in public expenditure for education, based on the three rounds of the EPRR. Annex H contains the summary of the evaluation of support to the Roadmap and Stocktake process, Annex I presents the summary of the evaluation of the use of SBS under the programme, and Annex J provides the summary of the evaluation of TA provided through TAMO (all from IER1). Annex K summarises the findings of the evaluation of support to the PEEF intermediate scholarship scheme, and Annex L, support to the LUMS/NOP scholarship scheme. Annex M summarises the evaluation of support to special and inclusive education, Annex N support to PEF, and Annex O support to school infrastructure. Annex P summarises the evaluation of TA provided by Cambridge Education, and Annex Q provides the evaluation of TA provided by I-SAPS. The findings of the District Study are contained in Annex R (DEMS), Annex S (School Survey), and Annex T (Community Study). Annex U provides the conclusions of the evaluation<sup>3</sup> of the Siyani Sahelian (A3G) programme in South Punjab. Annex V provides information on World Bank studies funded by PESP2. Annex W contains the PDMR.

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<sup>3</sup> This evaluation (OPERA, 2020) was directly commissioned by DFID and conducted independently of this PESP2 Performance Evaluation.

## 2 Education in Punjab: the context for implementation

### 2.1 Political context for education in Punjab

The Business Case for PESP2 (DFID, 2012, p.10) noted that:

“Pakistan had declared an education emergency in 2011. Only 88% of the country’s children enter school on time, while half of those drop out before finishing primary school. Nearly a quarter of children aged between seven and sixteen have no education at all. Many children who are in school fail to learn, with almost two thirds of rural schoolchildren unable to read a story.”

Punjab, as Pakistan’s largest province with 56% of the national population, was estimated to have approximately six million children between six and sixteen out of school. It had also achieved significant recent progress, for instance increasing the Net Enrolment Ratio (NER) from 62% to 70% between 2006/7 and 2010/11.<sup>4</sup> DFID had provided support, together with the World Bank and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) through the Punjab Education Sector Project 1 (PESP1) between 2009 and 2012.

While progress in education in Punjab had occurred under successive governments, the devolution of greater powers to provinces under the 18th Amendment to Pakistan’s constitution in 2010, and the establishment of the Punjab Education Reform Roadmap (PERR) in January 2011, was seen by DFID as providing a particularly positive political context for support. The Chief Minister (Shahbaz Sharif, who held the post from 2008 to 2018) had worked closely with DFID’s Special Representative for Education in Pakistan, Sir Michael Barber, in developing the PERR and a process of Stocktakes that involved the monitored the achievement of delivery targets for the sector.

The reform process up to 2018 was strongly influenced by the governance style of the Chief Minister of Punjab, and his strong commitment to achieving education sector goals. A set of governance structures outside the traditional bureaucratic structures were created with the intent of fast-tracking the reform process. In the education sector this included the Roadmap structure and associated bodies, including the Special Monitoring Unit (SMU) and PMIU. This process of centralised decision-making and focus on delivery enabled Punjab to push through significant reform packages fairly quickly, without encountering much resistance from potentially threatened interest groups. For instance, unions were not a force generating resistance even for policies where they perceived a threat to their power and interests.

The 18th Amendment was accompanied by a National Finance Commission award that increased the proportion of total revenues received by the provinces, effectively expanding fiscal space considerably and allowing greater allocations and spending on education. Perceived and real inter-provincial political competition after the 18th Amendment to the Constitution devolved responsibilities for educational policy and planning to the provinces has provided some spur to improved performance. Where each province is run by a different political party, the quality and performance on social service delivery has been a point of political competition.

During this period, the focus of the attention of public discourse on education policies and reforms strengthened to historically unprecedented levels. This was reflected in debate on

<sup>4</sup> Data from the Pakistan Living Standards Monitoring Survey, DFID (2012) p.11



constitutional commitments to education (Article 25-A) and also international commitments (the Sustainable Development Goals, the Millennium Development Goals, universal primary education commitments). Education policy debates and reform choices in Punjab were also increasingly informed by consideration of international experience and practice.

The previously ruling party, PML-N, lost power in the provincial elections held in July 2018, to a government led by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, with Sardar Usman Buzdar assuming office as Chief Minister in August 2018. While as discussed below (Chapter 6), education has remained a high priority for GoPb over the whole period, the change of leadership in 2018 has seen some shifts in priorities in the sector, and significant changes in the approach to education sector management, as well as the effects of a severe fiscal crisis from 2018 that was inherited by the new government, and then the impact of Covid-19 during 2020.<sup>5</sup>

## **2.2 Organisational structure for education**

### **2.2.1 Provincial level**

There have been few major changes at provincial level to the organisational structure for education (up to higher secondary level) in Punjab over the period of PESP2. The School Education Department (SED) has responsibility for legislation, policy formulation and planning for primary, elementary, secondary and higher secondary education, and to ensure the provision of compulsory and free education to all of age 5-16 years. SED also has responsibility for maintaining standards through formulating the curriculum and syllabus and the production and publication of text books. It seeks to assure the quality of education through the assessment and examination system. Its other main responsibilities include monitoring and evaluation, staff development (through pre-service and in-service teachers training and continuous professional development - CPD). SED oversees the provision of scholarships, regulatory policy concerning private sector schools, and public-private partnerships (PPPs) in education. SED has not been restructured, but has remained the main focus for the planning and implementation of sector reforms over the whole period (with implementation of programmes managed through PMIU), although some aspects of practice and monitoring were removed from SED and have instead been brought under direct control of the Chief Minister's office.

The performance of SED functions is delegated to statutory bodies including the Punjab Textbook and Curriculum Board (PTCB), the Punjab Examination Commission (PEC), and the Quaid-E-Azam Academy for Educational Development (QAED) – until 2017 the Directorate of Staff Development (DSD). PPPs in education are managed through the programmes of the Punjab Education Foundation (PEF), though in 2018 responsibility for one of these programmes, the Public School Support Programme (PSSP) was transferred to a new body, the Punjab Education Initiatives Management Authority (PEIMA). The Programme Monitoring and Implementation Unit (PMIU) of SED has responsibility for overseeing the management and implementation of education reforms as well as supervising the monitoring of schools

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<sup>5</sup> Educational institutions across the country, including the province of Punjab, were closed on 13 March 2020, a little over two weeks after the first case of Covid-19 was confirmed in Pakistan. Emerging evidence on the likely impact of Covid-19 on education and the achievement of programme objectives is discussed in Section 5.11. The main elements of the government response to the impact of Covid-19 are reviewed in Section 6.3, and the role of PESP2 TA support this response is assessed in Annex Q, Section Q.3.



(including implementing the Annual School Census - ASC), and serves as the project implementation unit for World Bank education support.

The Special Education Department (SpED) has had responsibility for meeting the needs of children with disabilities principally through managing its own network of schools. As discussed below (section 10.7) the Inclusive Education Strategy developed in 2019 made progress towards clarifying the responsibility of SED for meeting the needs of children with mild and moderate disabilities.

### **2.2.2 Decentralisation**

While provincial level management arrangements for education have not changed over the period of PESP2, there have been important reforms at local government level. The Punjab Local Government Act (PLGA) 2013 (enacted to meet the requirements of a Supreme Court decision directing provincial governments to institute local self-government<sup>6</sup>) established District Education Authorities (DEAs) as autonomous bodies at the district level (not reporting to local government), with the intent of transferring certain functions of management to the district level. DEAs were intended to replace district-level education departments and to have more authority over finance and delivery (including the recruitment and management of teachers). The establishment of DEAs began from 2015. In addition, a direct financing mechanism for schools was established – the Non Salary Budget (NSB). The NSB was introduced in nine districts in 2014 (and scaled up to all districts in 2016) to replace School Management Committee Funds, and involved a direct (formula-based) transfer to a school bank account with greater discretion granted to schools over the use of the funds.<sup>7</sup>

The new government elected in 2018 has a significantly different vision for decentralisation, reflected in the PLGA 2019. This creates urban and rural governance units smaller than the district level. The idea is to create more autonomous governable units, and to make the overall governance system more coherent and efficient by reducing overlap in responsibilities. The new governance system is also proposing a greater role for communities through the creation of village councils in rural areas, and neighbourhood councils in urban areas. It is envisaged that the management of education will be devolved to tehsils (in rural areas) and municipalities (in urban areas), removing the district level of management. However, the way in which this will be implemented, and the implications for the current DEA structure, remain to be resolved.

## **2.3 Development cooperation in education**

Over the period of PESP2, development support to education in Punjab has mainly been provided by the UK, through the grant funding of PESP2, and by the World Bank, through its (loan-funded) Punjab education sector projects, which have provided budget support against Disbursement Linked Indicators (DLIs), as well as TA that has been provided through PMIU. Initially, the PESP2 SBS was aligned with World Bank DLIs, but after 2015, the PESP2 SBS was provided against a separate RAF, though this was designed to be aligned with and complementary to World Bank support. PESP2 has also provided funding for World Bank-managed research products (see Annex V). Coordination of World Bank and PESP2 TA was facilitated during the second phase of PESP2 TA (October 2018 to March 2020) by the fact that both were being managed by the same contractor, Cambridge Education.

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<sup>6</sup> See Islam and Khan (2018).

<sup>7</sup> See Bari, Malik and Nadeem (2018).

## 3 The PESP2 programme

### 3.1 Main features of programme design<sup>8</sup>

The original design of PESP2, as set out in the November 2012 Business Case (DFID, 2012), built on previous UK support (the first stage of the Punjab Education Support Programme, and support to the Chief Minister's Education Reform Road Map) and aimed to reform and transform delivery of education in Punjab:

'In addition to working through government to ensure every child in Punjab has access to a good quality education, PESP 2 will focus on eleven districts identified as low performing compared with the rest of the province. Through a range of innovative interventions with the government, private sector and civil society organisations (CSOs), the programme will deliver equitable access to better quality education across the whole province.'

The programme planned to provide up to £350.3 million over six years between 2012/13 and 2017/18, and was based around seven components:

1. SBS, to provide funds to GoPb to improve access to education and improve its quality in public schools. This was envisaged as being aligned with World Bank budget support, and it was envisaged that 'tranche releases will be subject to evidence of satisfactory progress made by government on a range of agreed indicators, including tackling binding constraints to systemic reform'.
2. A school infrastructure component, to upgrade facilities in existing public schools, to ensure they are fit for purpose. This was envisaged as operating through school councils, as this was expected to both reduce costs and increase quality, and it was envisaged as being managed through a contracted TA provider, since funding infrastructure through SBS was regarded as a 'blunt targeting tool with high corruption risks'.
3. Developing the low-cost private schools sector through expanding the capacity of PEF by funding its main programmes.
4. Piloting a credit guarantee scheme through an ATF component, focused on expanding low-cost private sector schools in under-served areas through participation in PEF's New Schools Programme (NSP).
5. The provision of targeted support through CSOs to tackle social exclusion and inequity in eleven priority low-performing districts.<sup>9</sup>
6. A scholarship programme, with funding provided through the support to PEEF, to provide scholarships for talented female secondary school students from poor households in the eleven priority districts to study at intermediate level; and for male and female students at intermediate level to study at tertiary level, and the LUMS/NOP, a scholarship programme for talented students from disadvantaged households to study at a leading university.

<sup>8</sup> More details are provided in Annex section W.2.

<sup>9</sup> The 11 priority districts (which have been maintained throughout implementation) are Chiniot, Bhakkar, Layyah, Vehari, Muzafargarh, Dera Ghazi Khan, Lodhran, Rajanpur, Bahawalpur, Bahawalnagar, and Rahim Yar Khan.


7. TA, to ‘underpin delivery of the other six components’.

The programme was designed in conjunction with, and was intended to be complementary to, World Bank support, with which it shared a common results framework. It was also designed to be implemented along with DFID’s Transforming Education in Pakistan (TEP) programme, which sought to ‘use political influence to increase the chances of a young boy or girl in Pakistan attending and staying in school and learning more’ including through the Alif Ailaan campaign<sup>10</sup>; and the Education Innovation and Voice and Accountability Fund (Ilm Ideas, and its successor Ilm Ideas 2), which focused on encouraging innovative solutions, principally from the private sector.

### 3.2 The PESP2 theory of change and structure of objectives

The PESP2 Business Case did not set out a fully developed theory of change, but rather presented a diagram (Figure 4) labelled ‘Overview of programmes under consideration for PESP 2’, which was a summary presentation of the (original) logframe.

**Figure 4: PESP2 theory of change (from Business Case)**



During implementation some changes were made to the definition of Outputs as shown in Figure 52 (see Annex section W.2.3). The revised listing of Outputs was:

<sup>10</sup> Alif Ailaan sought to increase awareness of education in Pakistan through running campaigns in print, on radio and television, and on social media, as well as conducting seminars and surveys, publishing a district education rankings report, and monitoring the performance of parliamentarians in reforming education in their constituencies. Alif Ailaan was established as an NGO in Pakistan in 2013 but ceased operating after the end of DFID funding in 2018.

1. Strong leadership and accountability;
2. Better teaching performance and better teaching;
3. High quality school infrastructure;
4. Improved access to schools, especially in priority districts;
5. Top political leadership engaged on education reform in Punjab;
6. High quality technical assistance to government stakeholders that builds sustainable processes and systems.

### **3.3 Main developments in implementation**

The main developments in the programme over the period of implementation have been the following:

1. The allocation of funding was increased to £426.5 million, mainly through an increase in SBS (see section 3.5.1).
2. The ATF component (Component 4) was not taken forward, following a study that concluded that the evidence in favour of the viability of a credit guarantee model to overcome start-up costs for private schools was not strong, and that a high default rate for start-up schools would limit scalability.
3. After an initial initiative working with CSOs to establish schools under the NSP it was decided from 2016/17 to channel the resources identified under Component 5 directly to PEF, to support PEF programmes, with enrolment targets being set for the eleven priority districts as a whole.
4. TA (see section 3.5.4) was initially supplied through TAMO, comprising ASI and McKinsey, providing support to GoPb, the Chief Minister's Education Roadmap process, and other partners in the PESP2 programme. US\$ 1 million was also provided through the World Bank for TA to support early implementation of the World Bank's PESP3 programme. Following completion of the ASI contract to supply TA in March 2018, and the McKinsey contract supporting the Roadmap in December 2018, Cambridge Education (in association with Delivery Associates) took over as TA supplier from October 2018 to March 2020. A further TA contract was issued in July 2020 to I-SAPS to cover the period to March 2021.
5. Following major problems in the implementation of the school infrastructure component and following a review in 2018, the component was restructured as described in section 3.5.2. The period of implementation of PESP2 has been extended to July 2021 for the school infrastructure component.
6. A component focused on support to special and inclusive education was developed and piloted through the Punjab Inclusive Education Programme (PIEP).<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Separate funding following on from PIEP (which was funded using SBS) was not taken forward (so no expenditure against this component is shown in Figure 5). Funding was provided to PEF for the Inclusive Voucher Scheme (IVS), while support to the SED was funded under SBS and through TA.


7. The Performance Evaluation implemented through a consortium of Oxford Policy Management (OPM), the Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives (IDEAS), and the Consortium for Development Policy Research (CDPR), began in August 2017. It was originally planned to be completed by March 2020, but this was revised to March 2021 so that supplementary evaluation studies could be carried out of the components whose implementation had been extended (principally TA and school infrastructure).
8. A grant was provided, administered by the World Bank, for externally financed outputs (EFOs), whose 'objective is to deepen sector knowledge and to provide technical support to the School Education Department in strengthening the design, implementation and evaluations of key sector reform'.<sup>12</sup>
9. The Advancing Action for Adolescent Girls (A3G) (Siyani Sahelian) programme was started, focusing on 20,000 adolescent girls (who have either dropped out of school with little or no learning, or who never enrolled in school) in three of the lowest-performing districts of South Punjab (see section 3.5.6). This was provided through an accountable grant provided to the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Idara-e-Taleem o Aagahi (ITA). This component has been extended to June 2021 to cover the period up to Grade 9/10 examinations (which were delayed as a result of Covid-19).
10. In addition, funds were provided to ITA for the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER), after the end of the TEP, which had previously funded this.

### **3.4 Allocation of programme spending**

Total programme spending over the lifetime of the programme up to July 2021 is expected to be £426.3 million (see Table 41). The shares of spending between the main components are shown in Figure 5. SBS has accounted for 40% of programme spending, school infrastructure 25%, financial support to PEF 20%, TA 8%, and scholarships 5%.

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<sup>12</sup> This funded a series of studies complementary to the World Bank's Punjab education sector projects. Details of these studies are included in Annex V. This component has not formed part of the evaluation, though the evaluation has drawn on some of the studies produced.

**Figure 5: Shares and value of spending on PESP2 components (£ million)<sup>13</sup>**

## 3.5 Programme components

### 3.5.1 SBS

SBS provided funds to GoPb to improve access to, and the quality of, education in government schools, with a total budget of £170.2 million – this includes an additional £70 million allocated in April 2015 to support the Chief Minister’s 2018 education goals. Up to 2015, disbursement was aligned with the World Bank’s disbursement-linked indicators (DLIs) for its loan-funded support to education. From 2015, disbursement was made against a separate RAF, which was also aligned with the World Bank DLIs. The final disbursement of SBS was made in 2018. The RAF was structured around ‘key results’ defined in the Roadmap goals, noting the government body responsible for each results area, and setting targets each year, against the achievement of which funds were released to GoPb.

### 3.5.2 Support to school infrastructure

Support to school infrastructure under PESP2 originally consisted of the SCRP, also known as the Humqadam-SCRP project, which was implemented in Punjab province by IMC Worldwide (contracted to provide the Technical Assistance for Construction and Engineering - TACE), with an original budget of £104 million. Subsequently (following a programme review in 2018), there was a reallocation of £35 million of the school infrastructure funding to be managed directly by GoPb through PMIU, called the PSCR; a further component of £4.7

<sup>13</sup> “Evaluation and Research” includes expenditure on the Performance Evaluation, the World Bank EFOs, and ASER.



million implemented by TCF (for classroom construction in government schools being managed by the private sector under PSSP). In addition, £5 million of school infrastructure expenditure was allocated to the DFID International Climate Fund (ICF) on the basis of estimated carbon savings from the use of Chinese brick bond technology in construction by IMC.<sup>14</sup>

The support includes the construction of additional classrooms in schools; the provision of missing facilities, such as toilets, drinking water, and boundary walls; the rehabilitation of 'dangerous schools';<sup>15</sup> the rehabilitation and revitalisation of science and IT labs; and the upgrading of model schools.<sup>16</sup> The targets for infrastructure support have been revised over the passage of implementation. For Humqadam-SCRP, it has reduced from an overall construction of 23,000 classrooms and provision of missing facilities in 3,315 schools, to 4,508 classrooms and 1,989 toilets. For PSCRP, the scope includes constructing 2,000 classrooms and 110 model schools and the rehabilitation and revitalization (R&R) of 1000 science labs, 1000 IT labs, and 400 libraries; and, resumption of TCF component in September 2020 with a scope of 600 classrooms, 100 toilets, and the provision of 7047 units of furniture. The infrastructure support was given a no-cost extension up to July 2021.

### 3.5.3 Support to PEF

Support to PEF under PESP2 was envisaged in the original programme design, as set out in the PESP2 Business Case, as providing PEF with:

'targeted financial aid to enable it to expand its main programmes (EVS and NSP in particular and targeted, re-designed FAS) in 11 Low Performing Districts, mainly in South Punjab, and in rapidly expanding low income, peri-urban areas. This is expected to increase enrolment, mainly at primary level, by between 275,000 and 365,000 children. About 60% of those additional enrolments will be girls. Quality improvements under the EVS, NSP and FAS programmes will be achieved by supporting PEF's Continuous Professional Development Programme for teachers, and improving its approach to quality assurance.'

The original targets for the support to PEF related to additional enrolment across the three PEF programmes. Because of difficulties in attribution, this target was replaced by aggregate targets for PEF enrolment, with an initial budget of £68.6 million. Subsequently, this support has been supplemented in the following ways:

1. TA provided to PEF to help deliver its programmes and strengthen its management, including most recently support for reviewing programme performance, and developing proposals for organisational reform and future strategy. TA was also used to design and support CSO-managed schools to boost enrolment in two districts (Rahimyar Khan and Muzaffargarh).
2. An increase in the direct targeted financial support to PEF, as funds were reallocated from the original CSO-implemented Component 5 to direct funding of PEF programmes.

<sup>14</sup> This element has not been evaluated as insufficient information about it was available to the evaluation team.

<sup>15</sup> The rehabilitation of dangerous schools is relevant to the IMC component only.

<sup>16</sup> The rehabilitation and revitalisation component is relevant to the PSCRP component.




3. SBS provided through the provincial budget against targets agreed in the RAF relating to PEF operations, and to other aspects of PPPs in education, from 2016/17.
4. Support was also provided to PEF under the PIEP pilot, which used vouchers to improve access to education in PEF schools for disabled children.

### 3.5.4 Technical Assistance

#### TAMO and support to the Roadmap

DFID-funded TA support to the Roadmap (provided by McKinsey) predated PESP2, being provided through the Punjab Education Sector Reform Roadmap project. From 2014, the TA component of PESP2 was provided by TAMO, formed as a consortium between ASI and McKinsey. Integration of the Roadmap and other TA took place at two levels. The first was that the Roadmap's budgetary and management process was subsumed under PESP2, as a sub-contract implemented by McKinsey. In 2017, the contracts were separated, with McKinsey continuing to provide support to the Roadmap process through 2018, and ASI providing other TA through TAMO up to March 2018. TAMO's support was focused on four priority areas, as shown in Figure 6. More details are provided in Annex J.

Figure 6: TAMO priority areas



Source: TAMO (2018)

#### Cambridge Education

TA provision under the Cambridge Education contract was based on three results areas:

1. Effective teaching and learning – This included support to the Punjab Curriculum and Textbook Board (PCTB), QAED, and the Punjab Examination Commission (PEC).
2. Equitable access to education – This covered support to inclusive and special education, and PPPs, including support to PEF.
3. Good governance, management, and PFM reform – This encompassed district delivery (including the handover from the TA provided under the Roadmap, which guided education initiatives under the previous government); institutional reform; support to SED; and support to budget analysis, budget processes, and local government reform.

More details on the activities undertaken are included in Annex P.

## **I-SAPS**

I-SAPS TA has been based on the following objectives, with a strong emphasis on supporting SED in its response to the Covid-19 pandemic:

1. supporting SED in planning, implementation, and efficient education service delivery;
2. supporting SED in the implementation of its priority initiatives and ensuring that these are embedded within the government systems; and
3. adopting and scaling up interventions that can help achieve improved education outcomes and complement DFID/FCDO programme development.

The main activities undertaken are listed in Table 37 in Annex Q.

### **3.5.5 Support to scholarship programmes**

#### **PEEF**

PEEF is an initiative of GoPb. It was established in 2009 to create opportunities for motivated students to pursue higher education through the disbursement of various scholarships at secondary, intermediate, and graduate level. Following a due diligence review, PEEF and DFID signed a five-year (2013–17) memorandum of understanding on providing 28,000 scholarships (27,500 intermediate-level scholarships for female students from 11 less developed districts of Punjab and 500 undergraduate-level scholarships to both male and female students across the whole of Punjab). In September 2018, DFID extended the project until March 2020. In these two years (Phase II), PEEF aimed to award an additional 20,000 intermediate scholarships to students in an additional five districts.

#### **LUMS/NOP**

The LUMS/NOP scholarship programme was set up in 2001 to ensure that talented students from disadvantaged backgrounds from across Pakistan could get the opportunity to attend LUMS, a leading private university. In 2013, the NOP Centre was established at LUMS to cater solely to the NOP scholarship. DFID's support to the NOP began in 2013, with the main aim of providing financial support to students from underprivileged backgrounds. The intention was to provide not just higher education opportunities but *transformative* opportunities for students from disadvantaged backgrounds. Support under PESP2 comprised:

1. **creation of the NOP Centre** – organisational development or capacity-building support to LUMS;
2. **funds for NOP scholarships (and NOP-like scholarships)** – direct funding to provide financial assistance to undergraduate and postgraduate students, which benefited 742 recipients for over 1,800 student years of education; and
3. **an ambassador programme** – this was a way to engage NOP scholars to return to their communities and share their experiences about the NOP.

### **3.5.6 The Siyani Sahelian (A3G) programme<sup>17</sup>**

This programme aims to support out-of-school girls in rural areas of South Punjab through bridging programmes and technical, vocational, and educational training and enterprise development programmes, in three districts: Muzzaffargarh, Rahimyarkhan, and Bahawalpur. This programme comprises three strands: (i) remedial/accelerated learning/bridge programmes; (ii) skills/livelihoods and financial literacy; and (iii) life-skills-based education. It targets girls who have: 1) either never been enrolled into schools; or 2) have dropped out with some learning and have been excluded due to disabilities, early marriage, belonging to a minority community, and/or child labour. For the girls who have never been enrolled in schools, the strand offers a 45-day course called 'Chalo Parho Barho', which provides bursts of remedial learning in literacy and numeracy mapped to the curriculum of Grade 2. To cater to the girls who have dropped out of school in the past two years or less, the strand provides opportunities to the beneficiaries to finish primary and middle grades and a small pilot for Grades 9 and 10 through secondary school attachment. The programme is offered at a purpose-built hub, as well as across 159 partner government and private partner schools.

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<sup>17</sup> The text for this sub-section comes from OPERA (2020), p.2

## 4 Evaluation methodology

### 4.1 Overview

This chapter presents the main features of the evaluation methodology. Full details of the methodology used for each evaluation study are contained in the evaluation study reports. Section 4.2.2 explains the conceptual framework that has guided the evaluation design and interpretation of the findings. Section 4.3 summarises the evaluation methodology, including the main features of the evaluation framework (which is contained in Annex B) and the evidence sources used. Section 4.6 covers evaluation management issues, including ethics, safeguarding, stakeholder engagement, and the use of the evaluation.

### 4.2 Theory of change and the conceptual framework in the evaluation

#### 4.2.1 Approach to theory of change analysis

The SEQAS Evaluability Assessment of PESP2 (p. 2) noted that:

‘The programme suffers from an under-developed theory of change ... meaning that vertical and horizontal logic are sometimes unclear, and intended causal pathways and interlinkages not defined... The intended impact and main outcome statements are clearly identified and comprehensible. However they are not precise or conceptually unpacked, with no fully developed, programme-wide theory of change available.’

In this situation, rather than attempting to reconstruct the originally intended (and subsequently adapted) intervention logic for the programme as a whole, and making an evaluation judgement on how appropriate this was, the approach followed in the evaluation (as set out in the Inception Report) has been to develop a conceptual framework (Figure 7) within which to understand the likely contribution of each component to the strengthening of the education system (e.g. measured in terms of its performance at the outcome level). The choice of conceptual framework for this purpose has been guided by the literature and has been based on identifying the likely routes and mechanisms by which education system performance may be improved. However, considerations about the validity of key design assumptions (especially those relating to the choice of components and instruments) have also been addressed as part of the PDMR.


The approach used in the evaluation has involved (where appropriate) identifying key design assumptions and elements of the intervention logic for each component as part of each evaluation study, and seeking to test their validity. This has involved linking the results of the components to the PESP2 logframe structure (of outputs and outcomes), but also assessing them within the wider conceptual framework, as a basis for making a judgement about the likely contribution to education system performance improvement. A generic theory of change for TA (see Section 4.2.3) has been widely applied throughout the evaluation, while the approach for evaluating SBS has been informed by the Organisation for Economic Co-

operation and Development (OECD) Comprehensive Evaluation Framework (CEF) for Budget Support.<sup>18</sup>

### 4.2.2 Conceptual framework for the evaluation

The conceptual framework used for the evaluation has been derived from World Bank (2018), which is itself based on a comprehensive review of global evidence for assessing the effectiveness and functionality of systems of education. This framework identifies four key school-level ingredients for learning: prepared learners; effective teaching; learning-focused inputs; and skilled management and governance. It incorporates accountability relationships and conditions for coherence and alignment around certain policy goals. The framework is summarised in Figure 7.

**Figure 7: Conceptual framework: ingredients of an effective learning system**



Critical to delivering the school-level ingredients is the extent to which policy and governance ensure that the system is coherently aligned around learning objectives. A coherently aligned system in the context of this framework is one where the following elements are in place:

- *Learning objectives and goals* are clearly articulated, and the *roles and responsibilities* of different system actors in achieving them are clearly defined. An absence of either of the two results in limited accountability.
- Accurate, credible *information* on key goals is available, is used for monitoring progress on goals, and for evaluating interventions aimed at improving outcomes. This refers to the quality and usage of data in the system – not just what is being measured but how well it is being measured and who is using that information.
- Adequate education *financing* is a) made available, b) allocated in ways that are consistent with equity principles, and c) spent.

<sup>18</sup> More details are provided in the Inception Report.

- *Incentives* of key actors are strongly linked to the achievement of the policy goals and objectives. For example, teachers' incentives are aligned to deliver learning, to include all students, to retain children; the district administrators incentives are designed to realise progress, to ensure coordination, and to implement reforms.

This framework emphasises the importance of policy objectives, and how these relate to the objective of improving learning outcomes. Goals such as increasing enrolment or retention may be an important step towards improving learning outcomes, but may not be sufficient to ensure that learning does in fact improve.

The conceptual framework has been used to structure the EQs and has provided a normative basis for comparison. The Level One EQs have focused (particularly in assessing effectiveness) on the extent to which progress has been made in delivering the school-level ingredients of an effective educational system for learning, and the extent to which the educational system is coherent and aligned around the objective of learning. The Level Two EQs examine the extent to which PESP2 has contributed to this progress.

It should be noted that this framework does not explicitly address the political determinants of the extent to which the education system promotes learning (rather than other objectives, such as nation-building or school attendance). The attempt to understand these political factors has been a focus of recent literature, including following the agenda set out in Pritchett (2018) to explain the prioritisation of schooling over learning, among other characteristics of education systems, and the application of political settlements theory to education through the RISE education system diagnostic. Hossain and Hickey (2019, p. 17) argue that:

'Education quality reforms tend to be less politically tractable than programmes of expansion. The nature and distribution of power over the vital resource involved in education quality—teaching—are necessarily at the centre of this analysis. Quality reforms are difficult to design and difficult to deliver: less is known about 'what works' and achievement is hard to measure. Weak state capacity has not prevented children from attending school, but it is very likely to shape what happens once they get there. Yet strong state capacity in relation to education may not necessarily or only mean centralized power; effective education systems must be responsive and adaptive to local needs, granting enough autonomy for schools to be accountable to the local communities they seek to educate. The governance and institutional reforms needed to build effective schools are intensely political and involve struggles over power, whether in terms of the authority to define the content and direction of nation building, the power to deploy the vast national teaching force, or the resources to spend on school buildings and teachers' pay.'

While recognising the importance of the wider (macro) political and social context in ultimately determining education system objectives and the likely feasibility of particular reforms, this evaluation is more focused on (and more informative about) the meso- or micro-political dynamics of education reforms, including the role of individuals and the capacity and functioning of particular organisations.

### **4.2.3 Theory of change for TA**


The general framework for TA evaluation that has been used in the evaluation is set out in Figure 8. The main features of this framework are the following:



- It draws a clear conceptual distinction between ‘inputs’ (the advice, training, and other capacity-building provided by the TA), ‘outputs’ (what is directly produced by the TA, including enhanced skills, improved systems design, and knowledge products), ‘intermediate outcomes’ (relating to the application by stakeholders of the outputs produced, such as the implementation of proposals for improved system design), and ‘higher-level outcomes’, which are the actual improvements to systems, processes, and policies that result.
- It focuses attention on the critical importance of effective engagement with the stakeholders who are the intended users of the products of TA, since the process of converting the outputs of TA into improvements in systems and processes depends critically on the relevance of what is produced to the needs of stakeholders, and the ability of stakeholders to apply the outputs.
- The general framework may be applied to a wide range of different types of intervention.

This general framework has been applied to examine specific TA interventions, as well as when reviewing TA management arrangements. The approach has involved, in particular, formulating and testing specific assumptions relating to the effectiveness of engagement with stakeholders (including through the process of TA design and delivery), and the ability of stakeholders to apply the outputs produced.

**Figure 8: General framework for theory of change for TA**



## 4.3 Summary of evaluation methodology

### 4.3.1 Overall logic and structure of evaluation questions

The overall logic of the evaluation approach has been, first, to document and analyse the performance of the education sector over the period of PESP2, including evidence on the results achieved, as well as the policies and organisational reform initiatives, and contextual



factors, that may have influenced this performance, working within the conceptual framework for understanding education sector performance set out in Figure 7.

The second logical step has then been to assess the performance of each component of PESP2 support in relation to the results that it has achieved. This provides the basis for making an assessment of the **contribution** that PESP2 (as a whole) has made to the education sector in Punjab.

This approach is reflected in the structure of the EQs that the evaluation has sought to answer, which have also been structured around the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria:

- Level One EQs (Box 1), which focus on understanding progress with education system performance, and the factors that may have influenced this, including education policies and progress in reform implementation.

#### Box 1: Level One EQs

1. To what extent has educational attainment (learning outcomes) improved in Punjab over the period of PESP2?
2. To what extent have there been improvements in educational participation, including in measures of: (a) enrolment; (b) retention; and (c) transition?
3. How accurate and complete are the available measures of education sector performance, and to what extent can valid conclusions about sector performance be drawn on the basis of these?
4. How has performance differed in relation to gender, poverty, location, and other factors, and to what extent has equity in education improved?
5. How does education sector performance compare with targets set (e.g. through the Education Roadmap)?
6. What have been the main education sector policy and organisational reform initiatives over the period of PESP2? How effectively have they been implemented?
7. To what extent have the following ingredients of education system performance at the school level been strengthened over the period of PESP2: (a) preparedness of learners for school; (b) effectiveness of teaching; (c) the provision of learning-focused inputs; and (d) effectiveness of management and governance?
8. To what extent has the education system in Punjab been effectively aligned around learning objectives, and to what extent has it been coherent in pursuing these objectives? How has this been reflected in: (a) the setting of learning objectives and responsibilities for them; (b) the provision of, access to, and use of information and metrics; (c) the provision of finance; and (d) incentives to actors within the education system?
9. What factors explain the extent of progress achieved? What have been the constraints on further progress?

- Level Two EQs, which focus on the performance of each component of the programme. The generic form of these EQs is set out in Box 2 – specific forms of these EQs were developed for each evaluation study covering each component.

#### Box 2: Level Two EQs for each PESP2 component

##### Relevance:

1. How appropriate was the component's design as a way to meet the educational needs of parents and children, and the priorities of GoPb, originally and over time?
2. To what extent was the component's design based on a valid theory of change that was appropriate to the context of implementation?
3. To what extent was the component's design based on a sound and comprehensive gender and equity analysis, and to what extent were gender and equity issues appropriately integrated into the design?
4. To what extent was the component aligned with/integrated into the wider PESP2 design, and with other education programmes in the province?

##### Effectiveness:

5. To what extent and how has component contributed to: (a) improvements in education sector performance, including equity-specific results (in relation to gender, disability, poverty, minority groups) in education? (b) implementation of policy and organisational reforms?; (c) strengthening drivers of education performance at school level?; and (d) improving the alignment of learning objectives and coherence in pursuing the objectives?
6. To what extent were synergies with other components realised?
7. To what extent and how did the design, management, and governance arrangements, partnership and coordination arrangements, and use of innovative approaches for the component influence the achievement of results?
8. To what extent and how did the context (e.g. policy, political engagement, staff turnover, coordination within and between levels of government) influence the extent to which results were achieved?

##### Efficiency:

9. How effectively was the component managed and implemented (by DFID, service providers, and partners)?
10. Was the component implemented in line with its planned budget and timetables? Did the component meet its milestone objectives?
11. To what extent did the component provide VFM?

##### Sustainability:

12. To what extent are the results achieved by the component sustainable?
13. To what extent and how successfully did the design and implementation of the component foster sustainability?
14. To what extent and how has the engagement and ownership of key stakeholders in the component been achieved and maintained during implementation?

##### Impact:

15. Were there any unintended or negative effects of the component?

- Level Two EQs relating to the contribution of PESP2 as a whole (**Box 3**), including the relevance and appropriateness of the programme's design (including the selection of components and the relationship between them), and the effectiveness of its overall management and implementation.

**Box 3: Level Two EQs for PESP2 as a whole****Relevance:**

1. How appropriate was PESP2's design (including its components) as a way to meet the educational needs of parents and children, and the priorities of GoPb, originally and over time?
2. To what extent was PESP2's design based on a valid theory of change that was appropriate to the context of implementation?
3. To what extent was PESP2's design based on a sound and comprehensive gender and equity analysis in its target areas, and to what extent were gender and equity issues appropriately integrated into the design?
4. To what extent are PESP2's components aligned with/integrated into the wider PESP2 design, and with other education programmes in the province?
5. To what extent did the PESP2 programme adapt effectively to changes in the context?

**Effectiveness:**

6. To what extent and how did PESP2 contribute to improved education outcomes (including through strengthening drivers of education system performance)? To what extent were gender, disability, poverty, minority, or other equity-specific results achieved?
7. What were the contributions of each component and combination of components to achieving results? To what extent were synergies realised?
8. To what extent and how did the design, management, and governance arrangements, partnership and coordination arrangements, and use of innovatory approaches for the programme influence the achievement of results?
9. To what extent and how did the context (e.g. policy, political engagement, staff turnover, coordination within and between levels of government etc.) influence the extent to which results were achieved?

**Efficiency:**

10. How effectively was the programme managed and implemented (by DFID, service providers, and partners)?
11. Was the programme implemented in line with its planned budget and timetables? Did the programme meet its milestone objectives?
12. To what extent did the programme provide VFM?

**Sustainability:**

13. To what extent are the results achieved by PESP2 sustainable?
14. To what extent and how successfully did the design and implementation of PESP2 foster sustainability?
15. To what extent and how has GoPb engagement and ownership of PESP2 been achieved and maintained during implementation?

**Impact:**

16. Were there any unintended or negative effects of the programme?

**4.3.2 Assessing the programme's contribution**

PESP2's design has been based around 'components', as described in Sections W.2 and W.3. The components essentially reflect budget lines for the programme. It is useful to make a distinction between the components providing funding for SBS and TA, on one hand, and the other components, on the other, which involve direct financial transfers (i.e. outside the GoPb budget) to particular organisations with a view to supporting improved organisational performance as well as the delivery of specific results. In most cases, the funding provided under the defined component support to a programme or organisation does not represent the

totality of support provided, since in addition to the direct financial transfer there has typically been TA support (funded from the TA budget line). Also, in many cases, targets were set in the RAF relating to programmes, organisations, and policy measures that were also being funded through direct financial support under particular components – so that, at least notionally, SBS was being used in support of the objectives of other components. For example, support to special and inclusive education involved some direct funding, TA support, and SBS.

SBS, TA, and direct financial support can be considered as the three main instruments used to support the delivery of education sector results (at outcome level), as well as to deliver specific outputs (as defined in the logframe and in Figure 52). The evaluation of the performance of the components of PESP2 is therefore in part an evaluation of the performance of particular types of instrument, and in part an evaluation of the results achieved by, typically, a combination of instruments in supporting particular organisational or policy objectives.

The evaluation studies, summaries of which are contained in the annexes, provide assessments of the performance and results for each instrument and in relation to engagement with specific objectives and organisations. The analysis of the contribution that PESP2 has made, as set out in Chapter 10, draws on these studies to make a comparative assessment of the results achieved by the components, as well as considering the appropriateness of the overall design and management of the programme.

The evaluation has not, however, sought to carry out a complete formal contribution analysis using, for instance, the methodology described in Mayne (2008), which involves a formalised iterative six-step process based around the development and testing of a theory of change and assembling evidence to construct a ‘contribution story’. This is because PESP2 is a highly complex programme whose overall objectives were broadly defined and whose planned results, and specific interventions, have changed over time, and for which there was no fully articulated theory of change. PESP2 may best be understood as a form of adaptive engagement to support the achievement of goals shared with GoPb. Formalised contribution analysis is more suitable to a narrower set of interventions focused on a more tightly defined and measurable objective. In such a situation, the evidence base may validly support contribution stories related to the validity of relatively simple causal links. In the case of PESP2, it was not considered that in general the quality of evidence (as well as being very variable across components) would be sufficiently strong to apply this formalised methodology, and it was also considered that the causal mechanisms in totality would be too complicated to do so.

### **4.3.3 Changes from the terms of reference and inception approach**

The Inception Report noted minor changes from the terms of reference relating to focusing on the performance of components of the programme, rather than the logframe outputs. There have been no significant changes to the overall evaluation design and approach following the inception phase. There have, however, been changes to the originally envisaged timing of specific research studies. These have reflected changes in programme implementation (including the extension of the programme beyond the planned end date of March 2020), as well as factors influencing the appropriate timing for undertaking specific studies. It was also originally intended to undertake two rounds of data collection for the District Study but it was decided instead to use the resources earmarked for the second round for the Supplementary Report, since it was not considered that additional data collection at school level would be informative.

## 4.4 Background studies for Level One EQs

The following background studies (undertaken in three rounds, as summarised above) have provided the evidence base to answer the Level One EQs.

### 4.4.1 Review of Education Sector Performance (RESP)

The RESP analysed data on indicators of education sector performance over the PESP2 period, and made an assessment of the evidence on progress achieved, in order to answer Level One EQs 1, 2, 3, and 4. It was preceded by a DQA of administrative and survey data on education to determine which data series were of sufficient quality and completeness to enable the measurement of trends over time (the findings of the DQA are summarised in Annex F). The first version of the RESP was prepared in 2018 as part of the background studies contributing to IER1. A selective update based on newly available information was prepared in 2019 to contribute to IER2 in 2019. As part of the Final Evaluation, the first version of the RESP was comprehensively revised and updated. A final supplementary update was undertaken in February 2021 to include Literacy and Numeracy Drive (LND) and education management information system (EMIS) data for 2020.

### Methodology

The intention in the RESP has been to present evidence from before the start of PESP2 (e.g. in 2011/12) to the most recent data available (usually 2018/19) to summarise: a) what the evidence suggests regarding the broader question and the more specific questions above; and b) the quality of the evidence (with respect to the indicators that can be calculated, and the extent to which these help answer the EQs).

The presentation of the data evaluation draws on the conceptual framework and arranges evidence around the four key school-level ingredients for learning:

- prepared learners;
- effective teaching;
- learning-focused inputs; and
- skilled management and governance.

The DQA involved an initial assessment of data quality based principally on desk analysis of documentation and examination of raw data and published results; and additional analysis of the quality of data systems, focusing on sources that were identified as most important and/or problematic during the initial assessment, and potentially involving some primary investigation. This was undertaken for both survey and administrative data sources.

The analysis of data was undertaken as follows:

- The identification of core data sets from the inception phase.
- Mapping the data sources against the conceptual framework.
- Undertaking extensive data analysis using core indicators. Some of the datasets focus only on Punjab Province while others collect data nationally. It was agreed to compute the relevant indicators only on Punjab, with more limited analysis on other provinces/regions to provide a cross-province/-region picture.

- Combining the sources from different datasets where appropriate.
- Consulting organisations directly for assistance in interpreting findings (e.g. ASER data).
- Supplementing data analysis with data from reports/mimeographs where relevant to provide a more comprehensive answer to the questions posed in this report.

### Data sources used<sup>19</sup>

This report presents a detailed summary of the evidence based on extensive analysis of datasets mainly in Punjab (with some evidence on variations in key statistics by province/region). Raw data from the following datasets have been used to develop indicators that have then been used to answer the above questions:

- The **Punjab School Education Survey (PSES)<sup>20</sup> household dataset**: This covered nine waves of 36,000 households, on average, between November 2011 and March 2017 (with a slightly different questionnaire used in the last round).
- The **LND data**: These relate to monthly testing. A number of different tests and questionnaires were used, covering the period from 2015 to February 2020. This is a school-based dataset.
- **DFID's six-monthly learning assessment data**: This covered the period September 2014 to March 2018. This is a school-based dataset.
- **ASER data**: ASER produced annual waves of data (with the exception of 2017), which are covered in the RESP (2012–19). This dataset collects information from both households and schools. Children are assessed on basic literacy and numeracy, and both household-level information collected (assets, maternal education, education levels completed) and school-level information is gathered (teacher qualifications, enrolments etc.). However, analysis undertaken by the evaluation team suggests that (because of problems in the sampling approach used) there are limitations in the extent to which it is possible to use the ASER data to measure changes over time.<sup>21</sup>
- **Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement (PSLM) survey, 2012–2018**: This is an extensive household-level survey with very detailed information collected on household incomes and expenditures, the education levels of various household members etc.

The number of continuing survey sources of data was reduced between the first and final rounds of the RESP as the PSES household survey and DFID Six-Monthly Assessment (6MA) have not been conducted since 2018.

In addition to analysing raw data from these data sources, the Evaluation Team where possible used data from other published and unpublished research (without a formal assessment having been made of its quality). This includes the following:

- **Teaching Effectively All Children (TEACH)**: A study funded by the UK Economic and Research Council (ESRC) and DFID (ES/M005445/1) which collected household and school-based data on rural children aged 8–12 years from three districts in Punjab. Data are cross-sectional and available for 2016–17 (with children in schools in Grades 3–5 assessed at the beginning and end of the school year). Extensive detailed information on

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<sup>19</sup> Additional details are included in Annex F.

<sup>20</sup> Formerly known as the Nielsen Survey.

<sup>21</sup> The issues related to comparing ASER estimates over time are discussed in the RESP report.



teachers was also collected. Children in schools provided self-reported measures of wealth. The data from TEACH have been collected by IDEAS and the University of Cambridge and are not yet publicly available.

- **Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS)**, conducted every three years from 2011 to 2017 for Punjab. This is an extensive household-level survey led by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). It maps the situation of women and children around the world.<sup>22</sup>
- The **SABER Service Delivery (SD)** tool, developed by the World Bank, studies barriers to student learning outcomes (SLOs) in primary schools in Punjab. Data were collected for a convenience sample of six districts that is representative of North, Central, and South Punjab. Data were collected on schools, children, teachers, principals, and parents in 2018. Preliminary findings from the initial data release are discussed here.
- **PEC** published reports: Exam result analysis reported on the PEC website has been drawn on where possible. PEC also conducted a Provincial Assessment of Student Learning (PASL) 2018–19 that links student learning with teacher competence and teaching practice, providing useful information for understanding teacher effectiveness.

The following administrative datasets were also analysed:

- **Annual School Census (ASC)/EMIS** data (2012–20).<sup>23</sup> This is a mandatory data collection exercise for all public schools in Punjab, providing reliable information for policymaking. The modules include a detailed school information sheet, along with a teacher and student roster.
- **Private Schools Census (PSC)** data (2011 and 2016). While there is no legal obligation for private schools to provide data, this exercise aims to gather data on all private schools in Punjab. The survey is a sub-set of the EMIS survey. It gathers basic data on school characteristics, enrolment, and staff.

#### 4.4.2 Education Policy and Reform Review (EPRR)

The EPRR examined progress in education policy and reform implementation in Punjab during the period of implementation of PESP2 programme in order to provide evidence to answer Level One EQs 6, 7, 8, and 9. It reviewed the main reform initiatives over the period, organised around the conceptual framework, which focuses on how effectively educational systems are aligned around, and coherent with, learning objectives, and how well the key ingredients of learning (effective teaching, prepared learners, learning-focused inputs, and skilled management and governance) are realised at school level.

The EPRR was based on reviews of documentation and key informant interviews (KIIs), including with leading education officials and other stakeholders. The 2018 EPRR (EPRR1) provided a comprehensive overview of policies and reform initiatives relating to the supply of each of the four school-level ingredients of learning, as well as an assessment of the extent to which the organisational and policy framework for education provided coherence and alignment with learning or other objectives, up to the elections of July 2018. It also included an analysis of the contribution of the Roadmap and Stocktake process. The 2019 EPRR (EPRR2) covered the period of the first year after the elections and focused on assessing the

<sup>22</sup> Access indicators from MICS have been calculated from the raw data in line with the approach followed for other sources above, while the remaining indicators from MICS draw on reported statistics in publicly available reports.

<sup>23</sup> Preliminary data for 2020 have been used; in particular, estimates of changes in enrolment in government schools following the Covid-19-related school closures.



main elements of the new government's education policy and priorities, and its approach to sector management. It reviewed the main policy documents and the policy areas in which the Government had thus far implemented initiatives. The 2020 EPRR (EPRR2) covered the period up to July 2020, reviewing the extent to which progress had been made in clarifying education priorities, the main policy initiatives undertaken, the extent to which there was coherence in sector management, and also the initial response to the Covid-19 pandemic. The 2021 supplementary update to the EPRR (EPRR4), undertaken in January 2021, reviewed subsequent developments in the response to Covid-19 and progress on the implementation of key initiatives for the sector.

#### **4.4.3 Public Finance for Education Review (PFER)**

The PFER provides an assessment of trends in the education budget and expenditure over the period of PESP2's implementation (including in comparison to the period immediately before the programme), and of the quality of PFM for education. It provides evidence to answer Level One EQ 8c. Specific questions addressed in this analysis include: (i) How has the level of the education budget and spending changed over the period of PESP2? (ii) To what extent has the budget been executed? (iii) To what extent has PFM for education improved over the period of PESP2?

The analysis has been undertaken in four rounds, with the most recent update (PFER4) including the analysis of expenditure data up to 2019/20.

A **fiscal data analysis** was performed on the education budget/expenditure data, including some analysis of the health sector for comparison (see Annex G). The data were sourced from civil accounts of the Government to identify trends and growth patterns in the sector in general, and for the key areas under the programme. This phase involved obtaining data from the Finance Department. The data were cleaned and consolidated, to put them into a form in which they could be used to conduct analysis for the study. The team was able to access and develop data both at the provincial level and at the district level. There are no alternative credible sources of data for the analysis of budget and expenditure at the provincial and district levels. The study analysed the budget data at the overall provincial level and at the district level. Further, data were also tabulated at the agency level. Analysis was also undertaken to assess disparities between districts in terms of allocations and utilisations, and was undertaken at both current and 2007/8 prices.

To understand the impact of SBS on total education financing at the provincial and district levels, as well as to understand the spectrum of PFM reforms undertaken during the period, the team conducted **KIIs** with key stakeholders in GoPb, primarily the Finance Department and SED; the TA providers; and PMIU. The KIIs were used to assist in interpreting findings from the data analysis and to assess the trajectory of PFM reforms and the results of SBS. A particular focus of the KIIs was to examine the contribution of PESP2 TA and the role of SBS in contributing to strengthening PFM.

#### **4.4.4 District Study**

The **District Study** collected evidence on the extent to which education reforms were affecting the management of education at district level, the management and delivery of education in schools, and perceptions of the education sector in communities. This relates to answering Level One EQs 6, 7, 8, and 9. The District Study focused on four districts purposefully selected

from among those with the worst education indicators in Punjab between 2012 and 2016 (including but not restricted to those which had been identified as priority districts under PESP2), but distinguishing two districts (Bhakkar and Rahimyar Khan) that had subsequently performed relatively well in improving indicators, and two (Rawalpindi and Rajanpur) that had performed badly.<sup>24</sup>

The three elements of the District Study were:

- **District Education Management Study (DEMS):** Data collection for the DEMS included KIs with district management staff, principally: Deputy Commissioners, Chief Education Officers (CEOs), District Education Officers (DEOs), Deputy District Education Officers (DDEOs), and Assistant Education Officers (AEOs). Following a pilot carried out in December 2018, data collection took place in the four districts in January and February 2019. A summary of the study is included as Annex R.
- **School Survey:** The School Survey design was based on identifying a set of hypotheses related to how education reform in Punjab intended to influence schools and teaching in schools, and on collecting data to test these hypotheses. The hypotheses were derived from the conceptual framework used for the evaluation. Within each school, the school study aimed to collect data at the school and classroom level on: (i) outcomes (access, quality, governance) or indicators of education sector performance; process-level indicators (effective teaching, financing, learner-focused inputs, monitoring and governance) or the drivers of education performance at the school level; evidence of implementation of policy and organisational reforms; and evidence of alignment of learning objectives. Four main instruments were used: a School Information Sheet; a Head Teacher Questionnaire; a Teacher Questionnaire; and a Classroom Observation Tool. Primary data were collected between September 2019 and November 2019 from 50 schools<sup>25</sup> in each of the four selected districts (200 schools in total). A summary of the study is included as Annex S.
- **Community Study:** The Community Study collected information from parents and community members, as well as from head teachers, teachers, and School Management Committee (SMC) members on the factors that community members considered as influencing education participation in their communities; the main constraints on education participation, and how these might be addressed; the extent to which community members considered that schools in their communities provided a high-quality education that is relevant to the needs of children in the community, and how this had changed over time; and satisfaction with the provision of the ingredients of effective learning (as derived from the conceptual framework). The study covered four schools (both urban and rural) in each of two districts.<sup>26</sup> A summary of the study is included in Annex T.

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<sup>24</sup> The intention underlying this selection was to test if there was any evidence linking the performance of these districts to the level or features of reform implementation. In the event, no clear evidence of a link was found.

<sup>25</sup> Schools were selected randomly from among functional government schools which had a primary section, and which were not madrassah or PPP schools. The 200 surveyed schools included 143 primary standalone schools, 33 middle schools, 22 high schools, and two higher secondary schools.

<sup>26</sup> In total, interviews were carried out (through KIs or focus group discussions) with eight head teachers of sampled schools; 31 head teachers of other non-sampled schools; 36 teachers in sampled schools; 33 SMC members in sampled schools; 48 mothers of children in sampled schools; 48 mothers of children in other schools; 16 parents of out-of-school children (OOSC); and 16 community leaders.

## 4.5 Background studies for Level Two EQs

These studies focused principally on evaluating specific components of the programme to address the Level Two EQs. However, some also included more specific reviews of particular policy areas than were covered in the EPRR, in order to provide context for assessing the contribution that PESP2 has made.

### 4.5.1 Studies for IER1

The first round of evaluation studies focused principally on assessing the results achieved through TA (including support to the Roadmap and Stocktake process) and SBS. This involved three **case studies** of particular policy areas, including the provision of support to the main organisations (curriculum, teacher training, and public examinations). The case studies collected evidence on the role of the Roadmap process, SBS, and other TA in supporting reforms in each policy area, and the organisational capacity of the lead organisation in each sub-sectoral area, respectively PCTB, the Directorate of Staff Development (DSD) (which became QAED), and PEC. The case studies were complemented by a **Review of Technical Assistance Management Arrangements**, and a review of documentation on TAMO results reporting. These studies involved reviews of documentation and KIs, and were undertaken during 2018.

Summaries of the findings (drawing on the case studies but also on the first round of the EPRR) in respect of support to the Roadmap and Stocktake process, and the use of SBS, are contained in Annex E and Annex I respectively. A summary of the assessment of the first phase of TA through TAMO, drawing on the case studies and the review of TA management arrangements, is included as Annex J.

### 4.5.2 Studies for IER2

**Evaluation of support to the PEEF intermediate scholarships programme.** This study involved a review of secondary data and documentation, KIs, and a telephone survey of young women who had received intermediate scholarships through PEEF. The survey sample was drawn from scholarship recipients of 2013, 2014 and 2015: that is, in the first three years of PESP2's funding to the programme, since the majority of these students were expected to have completed their intermediate studies during 2015 to 2017, and thus it was expected that they could provide information about their educational progression and the impact of the scholarship on their lives. The beneficiaries of all three years were pooled together and a sample of 1,105 females was drawn out of a total of 25,576 beneficiaries. The sample size and survey approach was designed to provide a statistically representative picture of the population as a whole. However, the approach did not permit causal judgements to be made about the impact of the scholarship since there was no counterfactual. Data collection was carried out between July and September 2019. A summary of the findings is included as Annex K.

**Evaluation of support to the LUMS/NOP scholarships programme.** The evaluation focused on the NOP scholarships programme between 2013 and 2018. The assessment was structured along the OECD DAC criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability. Given the lack of baseline data and competitive data, establishing a counterfactual, and therefore estimating causal impact, was not possible. A number of data sources were used by the evaluation team – this included documentation provided by LUMS

and DFID, KIs, selected secondary/administrative data provided by LUMS, an online survey of NOP scholars, and case studies of some NOP scholars. The evaluation encountered challenges with a lack of comparative data on NOP (and especially non-NOP) scholars, a lack of financial data, and low response rates from research participants. These challenges were mitigated, to the extent possible, through the triangulation of information from different stakeholders. Data collection was carried out between March and July 2019. A summary of the findings is included as Annex L.

#### **4.5.3 Studies for the final evaluation phase (including supplementary studies)**

**Evaluation of support to special and inclusive education.** This evaluation study examined the performance and contribution of PESP2 to special and inclusive education, within the wider context of the development of special and inclusive education policies in Punjab since 2013. Evidence was obtained from: (i) a review of data and documentation on special and inclusive education policy in Punjab, including the prevalence and characteristics of children with SEND in Punjab, the development of policy towards special and inclusive education in Punjab over the period of PESP2, and administrative and public finance data; (ii) a review of PESP2 programme documentation, including the key documents produced by DFID, SpED, SED, the TA providers, and other relevant stakeholders, and the setting of, and performance against, relevant RAF targets for SBS; and (iii) KIs with current and former DFID staff, SpED and other government of Punjab officials, and other stakeholders, including CSOs, to collect evidence in relation to both Level One and Level Two EQs. A summary of this study is presented in Annex M.

**Evaluation of support to PEF.** This study reviewed the development of GoPb's policy towards private education and PPPs in education, and the role of PEF within this context, as well as PEF's overall performance. It then assessed how appropriately designed and implemented PESP2's support to PEF has been, and the results that it has achieved. The study was based on: (i) a review of documentation on policies and initiatives related to the role of the private sector in (basic) education in Punjab over the period of PESP2, including research literature; (ii) a review of literature on PPPs in education, internationally and in Pakistan; and (iii) a review of documentation and data on PEF programme implementation. This included data from PEF annual reports and administrative sources, PEF documents, and reviews of PEF performance (including those undertaken by PESP2 TA) and DFID reporting information; (iv) a review of specific outputs produced by PESP2 for PEF; and (v) KIs with staff from PEF, DFID, SED, the TA providers, CSOs, and private school operators. Interviews were mainly carried out between October 2019 and January 2020. A summary of this study is presented in Annex N.

**Evaluation of support to school infrastructure.** This study reviewed the wider context of progress and policy towards school infrastructure in Punjab over the period of PESP2, and assessed the performance and contribution of PESP2, including the implementation problems encountered. Evidence was based on: (i) reviewing documentation and data on school infrastructure in Punjab over the PESP2 period; (ii) reviewing data and documentation on the implementation of the programme; and (iii) KIs with current and former DFID staff, Humqadam-SCRIP project staff, members of the third-party verification team, and GoPb staff. Interviews were carried out between February and September 2020. A supplementary study was completed in February 2021 to review progress with each of the three components (Humqadam-SCRIP, PSCRIP implemented by the PMIU, and TCF) that are being implemented

in the final phase of the programme, including assessing the prospects that planned results will be achieved. A summary of this evaluation study (including the supplementary study) is presented in Annex O.

**TA Update Study.** This study covered the provision of TA by Cambridge Education over the period of its contract from October 2018 to March 2020, following on from the earlier TAMO arrangement. The study addressed the same EQs as for the review of TA for IER1, while also seeking to make a comparison of performance and examining how far recommendations from the first study were implemented. The study involved the following elements:<sup>27</sup>

- A review of documentation on management arrangements (including the M&E system, the inception report and related documentation on decisions about focus, and other key documents) and KIIs with the TA provider, DFID, and SED staff.
- A review of reporting information, particularly from the quarterly reports, to provide an overall assessment of results reported and achieved.
- Updates on support to QAED, PEC, and PCTB (Results Area 1), based on a review of documentation (including from the Government Feedback Tool) and selected KIIs focused on support provided under Results Area 1 to these organisations. Since no significant additional support had been provided to PCTB, the study focused on QAED and PEC.
- A review of TA under Results Area 3, based on a review of documentation and KIIs focused on support to district delivery (following the termination of the Roadmap process), and on selected elements of the institutional strengthening component.<sup>28</sup>

Most KIIs were carried out between December 2019 and February 2020, with some relevant information included from later KIIs (in June and July 2020). The Project Completion Report (PCR) produced by the TA team in March 2020 provided the most comprehensive overview of the activities and claimed results, and a review of issues for sustainability, so core evaluation assessments are made in the form of commentaries on the PCR. A summary of this study is presented in Annex P.

A light-touch study of the final phase of PESP2 TA (from August 2020 to March 2021) being provided by I-SAPS was also carried out and is included as Annex Q.

**Programme Design and Management Review.** Additional data collection through a review of documentation and KIIs (in particular with former DFID and government officials involved at different stages in the history of PESP2) was carried out principally between March and July 2020 to collect additional evidence relating to the design and management of the programme as a whole (i.e. to answer the EQs in **Box 3**). This is included as Annex W.

In addition, DFID separately contracted an evaluation of the A3G (Siyani Sahelian) programme carried out under PESP2 (OPERA, 2020), which has also been drawn on for this Final Evaluation Report. The conclusions of this evaluation are reported in Annex U.

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<sup>27</sup> Results Area 2 covered support to special and inclusive education and to PEF and PPPs for education, so information collected for the special education and PEF studies was used.

<sup>28</sup> The review of TA support to PFM was also used to inform the final round of the PFER.



## **4.6 Evaluation management**

### **4.6.1 Ensuring the quality of evidence**

As set out above, the main sources of evidence for the evaluation can be classified as follows:

- Data from primary sources:
  - quantitative and qualitative data collected from surveys (in person, by telephone, and online) undertaken for the evaluation; and
  - qualitative data collected from KIIs and (to a lesser extent) focus group discussions carried out by the evaluation team.
- Data from secondary sources:
  - quantitative data from administrative and survey sources;
  - data from official documentation; and
  - findings from other studies and research, including those carried out for and by the programme (especially by the TA providers).

Where surveys were carried out by the evaluation team, sampling strategies were developed, including justification of the sample size. So far as feasible, data were disaggregated by sex, location, and other factors. Instruments for primary data collection were pre-tested and are in general included in the evaluation study reports. The DQA of secondary quantitative data sources was used to assess the extent to which these data could be used validly to draw conclusions, especially about trends over time. In general a range of data sources was used to triangulate findings, with the specific approach and any issues arising explained in each evaluation study. Quality assurance was carried out through peer review within the evaluation team, review and feedback from stakeholders, EQUALS review of selected evaluation products, and review by technical specialists where appropriate.

### **4.6.2 Ethics and safeguarding**

The evaluation has adhered to international best practice in ethical conduct (including the principle of 'do no harm') and has been informed by DFID's Ethical Guidance for Research, Evaluation and Monitoring Activities. Most data collection through KIIs has been with government officials and related stakeholders, and has not required formal approval from an ethical review board. Where this was deemed necessary (specifically for the School Survey and Community Study, which involved interviews of teachers, head teachers, parents, and other community members, and for the scholarship studies, which included interviews with scholarship beneficiaries), ethical clearance was provided by OPM's independent Ethical Review Committee, in addition to obtaining no objection certificates from the appropriate authorities. The selection of schools and communities was designed to ensure inclusion of hard-to-reach groups (geographically and in terms of socioeconomic status).<sup>29</sup> No primary data collection with vulnerable community members or children was undertaken, and no reward or compensation structure was provided for participants. The burden of participation was assessed during the design and piloting of data collection instruments, and was determined not to be excessive.

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<sup>29</sup> Full details are available in the School Survey, Community Study, and PEEF and LUMS/NOP scholarship study reports.

### 4.6.3 Stakeholder engagement

The selection of key informants for evaluation studies sought to ensure the range of relevant stakeholder perspectives was obtained, including from female key informants and from civil society. An initial stakeholder analysis was undertaken during the inception phase of the evaluation, and this has been used to guide stakeholder engagement.

Protocols for ensuring privacy and confidentiality for interviewees (and securing informed verbal consent) were developed and followed.<sup>30</sup> The data collected (including interview transcripts) are being maintained on a secure server. The approach followed for quality assurance and ensuring data integrity for each evaluation study is set out in each study report. In general, a quality assurance review has been carried out by an education specialist, and by specialists in quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis, where appropriate.

The evaluation studies were shared in draft with key stakeholders to provide opportunities for comment and feedback, and the final version of reports reflected comments and differing perspectives from key informants and stakeholders, where appropriate. All quotes from KIIs used in the evaluation have been anonymised. The findings of IER1 and IER2, as well as selected evaluation studies, and an earlier draft of this final evaluation, report have also been presented for discussion in events held in Lahore, as summarised in Annex D.2, as well as being shared with stakeholders for review and comment in draft.

A Use and Influence Plan for the evaluation is presented in Annex D.

### 4.6.4 Paris Declaration principles

This evaluation has been implemented in accordance with the Paris Declaration principles in the following ways. National ownership of the evaluation has been promoted through the sharing for review and comment of terms of reference and approach papers with government and other stakeholders, and through DFID's (and subsequently FCDO's) consultation and briefing on the evaluation with the Government through the PESP2 Steering Committee's regular meetings. The evaluation has drawn heavily on information produced through government systems. Harmonisation of evaluation approaches with other donors was not in general required because of the limited linkages between PESP2 and other donor support. The evaluation team has overwhelmingly consisted of Pakistani specialists, and national evaluation capacity development has taken place in particular through the involvement of junior consultants.

However, several obstacles to effective national ownership should be noted. First, while an Evaluation Steering Committee was established and reviewed the Inception Report, this committee was mandated to focus on ensuring independence and the quality of the evaluation and did not include direct stakeholder representation (instead it included technical specialists in education and evaluation). This arrangement was also not maintained beyond the first phase of the evaluation. Second, the high level of turnover of the most senior education officials (particularly in the post of Secretary of SED) during the evaluation (and especially after the July 2018 election) militated against effective GoPb ownership, though efforts were made by DFID/FCDO and the evaluation team to ensure that provincial government staff were

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<sup>30</sup> Where appropriate, details of questionnaires and interview protocols have been included as annexes to evaluation study reports. No digital tools have been developed or used.



briefed. Third, the evaluation process was not integrated into, or overseen by, any higher-level GoPb evaluation function.

#### **4.6.5 Independence and conflicts of interest**

The evaluation team was able to work freely and without interference. The broad scope of the evaluation (covering the last seven years of education policy in Punjab) means that some team members (for instance as researchers active on education issues) have had some involvement in aspects of programme implementation, though OPM has not undertaken any non-evaluation work related to PESP2. Team selection and management and quality assurance review arrangements for each of the evaluation studies have ensured that there have been no conflicts of interest. As discussed in Section 4.3 a wide range of secondary data sources have been used, as well as primary data collected from interviews at schools, with community members, and scholarship beneficiaries, and KIIs with both stakeholders and independent observers. Independence and objectivity has been assured through the triangulation of different data sources, including to reflect a balance of stakeholder interests and to take account of any biases.

#### **4.6.6 Limitations of evidence**

The limitations of evidence in relation to each of the evaluation studies are discussed in each report. These (together with overarching issues about evidence quality) may be summarised as follows:

- The evaluation began in August 2017, more than four and a half years into a programme then expected to last just over seven years. Evaluation approaches therefore had to be designed after implementation had started and some activities had been completed, and there was limited scope to influence the M&E frameworks that had been developed for the programme in order to improve evaluability.<sup>31</sup>
- Related to this timing, there was no complete and specifically designed baseline against which progress during the PESP2 period could be assessed. Available secondary sources on education performance (as discussed in the RESP and DQA report prepared for inception) do not consistently cover the whole of the period since the start of PESP2, although the evidence is sufficient to allow some important conclusions to be drawn.
- In some cases it was not possible to interview all potentially relevant key informants – particularly former officials where they had moved post. A general potential bias in the information from KIIs is that these tended to over-represent government and donor officials as the most directly involved stakeholders in the implementation of reforms and the delivery of PESP2 components, compared to the views and interests of other sector stakeholders, most notably parents and pupils, as the ultimate users of the education system. The Community Study and the scholarship evaluations were the only research activities that involved primary data collection from these groups.

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<sup>31</sup> However, the M&E framework for the second phase of TA did take into account recommendations from IER1.

## 5 Performance of the education sector in Punjab<sup>32</sup>

### 5.1 Overview

The comprehensive review of education data for Punjab that has been undertaken for the evaluation has found that there has been significant improvement in the information available about the sector, so that trends in performance (e.g. participation and learning outcomes) can be tracked, as well as features of the availability of the ingredients of school-level learning. Annex F contains details of the sources used. DFID support, in part through PESP2, contributed significantly to this improvement in data by providing funding for the DFID 6MA, the Nielsen Survey/PSES, and ASER, as well contributing through TA support to the SIF and developments of the EMIS.

Analysis of the data shows that the extent of progress in the education system in Punjab during the period of PESP2 has been mixed. There have been some gains (more children in school, better qualified teachers, and improved infrastructure and facilities in schools) but there are numerous challenges: the children in school are not always in appropriate grades for their age, learning outcomes are low for many, both access to education and outcomes achieved are inequitable, particularly in relation to socioeconomic status. However, the availability of high-quality data remains insufficient to answer many key questions, pointing to a continued need for a data strategy for the sector (which also needs to encompass the private sector). In addition, only very limited data are available to allow an estimate to be made of the impact of Covid-19 school closures and livelihood disruptions on education.

Section 5.2 provides an assessment of the adequacy of data both to measure sector performance and to allow tracking of the delivery of the key ingredients of school-level learning. Section 5.3 compares performance against the targets set in the Chief Minister's Roadmap to 2018. Section 5.4 examines evidence on participation, and section 5.5 on learning outcomes, and. Section 5.6 reviews to what extent these variables are related to social and economic factors and evidence on equity. The next sections review evidence about the provision of key ingredients of learning at school level (based on the conceptual framework): Section 5.7 on the preparedness of learners, Section 5.8 on the effectiveness of teaching, Section 5.9 on the provision of learner-focused inputs, and Section 5.10 on the effectiveness of school-level management and governance. Section 5.11 reviews evidence on the likely impact of Covid-19 on progress in education. Finally, section 5.12 reviews how information has been used to inform education sector management.

### 5.2 How well can changes in education sector performance be measured?

Over the period of PESP2 there was a substantial improvement in the range and quality of data available on education in Punjab, particularly from survey sources, with DFID support significantly contributing to this, including to strengthening the ASC/EMIS data. However, both

<sup>32</sup> This section is based on the final 2021 version of the RESP (RESP4), and updates the analysis presented in IER1, which was derived from the 2018 version of the RESP (RESP1). Additional information on the extent to which the ingredients of learning are being delivered in schools is also provided from the School Survey and the Community Study.

the PSES and the DFID 6MA ended in 2018, significantly reducing the range of survey data sources available on participation and learning outcomes.

**The information available is sufficient to identify key features and some broad trends in education sector performance, including in relation to learning outcomes and education participation. However, there are significant limitations** in the time periods covered (in some cases with changes in survey methodology over time) and the extent to which disaggregation (particularly to identify the role of socioeconomic variables in explaining differences in performance) is possible. While household-based survey sources sample from all pupils, school-based sources apart from the DFID 6MA focus on government schools. A critical limitation is a lack of information about retention and repetition, so that it is not possible fully to measure the extent to which children who enter school go through a full cycle of education.

In relation to information on the four school-level ingredients of learning (as identified in the conceptual framework)<sup>33</sup>:


1. **There are no good data to measure ‘learner preparedness’ in Punjab.** The measured indicators are very poor proxies of this concept, which should encompass whether children entering Punjab’s schools are entering well-nourished, whether they are appropriately stimulated, whether they enter into suitable and good-quality early years learning environments, and whether they are motivated. The only relevant data available are on pre-primary enrolment (*katchi*).
2. **Large-scale datasets in Pakistan do not capture fundamental aspects of the effectiveness of teaching.** The ASER and EMIS datasets are able to provide information on measures that are not always fully able to capture teacher effectiveness. Data on the process of teaching and teachers’ time on task, both in the classroom and outside it, are critically missing from all of the large-scale datasets. Teacher attendance rates and qualifications only provide very crude proxies of teacher characteristics that might equate to ‘effectiveness’. Teacher qualifications also provide a very crude measure of effectiveness. Data have been collected on teacher competency through the TEACH study, but this covers only a small sample of teachers in three districts.
3. **There are some data available on school infrastructure, with coverage across all public schools, but no cross-province data on some fundamental learner-focused inputs, most notably the availability of teaching material, such as textbooks,** although recent initiatives (the SIF) are focusing on collecting more comprehensive school-level data.
4. **Large-scale datasets do not capture good-quality information on key aspects of school management and governance.** The ASC collects information on some aspects, including development expenditures and frequency of school council meetings. However, the indicators are very crude proxies for judging the effectiveness of governance and management. Again, initiatives are now underway through the SIF to strengthen the availability of data related to school management, including on the use by schools of the non-salary budget (NSB).

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<sup>33</sup> See Annex F for more details on the mapping of sources.

## 5.3 How does education sector performance compare with the targets set?

Figure 9: Chief Minister's 2018 goals



The Education Sector Plan (ESP) for 2013–17 did not set a framework of quantitative targets. The Chief Minister identified a set of goals to be achieved by 2018, which were launched as 'Parho Punjab, Barho Punjab' ('Learn Punjab, Progress Punjab') in March 2015 (see Figure 9).

In the second quarter of 2016, the Roadmap set a series of new target areas to further refine and focus the quality agenda. These were derived from the 2018 goals, but gave the SED greater implementation-level clarity. They were as follows:

- Teaching quality: Increase basic literacy and numeracy levels in primary schools, attaining a 75% average score on the independently administered six-monthly assessment (to be tracked using the newly introduced 6MA).
- Enrolment and access: Get every primary school-aged child into school, attaining a minimum 95% participation rate for five- to nine-year-olds across the province.
- Schools and teachers: Significantly improve infrastructure in Punjab schools, adding 36,000 new classrooms and recruiting 46,000 new teachers; and ensure 100% functioning facilities and schools
- Public–private cooperation: Improve access and quality through public–private cooperation, enrolling at least 2.6 million students in PEF schools by 2018.

Analysis of reporting against these targets from the April 2018 Stocktake, as well as performance against short-term (2018/19) targets, shows that the targets for basic literacy and numeracy have been achieved, along with the enrolment target – in both cases as a result of substantial improvements in measured performance in the most recent period. Teacher

recruitment and PEF enrolment is also reported as having achieved targets, but performance lagged significantly below targets (even below revised and much lower targets) for new classroom construction.

Comprehensive sector targets have not been set, and thus progress has not been reported against such targets, since the change of political government in 2018.

## 5.4 Has access to education improved?

This analysis is based on PSLM, PSES, ASER, and MICS data, along with administrative EMIS and PSC datasets covering the 2011–19 period. However, only preliminary data from the 2020 EMIS are available to allow any assessment to be made of the impact of Covid-19 on enrolment and participation (Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7). These data cover only government schools.

Using these datasets, three indicators of access have been calculated – education participation rates, gross enrolment rates (GERs), and net enrolment rates (NERs) – for various age groups, for male and female children, by socioeconomic status, and by location, where possible.

**A larger percentage of children in Punjab are now *in* school but they are not always in the appropriate grades for their age**

The analysis of access indicators shows that the percentage of **children in Punjab attending school has increased up to 2019**. Participation rates have been growing over the period (Table 3), which shows that children aged 5–16 years are now more likely to be attending school.

**Table 3: Participation rates (5–16 years), by age, gender, and location (%)**

| Dataset   | Overall<br>(5–16<br>years) | Age group (years) |       |       | Gender |      | Location |       |
|-----------|----------------------------|-------------------|-------|-------|--------|------|----------|-------|
|           |                            | 5–9               | 10–12 | 13–16 | Female | Male | Rural    | Urban |
| PSLM      |                            |                   |       |       |        |      |          |       |
| 2012/13   | 74.6                       | 79.2              | 81.0  | 62.7  | 70.9   | 78.2 | 70.6     | 84.2  |
| 2013/14   | 73.2                       | 78.7              | 79.6  | 60.4  | 68.3   | 78.0 | 68.6     | 83.6  |
| 2014/15   | 74.6                       | 79.7              | 81.3  | 61.8  | 71.1   | 77.9 | 69.6     | 86.0  |
| 2015/16   | 73.8                       | 79.6              | 81.2  | 59.5  | 69.2   | 78.3 | 69.1     | 84.5  |
| 2018/19   | 79.1                       | 85.0              | 84.7  | 65.5  | 76.7   | 81.4 | 75.2     | 86.4  |
| PSES      |                            |                   |       |       |        |      |          |       |
| Nov. 2011 | 78.6                       | 84.1              | 84.0  | 64.7  | 75.0   | 81.9 | 76.0     | 87.1  |
| Jun. 2012 | 80.8                       | 85.4              | 85.0  | 69.9  | 77.9   | 83.5 | 78.4     | 88.8  |
| Nov. 2012 | 80.7                       | 85.5              | 84.6  | 68.8  | 77.9   | 83.4 | 78.2     | 89.0  |
| Jun. 2013 | 80.2                       | 84.4              | 84.0  | 69.9  | 77.1   | 83.1 | 77.6     | 88.7  |
| Nov. 2013 | 83.0                       | 87.6              | 86.2  | 71.6  | 80.6   | 85.1 | 80.9     | 89.5  |
| Nov. 2014 | 85.0                       | 89.4              | 88.3  | 74.5  | 83.0   | 86.9 | 83.2     | 90.6  |
| Jun. 2015 | 85.8                       | 90.2              | 88.8  | 75.8  | 83.8   | 87.7 | 84.2     | 91.0  |
| Dec. 2015 | 86.6                       | 90.4              | 89.7  | 77.0  | 84.9   | 88.2 | 85.0     | 91.5  |
| Mar. 2017 | 85.5                       | 90.5              | 88.3  | 75.1  | 83.6   | 87.2 | 82.3     | 91.4  |
| ASER      |                            |                   |       |       |        |      |          |       |
| 2012      | 83.7                       | 87.6              | 87.0  | 73.3  | 80.1   | 86.4 | 83.5     | 91.2  |
| 2013      | 84.6                       | 88.8              | 87.0  | 74.8  | 81.9   | 86.7 | 84.1     | 93.3  |
| 2014      | 85.8                       | 89.4              | 88.6  | 76.9  | 83.4   | 87.6 | 85.0     | 91.6  |
| 2015      | 85.0                       | 89.2              | 87.5  | 75.2  | 82.2   | 87.2 | 84.3     | 91.3  |
| 2016      | 85.8                       | 89.2              | 89.5  | 75.6  | 83.4   | 87.7 |          |       |
| 2018      | 88.8                       | 92.0              | 91.0  | 80.4  | 87.5   | 89.9 |          |       |
| 2019      | 92.0                       | 94.2              | 94.3  | 85.4  | 91.2   | 92.8 | 91.0     | 96.4  |
| MICS      |                            |                   |       |       |        |      |          |       |
| 2011      | 71.9                       | 77.0              | 77.8  | 59.8  | 68.0   | 75.5 | 68.0     | 82.3  |
| 2014      | 73.9                       | 80.1              | 78.9  | 60.8  | 70.9   | 76.7 | 69.4     | 83.9  |
| 2017/18   | 78.6                       | 85.3              | 82.8  | 64.6  | 76.5   | 80.7 | 75.4     | 84.8  |

Note: Differences in the participation rate by gender and location are significant at the 99% confidence level or above. In terms of age groups, the differences between primary (five to nine years) and secondary (13–16 years) age, as well as the difference between middle (10–12 years) and secondary (13–16 years) age, is significant at the 99.9% confidence level.

However, while participation in schooling seems to have improved, the pattern of enrolment rates indicates that there are still many children who are not attending schooling in the appropriate grade for their age band (and this is reflected in stagnant or declining GERs and low NERs: for example, see Table 4).

**Table 4: Primary (Grades 1–5) NER (%), by gender and location**

| Dataset   | Overall<br>(Grades 1–5 and 5–9 years) | Gender |        | Location |       |
|-----------|---------------------------------------|--------|--------|----------|-------|
|           |                                       | Male   | Female | Rural    | Urban |
| PSLM      |                                       |        |        |          |       |
| 2012/13   | 62.3                                  | 64.0   | 60.5   | 59.4     | 69.8  |
| 2013/14   | 64.3                                  | 65.8   | 62.7   | 61.4     | 71.6  |
| 2014/15   | 61.1                                  | 62.9   | 59.2   | 57.3     | 70.4  |
| 2015/16   | 58.8                                  | 59.6   | 57.9   | 55.1     | 67.7  |
| 2018/19   | 59.6                                  | 59.2   | 60.0   | 56.8     | 65.2  |
| PSES      |                                       |        |        |          |       |
| Nov. 2011 | 65.1                                  | 66.8   | 63.3   | 64.4     | 67.7  |
| Jun. 2012 | 60.9                                  | 61.6   | 60.0   | 60.1     | 63.6  |
| Nov. 2012 | 57.6                                  | 58.6   | 56.5   | 57.0     | 60.0  |
| Jun. 2013 | 54.9                                  | 55.8   | 53.8   | 53.2     | 60.9  |
| Nov. 2013 | 50.5                                  | 50.5   | 50.5   | 49.1     | 55.3  |
| Nov. 2014 | 49.0                                  | 49.4   | 48.6   | 48.7     | 50.0  |
| Jun. 2015 | 63.9                                  | 64.6   | 63.2   | 62.9     | 67.4  |
| Dec. 2015 | 59.8                                  | 59.8   | 59.8   | 59.4     | 61.1  |
| Mar. 2017 | 61.9                                  | 61.7   | 62.2   | 60.8     | 64.1  |
| ASER      |                                       |        |        |          |       |
| 2012      | 71.9                                  | 73.7   | 69.7   | 71.8     | 76.6  |
| 2013      | 70.6                                  | 72.0   | 68.8   | 70.7     | 68.0  |
| 2014      | 72.9                                  | 74.4   | 71.2   | 72.2     | 78.4  |
| 2015      | 72.4                                  | 73.8   | 70.7   | 72.5     | 71.5  |
| 2016      | 73.0                                  | 73.5   | 72.5   |          |       |
| 2018      | 73.1                                  | 74.0   | 72.0   |          |       |
| 2019      | 75.7                                  | 76.2   | 75.1   | 74.2     | 82.0  |
| MICS      |                                       |        |        |          |       |
| 2011      | 53.7                                  | 54.9   | 52.4   | 50.6     | 62.5  |
| 2014      | 53.0                                  | 53.5   | 52.5   | 49.3     | 61.7  |
| 2017/2018 | 53.4                                  | 53.2   | 53.5   | 51.4     | 57.2  |

As noted above, at the moment only data from the 2020 EMIS are available to allow any assessment to be made of the impact of Covid-19 on participation, and these are both restricted to government schools and have some issues regarding comparability with earlier years.<sup>34</sup> However, Table 5 and Table 6 suggest there have been substantial reductions in enrolment among younger children, but not at middle school level (Table 7).

<sup>34</sup> The issue of comparability is discussed in the final version of the RESP (RESP4).



**Table 5: EMIS: Pre-primary (*katchi*) GER (%)**

|               | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|---------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Overall       | 14.9 | 16.5 | 15.3 | 14.7 | 15.4 | 17.1 | 15.7 | 11.6 | 7.0  |
| <b>Gender</b> |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Female        | 14.8 | 16.5 | 15.5 | 14.9 | 15.4 | 17.0 | 15.6 |      |      |
| Male          | 15.0 | 16.5 | 15.2 | 14.5 | 15.4 | 17.2 | 15.9 |      |      |

**Table 6: EMIS: Primary (class 1–5) GER (%)**

|               | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|---------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Overall       | 39.1 | 39.7 | 39.9 | 39.6 | 41.2 | 45.3 | 47.3 | 46.7 | 42.0 |
| <b>Gender</b> |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Female        | 38.6 | 39.2 | 39.6 | 39.7 | 41.6 | 46.2 | 48.4 | 48.0 |      |
| Male          | 39.7 | 40.2 | 40.1 | 39.4 | 40.9 | 44.6 | 46.2 | 45.4 |      |

**Table 7: EMIS: Middle (class 6–8) GER (%)**

|               | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|---------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Overall       | 17.6 | 18.2 | 18.1 | 17.7 | 17.5 | 18.4 | 19.4 | 19.9 | 19.8 |
| <b>Gender</b> |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Female        | 16.2 | 17.0 | 17.1 | 17.0 | 17.2 | 18.6 | 19.8 | 20.5 |      |
| Male          | 18.9 | 19.2 | 19.0 | 18.3 | 17.9 | 18.3 | 19.0 | 19.3 |      |

### **Educational access differs by location, by gender, and by socioeconomic and disability status**

There are differences in educational access by region (with children in rural areas accessing education far less than their urban counterparts) and for girls (with girls often less likely to participate in schooling than boys). Regardless of which indicator is used to measure access, wealth appears as a clear marker of disadvantage within the province, with the rich far more likely to be accessing schooling than the poorest (see Table 8 and Table 9). Data on disability and the number of children with special educational needs are very weak, though the analysis of richer data from the TEACH study, albeit from only three districts of Punjab, suggests that disability can be a deterrent to accessing schooling especially for the poor and for girls.

### **There has been some success in getting more of the poorest into schools, but not always in retaining them in school**

The province has been more successful in getting the poorest children into schools, but has not always been successful in ensuring they enter the grades appropriate for their age (Table 9), and has not always been successful in ensuring they remain in the schooling system to ensure completion (Table 10).

**Table 8: Participation rates (%) by wealth quintile, ages 5–16 years**

| Dataset  | PSLM    |         |         |         |         | ASER |      |      |      |      |      |      | MICS |      |         |
|----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|
|          | 2012/13 | 2013/14 | 2014/15 | 2015/16 | 2018/19 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2018 | 2019 | 2011 | 2014 | 2017/18 |
| 1 (poor) | 66.7    | 53.6    | 66.1    | 56.9    | 68.8    | 63.8 | 58.4 | 63.9 | 66.1 | 72.7 | 79.8 | 81.4 | 45.6 | 47.4 | 58.3    |
| 2        | 70.0    | 71.9    | 68.9    | 71.5    | 71.6    | 75.4 | 71.9 | 77.2 | 76.6 | 82.8 | 84.7 | 88.1 | 67.4 | 70.6 | 77.1    |
| 3        | 73.7    | 82.4    | 73.0    | 80.0    | 80.4    | 78.9 | 80.1 | 78.6 | 82.1 | 88.8 | 86.0 | 89.9 | 79.0 | 81.0 | 84.6    |
| 4        | 78.5    | 85.9    | 76.6    | 88.9    | 83.7    | 87.1 | 86.5 | 86.4 | 86.7 | 87.2 | 89.9 | 92.4 | 84.4 | 87.2 | 88.5    |
| 5 (rich) | 85.5    | 85.1    | 83.8    | 94.3    | 88.4    | 91.3 | 91.9 | 92.9 | 90.0 | 91.2 | 92.8 | 95.4 | 91.3 | 92.2 | 92.8    |

Note: Differences in the participation rate by wealth quintiles are significant at the 99% confidence level or above for most of the group-wise comparisons. More details about the significance levels can be found in the dataset-specific annexes.

**Table 9: Primary NER (%) by wealth status/expenditure quintiles**

| Dataset  | PSLM    |         |         |         |         | ASER |      |      |      |      |      |      | MICS |      |         |
|----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|
|          | 2012/13 | 2013/14 | 2014/15 | 2015/16 | 2018/19 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2018 | 2019 | 2011 | 2014 | 2017/18 |
| 1 (poor) | 53.1    | 50.8    | 52.1    | 48.4    | 52.0    | 57.4 | 49.0 | 54.4 | 58.3 | 63.5 | 66.8 | 64.7 | 32.6 | 30.5 | 36.0    |
| 2        | 59.9    | 63.4    | 55.3    | 54.9    | 53.4    | 66.3 | 62.7 | 65.4 | 67.0 | 72.6 | 71.9 | 72.0 | 50.9 | 50.5 | 53.8    |
| 3        | 63.4    | 69.5    | 61.1    | 63.8    | 60.5    | 69.4 | 67.9 | 68.2 | 68.9 | 76.2 | 71.8 | 74.6 | 60.5 | 61.2 | 59.6    |
| 4        | 67.8    | 70.9    | 65.4    | 68.8    | 64.1    | 75.1 | 72.0 | 75.3 | 74.8 | 73.4 | 74.4 | 76.7 | 65.8 | 65.3 | 62.3    |
| 5 (rich) | 72.5    | 74.0    | 70.8    | 72.2    | 69.6    | 77.6 | 76.0 | 78.2 | 75.8 | 76.1 | 75.4 | 79.3 | 69.4 | 68.5 | 63.4    |

**Table 10: Drop-out rates (%) by wealth status/expenditure quintiles**

| Dataset  | PSLM    |         |         |         |         | ASER |      |      |      |      |      |      | MICS |      |         |
|----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|
|          | 2012/13 | 2013/14 | 2014/15 | 2015/16 | 2018/19 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2018 | 2019 | 2011 | 2014 | 2017/18 |
| 1 (poor) | 7.8     | 10.9    | 8.5     | 11.5    | 7.2     | 10.3 | 9.2  | 9.9  | 11.1 | 8.3  | 7.9  | 6.8  | 8.6  | 10.7 | 13.7    |
| 2        | 8.7     | 11.0    | 8.2     | 9.7     | 8.0     | 8.6  | 11.7 | 7.4  | 9.3  | 8.2  | 7.1  | 4.6  | 11.0 | 13.0 | 12.3    |
| 3        | 8.8     | 6.7     | 9.1     | 8.6     | 8.0     | 9.0  | 8.0  | 10.1 | 8.3  | 5.6  | 6.4  | 4.2  | 10.1 | 11.0 | 9.7     |
| 4        | 8.6     | 5.1     | 8.7     | 5.7     | 8.1     | 6.3  | 6.0  | 6.0  | 6.1  | 5.4  | 5.1  | 4.3  | 8.6  | 8.1  | 7.6     |
| 5 (rich) | 6.4     | 6.3     | 6.9     | 2.6     | 6.3     | 4.0  | 4.1  | 3.5  | 4.6  | 3.9  | 3.5  | 3.0  | 5.3  | 5.2  | 5.0     |

Note: Differences in the drop-out rate by wealth or expenditure quintiles show varying levels of significance and non-significance, without a clear pattern. More details about the significance levels can be found in the dataset-specific annexes.

## There is an increasing share of school-age children in private schools

Analysis of participation and enrolment over this time period shows an increasing share of the private sector in education, across schooling levels (Table 11).

**Table 11: Participation (5–16 years) by school type (%)**

|             | Government | Private | Madrassah | Other |
|-------------|------------|---------|-----------|-------|
| <b>PSLM</b> |            |         |           |       |
| 2012/13     | 60.5       | 37.4    | 1.9       | 0.2   |
| 2013/14     | 56.5       | 42.9    | 0.5       | 0.2   |
| 2014/15     | 56.6       | 42.2    | 1.0       | 0.2   |
| 2015/16     | 54.1       | 43.4    | 2.2       | 0.3   |
| 2018/19     | 55.3       | 43.6    | 0.9       | 0.2   |
| <b>PSES</b> |            |         |           |       |
| Nov. 2011   | 61.6       | 36.8    | 1.6       |       |
| Jun. 2012   | 62.1       | 35.7    | 2.2       |       |
| Nov. 2012   | 61.9       | 35.3    | 2.9       |       |
| Jun. 2013   | 61.8       | 35.1    | 3.1       |       |
| Nov. 2013   | 61.5       | 35.9    | 2.6       |       |
| Nov. 2014   | 59.9       | 37.6    | 2.6       |       |
| Jun. 2015   | 60.6       | 36.7    | 2.7       |       |
| Dec. 2015   | 60.8       | 37.1    | 2.1       |       |
| Mar. 2017   | 55.4       | 41.3    | 3.2       |       |
| <b>ASER</b> |            |         |           |       |
| 2012        | 65.9       | 31.6    | 1.5       | 1.1   |
| 2013        | 62.0       | 35.4    | 1.3       | 1.3   |
| 2014        | 58.5       | 38.9    | 1.3       | 1.3   |
| 2015        | 61.4       | 35.8    | 1.4       | 1.3   |
| 2016        | 65.7       | 31.6    | 1.4       | 1.3   |
| 2018        | 72.4       | 25.7    | 1.0       | 0.9   |
| 2019        | 62.1       | 36.4    | 0.8       | 0.7   |
| <b>MICS</b> |            |         |           |       |
| 2011        | 63.4       | 36.3    | 0.2       | 0.0   |
| 2014        | 60.7       | 39.2    | -         | 0.1   |
| 2017/18     | 61.0       | 38.1    | 0.7       | 0.2   |

## Punjab has fared better than other provinces in Pakistan in educational access during the evaluation period

Table 12 and Table 13 report participation rates (5–16 years) and NERs at the primary level for children in Punjab compared to other provinces (and regions) in Pakistan. Punjab's performance in getting children into school has been consistently better during the evaluation period (based in particular on PSLM data, which are likely to be the most comparable) than other parts of Pakistan.

**Table 12: Participation rates (%; 5–16 years), by province/region**

|                  | PSLM        |             |             |             |             | ASER        |             |             |             |             |             |             |
|------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
|                  | 2012/13     | 2013/14     | 2014/15     | 2015/16     | 2018/19     | 2012        | 2013        | 2014        | 2015        | 2016        | 2018        | 2019        |
| Punjab           | 74.6        | 73.2        | 74.6        | 73.8        | 79.1        | 83.7        | 84.6        | 85.8        | 85.0        | 85.8        | 88.8        | 92.0        |
| KPK              | 70.9        | 68.2        | 72.9        | 68.8        | 68.9        | 82.2        | 85.2        | 84.0        | 86.4        | 84.0        | 84.1        | 84.2        |
| Sindh            | 60.3        | 56.2        | 61.2        | 56.4        | 58.4        | 68.3        | 73.7        | 77.1        | 77.5        | 77.2        | 85.1        | 87.9        |
| Balochistan      | 52.0        | 49.2        | 56.6        | 44.4        | 41.0        | 63.8        | 63.6        | 66.6        | 68.9        | 62.6        | 70.1        | 71.0        |
| AJK              |             |             |             |             |             | 91.7        | 94.4        | 93.3        | 95.3        | 95.5        | 94.4        | 96.9        |
| FATA             |             |             |             |             |             | 73.0        | 77.4        | 78.0        | 77.9        | 83.2        | 69.9        | 70.3        |
| Gilgit-Baltistan |             |             |             |             |             | 82.1        | 81.7        | 83.9        | 83.0        | 85.7        | 89.2        | 91.1        |
| Islamabad – ICT  |             |             |             |             |             | 93.0        | 92.9        | 99.5        | 97.8        | 93.0        | 90.6        | 95.9        |
| <b>Total</b>     | <b>69.3</b> | <b>66.5</b> | <b>69.9</b> | <b>67.1</b> | <b>69.9</b> | <b>76.0</b> | <b>78.4</b> | <b>79.4</b> | <b>80.2</b> | <b>79.1</b> | <b>81.6</b> | <b>84.0</b> |

**Table 13: Primary NER (%) by province/region**

|                  | PSLM        |             |             |             |             | ASER        |             |             |             |             |             |             |
|------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
|                  | 2012/13     | 2013/14     | 2014/15     | 2015/16     | 2018/19     | 2012        | 2013        | 2014        | 2015        | 2016        | 2018        | 2019        |
| Punjab           | 62.3        | 64.3        | 61.1        | 58.8        | 59.6        | 71.9        | 70.6        | 72.9        | 72.4        | 73.0        | 73.1        | 75.7        |
| KPK              | 53.9        | 54.2        | 56.4        | 52.6        | 47.8        | 64.7        | 67.4        | 65.8        | 69.8        | 64.8        | 59.3        | 64.3        |
| Sindh            | 52.3        | 48.5        | 51.0        | 48.3        | 47.7        | 61.8        | 66.0        | 67.5        | 67.5        | 68.1        | 61.1        | 72.4        |
| Balochistan      | 44.7        | 38.7        | 46.1        | 32.7        | 33.0        | 35.4        | 41.6        | 40.9        | 54.7        | 45.9        | 41.0        | 51.9        |
| AJK              |             |             |             |             |             | 74.4        | 72.6        | 73.0        | 74.8        | 78.3        | 66.7        | 67.3        |
| FATA             |             |             |             |             |             | 55.7        | 59.1        | 57.8        | 63.4        | 65.7        | 51.3        | 58.0        |
| Gilgit-Baltistan |             |             |             |             |             | 60.3        | 57.6        | 57.5        | 58.9        | 61.7        | 61.7        | 53.6        |
| Islamabad – ICT  |             |             |             |             |             | 80.1        | 75.4        | 96.4        | 81.7        | 76.1        | 66.0        | 76.2        |
| <b>Total</b>     | <b>57.5</b> | <b>56.7</b> | <b>56.7</b> | <b>53.7</b> | <b>52.8</b> | <b>58.4</b> | <b>61.7</b> | <b>61.5</b> | <b>65.7</b> | <b>63.5</b> | <b>57.4</b> | <b>63.9</b> |

### **Available access indicators have limitations**

The access indicators – participation rates and GERs and NERs – are snapshots at a point in time. They can also have differing values, depending on how they are calculated, so they need to be interpreted with caution. For example, a GER can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students. Participation rates are calculated as the percentage who report participating in school, regardless of the grade. They can be calculated for any age group and not just for the official school-age population, as is the case for GERs. Therefore, participations rates could vary significantly from enrolment rates.


There are also differences in how socioeconomic status is measured between sources. Some datasets do not collect suitable measures to allow disaggregation, while others use excessively simple indicators. It is important to understand which children are participating more in schooling, as well as aggregate numbers. It could be that the greater participation reflects entry by more marginalised children, but once they are in school it becomes even more important to ensure they receive quality learning opportunities so that they can attain the skills required for smooth progression through schooling, rather than dropping out.

## **5.5 Have learning outcomes improved?**


This analysis covers the period 2012–2020 using LND data, DFID 6MA data, and ASER data (mainly rural). The first two of these datasets collect learning outcomes data for Grade 3 pupils while the latter collects pupil outcomes information for all children aged 5–16 years (on Grade 2, and some Grade 3, competencies). Data are mainly collected on literacy and numeracy (English, Urdu, and maths mainly, with some variations in ASER, which focuses more on basic skills, depending on which part of the country children are assessed in) and are either school-based (LND and DFID 6MA) or household-based (ASER). Reported data from TEACH, PEC, MICS, and SABER SD survey are also discussed.

### **Learning outcomes from school-based data show some improvements in the period 2014–19, with differences by location, gender, and school type**


Based on the LND data, there have been some gains in learning outcomes in the province and across most competencies during the period in which data are available, though results worsened during 2019 and 2020, and no data are available for the period after Covid-19 led to school closures (see Figure 10).

**Figure 10: Average school-level score (%), LND data by subject**

There are differences in learning outcomes by gender (Figure 11), location (Figure 12), and school type (Figure 13), as shown by the DFID 6MA data. However, these data were only collected up to March 2018.


**Figure 11: Learning outcomes by subject and student gender, DFID 6MA data**

Note: Differences in average scores by gender are significant at the 99% significance level or above.

**Figure 12: Learning outcomes by subject and location, DFID 6MA data, Sept. 2016**

Note: Differences in average scores by location are significant at the 95% significance level or above.



**Figure 13: Learning outcomes by subject and school type, DFID 6MA data**

Note: Differences in average scores between government and PEF schools are significant at the 99.9% significance level across subjects and rounds.



### Small improvements in learning outcomes do not necessarily signify failure

The data show some progress for the limited set of skills that are assessed. However, when interpreting results, it is important to remember that evidence about other aspects of children's learning and development is not available and that learning progresses in a complex and non-linear manner, so it is helpful to observe gains over a suitably long time period.


Another critical point to note is that understanding whose learning is being assessed becomes all the more important in light of progress in the enrolment of disadvantaged children. These children tend to have poorer learning outcomes and improvement in enrolment of the disadvantaged would be expected to have a negative effect on measured learning outcomes if the quality of schools does not change. The success lies in getting these children into school, followed by retaining them long enough in the system to show meaningful improvements in learning. The fact that it has not been possible to identify the socioeconomic profile of the assessed students is a significant weakness of both the LND and the DFID 6MA datasets.

### Rural ASER data paint a less optimistic picture of learning in Punjab, with some recent improvements

ASER data provide mainly a rural dataset that reports learning outcomes as scaled scores (a child is able to read nothing, a child is able to read a word, etc.), shows poor levels of learning, but with some improvement in 2018–19. Large proportions of school-aged children are unable to achieve the most basic outcomes in literacy and numeracy. This dataset also allows for a more nuanced analysis of learning outcomes by allowing disaggregation by socioeconomic status. Figure 14 compares the proportion of children able to read nothing and able to read a story for the richest and poorest deciles and Figure 15 the proportion of children unable to identify numbers one to nine, and those able to carry out division.

**Figure 14: Achievement gaps in literacy (%), by socioeconomic status****Figure 15: Achievement gaps in numeracy (%), by socioeconomic status**

Wealth emerges as a strong predictor of performance, especially so for girls – the poorest girls in rural Punjab have the worst learning outcomes (see, for example, Figure 16). There have been some improvements – the gap between the poorest girls and the poorest boys diminished in 2018–19. Furthermore, the gap between the poorest quintile and the richest quintile, while persistent, has narrowed over time. Limited data (MICS) show that children in urban areas outperform their peers in rural areas, particularly in terms of literacy.

**Figure 16: Children able to read a story (%), by gender and socioeconomic status**

## Children do learn more in school than out of it

Even in relatively poorly performing education systems, there is a positive relationship between schooling and learning (World Bank, 2018). Getting children into schools improves their chances of learning – and this is clearly the case in the Punjab, though learning levels even for children who are in school remain low. Nevertheless, getting them into school and retaining them for the full cycle in a good-quality environment is fundamentally important.

**Children in (rural) Punjab have performed above the national average as compared to other provinces and regions in the country over the period of PESP2, though overall achievement levels remain persistently low**

Table 14 and Table 15 (from ASER surveys, covering rural areas) below show that Punjab has performed above the national average in both simple measures of literacy and numeracy, but that there is little indication of major improvements over time. However, the comparability of these data, as well as their adequacy for assessing literacy and numeracy, is limited, as is the strength of valid conclusions that can be drawn from them.

**Table 14: Children's literacy achievement by province (5–16 years)**

|       | % of children who can read 'nothing' aged 5–16 years |       |             |      |      |      |           |      |          |
|-------|--|-------|-------------|------|------|------|-----------|------|----------|
| Years | Punjab   | Sindh | Balochistan | KPK  | GB   | AJK  | Islamabad | FATA | National |
| 2012  | 17.3   | 33.7  | 34.5        | 19.5 | 15.5 | 7.6  | 7.2       | 27.8 | 24.0     |
| 2013  | 15.1   | 27.1  | 27.6        | 14.1 | 13.8 | 7.1  | 14.8      | 19.8 | 19.4     |
| 2014  | 14.6   | 21.8  | 27.1        | 12.9 | 13.0 | 8.7  | 4.9       | 15.2 | 18.1     |
| 2015  | 13.8   | 22.4  | 27.5        | 12.1 | 15.0 | 7.7  | 5.0       | 17.8 | 18.1     |
| 2016  | 24.6   | 30.3  | 37.1        | 27.1 | 26.8 | 6.8  | 10.0      | 29.3 | 27.8     |
| 2018  | 13.3   | 18.9  | 26.4        | 14.6 | 12.1 | 6.9  | 19.8      | 25.8 | 18.1     |
| 2019  | 15.0   | 26.0  | 35.2        | 25.4 | 31.1 | 11.2 | 7.0       | 33.0 | 25.5     |
|       | % of children who can read a story aged 5–16 years   |       |             |      |      |      |           |      |          |
|       | Punjab   | Sindh | Balochistan | KPK  | GB   | AJK  | Islamabad | FATA | National |
| 2012  | 42.0   | 18.8  | 17.8        | 31.6 | 36.7 | 47.6 | 49.0      | 20.4 | 29.9     |
| 2013  | 42.2   | 23.2  | 19.8        | 30.5 | 32.0 | 47.3 | 39.4      | 22.8 | 30.4     |
| 2014  | 42.2   | 27.5  | 16.2        | 29.5 | 35.9 | 44.3 | 43.5      | 25.8 | 30.0     |
| 2015  | 42.7   | 27.0  | 17.6        | 33.5 | 38.4 | 51.7 | 59.0      | 27.5 | 32.0     |
| 2016  | 37.0   | 17.1  | 15.0        | 27.5 | 31.4 | 62.1 | 46.7      | 19.3 | 27.6     |
| 2018  | 42.8   | 22.9  | 14.0        | 36.6 | 40.0 | 55.5 | 48.5      | 22.2 | 30.9     |
| 2019  | 49.1   | 27.6  | 21.1        | 29.5 | 32.7 | 51.9 | 47.7      | 16.2 | 32.3     |

Source: ASER

**Table 15: Children's numeracy achievement by province (5–16 years)**

|       | % of children who cannot identify numbers one to nine aged 5–16 years |       |             |      |      |      |           |      |          |
|-------|---|-------|-------------|------|------|------|-----------|------|----------|
| Years | Punjab  | Sindh | Balochistan | KPK  | GB   | AJK  | Islamabad | FATA | National |
| 2012  | 17.1  | 38.7  | 34.5        | 18.9 | 15.7 | 8.3  | 7.6       | 25.9 | 24.5     |
| 2013  | 15.1  | 29.6  | 25.0        | 12.9 | 13.5 | 6.9  | 13.9      | 14.9 | 18.7     |
| 2014  | 14.8  | 23.7  | 25.7        | 11.8 | 11.7 | 8.7  | 1.6       | 13.9 | 17.8     |
| 2015  | 14.0  | 24.2  | 24.8        | 11.5 | 14.1 | 7.7  | 4.9       | 15.3 | 17.5     |
| 2016  | 24.6  | 31.6  | 35.3        | 27.4 | 25.7 | 5.7  | 10.7      | 27.8 | 27.4     |
| 2018  | 12.4  | 18.9  | 20.2        | 11.9 | 9.8  | 6.0  | 18.4      | 20.7 | 15.4     |
| 2019  | 14.1  | 26.5  | 34.7        | 22.8 | 28.7 | 10.8 | 1.8       | 35.8 | 24.8     |
|       | % of children who can divide numbers aged 5–16 years                  |       |             |      |      |      |           |      |          |
|       | Punjab  | Sindh | Balochistan | KPK  | GB   | AJK  | Islamabad | FATA | National |
| 2012  | 36.0  | 13.5  | 16.4        | 31.5 | 37.4 | 38.1 | 52.0      | 20.3 | 26.6     |
| 2013  | 37.1  | 17.8  | 17.2        | 29.9 | 31.2 | 41.0 | 28.6      | 25.8 | 27.3     |
| 2014  | 35.6  | 22.3  | 12.3        | 29.7 | 35.0 | 39.4 | 42.3      | 28.1 | 26.5     |
| 2015  | 36.7  | 22.1  | 16.8        | 33.1 | 37.4 | 48.4 | 56.5      | 28.6 | 29.3     |
| 2016  | 34.0  | 13.4  | 13.9        | 27.7 | 32.0 | 61.8 | 34.7      | 20.7 | 26.0     |
| 2018  | 43.1  | 25.4  | 23.9        | 39.5 | 46.1 | 54.2 | 45.8      | 31.9 | 35.0     |
| 2019  | 44.9  | 24.1  | 15.8        | 26.2 | 35.9 | 49.3 | 44.0      | 20.2 | 29.7     |

Source: ASER

**The evidence on learning outcomes is insufficiently complete, representative, and disaggregated to allow firm conclusions about trends to be drawn**

These datasets have certain limitations. The LND data report school-level averages and the DFID 6MA data have student-level averages. A reasonably high percentage of responses are correct and there are marginal improvements over time. It is worth noting that school-level outcomes are likely to mask both progress as well as disparity, in that improving averages could be driven by a few students (especially if they are deliberately selected to be assessed), in which case they are not illustrative of any real improvements in learning outcomes. However, even small improvements in outcomes that truly represent the entire age group are likely to be more illustrative of system-wide improvements.

This report highlights that it is important to identify the characteristics of the students in the samples. If the pupils who are being assessed are from particularly disadvantaged backgrounds, even marginal improvements in learning outcomes reflect equitable system-wide changes (in that not only are these children accessing schools but they are also showing improvements in learning). The fact that it is not possible to disaggregate the LND and DFID 6MA data by socioeconomic status is a key limitation of these datasets.

ASER data report outcomes in a different way, which does not allow comparison across these datasets, and ASER data are simpler in terms of how outcomes are measured. Furthermore, there are issues regarding the comparability over time of the ASER dataset, as noted above.

## 5.6 Has equity in education improved?

As discussed in the sections above, **there is clear evidence** (principally from the ASER) **of substantial differentials in education access and learning outcomes that are related to household economic status (in rural areas), and that these differentials are greater for girls than for boys. However, the data available are not sufficient to draw more detailed or nuanced conclusions, or to assess whether there have been changes in equity measures** (e.g. participation rates and learning outcomes by socioeconomic status) **over the period since the start of PESP2 implementation.**

There is a lack of comprehensive and consistent data on SEND in Punjab, though the data available from survey sources have improved in recent years. As a result, it is not possible to provide more than a partial and incomplete assessment of the scale and characteristics of SEND, though there is evidence of significant regional variations within the province, and of correlation between different kinds of exclusion.

The lack of adequate data on the prevalence of SEND makes it impossible to assess with any accuracy the extent to which the needs of children with SEND are being addressed, though it is clear both that the level of provision is inadequate and that it has not improved. Increases in enrolment in SpED institutions have slowed over the PESP2 period compared to previous years. While there has been some improvement in provision for the small number of beneficiaries of the IVS in PEF schools, there is no evidence that provision for SEND in mainstream government schools has improved. There are no data available on the quality of education provided to children with SEND, or the results achieved.

## 5.7 Are learners prepared for education?

### 5.7.1 Evidence from the RESP

Rough proxies of ‘learner preparedness’ have been developed using mainly ASER and MICS data, along with administrative EMIS and PSC data (2011–19). It is recognised that the notion of a ‘prepared learner’ entails a complex array of factors (such as a well-nourished child who is stimulated sufficiently from a young age to enter schooling prepared for it). For this, limited reported data from MICS (2011–17) on nutrition, early child development, and home environments are used.

**There was some increase in pre-primary enrolment in Punjab (though this may have been reversed in 2019 and 2020), but most children of three to four years are not participating in formal learning**

The data reveal that pre-primary gross enrolment in the Punjab has increased from 79.4% in 2011 to 115.6% in 2017 according to MICS (rural data from ASER show no improvement). Growth in net enrolment has been slower, implying that an increase in children attending pre-primary classes has not necessarily been at the age-appropriate level. Richer pupils and those in urban areas are more likely to access pre-primary schooling, with gaps by location declining over time. The share of private schools in pre-primary enrolment has increased such that more than half of pre-primary GER was attributed to the private sector in 2016. Pupils in Punjab also appear to be attending schools fairly regularly. The incomplete information available on the most recent period from EMIS suggests a sharp fall in pre-primary enrolment rates (Table 5).


## Early childhood development lags in regard to literacy and numeracy in Punjab

In terms of early childhood development, children three to four years of age lag significantly behind in basic literacy-numeracy tasks, with only 27.2% having basic familiarity with the alphabet, simple words, and numbers in 2017. Moreover, evidence shows that children entering Punjab's schools are not appropriately nourished and stimulated. Although the nutrition and health of children under five has improved between 2011 and 2017, gaps remain. Persistent wealth gaps indicate that poorer children are set on a low physical growth trajectory.

## There is limited support for learning in the household, with gaps by wealth and location

Limited evidence shows low learning support for children under five in terms of availability of materials (books) and early stimulation activities with adult household members. Similarly, children aged seven to 14 years lack a conducive learning environment at home, as well as parental support for learning at school. Wealth and regional disparity is evident, with children from richer households and urban areas better prepared for schooling. See, for example, Figure 17, which provides data on the percentage of children engaged with an adult household member in learning activities for the poorest and richest households.

**Figure 17: Support for learning at home (%), by wealth and location**



## There are limited good data to measure 'learner preparedness' in Punjab

'Learner preparedness' is a broad concept, comprising all physical, mental, and socio-emotional development that helps a student to learn when they get to school. Good nutrition is necessary to enable the brain to develop properly. Similarly, appropriate care and stimulation during the first years of life aid brain development. Much of this needs to take place within the home and communities, but pre-schools play a role in providing mental stimulation and preparing children to behave in a way that is appropriate within schools. While data is available on pre-primary access, and some further early childhood indicators are collected in the most recent round of MICS) in general very limited and incomplete data on learner preparedness is available in Punjab.

## 5.7.2 Evidence from the School Survey and Community Study

In Punjab, early childhood education (ECE) classrooms have been set up for three-year-olds. These are playgroup-type settings that are run by what are called care-givers. This schooling level is followed by *katchi* class and then Grade 1. In the sampled schools, significant strides have not been made to ‘prepare learners for school’. The survey findings indicate that ECE classrooms have not been fully set up, and where they have been reportedly set up, they are not always used for ECE purposes.

Head teachers have also reported that their schools are not adequately equipped to handle ECE enrolments, and while both teachers and head teachers have noted that a lack of ‘preparedness for schooling’ does not pose a significant challenge to them in doing their jobs, head teachers believe that ECE attendance can equip children with literacy and numeracy skills and also familiarise them with the schooling environment in preparation for more schooling.

Community members expressed diverging views on the preparedness of learners before entering school. While parents, particularly those with better education, reported engaging in activities and sending their children to some form of organised learning before Grade 1, school and community leaders pointed towards the lack of parental focus on preparing children before entering school. Elder school-going siblings were considered to play an important role in easing the transition into school for younger children.

## 5.8 Has the effectiveness of teaching improved?

### 5.8.1 Evidence from the RESP

Data on proxies for effective teaching are available from the ASER, EMIS, and PSC datasets (2011–19). Some evidence is also used from the TEACH project, which has gathered far more nuanced data on ‘effective teaching’ than are available from these large-scale datasets, though only for three districts in Punjab. Similarly, PEC’s PASL report and preliminary findings from SABER SD’s classroom observations are also used. Teacher attendance rates, percentages of ‘qualified teachers’, teacher experience, teacher responses to training received during pre-service training, teacher competence, and teaching practice in the classroom are some of the proxies used to assess ‘effective teaching’ in the province.

### **Teacher attendance in (rural) Punjab has consistently averaged more than 85% during 2012–19**

The data indicate that more than 85% teachers are consistently in attendance when an enumerator visits. For learning to take place, the most critical factor is the presence of a teacher in the school. However, teacher presence in school forms only one aspect of ‘teacher effort’, and is likely to be influenced by numerous factors (such as distance to school, number of dependents in the household, official non-teaching duties the teacher might need to do, or health).


### **Student–teacher ratios have fluctuated and are slightly higher in 2018 than in 2012**

Figure 18 illustrates the trend in student–teacher ratios (STRs), with larger numbers of children in any given classroom likely to negatively impact a teacher’s ability to effectively teach



(though the evidence on the relationship between effective teaching and class sizes and STRs is mixed). Given that GoPb prescribes STRs of up to 1:40 at the primary level, the trend in STRs in government schools suggests urban STRs are well below the prescribed standard, while overall STRs have generally been close to the prescribed standard.

**Figure 18: Student teacher ratio in government schools in Punjab**



### **More qualified teachers have been hired in the province over the last few years**

The data also reveal a sharp upward trend in government teachers with at least a graduate qualification in Punjab during the 2012–19 period. EMIS data reveal similar trends, and also show that, on average, a government school teacher in the province has about eight to nine years' experience in the sampled school and around 14–18 years' employment by SED. Average experience has decreased in the latest round – 2018 – indicating new teacher recruitments.

### **But some evidence suggests that teachers are not sufficiently prepared to teach challenging classrooms**

TEACH data reveal that teachers in Punjab are not always well prepared to address the challenges they face in their classrooms. A large percentage of sampled teachers reported that their pre-service training did not provide them with any training for multi-lingual settings (47%), diverse classrooms (47%), working with poor children (44%), or working children with special needs (58%).

### **Some evidence also shows that teachers are not fully competent in the curriculum, are unable to transfer their knowledge to students, and do not show good teaching practices**

The SABER SD exercise measured teacher knowledge of the curriculum for a sample of 3,373 primary school teachers in 812 schools. Overall, a little more than half (56%) of teachers were found to have basic mastery of the curriculum (more than 80% correct answers in the assessment). Table 16 shows that public school teachers show a higher basic mastery at every grade level, in comparison to teachers in private and PEF schools.

**Table 16: Teacher (%) mastery of curriculum, by school type**

|                              | Public | Private | PEF |
|------------------------------|--------|---------|-----|
| Masters the full test (>80%) | 68     | 44      | 34  |
| Grade 1 (>80%)               | 87     | 86      | 84  |
| Grade 2 (>80%)               | 75     | 58      | 51  |
| Grade 3 (>80%)               | 67     | 52      | 51  |
| Grade 4 (>80%)               | 65     | 44      | 35  |
| Grade 5 (>80%)               | 63     | 48      | 46  |
| Grade 7 (>80%)               | 61     | 45      | 47  |

Source: Initial data release from the SABER SD survey, August 2019 – Table 3.1.1: Share of teacher's mastering of the curriculum by school type (80% minimum requirement).

Classroom observations from the SABER SD survey (Table 17) show that while teachers are able to create a positive classroom culture, they rarely follow instructional techniques and provide socio-emotional support in the classroom.

**Table 17: Teacher (%) showing good practice in the classroom, by school type**

|   | Total     | Public    | Private   | PEF       |
|---|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| <b>Classroom culture</b>                  | <b>79</b> | <b>82</b> | <b>75</b> | <b>76</b> |
| Supportive learning environment           | 66        | 70        | 62        | 59        |
| Setting positive behavioural expectations | 33        | 36        | 27        | 30        |
| Providing equal opportunities to learn    | 89        | 89        | 90        | 88        |
| <b>Instruction</b>                        | <b>5</b>  | <b>7</b>  | <b>4</b>  | <b>3</b>  |
| Lesson facilitation                       | 21        | 28        | 10        | 12        |
| Checking for understanding                | 9         | 11        | 6         | 5         |
| Providing feedback                        | 12        | 14        | 12        | 10        |
| Critical thinking                         | 2         | 3         | 3         | 1         |
| <b>Socio-emotional skills</b>             | <b>1</b>  | <b>1</b>  | <b>0</b>  | <b>2</b>  |
| Giving students autonomy                  | 8         | 11        | 5         | 3         |
| Stimulating perseverance                  | 2         | 3         | 2         | 1         |
| Nurturing socio-emotional skills          | 3         | 2         | 0         | 7         |

Source: Initial data release from the SABER SD survey, August 2019 – Table 3.1.2: Share of teachers meeting good practice under each component by school type

### **Data from the main survey sources does not capture fundamental aspects of teacher effectiveness or allow assessment of changes over time**

The ASER and EMIS datasets provide information on measures that are not always fully able to capture teacher effectiveness. Teacher attendance rates and qualifications only provide very crude proxies of teacher characteristics that might equate to 'effectiveness'. Arguably, teacher attendance is a proxy of effectiveness in that it proxies for teacher 'effort' through presence in school. The way the data are collected on this particular measure, as with pupil attendance, is also superior to asking teachers or head teachers to report on attendance. However, as with the pupil attendance measure, it only captures a 'snapshot' measure of teacher attendance on any given day, and may not capture more systemic absence for teachers which may arise due to them being absent because of election or other similar duties,

or even during harvesting season. Teacher qualifications also provide a very crude measure of effectiveness, in that research has consistently shown that qualifications do not matter for pupil learning.

More useful measures of 'effectiveness' would capture teacher competency, the teaching process within a classroom, and teachers' time on task for actual activities within a classroom, and would be able to link this to pupil learning gains effectively. With teachers forming the most critical input into a child's learning experience, school quality is directly associated with 'teacher preparedness'. In this regard, TEACH, SABER SD, and PEC PASL data are far more suitable than ASER and EMIS data. Additionally, to fully capture teacher effectiveness and its impact on student learning, it is important to be able to link a given teacher who teaches a student to her student. ASER and EMIS data are unable to do this. TEACH data, on the other hand, are able to achieve this, but their greatest limitation lies in being non-representative of Punjab, as they only capture information from three districts and on a small sample of teachers. The PEC PASL data also link students and teachers in the classroom to learning. Furthermore, the SABER SD exercise conducts classroom observations, providing data on teaching practice and methods in the classroom. Statistics are representative for Punjab and provide a comparison between teachers in public, private, and PEF schools. However, these datasets are only available for one year, and data on the process of teaching and teachers' time on task, both in the classroom and outside it, are critically missing from all of the large-scale datasets.

### **5.8.2 Evidence from the School Survey and Community Study**

Effective teaching is a particularly challenging construct to measure successfully. However, there is evidence that some reform initiatives aimed at improving the effectiveness of teaching have come to fruition more than others. For example, while there is clear evidence that more qualified teachers have been hired in the sampled schools, continuing teacher shortages are reported.

Teachers have reported receiving training, though the exposure to training has varied by district and has not been uniform, at least based on the evidence from the School Survey. Teachers have also reported being observed and providing feedback through the reform initiatives, and there is evidence that they value this aspect of the initiatives. However, the frequency of providing feedback is lower than the frequency of being observed, and while the content of most trainings is useful for developing confidence in SLOs and pedagogy, teachers are not well trained on key aspects, such as how to work with children with disabilities and those from more disadvantaged backgrounds.

In the classroom observations in the School Survey, teachers were engaged in teaching 90% of the time. While there are significant differences in practices across districts, writing on the board and lecturing are the main activities. Group work and activities in pairs do not happen very often. Teachers spend more time helping students to work on their own, and on helping students write on the blackboard. On average, about 90% of students are actively engaged in the activities that teacher expects them to engage in.

Teachers interviewed in the School Survey considered that they could not complete the teaching of the curriculum because it was over-ambitious. Teachers were set learning targets, though the extent to which they were involved in setting the targets varied greatly across districts.

The Community Study found that community members were satisfied with improvements in the quality of teachers, through better teacher performance, behaviour, communication, and responsiveness in the last few years, as a result of changes in government policy. Yet school leaders are often overburdened and demotivated, due to what they regard as excessive monitoring, changing teacher–student dynamics, and lack of useful feedback.

## 5.9 Has the provision of learner-focused inputs in schools improved?


### 5.9.1 Evidence from the RESP

Data on ‘learner inputs’ are available in the ASER, EMIS, and PSC data (2011–19). Physical infrastructure-related inputs proxy for indicators capturing the provision of ‘learner-focused inputs’. These include measures such as the availability of drinking water, boundary walls, playgrounds, and useable toilets; student–useable toilet ratios; the condition of the school building; and student–classroom ratios.

**There have been improvements in the provision of physical infrastructure and facilities in Punjab’s schools – almost all schools have electricity, drinking water, toilets, and boundary walls**

The evidence indicates some improvements in physical infrastructure inputs in rural Punjab (ASER data) over 2012–19 (particularly for playgrounds, computer labs, and laboratories). The more comprehensive school census/EMIS data from urban and rural Punjab also report improvements in school facilities. Almost all schools have electricity (Figure 19), and there are more useable toilets for students (an average of 53 pupils to one useable toilet in 2018, compared to 67 pupils to one useable toilet in 2012). However, the number of pupils per classroom has increased (almost 49 children per classroom in 2018, compared to an average of almost 41 children per classroom in 2012). The condition of government school buildings has also shown improvement in this period, although around 4.8% of government schools were classified as having ‘dangerous’ buildings in 2018.

**Figure 19: Availability of electricity (%) in government schools, by location**



Note: Differences in electricity availability by school location are significant at the 99.9% significance level in the EMIS dataset.

**However, there are no comprehensive data on other learner-focused inputs, such as materials**

The main strength of the data analysed in this sub-section lies in the scope and coverage – both ASER data, and in particular the ASC/EMIS data, cover very large (or all government) schools in Punjab, and allow reporting on the inputs specified above. There are, however, some crucial weaknesses of the data. None of the datasets collect information on the availability of learning materials or textbooks per pupil. The indicators also do not provide detail on those inputs for which information is available. For example, ASER data only report ‘yes/no’ responses regarding whether a boundary wall is available, whether a useable toilet is available etc., without confirming the quality of these inputs.

**5.9.2 Evidence from the School Survey and Community Study**

The School Survey conducted for this evaluation in 2019 found that the provision of learning-focused inputs differed between districts. Just over three-quarters of teachers reported receiving teacher guides across the four districts. However, in instances where they were available, learning materials were not always effectively used.

NSB funds were reported to be universally available by head teachers in sampled schools though there were reports of delays in receiving them. Most head teachers reported using these funds for infrastructure improvements and for the day-to-day running of their schools, rather than for hiring more teachers or in efforts that are likely to improve teaching quality. There is evidence that the school environment is broadly conducive to learning, though evidence has emerged of practices that may raise concerns.

LND assessments were noted to be valued, though further probing indicated that teachers find them stressful and they note that these assessments may not always add value to children’s learning in the schools they teach in.

Overall, the evidence with regard to this EQ paints a mixed picture: with some evidence of progress but certainly room for improvement across the sampled districts.

The Community Study found that community members expressed satisfaction with the significant improvements in infrastructure – associated with school buildings, classroom furniture, and drinking water facilities – over the last few years. Although it was considered that the NSB had improved resourcing, reservations remained on the allocation and taxation of these funds.

**5.10 Has the management and governance of schools improved?****5.10.1 Evidence from the RESP**

Some information on school management practices is taken from a research study of 89 government schools. Similarly, preliminary findings from SABER SD on principals’ knowledge of school problems is also discussed. DSD collects information on the frequency of District Teacher Educator (DTE) visits, but the datasets were not available for analysis. Data on SMCs and NSB are taken from the EMIS database.

**Insufficient information is available to draw any clear conclusions about the effectiveness of school management and governance, and how this has changed**

There is some evidence that assessments are being used to track students and rank schools in an effort to create mechanisms for data-driven planning and to create incentives for schools to focus on learning. However, there is a long way to go both in terms of effective planning based on learner needs at the school level, and empowering and capacitating school heads and teachers to use learning data to focus on children who are struggling with learning.

Introduction of the NSB reform has improved the efficiency of school financing mechanisms by getting funds directly to schools, bypassing bureaucratic hurdles. However, underspending remains a concern at the school level. This issue is linked to questions around the management capacity and support at the school level.

Teacher attendance has improved in government schools. However, there is little readily useable information available on teacher effort and time on task in class. DSD/QAED has mechanisms in place to collect this information and there is some anecdotal evidence that this information is being fed into teacher training content and mechanisms. However, information/data from these mechanisms are not available for engagement by researchers and evaluators, are not being systematically tracked, and are not fully integrated into the thinking about improvements in operational management and governance at the school level.

Limited evidence suggests that primary head teachers are not prepared for their role (through pre-service or in-service training), and lack realistic knowledge of teacher and student performance in their school.

However, the SIF initiative is beginning to collect and use more information related to the effectiveness of school management.

**Large-scale datasets in Pakistan do not capture good-quality information on key aspects of school management and governance**

The quality of management at the school level incorporates aspects of operational practices, monitoring processes and outcomes, and people management. The data collection systems of the government departments and independent surveys do not collect any information at the school level on these aspects. The ACS/EMIS data collect information on some aspects, including development expenditures and the frequency of school council meetings. However, the quality of the data are in question. Preliminary findings from SABER SD shed light on principals' knowledge of school problems but these data are available for 2018 only. Furthermore, available indicators are very crude proxies for judging the effectiveness of governance and management.

**5.10.2 Evidence from the School Survey and the Community Study**

The School Survey found that very few head teachers reported having induction training and QAED leadership training, (though a large majority received support from DTEs), though those who had received such training reported it to have been useful.

The head teachers in the sample across all four districts were generally found to be motivated towards public service. Head teachers reported having several mechanisms available to them to sanction non-performing teachers. However, not all of these accountability mechanisms



were viewed as the best means to hold teachers accountable, nor did head teachers feel that they always had the authority to use some of these mechanisms.

However, head teachers have received substantial support, both through DTEs and through Assistance Education Officers (AEOs). The findings support the hypothesis that monitoring through pre-District Review Committee (DRC) meetings has improved school performance.

School councils were available in all 200 schools, and were viewed as a useful tool for community mobilisation by the school heads. They were found to meet often and to include several different representatives, though female representation was still found to be lower than male representation and this was identified as an area for improvement. Schools were also found to be collecting timely and accurate data, and using these data to inform school-based decisions.

The Community Study found that community members were largely unaware of the existence of SMCs, and there was no formal process to select SMC members. Those community members familiar with SMCs regarded their role to be limited to the utilisation of NSB funds and the facilitation of conflict resolution. It was reported that head teachers serve as the key point of contact for parents to discuss any school-level issues, but these interactions are limited. Community members did not report having any interaction with district education officials, though they generally have good relations with the school administration.

Overall, the survey evidence presents a mainly positive picture – one where head teachers noted various significant improvements in their ability to lead effectively and in terms of having mechanisms in place to engage with critical stakeholders (e.g. at the district level or with DTEs and AEOs, or with others through regular school council meetings). However, the areas that require improvement include the provision of more effective training to all head teachers via the different options available.

## **5.11 Impact of Covid-19 on enrolment and learning in Punjab**

The Covid-19 pandemic led to the closure of schools in Punjab in March 2020. Schools re-opened from 23 September<sup>35</sup> to 25 November 2020, and were then scheduled to re-open again from 1 February 2021, with the academic year being extended to May 2021. Spilt attendance mechanisms are being followed to allow for social distancing.

As noted above, the only comprehensive empirical data available on the impact of school closures come from the 2020 EMIS, whose provisional results suggested that there had been a reduction in total enrolment from 11.7 to 11.2 million children in government schools compared to 2019, based on EMIS raw data, as shown in Table 18. Key informants considered that the impact of Covid-19 restrictions on (low-cost) private schools was likely to be greater than on government schools because government teachers continued to be paid while private schools lost revenue.

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<sup>35</sup> A staggered school opening strategy was followed between 15 September and 30 September, with first Grades 9–12, then Grades 6–8, and finally primary grades.



**Table 18: Comparison of school enrolment in SED schools (EMIS data)**

|                                    | 2019/20    | 2020/21 (P) |
|------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| Primary ( <i>Katchi</i> – Class 5) | 7,647,498  | 7,002,824   |
| Middle (Classes 6–8)               | 2,513,867  | 2,572,791   |
| High (Classes 9–12)                | 1,565,310  | 1,624,185   |
| Total                              | 11,726,675 | 11,199,800  |

A study carried out by I-SAPS (Alam and Ali, 2020) following school re-opening in September suggested that household income stress as a result of Covid-19 restrictions was an important factor in explaining school drop-outs, implying that drop-out rates are likely to be substantially higher for children from disadvantaged socioeconomic households.

No comprehensive data on the impact on learning outcomes are available since the LND survey has not been conducted since February 2020. A simulation study covering the whole of Pakistan (Geven and Hasan, 2020) estimated that income losses would lead to around 900,000 children dropping out of school (increasing the total number of children out of school by around 4.2%), and an average loss of between 0.3 and 0.8 years of learning for each child enrolled in school. The share of children defined as ‘learning poor’ (defined as being unable to read and understand a simple text by the age of 10) was estimated as likely to increase nationally from an already very high 75% to 79%. A further study (I-SAPS/Ipsos, 2020), based on interviewing parents and teachers, found that, nationally in Pakistan, only 53% of parents and 58% of teachers were aware of the distance learning platforms established to provide access to education during school closure, and that of those who were aware only 30% of parents and 70% of teachers (with the rate for private school teachers twice that for government school teachers) were making use of the platforms, with access to them largely restricted to those in urban areas with adequate internet penetration.

The PESP2-supported ITA initiative on girls’ education (focused on priority districts) estimated that only 62% of households from which pupils came had television, while 64% had a simple phone (with poor households typically having access to only a single device), and that Covid-19 was associated with a reduction in enrolment in ITA programmes of 2–3%, which was particularly associated with migration (families returning to home villages following loss of employment).

While the evidence available so far is very limited, it suggests that Covid-19, both through the direct effects of school closure in disrupting teaching, and the indirect effects of negative income shocks, is likely to lead to a setback – amounting to several years – in the progress that has been made in improving enrolment and learning outcomes, with the impact heavily concentrated on children from the poorest and most vulnerable households, who were already most disadvantaged in terms of access and educational achievement.

## 5.12 How has information been used to guide sector management?

While information management systems for education had existed prior to PESP2, they were strengthened and expanded during this period – thanks in large degree to support provided through the PESP2 programme including support to the Roadmap process (see Section 5.2). The use of data for policymaking and accountability increased during the period. The ASC continued on a yearly basis, and collected information on a more elaborate set of indicators.

QAED set up mechanisms for collecting information on a very large and detailed set of pedagogy- and learning-related variables. PEC digitised its databases and PITB piloted technology which can track individual children's progress over time.

Punjab improved its use of data in education most markedly for the Roadmap and Stocktake meetings. However, beyond this, there was a lack of policies or a culture to entrench the use of evidence in policymaking, and to ensure that the data collected were effectively used.

After the change of government in 2018, the frequent and regular high-level review (led by the Chief Minister) of sector performance information through the Stocktake process, and the extremely proactive management against targets, ceased, at least in its previous form. A more limited form of the Stocktake process continued to take through presentations by SED to the Chief Minister.

The School Survey carried out for this Evaluation did however find that an active process of data collection and review was taking place at school level, involving AEOs and guiding the support provided to teachers and head teachers. All of the sampled schools were found to be collecting timely and accurate information, though there were some variations by district. The sampled schools collected enrolment data by grade, student attendance data by grade, teacher attendance data by grade, as well as data on filled posts. Internal and external assessment data were also being collected. Head teachers also reported that these data were used for reporting to higher authorities. Schools were reported to be using the data they had collected for school development purposes. Data on school performance were used to guide teacher development and to motivate students to improve attendance.

In terms of information-sharing and dissemination for the purpose of decision-making, PMIU, with support from PITB and the PESP2 TA team, has developed an Integrated Education Dashboard (as part of the SIF) during the last year. It was piloted in the districts of Kasur, Mianwali, Nankana Sahib, Toba Tek Singh, Sargodha, and Rahim Yar Khan. The Integrated Education Dashboard aggregates data from PEC, PEF, SED, the Student Information System, the Classroom Observation Tool, and PMIU. Data are gathered around key metrics such as student and teacher attendance, the quality of teaching practices, the provision of facilities, student performance, and learning outcomes. Analysis reports are generated from these data, and the dashboard is currently accessible to SED and the heads of the attached departments and the DEAs at the district level. Online trainings were conducted for the district-level stakeholders, including the CEOs, District Monitoring Officers, DEOs, and DDEOs, in the pilot districts during the month of May 2020. However, it is too early to assess the use made of this newly introduced data management platform for decision-making, and its effectiveness.

Following the pilot in six districts (supported by PESP2 TA from Cambridge Education), the SIF is being scaled to all districts as schools open in February 2021, with I-SAPS TA support. Other efforts to improve the use of data in sector management include the introduction of student registration numbers as part of the ASC exercise, in an effort to uniquely identify students.

## 6 Education policy and sector management

### 6.1 Policy framework for education

#### 6.1.1 Role of the Roadmap: access and learning

At no stage over the period of PESP2 has GoPb adopted a comprehensive statement of its education policy. As discussed in section 5.3, up to 2018, the Roadmap provided a framework of objectives and (subsequently) targets and the ESP (2013-17) set out the main elements of education strategy but without defining targets. The ESP had significant limitations in regard to providing a strategic framework for the sector. It did not set targets or fully articulate how the broad reform areas identified would contribute to achieving objectives. Nor did it provide a clear basis for prioritisation or public expenditure decisions. In this context, the Roadmap and Stocktake process played a critical role in setting targets and following through on their implementation. However, this did not provide a strategic framework for public finance decisions, and focused on a small set of short- and medium-term (through to 2018) goals, whose prioritisation and rationale were not fully developed.

Up to 2018, the policy approach prioritised the goals of improving access and enrolment, and reducing the numbers of out-of-school children (OOSC). The approach to the expansion of enrolment relied on expanding PPPs, some scholarship programmes (not universal or large-scale), and enrolment drives. The low-fee private sector continued to grow over this period, with little regulation, and absorbed increasing numbers of pupils. Punjab did not build new government schools during this period. Resources were instead directed towards the expansion of different forms of PPPs: allocation to PEF increased with a view to expanding the flagship Foundation-Assisted Schools (FAS) programme, and new models of partnerships, with private actors adopting dysfunctional government schools, were developed and implemented. Achieving quality – as opposed to learning – was cited as a key policy goal in policy documents. However, the concept of quality was not clearly defined or operationalised.

Neither the Roadmap targets as initially developed (from 2011) nor the ESP (2013–17) explicitly focused on learning objectives – the focus was on improving education access and quality. Learning only became an explicit overarching goal (in the Roadmap) from 2015.

#### 6.1.2 Developments since 2018: the New Deal

In relation to education policy, the PTI had campaigned in the 2018 elections on the regulation of private sector schools, revitalisation of public sector schools, and uniformity in language of instruction and curriculum, across provinces. The principles and priorities to guide the approach to education in Punjab were set out in the “New Deal” document produced in 2018, as summarised in **Box 4**.

Subsequently, a revised Education Sector Plan was prepared in response to the requirements of access by Pakistan to Global Partnership for Education (GPE) funding. An Education Sector Policy document has also been in preparation but has not been finalised.

**Box 4: The New Deal 2018 – 2023: Transforming School Education in the Punjab****Principles to guide education policy:**

1. **Developing skills and knowledge:** Ensure every child, irrespective of gender, location or socio-economic class should learn appropriate skills and knowledge to help him or her prepare for a better future.
2. **Promoting equity:** Provide every child access to a public-school programme that meets basic standards, irrespective of gender, location or socio-economic background. This is critical to the creation of a fair, and just education system that bridges existing differences between public, low-cost private, and elite private schools.
3. **Fostering Patriotism:** Embedded in our national ideology and culture, nurturing children into productive citizens who are equipped with the knowledge and understanding to engage and contribute as active citizens in all walks of life.
4. **Clean and Green Pakistan:** Every student, teacher and the school will be aware of their responsibility and the role towards environment through conservation and plantation. Every school will play its role not only in tree-plantation campaigns, but also in raising a generation of children who value and strive for protection and preservation of our environment.

**Priorities: “a focus for the next five years”:****Learning:**

1. Transform teacher effectiveness through quality teacher education and continuous professional development
2. Strengthen basic competencies at the primary level
3. Reform post-primary education through restructured curriculum and assessment that prepare students for further learning while nurturing a strong sense of identity and citizenship

**Access, Retention and Equity:** To ensure provision of education for all, the state is to provide conducive learning spaces in the following ways:

1. Improve access, retention and equity through innovative and contextualized [initiatives to reach] marginalized communities for provision of education.
2. Improve and scale high-quality pre-primary education by setting up child-friendly classrooms being taught by trained teachers and equipped with extensive learning material.

**Governance:** Without robust governance, reform initiatives will be in vain. Improved governance will help provide the leadership to implement and track changes.

1. Strengthen School Education Department capabilities by developing technical and managerial leadership through a strong data management regime
2. Empower school leaders and administrators to inculcate a sense of responsibility and ownership of systemic improvements.
3. Streamline Public Private Engagement to regulate private education and align the efforts of private actors with the department for optimal results.

The most complete recent statement of priorities has been the Education Sector Framework section of the RISE Punjab document, which is a comprehensive framework that provides a strategic direction for public sector investments in Punjab during the Covid-19 period and in the post-Covid-19 period. It sets the direction of the ADP for fiscal year 2020/21 in the province.<sup>36</sup>

#### Box 5: Elements of the Education Sector Framework from RISE Punjab

**1. Quality of Education and Student Learning:** Acknowledging that Punjab is undergoing a 'learning crisis', the strategy aims to improve the quality of education through rethinking teacher development, reforming assessments and expanding the Early Childhood Education (ECE).

- For teachers, a new model of teacher training and development using e-learning methods, a digitized Classroom Observation Tool and AEO mentoring is being introduced at the primary level.
- Assessments will be reformed for improved quality and student learning. The Assessment Policy Framework developed in 2019 lays out a plan for the next 10 years on how the system will move away from considering assessments as an end in itself towards assessments that encourage learning at all levels.
- For the short and medium term, the government aims to focus on continued expansion of ECE, improvement in quality and development of a Two-Year Curriculum. In the longer term, the focus in ECE is to strengthen service delivery to ensure ownership and sustainability at the school level.

**2. Improved Access:** The Department will ensure that children across the province have increased opportunities to learn through measures such as public-private partnership models, improved infrastructure and facilities, development of online education models, conditional cash stipends and afternoon schools.

- The capacity of PEF schools in the coming years will be enhanced and the model will be strengthened by improving the Quality Assurance Test conducted by PEF.
- New centres for Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) will be developed in the next 3 years to promote education in these subjects.
- The online learning platform 'Taleem Ghar', introduced as a response to mitigate learning losses in Covid-19 school closures, will be further developed in the short and medium term.
- To facilitate girls' education in 16 districts of the province with a literacy rate of under 40 percent, the system of conditional cash transfers will be enhanced. The Insaaf Afternoon School programme which is currently being implemented in 22 districts will be expanded to 14 new districts.

#### **3. Governance and Monitoring:**

- To build the capacity of the School Councils for efficient utilisation of the non-salary budget (NSB) allocated to schools, a School Council Mobilisation Strategy has been developed and being piloted in the districts of the province.
- For digitising the systems in SED, the aim is to develop integrated systems with increased capacity of data storage, better analytical capability, and improved data collection within a span of the next 3-5 years.
- PMIU is currently piloting a School Improvement Framework (SIF) for effective monitoring of public schools in six districts of the province. The aim is to further strengthen the SIF and integrated dashboard to enhance the capability of SED for improved decision-making.

<sup>36</sup> A summary of key features of the education budget for 2020/21 is included in Annex G, Section G.6.

The Education Sector Framework (see **Box 5**) acknowledges that Covid-19 presents Punjab with an opportunity and a catalyst to search for innovative solutions that employ technology to strengthen the education system and that can reach out to the poorest and the most vulnerable. The three major areas of focus for education remain quality, access, and governance. The main current priorities of the Government and of SED can be characterised as focusing on the areas of quality, access, and governance, in addition to ensuring the safe re-opening of schools and minimising learning losses.

Key informants interviewed in January 2021 considered that policy priorities for education continued to be provided by the New Deal document – for example the emphasis on formative assessment in the APF and on improving teaching quality – though there was no formal monitoring against objectives (for instance, based on measurable definitions of quality).<sup>37</sup>

### 6.1.3 Gender, inclusion and equity

Gender, inclusion and equity in education has throughout the period been an important concern for GoPb, and targets were set for enrolment and learning for girls under the Roadmap, but no comprehensive approach to addressing inclusion and equity has been adopted. The emphasis in relation to inclusion initially focused on access to education rather than learning – for instance through the use of stipends and scholarship programmes.

The Punjab Free and Compulsory Education Act of 2014 provided a legal basis for education for all children, and included provisions for addressing the needs of marginalised children. However, the way in which universal education for children with SEND should be met was not made explicit in the law, but rather was dependent on intended subsidiary regulations. The Roadmap did not set any targets related to addressing children with SEND. The only significant initiative to address the needs of children with SEND was the PIEP (see section 10.7). From 2017/18, GoPb agreed to RAF targets focused mainly on strengthening SpED, but these did not include policy reforms. SpED was under-resourced as regards effectively meeting the needs of children with severe or profound SEND, while SED had neither a clear mandate nor effective capacity to address SEND within mainstream schools. The organisational structure for SpED after devolution to DEAs posed challenges for effective management of SpED institutions, while the average rate of execution of the SpED development budget was only 21.2%.

While the New Deal document did not make any explicit reference to SEND, important initiatives (both supported by PESP2 TA) have taken place since 2018: the IES and SEP documents that were finalised by December 2019 have for the first time formally defined SED's responsibility for children with mild and moderate SEND, and set out a comprehensive policy framework. Implementation plans for the IES and SEP have been developed and costed.

## 6.2 Management of the education sector

### 6.2.1 The Roadmap period

The period up to July 2018 was marked by close and hands-on engagement by the Chief Minister in the education sector management process. Sector management was driven by

<sup>37</sup> The I-SAPS PESP2 TA team has been developing a matrix tool to measure progress against New Deal priorities.



short-term targets (at district and school level), initially strongly focused on increasing enrolment but increasingly also emphasising learning outcomes, within a medium-term framework of targets (but without a comprehensive education policy), supported by an intense process of monitoring and performance review. This was implemented through the Performance Monitoring System (PMS) that was introduced in 2014/15 which formalised a district level process of monthly review progress against the Roadmap targets.

While it was planned to decentralise some education management functions to DEAs, this was only partially implemented. The period was also marked by stability in senior level staffing, particularly at the level of the Secretary of SED.

Education sector goals were clearly articulated in the Chief Minister's Roadmap. The process of Stocktake meetings set and renewed expectations from the district level bureaucracy. However, while the goals were clearly articulated for the top tiers of management (for example, the provincial-level bureaucracy and to some extent the district-level bureaucracy), stakeholders at the grassroots level (teachers, head teachers, others) were not embedded in the information and feedback loops as they were designed and implemented. They were also excluded from participation in the design of policies that impacted their work environments and professional developments. While there was decentralisation of responsibility for implementation, there was limited decentralisation of goal-setting or of the incorporation of local perspectives.

This was exacerbated by the highly personalised management style of the previous Chief Minister, and the dominant role of the Roadmap process and team, which operated outside the mainstream SED bureaucracy. This may have been a condition for it to have performed the galvanising and directing role that it did, but there was inherent risk to the sustainability of this model, particularly because it was seen as functioning as a parallel management system.

During this period, targets set and monitoring through the Roadmap and Stocktake drove incentives for the district-level managers of the education system. To the extent that learning targets were included, their incentives were (in principle) linked to improving learning. However, mostly the focus and effort was on increasing enrolment. This process, along with greater data collection in schools, also impacted school managers and teachers. The Stocktake process was a very high-stakes one in practice (because of the very real threat of dismissal or re-posting that officials faced, especially during the early stage of Stocktakes), and created pressures directly for district managers, and by extension for teachers, school leaders, and others in the delivery chain. There were widespread concerns that this may have led to perverse incentives, inaccurate information, or attempts to game the system, but no hard evidence on the scale and significance of any possible effects of this type is available.

## **6.2.2 Education sector management since 2018**

Since 2018, the Roadmap and Stocktake process has ceased to be the main mechanism for high-level education sector management, though the data collection processes have remained in place and are being strengthened and consolidated through the SIF. The Chief Minister no longer has the level of direct engagement in sector management that his predecessor had, with the Provincial Minister for School Education taking a more active leadership role. There has also been a sharp increase in the rate of turnover of senior sector managers, especially the Secretary of SED<sup>38</sup> and Managing Director of PEF. Rapid turnover of SED Secretaries has

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<sup>38</sup> See Table 11.



continued as shown in Table 50. This was reported by key informants to have led to delays in decision-making as new Secretaries came on board and required briefing and orientation, as well as to the discontinuation on their departure from office of initiatives that previous Secretaries had undertaken (for instance, the Teaching and Learning Roadmap that was initially developed from 2018). Some key informants also considered that discontinuity at the top administrative level contributed to parallel policy development processes – for instance, the development of the ESP by PMIU, along with the Roadmap – and that this was militating against coherent overall leadership of education sector institutions, in a way that had been achieved under earlier more stable administrative leadership.

With the abandonment of the Roadmap and Stocktake process there is no longer a clear link between the top-level political objectives for the education sector and those responsible for delivery, and no explicit management mechanism in this area. The revised approach to decentralisation in education (in accordance with the PLGA 2019) will require alternative approaches and implies a level of decentralisation in goal-setting that was not present in the previous system. However, this new system remains to be developed and implemented. Evidence from the School Survey did however find that there was active engagement at school level and in the district administration (through AEOs) in assessing performance against learning objectives.

### 6.3 Response to Covid-19

There have been three main elements to the GoPb response to the impact of Covid-19 on education (with TA provided by I-SAPS under PESP2 providing important support to the first and third of these):

1. **Plans for school reopening based on observing standard operating procedures (SOPs).** The school reopening in February 2021 was linked to markaz-level enrolment targets. These targets have been developed by PMIU using datasets mapping OOSC (with an estimated 5.5 million children out of school). An innovation has been the inclusion of targets for high and higher secondary schools: the previous focus has been on primary schools only. The campaign has a target to bring at least one million children to government schools through SMC engagement in the local community. The central role of the NSB in school funding of SOPs is seen by SED as part of a broader process of devolving authority to schools. This is envisaged as involving wider links between NSB provision and the achievement of targets (beyond enrolment), strengthened monitoring of NSB utilisation, and a future increase of the NSB budget.
2. **Promoting online and remote (especially television-based) learning, through the Taleem Ghar initiative.** A project document (PC-1) has been approved for a project to support remote learning initiatives at federal and provincial level, including for creating online content from the whole syllabus, with a view to this being available in parallel to face-to-face teaching. Taleem Ghar has so far been using existing content. There is recognised to be a large digital divide in access to online resources by pupils, and SED has had no resources to address this. In addition, while high and higher secondary schools have IT facilities most primary and middle schools do not.
3. **The ALP.** This has involved producing learning resources and a revised academic calendar. The ALP was developed by PCTB, in collaboration with the PESP2 TA, in order to help teachers deliver priority elements of the curriculum in the light of the disruption of

teaching and the loss of teaching time resulting from the alternative-day SOPs. It involves the provision of a shortened curriculum (covering English, maths, and science for Grades 1–8) and a comprehensive teaching plan around a revised academic calendar. Teachers have been provided with standardised and structured daily lesson plans. The initiative also provides some innovations, like the development of student worksheets. The toolkit of 'Covid-19 Accelerated Response for Education' (CARE) material has been made available online (through the PMIU website) so that teachers (in both government and private schools) can print, copy, and distribute worksheets and other material, funded by NSB.

No additional budget resources have been provided by GoPb for the education sector specifically to address the impact of Covid-19,<sup>39</sup> with schools reliant on using the existing NSB allocation to fund costs associated with following the SOPs, and with SED funding other support out of its existing budget. This has generated concerns from schools that other priorities for the use of NSB resources cannot be met. However, there has been an emphasis on ensuring NSB resources have been available for schools to use on a timely basis (which had not been the case in the previous year).

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<sup>39</sup> The EPRR3 noted estimates that 'the SED will require an additional PKR 9 billion for the purpose of ensuring that SOPs are adequately followed across all its schools which includes provisions of sanitizers, masks for teachers and washing facilities in schools across the province'. While the RISE Punjab strategy recognises the need for additional resources for strengthening online learning no resources were made available in the 2020/21 budget.

## 7 Progress with education reform initiatives

This chapter summarises the main reform initiatives undertaken over this period in relation to their potential influence on school-level ingredients of learning (see Figure 7).

### 7.1 Preparing learners for school

#### 7.1.1 Early Childhood Education Policy

Punjab's policy on early childhood education was published in 2017, but work on ECE as a strategy has been part of the Punjab Education Sector Reform Program since 2012. The ECE Policy calls for institutionalisation of early childhood education across the province and formulation of standards. The policy emphasises ECE as being part of the state's constitutional commitment to provide universal quality education for all, and cites the commitment under the Sustainable Development Goals. ECE is seen as a vehicle for increased enrolments and retention in school.

The policy notes that poor nutrition, health and lack of early stimulation disrupts development of brain capacities in children. These challenges are likely to be magnified for children living in poverty. Physical, cognitive, linguistic and socio-cultural support at an early age – the first 1000 days – is likely to dramatically turn around children's development ensuring they not only go to school, but remain in school and learn well.

The ECE policy for Punjab proposes a centre-based programme attached to a school. The strategy, rolled out in a phased approach, has three components: i) dedicated infrastructure: provision of dedicated ECE rooms in schools across Punjab; ii) content development and provision of learning inputs; iii) teacher training. The target set in the ECE policy is construction of ECE rooms in all schools in Punjab by 2020. The ECE rooms are replacing the earlier *katchi* classes.

All key education related departments have defined roles in the ECE policy. SED is responsible for planning, developing standards, preparing an implementation plan – including construction of new classrooms and recruitment of teachers, and budgeting. A teacher for ECE is required to be a high school graduate, should have come through the standard hiring procedures, and should have received ECE training. Additionally, a helper is to be made available. QAED is responsible for developing and providing training to teachers and to school council members; and for developing a teaching guide. The Punjab textbook board is meant to develop curriculum and textbooks appropriate for early childhood. The PMIU is responsible to researching tools and techniques for ECE, monitoring for performance-based accountability, and tracking gaps in student achievement. Donors have a TA role. Financing for ECE programmes is intended to take place through the NSB financing mechanism.

#### 7.1.2 Implementation issues

While the ECE policy provides an appropriate policy framework, only partial progress has been made in its implementation. No comprehensive implementation plan has been developed. The main emphasis so far has been on ensuring dedicated ECE rooms are in place in schools, but as discussed in section 5.7.2 above, the School Survey found that these were not fully equipped and schools lacked appropriately trained staff. Other elements of a comprehensive

approach that the conceptual framework suggests would be important (remedial education, and coordination on nutrition and public health for education) have not been a focus of policy attention.

While the foundational principles of school health programmes are in place, there is no evidence of systematic planning to scale these initiatives in schools across Punjab. No mention of school health plans is to be found in education or reform policies, and little progress has been made towards regarding school health programmes as part of a multi-sectoral integrated strategy aimed at alleviating early childhood disadvantage.

As indicated in Table 5 and Table 18, school closures as a result of Covid-19 have had a particularly severe impact on pre-primary enrolment, while the need to use NSB resources to fund Covid-19 SOPs for school reopening will have limited resources available for ECE at school level.

## **7.2 Effective teaching**

### **7.2.1 Teacher recruitment**

Teachers and their governing institutions have been made a key focus of reform efforts over the period of PESP2. The teacher recruitment process has been overhauled entirely with a view to making it a merit-based, transparent and consequently free of political interference. In 2013, the Punjab government established the National Testing Service (NTS) as the primary mechanism for screening and hiring teachers (for government schools). NTS is an independent testing organization (private) that has been commissioned by the government to test all applicants for government positions to assess merit. The results from the NTS tests become the basis for shortlisting candidates, and the rule is strictly applied. This has largely ensured that teacher recruitment reflects qualifications and removed political interference, though the 2019 Education Sector Plan noted that the recruitment of teachers through the NTS is not implemented across the province consistently, and there is considerable variance in the quality of the academic institutions from which these teachers obtain their professional qualifications. Teacher recruitment into government schools has been driven by the objective of ensuring every government primary school should have at least five teachers so as to improve the school environment, reduce multi-grade teaching, and improve the quality of teaching, as well as to improve student-teacher ratios. 80,000 new teachers were hired in 2017.

### **7.2.2 CPD for teachers**

In 2006, the Continuous Professional Development (CPD) framework was introduced to the Directorate of Staff Development (DSD). This system was based on teacher receiving training and support through District Training and Support Centres (DTSCs) and Cluster Training and Support Centres (CTSCs), with teachers receiving a month long induction training at their DTSCs and then monthly mentoring sessions by District Teacher Educators (DTEs). In 2017, the system was reformed including through the replacement of the role of DTEs by AEOs and subject specialists, as summarised in Table 19. At the same time, DSD was restructured to form QAED.

**Table 19: Changes to CPD model**

| Dimension  | CPD pre-2017  | CPD from 2017 to 2020   |
|------------|---|---|
| Scope      | Primary school teachers only  | Primary, middle, and high school teachers   |
| Frequency  | Teachers trained by DTEs for one day every quarter at the cluster centre and twice a month in schools | Teachers trained by Subject Specialists for one whole month every summer and for one day every month at cluster centres |
| Monitoring | Schools visited by DTEs who also provided mentoring based on observation and assessment               | AEOs visit schools twice a month to assess teacher knowledge and skill and provide mentoring                            |
| Duration   | Teacher receive a total of 50 to 60 hours of training annually  | Teachers receive 240 hours of training annually   |

Source: (Aslam, 2017)

Despite these initiatives, available evidence (see section 5.8) has suggested there are persistent significant weaknesses in the quality of teachers' content knowledge and pedagogical skills, their motivation, and incentives to focus on the most challenged learners.

A review by the Cambridge Education TA team of the revised CPD model identified weaknesses, including in its content, relevance for teachers and the dependence on subject experts, as well as an unsustainably high cost (Pakistani rupees (PKR) 8.3 billion for primary school teachers), consisting largely of honoraria to trainees for attending workshops, and transportation and refreshment costs associated with these workshops.

The new CPD model that was proposed (the Innovative Teacher Support Package (ITSP)) moves away from the cascade approach and instead focuses on a 'blended approach', putting technology at the heart of training. The blended approach makes use of instructional videos and lesson plans, which the teachers can access from the school tablets or their phones, along with face-to-face mentoring from the AEOs. This new model implies a significant decrease in costs (PKR 400 million vs. PKR 8.3 billion annually). The focus of spending has shifted from remuneration and workshop-related costs to material development and dissemination.

Implementation of the revised CPD is being taken forward by QAED, with support from World Bank PESP3 TA. The AEO's Classroom Observation Tool is being used to observe teaching practice, information that also feeds into the SIF, and to identify teacher weaknesses and development needs. Following the pilot conducted from November 2019 (by PESP2 TA), QAED decided to implement the new CPD system across all 36 districts using its own resources – noting the substantial reduction in costs due to the new approach. QAED reported that implementation through a blended delivery model that includes both face-to-face activities and online activities (using the ITSP application developed with PITB, which includes modules for primary teachers on 11 teaching practices, derived from 29–30 practices focusing on higher order and critical thinking), and is now reaching 193,000 primary school teachers.<sup>40</sup> PESP3 TA trained 3,300 AEOs on the new ITSP in September/October 2020, who will go on to mentor teachers and facilitate teacher forum meetings at markaz level. The ITSP application is also available for download for private sector teachers. QAED is carrying out monitoring in all districts, while PESP3 is undertaking further monitoring of implementation in twelve districts.

<sup>40</sup> <http://qaed.edu.pk/pages/homenews/373>

## **7.3 Provision of learning-focused inputs**

### **7.3.1 School infrastructure**

Over the course of PESP2, the Government of Punjab's policy towards building and reconstruction has evolved, from a recognition of supply side constraints to access and enrolment, towards seeking innovative and alternative approaches to addressing overcrowding in schools. A core element of policy, maintained throughout the period, has been a focus on rehabilitation and extension of existing government school facilities, rather than the construction of new government schools, with the result that new schools are all provided by the private sector.

Target 4 of the Roadmap related to the "Provision of missing facilities, together with upgradation of schools" and set a target of providing 4,286 computer labs in high schools, upgrade 2,500 schools, providing libraries to middle and high schools, and allocate an annual provision of PKR 4 billion to meet the requirement for missing facilities in schools. From 2016, the Khadim-e-Punjab Schools Programme (KPSP) supplied additional classrooms and missing facilities in fourteen districts. In the context of budget cuts after 2018, the New Deal highlighted the need for improving facilities and providing school-level solutions (including decentralizing construction responsibilities to school councils).

In order to address access issues given constraints on resources for construction, the Insaf Afternoon School Programme (IASP) was launched for middle and secondary schools so as to tackle overcrowding in the medium-term, and double shifts in primary schools to achieve the same end of tackling overcrowding. Under the IASP, 719 schools across 22 districts of Punjab were included. By November 2019, the IASP had been implemented in 577 schools, whereby more than 20,000 students had been enrolled. In addition, as discussed in section 3.5.2, new schoolroom construction took place funded by PESP2. As shown in 5.9.1, there has been significant improvement over the period of PESP2 in ensuring government schools have basic infrastructure and facilities.

### **7.3.2 Curriculum and textbooks**

Reforms (under the 2015 Punjab Curriculum and Textbook Act) have aimed at introducing transparency and efficiency in the procurement process for textbooks, strengthening the curriculum, and aligning textbook development, training, and assessments with the curriculum as comprehensively as possible. Punjab notified the adoption of the Single National Curriculum in December 2020 and has also informed private schools that they will be required to adopt it.

While planned initiatives have been implemented (with support from the first phase of PESP2 TA provided by TAMO), it remains unclear whether the interventions and reforms have been able to address the deeply rooted political economy constraints that have caused inefficiencies in the procurement processes.

There has been a gradual shift towards increased use of technology for knowledge management and monitoring – this has been given a substantial impetus by the impact of Covid-19 and school closures, through the development of Taleem Ghar and the ALP as described in section 6.3 above.



Curriculum and textbooks remain a focus of controversy. In July 2020, PCTB banned 100 textbooks used by private schools for containing content deemed 'anti-national' and 'blasphemous'. The Managing Director of PCTB was subsequently replaced and an initiative is now underway to establish an improved process and clearer criteria for approving textbooks.

### **7.3.3 Assessment policy**

Punjab has, until recently, lacked an overarching policy related to coherent measuring and tracking of student achievement levels using assessments, which resulted in different actors in the sector measuring learning progress in a varied and sporadic manner. One of the key updates in the education sector since last year is the approval of the APF-2019 by the Provincial Cabinet, in a meeting held in December 2019. The DEAs were notified in February 2020 that the APF is the framework under which all assessments in the province will be administered, in a 'coherent and meaningful way'. The overall custodianship of the APF rests with SED. PEC will provide supervision on the technical inputs to improvements and implementation of the APF, after coordinating with departments such as QAED and PCTB. The scope of APF is currently limited to elementary levels of education in government schools in Punjab; however, the PPP schools and private schools are welcome to adopt the proposed approach.

Under the APF-2019, assessments are to be treated as a supportive tool for encouraging learning at all levels of education, rather than considering assessment as an end in itself. Data on the assessments will be used for supporting student learning, informing teacher–head teacher forums, and improving curricular and pedagogical design – and not performance reporting. The overall aims and objectives of APF-2019 are summarised as follows:

- System-level diagnosis of performance at various levels (from student and school up to district and provincial levels).
- The measurement of change and progression/regression in learning competencies.
- Providing specific feedback to SED and line departments (QAED and PCTB, in addition to PEC) on system and school/student strengths and weaknesses to support education achievement journeys.
- Support to teachers through key feedback loops for continuous and needs-responsive improvement and adjustment in teaching practices.
- Support to actors across learning system in the development, implementation, and analytical use of assessments to institute stronger teaching and learning practices.
- Guidelines for the province in its adoption of global test practices for assessments, as and when required.

Under this framework, the assessments and examinations previously held by PEC at the level of Classes 5 and 8 are being discontinued. Two types of assessments, distinct in their purpose, methodology, and the end-users of their results, are being implemented.

The first is an annual sample-based Large-Scale Assessment for measuring core competencies in literacy and numeracy at key stages of schooling using an improved and revised Large-Scale Assessment structure. Other subjects can also be added to Large-Scale Assessment in special years, as determined by the system. Moreover, in the future, Punjab can also participate in national and international assessments, such as the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), Progress in International Reading



Literacy Study (PIRLS), and the Programme for International Student Assessment (for Developing Countries) (PISA-D).

The other type of assessment under APF-2019 is School-Based Assessments (SBAs), consisting of both summative and formative approaches to ‘facilitate an increased involvement of teachers and school leadership in supporting the learning of the child’. SBAs provide students with an opportunity to learn within the classroom by removing the pressure of intra-school comparability and, on the other hand, ensure a fast-paced performance feedback loop to support improvements in learning habits. According to the APF-2019, the summative assessments are medium-stakes assessments for students, their parents, and teachers because the results are reports that are only provided to those immediately responsible for a student’s learning. The formative assessments, however, are low-stakes across the system, and are based on an evaluation approach used by teachers to continuously monitor student performance using formal and informal techniques. The concerned school or teachers are to determine the methods to be used in the formative assessments.

The development of the ALP as part of the Covid-19 response has required modifications to the assessment strategy, and the AFP has also required adaptation to the Single National Curriculum initiative (for which material from ECE to Grade 5 will be shared). World Bank TA under PESP3 has supported these modifications. Grade 5 and Grade 8 examinations are not being carried out, with SBAs taking place instead (with sample verification), along with terminal assessments for Grade 9 and Grade 10. It is envisaged that assessments for the whole curriculum will take place in 2022, and World Bank TA is also supporting this. The design of, and details around, the formative assessment component of the APF-2019 are still ongoing and are not yet finalised.

## **7.4 Management and governance**

As discussed in section 6.2, over the period up to 2018, there was a strong emphasis on the management of the performance of the education sector against targets set by the Roadmap and monitored through the Stocktake and PMS process, with decentralization through the establishment of DEAs intended to facilitate the achievement of targets. At the same time, the establishment of the NSB provided some more autonomy to schools and SMCs. The Roadmap and Stocktake process was effective in focusing the system on achieving the targets set but was less clearly effective for achieving more complex objectives including sustained improvements in learning across a range of dimensions. This approach was discontinued by the new government in 2018.

Studies for the evaluation (including the DEMS and reviews of district education finance capacity as part of the PFER) found that (by 2019) there had been only limited implementation of the new DEA structure and that staffing skills and capacity, as well as the financial resources provided, remained inadequate to perform the envisaged DEA functions. Thus, the intended decentralisation model was not fully operationalised and its future is uncertain following the PLGA 2019.

The School Survey found that up to half of head teachers reported significant challenges related to pressure to meet targets, while considering that they had insufficient time and resources to achieve them. While head teachers now have several mechanisms available to them to sanction non-performing teachers, many considered that they did not have the authority to use all the mechanisms or that some were not always appropriate or effective.

School councils were viewed as a useful tool for community mobilisation (rather than as a forum for accountability) by the school heads. School councils were reported to meet often and to include representatives from the school, parent members, and those from the community. Female representation within the school councils was noted to be lower than male representation, particularly among community representatives. School heads reported school councils (and other means of engaging with the community) as useful mechanisms for engagement.

The Community Study found that community members were largely unaware of the existence of SMCs, and there was no formal process to select SMC members. Those community members familiar with SMCs regarded their role to be limited to the utilisation of NSB funds and the facilitation of conflict resolution. It was reported that head teachers served as the key point of contact for parents to discuss any school-level issues, but that these interactions were limited. Community members did not have any interaction with district education officials, though they generally had good relations with the school administration.

Over the period of PESP2 as a whole, there have therefore been (as discussed in 5.12) significant improvements in the flow of information related to school performance through the system, and evidence of the use of this information to guide decision-making at each level of the system. However, effective mechanisms of decentralised management for education have not been established, and information and accountability predominantly flows up through the bureaucracy rather than to communities and parents.

## 8 The private sector and public private partnerships in education<sup>41</sup>

### 8.1 Policy towards the private sector and PPPs

Over the period of PESP2, the proportion of children educated in the private sector has increased (Table 11). GoPb has emphasised the use of low cost private schools (supported through PEF) to expand access, especially where new schools are required. This has been a highly cost effective way, largely because private school teacher salaries are much lower than those in the public sector while learning outcomes between government and private schools have been similar. However, GoPb has not formulated a comprehensive policy approach towards the role and regulation of private education, the relationship between public and private education, and the role of PEF in achieving more complex policy objectives, including improving access, increasing retention, and improving learning outcomes across the educational system.

Over the period up to the elections in 2018 there were no substantial changes to the policy framework for PPPs in education in Punjab. The major new initiative was the PSSP, which was initiated by PEF in 2015/16 with a view to contracting out the management of selected government schools to the private sector. PEIMA was established in 2018. Its objectives were to 'devise, implement and manage reformatory & dynamic initiatives in education sector in partnership with the private sector', and it took over management of the PSSP from PEF. However PEIMA's performance and management capacity has been weak compared to PEF's.

The new government that came to power in Punjab in 2018 was originally sceptical about PEF's role and performance, as reflected in the funding squeeze over 2018/19. Subsequently the funding situation improved as PEF was seen as continuing to play a key role in expanding access to education especially in an environment of continuing fiscal pressure. However, allegations during 2020 of the registration of a substantial number of fictitious students at some PEF schools, and the response to this, appears to have undermined PEF's position, while the extremely high rate of turnover of senior leadership of PEF over the most recent period<sup>42</sup> has militated against implementation of a clear strategic direction. Long delays of payments due to schools under PEF programmes have caused significant financial difficulties for supported schools. GoPb policy has also sought to ensure private schools follow the single national curriculum and to ban some textbooks used in private schools (see section 7.3.2).

### 8.2 Performance of the Punjab Education Foundation

#### 8.2.1 PEF's role and programmes

PEF has played a lead role in GoPb policy towards the private sector, providing through its PPP programmes a well-established, effectively run, and low-cost means of achieving the objective of expanding enrolment, with a particular focus on disadvantaged areas, both urban and rural. PEF successfully established the Public School Support Programme (PSSP) as a

<sup>41</sup> This section is in part based on the findings of the PEF Evaluation Study (Annex N).

<sup>42</sup> While a single PEF Managing Director was in post from the end of 2015 to October 2018, between October 2018 and mid-September 2020 there were seven separate PEF Managing Directors, and a total of 10 changes of leadership.

new initiative, but the transfer to Punjab Education Initiatives Management Authority (PEIMA) (which has consistently had management problems) contributed to a loss of momentum.

PEF operates three programmes, constituting different forms of PPP:

- The FAS programme aims to improve access of children to quality education through low-cost private schools, by providing a per child subsidy.
- The Education Voucher Scheme (EVS) provides a choice to families below a certain income threshold to send their children to designated low-cost private schools.
- The NSP supports the establishment of new private schools in areas that lack access to education facilities.

PEF's three core programmes were developed from 2005, initially with the principal objectives of promoting quality in education and providing educational opportunities for underprivileged children through the private sector, with DFID support to the development of PEF having been provided under earlier support programmes. As described in Cambridge Education (2019a, Section 2.4.1):

'FAS was the first programme [in 2005] designed as a "school voucher" scheme to support existing private schools to encourage them to impart at least a minimum standard of quality of education set by PEF and support the entire student population of the partner school, whereas a year later EVS was launched specifically as a "student voucher" scheme to target and enrol children from underprivileged households residing in low income urban slums and peri-urban areas into existing schools where other non-voucher students were also enrolled... NSP, launched in 2008, was especially designed to respond to access issues in remote areas by providing a lump sum subsidy initially to entrepreneurs to establish schools in areas where school opportunities were missing.'

Following devolution to provinces under the 18th Amendment and the development (with DFID support) of the Punjab Education Roadmap in 2011, PEF was accorded a central role by GoPb in improving educational access and reducing the number of OOSC, with support from DFID and the World Bank. PEF was set a target of increasing enrolment from 1.9 million students in 2014 to 2.8 million by 2019, and developed an expansion plan in 2013 with assistance from the DFID-supported Roadmap team.

### 8.2.2 Performance of PEF programmes

Table 20 shows the expansion of enrolment in PEF programmes over the period of PESP2, during which enrolment in PEF programmes (not including the PSSP) increased by about 130%.

**Table 20: Enrolment in PEF programmes (excluding PSSP)**

| Financial year | FAS       |         | NSP     |         | EVS                  |         | Total (excluding PSSP) |         |
|----------------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|----------------------|---------|------------------------|---------|
|                | Pupils    | Schools | Pupils  | Schools | Distributed vouchers | Schools | Pupils                 | Schools |
| 2011/12        | 1,022,158 | 2,153   | 45,690  | 430     | 126,648              | 562     | 1,194,496              | 3,145   |
| 2012/13        | 1,176,023 | 2,160   | 59,024  | 444     | 122,198              | 812     | 1,357,245              | 3,416   |
| 2013/14        | 1,299,855 | 2,311   | 87,822  | 618     | 208,247              | 1,038   | 1,595,924              | 3,967   |
| 2014/15        | 1,413,197 | 3,198   | 131,365 | 1,588   | 321,786              | 1,362   | 1,866,348              | 6,148   |
| 2015/16        | 1,696,626 | 3,266   | 193,138 | 2,049   | 416,037              | 1,730   | 2,305,801              | 7,045   |
| 2016/17        | 1,777,551 | 3,507   | 207,479 | 2,125   | 510,990              | 1,664   | 2,496,020              | 7,296   |
| 2017/18        | 1,960,823 | 3,575   | 272,657 | 2,337   | 518,500              | 1,678   | 2,751,980              | 7,590   |
| 2018-19        | 1,935,529 | 3,762   | 287,242 | 2,289   | 462,508              | 1,633   | 2,685,279              | 7,684   |

Source: PEF annual reports

PEF remains one of the largest and most successful PPP schemes in education worldwide, and has developed and consolidated its role over the period of PESP2, substantially increasing enrolment, with evidence of achieving learning outcomes which have generally been better than in government schools at significantly less cost, though it is not possible reliably to trace the performance of learning outcomes in PEF schools over the whole period because no comprehensive and comparable time series data are available.

PEF successfully launched the PSSP, and increased enrolment in its core programmes (up till 2018/19), while also refining the model of each programme through successive phases and seeking to strengthen core functions of supervision, testing, M&E, and teacher training. Significant progress has been made in strengthening PEF systems (including IT, such as the development of the electronic voucher cards for the EVS), to which support under PESP2 has contributed, as described below. However, as shown in the institutional review (Cambridge Education, 2019b) there is substantial scope for strengthening PEF's processes and systems and making them more efficient.

Sustained progress in organisational and programme effectiveness has been constrained by persistent staffing shortages and an eroded value of the per student subsidy provided to partner schools, as well as the lack of a clear policy and strategic framework to address broader objectives beyond achieving increased enrolment, as well as, more recently, a lack of staffing stability in its leadership.

### 8.2.3 Funding of PEF

PEF's funding has been dependent on a subvention from the provincial development budget (the ADP), together with direct financial support provided through PESP2 and some additional project financing. Dependence on the ADP rather than the recurrent budget has left funding of PEF programmes more vulnerable to fluctuations and fiscal pressure than the funding of government schools (which is dominated by teacher salaries). Based on the figures shown in Table 21, PESP2 directly financed a total of 12.6% of PEF's expenditure over the period from 2013/14 to 2017/18.

**Table 21: Sources of funding of PEF**

|   | 2013/14 | 2014/15 | 2015/16  | 2016/17  | 2017/18  |
|---|---------|---------|----------|----------|----------|
| Total expenditure (PKR million)         | 8,327.6 | 9,851.6 | 13,747.3 | 18,565.3 | 21,015.5 |
| Total revenue (PKR million)             | 9,125.5 | 9,898.2 | 12,531.2 | 17,181.3 | 22,395.2 |
| <b>Revenue sources as % expenditure</b> |         |         |          |          |          |
| ADP                                     | 90.0    | 81.2    | 84.2     | 80.8     | 94.5     |
| PESP2                                   | 19.5    | 19.3    | 6.8      | 11.3     | 11.8     |
| Other                                   | 0.0     | 0.0     | 0.1      | 0.5      | 0.1      |
| <b>Revenue sources as % revenue</b>     |         |         |          |          |          |
| ADP                                     | 82.2    | 80.8    | 92.4     | 87.3     | 88.8     |
| PESP2                                   | 17.8    | 19.2    | 7.5      | 12.2     | 11.1     |
| Other                                   | 0.0     | 0.0     | 0.1      | 0.5      | 0.1      |

Source: PEF (2018)

Estimated figures suggest that PEF revenue and expenditure fell significantly in 2018/19 in nominal terms (more than 17% for revenue and funds utilisation), implying an even larger fall in real terms.<sup>43</sup>

## 8.2.4 Challenges for PEF

While PEF has been highly effective over the period of PESP2, it faces significant strategic and operational challenges, and its future role in education policy remains uncertain. A broader policy framework for PPPs in education and a regulatory framework for the private sector remains to be implemented, along with a long-term strategic vision for PEF's role and focus. Since 2018 high level political commitment to PEF has fluctuated and appears to be uncertain.

PEF's strategic focus has continued to be on increasing enrolment in PEF programmes, rather than on keeping children in school, improving learning outcomes, and seeing PEF programmes as an instrument for wider systemic improvements in school education – although there has been attention to improving the quality of teaching and results in PEF schools.

PEF's financing arrangements have remained precarious in part as a result of its continuing to be treated as a development scheme funded through the ADP, rather than a core part of recurrent education expenditure. Major funding problems affected schools in PEF programmes during 2020/21.

While PEF has effectively managed a significant expansion in its programmes, there has been limited investment in strengthening PEF staffing and systems. For instance PEF lacks an effective research and analysis function, while data to guide PEF strategic decision-making (e.g. on the location of out of school children) remain weak.

<sup>43</sup> The annual inflation rate in Pakistan to June 2019 was 8.9% (data from Pakistan Bureau of Statistics), [www.pbs.gov.uk](http://www.pbs.gov.uk).

## 9 Public finance for education<sup>44</sup>


### 9.1 Overview

While progress was made in increasing education expenditure up until the fiscal crisis of 2018/19, the rate of increase (in constant price terms) was similar to the period before PESP2, with the share of education expenditure in total provincial expenditure falling slightly. Important constraints on the effectiveness of PFM for education remain, reflected initially in low rates of execution of the development budget, though the rate of budget execution has improved in 2018/19 and 2019/20. Planned reforms to devolve control of education spending to districts were not fully implemented before the 2018 elections, and uncertainty remains about the management of devolved education spending going forwards. Key reforms (such as the establishment of a financial management cell in SED) have not yet been implemented, and at no stage has there been an adequate medium-term policy framework to guide budget decisions, nor to ensure an appropriate distribution of spending between districts.

### 9.2 Spending on school education

School education expenditure in Punjab has continued to rise in nominal (Figure 24) and real terms (Figure 25) at rates comparable to that before PESP2, though education has had a reduced share of total GoPb spending compared to the earlier period, except during the period of fiscal pressure in 2018/19, when education was relatively protected (Figure 20).


**Figure 20: School education as a share of total GoPb expenditure**



Development expenditure for education as a proportion of total education spending has generally been higher under PESP2 than in the preceding period (Figure 21). However, only a very small portion of development expenditure has been devolved to district level (Figure 43).


<sup>44</sup> This section draws on the four rounds of the PFER, including the analysis of education sector spending up to 2019/20 contained in Annex F.



**Figure 21: School education expenditure (constant prices)**

### 9.3 Budget execution

SED budget execution rates for the NSB and for development budgets have been variable but generally low (and lower than in the health sector) over most of the period, indicating weaknesses in absorptive capacity. However, budget execution rates improved significantly in 2018/19 and 2019/20, reflecting more realistic budgeting and significant PESP2 finance expenditures on school infrastructure by PMIU (Figure 22). Budget utilisation on the non-development side has always been high (reflecting its large salary component).

**Figure 22: Development budget, expenditure, and execution (constant price)**

### 9.4 Devolution and district-level public finance management

Before 2018, GoPb sought to devolve management of the education system to DEAs, supported by the restructuring of financial transfers to districts through the Punjab Finance

Commission (PFC). This was intended profoundly to affect district-level education expenditure, since for the first time the level of spending on education by each district would have been centrally determined according to a transparent formula, while DEAs would have had more control over the implementation of spending. However, the PFC recommendation was not implemented<sup>45</sup> and the new government after 2018 signalled a change in approach to decentralisation, including the intended abolition of the district level of government, with the PLGA envisaging education responsibility being further devolved to the tehsil level. The way in which this will be implemented, and its implications for the management of education spending, remain unclear.

KIs carried out in two districts in 2019 suggested there were major weaknesses in PFM capacity and resources available at the DEA level. Financial resources supplied were insufficient to meet planned current expenditure, and development resources were being used to fill the gap. DEAs lacked staffing and capacity for planning, budgeting, and review for PFM, with staff coming from an educational background. The officers posted as deputy directors had little capacity for PFM. Therefore, the budget-making and budget review process was *ad hoc* and variable across districts. No proper training was provided to the staff on budgeting and execution, or on budget review and there was no genuine involvement of DEAs in decisions on budget priorities. DEAs also lacked access to current financial data, which limited their ability to produce budget reports. While school councils formally had control over NSB resources, they were unwilling fully to use this authority because of cumbersome procedures and concerns about accountability for spending.

## 9.5 Quality of public finance management for education

As is reflected in the initial lack of progress in improving budget execution, the quality of PFM for education over most of the PESP2 period did not significantly improve, despite DFID's focus on the use of SBS and the provision of TA focused on PFM under both the TAMO and Cambridge Education arrangements. Significant weaknesses remain in each of the areas of strategic planning, budget preparation, reporting, and audit. For example, while the need to establish the FMC in SED has been acknowledged, this has not yet been implemented. This compares negatively with the better record of the implementation and sustainability of similar reforms in the Finance Department and the Health Department, also under DFID-assisted projects.

Reviews of the TA aimed at improving PFM (provided under both the TAMO and Cambridge Education arrangements) found that it had limited impact as there was insufficient sustained political focus on making progress in this area. For instance, in the second phase of TA there was a strong emphasis on the development of quarterly budget execution reports.<sup>46</sup> However, key informants from government did not expect the practice of producing budget execution reports to continue beyond the life of the TA support. One summarised the assessment as follows:

'Budget execution reports were a good way to present our data on expenditures in a structured form; however, no reform decision was taken or institutionalised based on these execution reports.'

<sup>45</sup> It is understood that an interim PFC formula-based award of funding between districts is envisaged for the financial year 2021/22.

<sup>46</sup> See Section 5.2.2 of the TA Update study.

## 10 Performance of PESP2 components

This chapter provides a summary assessment of the main features of the performance of each component of the programme, which is brought together in a comparative framework in Table 22.

### 10.1 Sector Budget Support<sup>47</sup>

**SBS is likely to have contributed to encouraging a focus on learning objectives and strengthening DFID's role in policy dialogue with GoPb, and may have contributed to higher education spending than would otherwise have occurred. However, continued weaknesses in public finance management, and a lack of alignment of SBS provision with the provincial budget process, mean it is difficult to trace a causal link to specific results.**

Up to 2015, SBS through PESP2 was provided as part of a budget support arrangement with the World Bank, against common DLIs. After 2015, the disbursement of PESP2 support was against a separate RAF, based on supporting progress towards the 2018 goals of the Chief Minister's Education Roadmap (while World Bank support continued against its own DLIs). The close integration of the RAF targets with the Roadmap process makes it difficult to assess the relative contribution of SBS (i.e. whether the provision of SBS provided an additional reform incentive beyond that provided by the Chief Minister's firm commitment to the Roadmap, and so to what extent it would be valid to attribute results achieved against the RAF targets to SBS). The lack of an articulated M&E framework based on a theory of change specifically for the SBS component also restricts the extent to which results can be attributed, since evidence was not collected along the results chain and has had to be obtained subsequently through the evaluation.

On the positive side, policy dialogue around the RAF is likely to have had some effect in encouraging alignment with learning objectives and coherence in pursuing the objectives, though up to 2018 the Roadmap and Stocktake process was the main mechanism for incentivising performance within the education system. Successive annual reviews of PESP2 highlighted the role of SBS in improving DFID's access to policy and programming dialogue with government, and in showing DFID's commitment to the Chief Minister's goals. SBS was strongly focused (through the choice of RAF results areas and indicators) on strengthening key drivers of education performance at school level, in particular through the focus on, for instance, DSD/QAED, PEC, PCTB, and PMIU. DFID, through SBS, provided a small but potentially significant (to the extent that it in fact increased resources for non-salary expenditure) share of total expenditure during a period in which education sector performance has improved, although the low rate of budget execution for the development budget over most of the period suggests that availability of budget funding was not generally a binding constraint on implementation at this time. While the lack of clear targets makes it difficult to assess the overall additionality of SBS, one indicator is the extent to which public spending has increased for the organisations which have been the main focus of attention in the RAF: in particular, PEF, PEEF, PMIU, PEC, and DSD/QAED. Annex section G.5.2 shows that in

<sup>47</sup> Evidence on the performance of SBS is derived from the three case studies undertaken as part of IER1, successive rounds of the PFER, and examination of the role of SBS in supporting special education and PEF (see the respective evaluation studies, Annex M and Annex N).

general there have been significant increases in spending on each of these organisations during the period of PESP2's implementation.

However, while the CEF framework for evaluating budget support emphasises the critical importance of effective PFM, and PFM reforms have been a focus of attention in the RAF throughout the period in which SBS has been provided, there have not been significant or sustained improvements in PFM for education. In addition, some features of the design and implementation of the SBS component have militated against its providing effective support for specific reforms. In particular, organisations responsible for achieving RAF targets did not perceive any link between their performance against the targets and the level of financing that they received. There was a strong preference (e.g. from PEF) for receiving direct financial support rather than funding through the government budget that was notionally earmarked against RAF targets for which PEF had responsibility. Key informants generally considered that direct financial support was more effective than SBS in assisting organisations to achieve specific targets, and that the setting of RAF targets did not provide effective incentives, in part because they did not align well with the budget process. RAF indicators were confirmed a quarter into the Government's fiscal year, and so could not be incorporated into the budget preparation for that year, further limiting any plausible additional incentive effect that SBS could provide.

## 10.2 Support to school infrastructure

**Both programme design flaws and weaknesses in contractor performance and DFID's response to this contributed to long delays, a failure to reach intended targets for the school infrastructure component, though performance improved substantially following restructuring in 2018 and with part of the resources redirected to be managed by PMIU and TCF. However, the component has not succeeded in its original objective of successfully piloting and replicating new approaches and building technologies.**

The school infrastructure component experienced long implementation delays, and in terms of numbers of classrooms delivered it missed its original objectives by a large margin up to February 2020. The final targets for Humqadam-SCRIP were less than a quarter of the original target. The PSCRIP targets were also redefined. Moreover, the infrastructure component did not achieve the desired quality as the percentage of failed inspections for Humqadam-SCRIP schools was consistently more than the baseline target.

These problems were rooted both in features of the original design (contracting an international company rather than working through government systems, and an original construction modality of community contracting that was abandoned without being either piloted or implemented) and in weak implementation performance by the contractor that DFID was slow effectively to address. Management arrangements for Humqadam-SCRIP were too centralised – to the programme's detriment – and were unable to balance quality/programme cost considerations.

DFID's management of the infrastructure programme had several significant weaknesses. These included the procurement and contract arrangements process for the TACE, accountability mechanisms, and limited internal staffing resources and technical capacity. These factors affected DFID's ability to respond to poor performance by the service provider. DFID/FCDO has effectively taken corrective measures pertaining to staffing and the contracts management process; however, these actions have only been taken in the last two years of

implementation – particularly as reputational risks have increased as a result of media scrutiny.

Over the final year of implementation, however, management and performance has improved, with each of the three elements (Humqadam-SCRIP, PMIU-SCRIP, and TCF) likely to achieve their revised targets, though with some continuing risks.<sup>48</sup>

### 10.3 Support to the Punjab Education Foundation

**PESP2 funding played a critical role in enabling PEF to increase enrolment in its well-run and effective programmes, and DFID's support for PEF has been important in enabling it to maintain political support. However, only limited progress has been made in building PEF's capacity (in functions such as research) and its future role and funding arrangements remain uncertain.**

Over the period of PESP2, PEF has continued to be a highly effective organisation which has achieved a large increase in enrolment and made incremental improvements in its core programmes. These continue to represent one of the most significant and successful PPP arrangements in education among low- or lower middle-income countries. PEF also introduced the PSSP as an important innovation in using private management to improve low-performing schools. PEF has been a centrepiece of the strategy for improving educational access, as it has provided a cost-effective means of increasing enrolment and supporting the establishment of new schools.

DFID's support has played an important role in helping to finance the expansion of enrolment and the consolidation of PEF programmes, including strengthening PEF's focus on districts that face particular disadvantages and that have lagged in their educational performance in the past, as well as helping persuade the new government of PEF's effectiveness.

However, despite these successes, and PEF's record of effectiveness, relatively little progress appears to have been made over most of the period in addressing some core challenges for strengthening PEF, in particular to play a more strategic role in education policy, as described in Chapter 8:

As a result, while PESP2 TA support has provided potentially useful strategic and organisational guidance for PEF, the recommendations made have been only partially implemented, and do not appear to have been accepted by PEF senior management in recent times. The lack of a long-term financing and policy framework for PEF has also undermined the sustainability of support provided through PESP2, so that there was concern from PEF management as to whether children enrolled on the basis of funding through PESP2 would be able to continue in education. TA support has been provided (by Cambridge Education) to help GoPb in developing a policy framework for PPP, but this has not been taken forward in the final phase of PESP2 TA as it was not identified as a priority by SED.

The design of DFID's support to PEF under PESP2 recognised these challenges and needs from the start but did not generally succeed in addressing them. The main focus of support

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<sup>48</sup> The scope of IMC's Humqadam-SCRIP includes classroom construction and the provision of missing facilities in 1,040 schools. The scope of PSCRIP includes the construction of 2,000 classrooms, the upgrading of 110 model schools, and the rehabilitation and revitalisation of 1,000 science labs, 1,000 IT labs, and 400 libraries. The scope of the TCF component includes the construction of 600 classrooms and 100 toilets, and the provision of 7,047 units of furniture.

(as measured by logframe targets) was on aggregate enrolment throughout the whole period of the programme. The overall effectiveness of DFID support (and of PEF as an organisation) might have been increased if the provision of resources had been more directly linked to progress in systems strengthening (as appears to have been attempted through the use of SBS in one year), rather than being linked just to achieving enrolment targets, though issues about sustainability would have remained unless GoPb was prepared to address longer-term financing and policy issues.

## **10.4 Technical assistance**

**The TA provided (under each phase) has generally been highly effective in producing agreed short-term outputs and responsive and flexible, but its record in contributing to sustainable organisational transformation, and addressing key governance issues for the sector, has been mixed. Effectiveness has in general improved over time and has reflected a greater attention in the selection of consultants to understanding of the local context. While TA provision has been responsive to GoPb priorities, GoPb ownership has been limited by lack of involvement in the selection of TA providers or management of TA arrangements.**

Key informants from GoPb argued strongly that TA would have been more effective if SED had been directly involved in the selection of TA providers, and if the TA had been located in SED and accountable to the department, rather than to DFID/FCDO. Key informants involved in or knowledgeable about several phases of the PESP2 TA support considered that a more structured and robust engagement of DFID/FCDO with SED, based around a formal agreement on the role and purpose of TA, could have been more effective – in particular in addressing issues of organisational capacity and governance, and in providing a basis for continuity in the face of senior staff turnover (particularly in the role of Secretary of SED).

### **10.4.1 Support to the Roadmap and Stocktake process**

The Roadmap and Stocktake process provided the main instrument for driving and monitoring improvements in the education system up to 2018, and support under PESP2 (provided by McKinsey) played a central role in facilitating this. The Roadmap provided a clear framework of targets, a focus for highlighting the political priority that the Chief Minister placed on education, and an effective process of monitoring, with strong incentives for achieving progress. There were, however, concerns about the extent to which the Roadmap and Stocktake process provided appropriate and effective incentives through the education system, particularly in the absence of a comprehensive policy framework. For the results it achieved, and the scale of the activity it was managing, the Roadmap process can be deemed highly efficient. For most of its implementation, the effort was managed by a lean team, often of no more than seven full-time individuals, with continuity of leadership.

### **10.4.2 TA from TAMO/ASI**

TA provided through ASI TAMO was largely effective but its performance was variable, with some significant weaknesses in its early stages – which also followed a delay in contracting compared to the original PESP2 design and timetable. Each of the three TA case studies found that TA support areas were identified in a collaborative manner, primarily between department leadership and TA partners, often with other staff members unaware of the discussions and decisions. The absence of an institutional needs assessment beyond the



level of department leadership led to some gaps in terms of TA provision, at least as perceived within the supported organisations.

Evidence from case studies suggests that partner organisations were able to use and implement TA support and output most effectively when it was provided through close engagement and effectively elicited stakeholder feedback. A close working relationship between TA and partner organisations was found to enable an exchange of knowledge that was conducive to capacity development. TA support was more likely to build the capacity of department staff when it was provided in close collaboration, to enable course correction and learning from interactions. It was less successful when perceived to be provided in a less collaborative way. For instance, TA provided to QAED was fully collaborative: both parties were willing to cooperate to understand the gaps that existed and this helped constantly refine the process and outcomes of the TA. On the other hand, some of the TA provided to PCTB, while designed to involve close engagement to build department capacity, could not be implemented in the same way, and this resulted in reduced buy-in and limited capacity development of the department.

TAMO management arrangements (including the quality of team leadership) did not consistently ensure the provision of TA of adequate quality, and M&E systems for TA were not sufficiently formalised to facilitate an effective response and lesson-learning during the early part of implementation. However, in both areas, arrangements were significantly improved in the latter part of the contract period.

It is likely that performance would have been stronger if there had been more attention to institutional and organisational assessment in designing TA support, and a strong M&E system – particularly one that encouraged structured feedback from the intended beneficiaries of the TA, so that any emerging concerns about TA quality could be addressed in a timely fashion. A stronger M&E system would also have allowed more complete and convincing assessments to be made of the results achieved.

### 10.4.3 TA from Cambridge Education

The TA was most successful in those situations where there was relatively stable leadership in partner organisations and clearly agreed strategic priorities (such as the need to move to a more cost-effective CPD model from QAED). The lack of stable leadership in SED and continuing uncertainty about key policy decisions, such as the form that decentralisation would take for education under the PLGA, and the lack of a clear view from government about district delivery approaches to replace the Roadmap and Stocktake, militated against the effectiveness of the TA provided, as did the short timeframe under which the TA was provided. As a result, while achievement was substantial at the level of ‘outputs’ (in the sense of the TA theory of change model set out in Figure 8), there has been only patchy progress in turning this into sustained improvements related to intended outcomes. Many initiatives have been undertaken which have transformational potential. Prospects for this being realised depend in part on further support through the World Bank’s PESP III TA, as well as the third phase of PESP2 TA through I-SAPS.

The context provided an opportunity in that the new TA arrangement approximately coincided with the formation of the new government, but it has taken time for the new government to develop detailed policy positions for education – with the difficult fiscal environment followed by the Covid-19 pandemic creating further challenges for taking forward new initiatives and



investments. It was also difficult at the time the bulk of data collection for the evaluation took place to make firm judgements on which of the initiatives would actually be sustained and taken forward by GoPb.

In comparison to the previous phase of TA support provided through TAMO, and to the Roadmap, the short timeframe, more rapid turnover of key leadership staff, and the less clear policy direction (provided through the hands-on engagement in the sector of the previous Chief Minister) has made the environment in many respects more challenging. This is especially the case for achieving sustained system improvements, or for bringing about significant strengthening of organisational capacity within key institutions. It has in some respects been more difficult to achieve sustained and collaborative engagement with partner organisations under the later phase of support, which has covered a wide range of technical areas and organisations over a shorter time period, as well as attempting to bring about a complete reformulation of the district delivery approach that had been developed over many years under the Roadmap and then abandoned by the new government.

#### **10.4.4 TA from I-SAPS**

The final phase of TA under PESP2 provided by I-SAPS has provided a flexible and responsive tool that has played an important role in the GoPb response to the impact of Covid-19 on the education sector, and in supporting the continuation of initiatives developed with earlier PESP2 TA, though the delay between the end of the previous TA arrangement in March 2020 and the implementation of the new arrangement from August, and the process of transition from DFID to FCDO, caused some disruption. In comparison to the TA provided under the World Bank PESP3 programme, which is managed through PMIU, the PESP2 support has been more flexible and adaptive to meet immediate priorities. However, key informants considered that this arrangement has provided less policy leverage and engagement for FCDO than the World Bank has. FCDO appears now to have limited direct interaction on policy issues with SED (as the amount of direct financial support has been reduced), with engagement depending on the TA partner, who has a good reputation and is trusted by SED.

### **10.5 Support to scholarship programmes<sup>49</sup>**

**PESP2 funding was effectively used by well-designed and managed programmes operated by PEEF and LUMS/NOP. Support was provided to building the management capacity of the LUMS/NOP but the long-term sustainability of its funding remains uncertain. PEEF scholarships were directly targeted on priority beneficiaries (including in disadvantaged districts). The targeting of support under LUMS/NOP was less clearly in line with programme priorities and its design was not focused on its originally intended role as a pilot to inform approaches for higher education scholarships.**

Support through PESP2 to both of the scholarship programmes reviewed has been effective and in line with the overall objectives of PESP2. In the case of LUMS/NOP, DFID bought into a successful established programme through providing additional funding to enable its reach to be extended, while PESP2 provided some organisational support aimed at improving the overall effectiveness of the programme. In the case of PEEF, PESP2 support was instrumental in enabling an already effective organisation (to which DFID had provided support at an earlier

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<sup>49</sup> This text is taken from IER2 Chapter 9.

stage) to substantially expand the scholarships it offered, but there was less support provided to organisational and programme strengthening.

In both cases, while it is possible on the evidence obtained to make a positive evaluation assessment of PESP2's contribution, it would have been desirable to have built in, from the beginning of the support, a stronger emphasis on monitoring and evaluation to enable firmer conclusions to have been drawn than has been possible within the constraints of this performance evaluation. To the extent that the LUMS-NOP support was intended by DFID to be experimental, a much stronger emphasis on monitoring and evaluating its impact should have been built into its design with a view to learning lessons for future, and for example, testing specific hypotheses about how such support should be provided.

The support provided would in principle have been suitable for a long-term quantitative impact evaluation approach that would have enabled a rigorous assessment against suitable counterfactuals to have been made, in particular through identifying control groups who were not beneficiaries of the scholarships but who had similar characteristics to beneficiaries. This would have enabled firmly grounded conclusions to have been drawn about the difference made to the lives of beneficiaries from receiving the scholarships, and provide the basis for a much stronger assessment of the value for money to DFID of the support, and to the Government of Punjab of the scholarship schemes. While an explicit decision was made by DFID on the basis of the original evaluation design not to undertake such an evaluation, if support is continued in the future, particularly on an expanded scale, this should be reconsidered.

Support through PEEF appears to have been highly effective and relevant to DFID's PESP2 objectives through directly encouraging a large number of girls in target districts to stay in education. The LUMS/NOP support is potentially more problematic because the benefits of the support are highly concentrated in a small number of recipients (who were already successful in the education system) relative to the cost involved. There is a case that can be made for how wider social benefits could be generated by the programme – through demonstration effects encouraging other students from disadvantaged backgrounds, and in the long-term from widening access to the national elite. However, the programme design was not explicitly focused on measuring or achieving such benefits. The limited effectiveness and sustainability of the Ambassadors Programme means that the demonstration effect was less than it might have been had such efforts been more successful.

## **10.6 Siyani Sahelian (A3G)**

**Siyani Sahelian appears to have been highly successful in developing and implementing approaches for providing remedial education and related support to reach out of school adolescent girls in rural areas of South Punjab. While it has secured some funding to allow its activities to continue after the end of PESP2, it is not clear to what extent GoPb will adopt lessons from the programme and support its scaling up.**

The A3G programme provides support to out-of-school girls in rural areas of three districts of South Punjab through three strands: remedial/accelerated learning/bridge programmes; skills/livelihood and financial literacy; and life-skills-based education.

An evaluation<sup>50</sup> of the programme (OPERA, 2020, pp. 92–93 – see Annex U) focused on the relationship between the remedial learning programmes and educational, economic, and social outcomes, and found that the programme was achieving its objectives and delivering results for participating girls, as well as generating useful lessons. The conclusions were as follows:

- The A3G programme has been delivered in an effective and efficient manner.
- The success of the A3G programme (as measured through learning outcomes triangulated with qualitative interviews with key stakeholders) has provided evidence that improved learning outcomes through remedial learning is possible even in difficult settings.
- Transport facilities matter more in environments with strong cultural norms and financially constrained households: long distances to schools, high travel costs, cultural norms that are resistant to educating girls, and unsafe journeys to and from school, are some of the huge challenges facing girls' education in many contexts.
- There is evidence of improvements in non-cognitive outcomes of girls participating in the programme.
- Information sessions can help break down cultural barriers.

FCDO's 2021 Annual Review noted that while targets for the component were adjusted following the closure of schools in response to Covid-19, the component was on course to reach its pre-Covid-19 enrolment targets by May 2021 and had effectively adapted to the challenges posed by the pandemic.

The evidence so far available suggests that A3G has been highly successful in developing and implementing approaches for bringing out of school adolescent girls back into education. ITA has secured some funding (e.g. from the Malala Fund) to continue aspects of the initiative and is exploring several other potential funding sources. However, it is understood that decisions about future FCDO funding have been delayed by the DFID to FCDO reorganisation and then following the announcement of cuts to UK aid spending. ITA had envisaged that GoPb funding for scale-up might be obtained once the success of the initiative had been demonstrated but had found difficulty engaging with SED on the issues in a context of budget restrictions, the impact of Covid-19, and the high rate of turnover of Secretaries of SED.

## 10.7 Support to special and inclusive education

**DFID's continued engagement, commitment, and advocacy and funding through PESP2 has been important in ultimately enabling progress to be made towards the adoption of the IES and SEP. PESP2 contributed (through PIEP) to the successful development and adoption of the Inclusive Voucher Scheme (IVS) by PEF, but the SED component of PIEP was not successful. PESP2 support to SpED achieved limited results and in strengthening its capacity and was not directly relevant to the objective of improving the extent to which the needs of most children with SEND were addressed in the education system.**

<sup>50</sup> An additional external evaluation funded through the Jameel Abdul Latif Poverty Action Lab's Post-Primary Education Initiative is testing the effect of the programme on female learning, future enrolment, and educational aspirations, empowerment, and the broader values and perceptions of female roles of both participants and their household and village members. However, implementation of this evaluation was delayed mainly as a result of Covid-19 and results from it are not available at the time of writing.

Support to special and inclusive education under PESP2 has involved the following main elements: (i) pilot initiatives for special education with SED and PEF under PIEP; (ii) SBS, which specifically in 2018/19 was provided against targets agreed in the RAF related to the special education policy and organisational support to SpED; (iii) TA to SpED, provided initially by ASI through the TAMO and since October 2018 by Cambridge Education; and, (iv) TA (also provided by Cambridge Education during 2019) for the development of the IES that was led by SED.

While DFID's continued engagement, commitment, and advocacy, as well as its provision of TA resources to support strategy and policy development in a flexible way, has been important in enabling progress to be made, the record on the achievements of support to special and inclusive education under PESP2 up till the most recent period has been mixed.

DFID's initiative through the PIEP pilots was innovative and highly relevant to the context. Design and management weaknesses meant that the SED element of the pilot was not a success, but the PEF element was regarded as a success by PEF, which was keen to roll out the pilot further but lacked sufficient funding to do so on a significant scale.

The subsequent decision by DFID after the evaluation of the PIEP pilot to switch the bulk of support to SpED does not appear to have been justified by the subsequent results achieved, and appears to have represented a move away from the primary objective of fostering inclusion of children with SEND in mainstream schools, which are operated by SED rather than SpED.

Some progress has been made in strengthening organisational capacity and developing a policy framework for SpED, but the unwillingness of GoPb to fund SpED's development budget, and continuing capacity constraints, have militated against achieving additional results. It is likely that more results could have been achieved for the same level of funding if additional resources had been provided directly to PEF for additional expansion of the IVS and to SpED, rather than through providing SBS, which was not matched by increases in government funding to the targeted institutions.

Over the last year, however, potentially very significant progress has been made in clarifying responsibilities for education for children with SEND in Punjab, and in developing the elements of strategies to improve the identification and addressing of their educational needs, including clarifying the relative responsibilities of SED and SpED. The collection of data on children with disability in schools has also been strengthened. This progress reflects greater political awareness of, and desire to address, the constraints on education for children with SEND, who represent an increasing proportion of OOSC and children facing learning challenges, as overall progress has been made in increasing education participation.

DFID's sustained advocacy of an inclusive approach to education and increased focus on disability (when other major donors had not emphasised this issue) is likely to have influenced the increasing receptiveness of the new government in Punjab to addressing this issue, which was not highlighted in the New Deal policy statement.

While implementation plans for the IES and SEP have been developed, additional strategic and capacity development support will be required to make further progress, as well as sustained political commitment, particularly to ensure the sufficient allocation of budget (especially development) resources.

## **10.8 Comparative assessment of component performance**

Table 22 provides a summary comparative assessment of the performance of the PESP2 components. In assessing effectiveness, a distinction is drawn between the achievement of planned results (as captured in the programme's logframe) and the more stringent criterion of the extent to which the component contributed to a transformational impact, understood as, for instance, the strengthening of the capacity of key organisations, or the adoption and implementation of new policies and programmes.

**Table 22: Summary assessment of the performance of PESP2 components**

| Evaluation criterion                           | SBS  | TA  | Scholarships   | Special/ inclusive education   | PEF   | School infrastructure  |
|--|--|---|--|--|---|--|
| <b>Relevance: appropriate design</b>           | <p>Some weaknesses: Results Area Framework (RAF) not aligned with budget calendar</p> <p>Not designed against clear theory of change</p> <p>Disbursement did not ensure funds were received by organisations responsible for achieving targets</p> | TA approach flexible and responsive, and clearly aligned with priority objectives   | <p>PEEF well-targeted at disadvantaged girls</p> <p>LUMS/NOP targeting questionable since not used as a pilot for wider improvement of access to higher education for disadvantaged and beneficiaries already succeeding in education system</p> | <p>Weaknesses in design of Punjab Inclusive Education Programme (PIEP)</p> <p>Subsequent focus on special education rather than inclusive education (in mainstream schools) possibly not appropriate</p> <p>SBS not appropriate for supporting Special Education Department (SpED)</p> | Sustained support to PEF and funding of its programmes has been appropriate to needs and priorities | <p>Significant weaknesses in design relating to dependence on international contractor and community involvement in construction</p> <p>Revised design of Punjab School Construction and Rehabilitation Programme (PSCR) and the Citizens Foundation (TCF) appears appropriate</p> |
| <b>Effectiveness: planned results achieved</b> | Yes, in the sense that disbursement has taken place against RAF targets, but unclear how far SBS contributed to targets being achieved   | Difficult to assess because of adaptive nature around rolling work programmes and performance measures for TA related to PESP2 as a whole | Yes, but stronger <i>ex ante</i> evaluation design would have enabled measurement of impact  | <p>PIEP did not achieve planned results for SED</p> <p>While the RAF targets were largely achieved, DFID did not succeed in protecting development funding to SpED</p> <p>Progress with SEP and IES in final phase</p>   | Yes (in terms of numbers enrolled on PEF schemes)   | <p>No: initial targets substantially reduced and long delays in implementation</p> <p>Following restructuring of contract in 2019 on course to achieve revised targets</p>   |

| Evaluation criterion  | SBS  | TA   | Scholarships   | Special/ inclusive education   | PEF  | School infrastructure   |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|---|
| <b>Effectiveness: transformational impact</b>                 | <p>By supporting progress towards Chief Minister's 2018 goals may have contributed to policy and organisational strengthening but difficult to establish this</p> <p>Failed to bring about significant improvements in PFM</p> <p>Unclear that led to increased spending on key priorities</p> | <p>Mixed picture but some significant examples of support to organisational strengthening, and development of new initiatives and policies</p> <p>Roadmap support critical to Chief Minister's vision and sector management approach</p> | <p>Support through PEEF made use of an effective programme (to whose earlier development DFID had contributed), but did not significantly strengthen the programme</p> <p>LUMS/NOP provided organisational strengthening to NOP centre but was not an effective pilot for testing approaches to improving access to higher education</p> | <p>Transformational impact depends on extent to which SEP and IES are effectively implemented</p> <p>DFID's continued emphasis on special and inclusive education, when this was not a government priority, may have contributed to subsequent increased focus from government</p> <p>Inclusive Voucher Scheme (IVS) provides model for inclusivity in PEF schools but has not been sufficiently resourced</p> | <p>Limited: supported expansion of existing PEF programmes, and initiation of IVS</p> <p>PESP2 TA has produced proposals for improving PEF's organisational effectiveness. However, progress in implementing these constrained by the lack of a clear government vision of PEF's future role, insufficient funding, and a lack of confidence in key proposals among current PEF management</p> | <p>Likely to be none, since Humqadam-School Construction and Rehabilitation Programme (SCRCP) failed to demonstrate successes in innovative approaches to school construction that are likely to be locally adopted</p> <p>PSCRCP and TCF elements effective for delivery but lack transformational potential</p> |
| <b>Efficiency/ value for money (VFM) (cost effectiveness)</b> | <p>Questionable, given limited evidence that SBS contributed to achieving RAF targets, relative to size of spend</p>   | <p>Likely to be high, though initial implementation delays and weak performance of some support; TA arrangements generally ensured economy and efficiency</p>  | <p>High (especially for PEEF) based on value of transfer to beneficiaries</p> <p>Issue for LUMS/NOP is large size of benefits to small number of recipients</p>  | <p>PIEP had few results relative to cost</p> <p>TA support will have provided VFM if it leads to effective implementation of SEP and IES</p>   | <p>High in that PEF programmes funded were a highly cost effective way of expanding access</p>   | <p>Low for Humqadam (though with improved performance over final period of implementation)</p> <p>Higher for PSCRCP and TCF</p>   |



| Evaluation criterion                     | SBS  | TA  | Scholarships  | Special/ inclusive education  | PEF  | School infrastructure   |
|--|--|---|---|---|--|---|
| <b>Efficiency: quality of management</b> | Not clear that target-setting process for RAF (and management through the Joint Results Framework) influenced results achieved | Some problems with quality of Technical Assistance Management Organisation (TAMO) management in early stages of programme but generally good<br><br>DFID contracting arrangements led to gap in provision (though timing over election period minimised disruption) | High by partner organisations<br><br>DFID could have strengthened monitoring and evaluation (M&E) to produce more robust assessment of impact | Weaknesses in management of PIEP<br><br>TA to SpED generally well-managed though some problems with TA for SEP (which were resolved)              | Provision of financial aid was effectively managed by DFID, and used and accounted for by PEF<br><br>PEF generally satisfied with provision of TA by service providers. Some reservations about quality of engagement in early support | Significant weaknesses in management by international contractor and DFID<br><br>Management performance improved after restructuring and establishment of PSCR and TCF components |
| <b>Sustainability of results</b>         | Varies for different reform initiatives supported through SBS  | Potentially high in some areas (QAED), IES) but affected by policy changes, e.g. Roadmap / Stocktake delivery model abandoned by new government, and potentially limited government ownership of some initiatives   | PEEF model highly sustainable (and benefiting lives of recipients)<br><br>Long-term financing of LUMS/NOP remains unresolved                  | Government commitment to IES appears strong but not yet implemented<br><br>PEF has sustained IVS although no additional funding has been provided | DFID support contributed to continued GoPb commitment to PEF but long-term role and secure financing (e.g. transferring funding of programmes to recurrent budget) has not been resolved   | Future maintenance may be a challenge for sustainability, especially for innovations implemented by IMC.<br><br>PSCR and TCF use simpler and established models                   |

## 11 Findings on performance of PESP2

This chapter provides findings on the performance and contribution of PESP2 and answers the Level Two EQs. Findings are provided in Section 11.1 on relevance, Section 11.2 on effectiveness, Section 11.3 on efficiency, Section 11.4 on sustainability, and Section 11.5 on impact (i.e. unplanned results). The chapter examines these findings in detail, within the context of making an assessment of the PESP2 programme as a whole, including its design and management, and the relationship between its components.

### 11.1 Findings on relevance

#### 11.1.1 How appropriate was PESP2's design (including its components) as a way to meet the educational needs of parents and children, and the priorities of GoPb, originally and over time?

**The original design was based on a comprehensive vision of education reform, built on past experience and was strongly aligned with GoPb priorities and with other development partners. The abandonment of some initial elements of the design suggests these had not been firmly based on evidence. While the design emphasised the use of international TA as a way of ensuring quality, there were significant contracting delays and performance problems with both the TAMO and the TACE contractors, while the original design of the school infrastructure component was misconceived. The directing of funds through established and well-managed programmes (such as PEF and PEEF) meant that rapid results could be achieved providing direct benefits to programme participants. It is less clear that the programme was well designed to support structural and system changes. The change of government in 2018 posed significant challenges for the programme, but TA was effectively and flexibly used to support the priorities of the new government.**

The design of PESP2 was appropriate in its strong initial alignment with agreed GoPb priorities and its close alignment with other support, especially from the World Bank, and in building on lessons from earlier and ongoing DFID support to education in Punjab, as well as its comprehensive and integrated vision of the education reform process.

However, some components of the original design were either abandoned without piloting or implementation (ATF and the community model of school construction), or were not taken forward, as a result of lessons from initial experience (the CSO/NSP initiative), suggesting weaknesses in the evidence base for the original design.

While the Business Case emphasised the contracting of international TA as a way of ensuring quality of management and delivery, there were significant delays in the contracting of both the TACE and TAMO, which affected implementation, and major performance problems with TACE, and also some performance problems with TAMO, which in both cases led to reviews and restructuring of the TA arrangements. The reliance on direct contracting of service suppliers by DFID, with little involvement of SED (as the client) in selection or management, was considered by GoPb key informants to have undermined effective government ownership.

The programme was supposed to complement (on the supply side of education service delivery) the demand-side focus, particularly of the TEP programme, including the Alif Ailaan campaign. This relative neglect of demand-side issues within the programmes (though PESP2

took over funding of the ASER initiative from TEP) may be considered in the event a design weakness, in that it contributed to the programme having only a limited emphasis on seeking to empower parents and communities and improve local-level accountability, rather than emphasising top-down information flows accountability for results to sector managers.

The Roadmap model was central to the design of PESP2 and its implementation up to 2018. The evaluation has found that this was appropriate given the strong GoPb commitment to this approach, and that it proved to be a largely effective vehicle for creating and sustaining momentum for education sector reform in Punjab. While insufficient progress was made over the period in implementing effective decentralised management in the education system and in developing a policy framework to guide strategic decisions, the Roadmap was able to ensure buy-in from the political leadership, build the capacity of government bodies, and provide strategic guidance and problem-solving support, although the strongly top-down nature of the target-setting process meant that there was limited scope for consultative inputs from a wide range of stakeholders into the setting of priorities, and there were concerns about the appropriateness of the incentives generated.

While the initial focus of the programme was on increasing aggregate enrolment, this reflected GoPb priorities. DFID consistently also emphasised education quality and equity, contributing over time to a greater emphasis on inclusivity and learning outcomes in GoPb education policy. The strong alignment with the priorities of the GoPb meant that when these priorities changed following the July 2018 elections this posed a significant challenge for the programme. However, DFID/FCDO's ongoing engagement through the programme and its ability to provide TA resources flexibly to assist the new government in developing its own policies and initiatives.

The directing of funds through established and well-managed programmes (PEF, and PEEF and LUMS/NOP) meant that rapid results could be achieved at the level of direct benefits to programme participants, through increasing the number of participants. The use of SBS to support increased enrolment in government schools against the Roadmap targets similarly channelled funding to achieve direct results, though the causal route there is more difficult to establish. The programme was therefore well designed to achieve results in terms of numbers enrolled.

It is less clear that the programme was well designed to support structural and system changes, especially those focused on improving quality and learning outcomes, beyond the support provided (especially through the Roadmap) to strengthening district delivery management systems. While specific reforms and initiatives in key agencies (DSD/QAED, PEC, PTCB) were identified and targeted, for instance in RAF conditions, the programme lacked a clearly formulated strategic approach to improving quality and learning outcomes.

This was reflected, in particular, in the lack of indicators and targets focusing on the comprehensive performance of key aspects of the learning system: for instance, the classroom performance of teachers, the overall adequacy of the assessment system, or the effective delivery and use of learning materials.

The most important weaknesses in the design of the components (not least because of the large share of the total programme budget involved) related, first, to the SBS component, which was not effectively aligned with the GoPb budget process and timetable, and which did not provide effective incentives for ensuring resources reached intended organisations, or that

sufficient progress was made in strengthening PFM, and second to the school infrastructure component.

While at the time of design, DFID had justified concerns about fiduciary and corruption risks in using government systems for school construction and rehabilitation, the decision to channel a large amount of resources through engaging an international contractor was inappropriate and faced inherent problems of lack of local ownership and of unsustainability. These were compounded by later weaknesses in management and implementation, with the decision subsequently being partially reversed, with funding taking place through PMIU after 2018. The objective of promoting innovative approaches in school construction was an appropriate one, but could have been promoted in a more flexible way (e.g. through a challenge fund to encourage innovation from a range of suppliers), rather than being tied into a contract that simultaneously required large-scale and rapid delivery. A better design approach would have been to encourage innovation through a component specifically designed to generate new models, while simultaneously using SBS and TA to encourage a strengthening of government systems, and only channelling substantial DFID resources into this area once demonstrable progress has been achieved in system strengthening. The fact that the school infrastructure component was integrated within PESP2 in financial and accountability terms but separately managed by a different DFID team also contributed to delays in the major implementation problems being escalated to senior management attention, or appropriate technical skills being deployed to manage the component.

The evaluation also identified some weaknesses in the design of other components. The PIEP pilot for improving the provision of education to children with SEND in government schools had over-ambitious targets and lacked effective SED ownership (being managed through SpED and a separate project implementation unit), although the similar pilot with PEF was appropriately designed and successful. Design of the scholarship programmes could also have been improved by having a stronger M&E approach and designing the LUMS/NOP support more explicitly as a pilot for approaches to improving access to higher education for pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds, rather than a standalone intervention.

#### **11.1.2 To what extent was PESP2's design based on a valid theory of change (and structure of objectives) that was appropriate to the context of implementation?**

No full theory of change was ever articulated for the programme. Instead the logframe structure was treated as equivalent to a theory of change. The original structure of objectives in the logframe highlighted the importance of measures of system performance but defined these as outputs rather than outcomes which would have been more appropriate. The definition of key impact indicators related to economic performance and overall literacy rates was inappropriate since it was not plausible the programme could influence these over a relevant timescale. While the original design intention had been to define output indicators related to system performance, these were replaced during implementation with indicators related to the delivery of specific reforms or numbers of beneficiaries reached. While these were appropriate for activity management, there was insufficient tracking of key elements of system performance (such as the effectiveness of teaching). The weaknesses in the structure of objectives and lack of full articulation of a theory of change militated against effective strategic management of the programme.

As noted in Annex section W.2.3, no fully articulated theory of change for PESP2 was developed, although for the purposes of successive annual reviews the logframe structure of objectives and linking assumptions was treated as constituting the theory of change. The evaluation has not attempted to construct a full retrospective theory of change but has identified the key underlying assumptions related to each component of the programme in the evaluation studies, and has used the conceptual framework (Figure 7) to assess the extent to which education policies and initiatives have promoted learning in Punjab, and so to provide a structure for assessing how far PESP2 may have contributed to this. IER1 recommended that DFID develop a theory of change but this was considered more relevant for future interventions, rather than for the remainder of PESP2.

Weaknesses in the programme results framework discussed in Annex Section W.4 reflect a lack of clarity about the key causal relationships underlying the programme. The impact measures (and indicators) selected in the logframe were inappropriate since it was not plausible that the programme could lead to measurable changes in either labour productivity (and hence GDP) over anything but the long-term since it would take decades for improved learning outcomes for school age children to translate into a substantial shift in the total skills base of the labour force. In the short- to medium-term, success for the programmes would in fact involve young people delaying entry to the labour force to undertake longer periods in education. Similarly, the programme could not plausibly significantly affect aggregate literacy rates over its period of implementation. A measure of changes in life chances for population cohorts whose education will plausibly have been affected by the programme would have been a better impact measure.

The outcome measures (related to participation and learning outcomes) are conceptually appropriate but the selected indicators provide the basis for only a partial assessment of overall improvements in the performance of the education system.

The most significant weaknesses, in relation to the underlying theory of change, relate to the definition and measurement of outputs. The change in the definition of outputs over the period of the programme (as discussed in section 3.2) has undercut the conceptual clarity of the original design (for instance through putting the delivery of TA, the strength of political leadership and the existence of school infrastructure at the same causal level). This change appears to have been driven by an increasing focus on tracking the delivery of specific activities rather than a strategic perspective on the performance of key elements of the education system. As shown in Table 43 in Annex section W.4.1, output indicators (in revisions of the logframe) have increasingly focused on tracking progress in the implementation of specific reforms and other measures, or the meeting of specific quantitative targets (e.g. scholarships provided, classrooms built). They have moved away from the original design conception set out in the 2012 Business Case which envisaged some output indicators that sought to capture key elements of overall system performance (such as the proposed index of school governance).

As a result, particularly viewed in the light of the conceptual framework used for the evaluation (Figure 7) but also the underlying logic set out in the Business Case, the PESP2 results framework does not pay sufficient attention to seeking to measure the extent to which the key ingredients of school-level learning are being delivered, but focuses instead on partial elements of these, and the implementation of measures that are intended to bring about improvements.

It is notable, for instance that while the effectiveness of teaching was correctly identified as of critical importance for improving education, the programme has not attempted to track any measure of the effectiveness of teaching. As noted in section 5.8, only limited information on the effectiveness of teaching and classroom practice is available and it is not possible to make any assessment of how the effectiveness of teaching in aggregate has changed over the period of the programme.

The indicators envisaged in the original logframe for this output originally included some measures the percentage of classrooms in which lesson plans were available and being used, and the average number of instructional hours received by learners, as well as a measure of teacher absenteeism. By November 2020, the indicators for this output focused on the implementation of specific reforms (e.g. related to the delivery teacher training, and the recruitment and deployment process).

This lack of focus on system performance reflects the original structure of objectives for the programme that defined system performance at an output rather than an outcome level, as well as a definition of impact that was, as discussed above, causally and temporally far beyond what the programme could plausibly influence during its implementation. The logframe focus of managing against outputs encouraged the shift towards tracking and targeting specific deliverables.

A better original structure of objectives would have placed system performance (the outputs defined in the original logframe) at the outcome level, with outputs being (as they became) factors that were more directly under the control of the programme. The tracking and targeting of system performance measures at the outcome level, together with management of the programme against a more fully articulated theory of change linking particular programme activities to improvements in these system measures, would have encouraged a stronger strategic focus to guide decision-making. In particular, it could have helped in identifying key bottlenecks to learning and access and assisting prioritisation. For example, it is unlikely that an assessment of the obstacles to progress to learning informed by such a perspective would have suggested the prioritisation of infrastructure spending to the extent that this occurred in the last years of implementation of the Programme.

The following sub-sections summarise conclusions about the validity of the underlying theories of change for some components of the programme.

## **SBS**

If SBS has been based on a valid theory of change (based for instance on the CEF), it would be possible to trace a clear causal link between the setting of targets in the RAF, the provision of budget support in line with the achievement of the agreed targets and expenditure in line with the budget, and the delivery of specific results. Neither the case studies for IER1 nor the evaluation studies on support to PEF and special education found that the process of target-setting and financing through the RAF was providing additional incentives for implementation, or that it was leading (in any clear way) to additional resources for the organisations supported. This was because SBS funds were seen as provided to SED, were not integrated into the budget process, and there was no evident link to the level of resources provided to organisations responsible for implementation. The provision of SBS does not appear to have contributed in general to a strengthening of the budget and public expenditure process, so this element of the CEF theory of change does not appear to have held. It is, however, possible that policy dialogue around the RAF contributed to the setting of priorities and the quality of



policies and programmes. However, it is in practice not possible to isolate the results from the provision of SBS from the Roadmap process, to which the process of target-setting was closely linked.

### **Scholarship programmes**

Key assumptions underlying DFID's support to PEEF scholarships appear to have held, though articulating a full results chain would have encouraged an approach to M&E that would have allowed firmer conclusions to be drawn about the impact of the programme. While DFID support to the LUMS/NOP programme was presented as being experimental and in the form of a pilot (given that it was potentially difficult to justify the level of resources provided to beneficiaries under the programme), design and implementation did not generate rigorous lessons. Articulation of a theory of change for the component could have helped highlight the disconnect between the stated objectives of the support and actual implementation.

### **Support to PEF**

Key assumptions for the effectiveness of the PEF programmes (which were already well-established, except for the PSSP) have held. In relation to the wider conditions for effective PPPs in education, conditions have generally been met in that PPP arrangements are well-designed and implemented. However, the regulatory environment for the private sector in general is not fully developed. PEF has lacked the resources and staff capacity to make full use of the TA provided, and weakness in the long-term financial commitment to PEF has limited the sustainability of the enrolment expansion achieved with funding from PESP2.

### **Support to special education**

Support to special education was not based on an explicitly formulated theory of change. It was envisaged that the PIEP pilots would create interest and build ownership in government for a greater focus on addressing children with SEND. While this did happen with PEF, the pilot had little impact on SED. DFID's sustained focus over many years on advocacy related to disability in general, and addressing SEND in particular, and continued attention to these issues in the TA support provided, ultimately contributed to progress in developing the IES and SEP during 2019.

The assumption has been that policy and some organisational development support to SpED would improve its effectiveness. Some progress has been achieved but this has been limited by underlying capacity constraints, and the fact that only a small proportion of SpED's development budget has been executed.

There was no attempt to articulate a full results chain for SBS. SBS provision was based on the assumption that the provision of resources for SpED's development budget and other expenditure would increase as a result of including targets in the RAF, but this did not occur. This also undermined the results chain for TA, since budget resources were not available to make effective use of the TA outputs.

### **Support to school infrastructure**

The *explicit* assumptions underlying the infrastructure component's theory of change were appropriate: insufficient school infrastructure does lead to overcrowding in classrooms and consequently low attendance, retention, and completion rates in Punjab. Implicit assumptions



have neither been backed by research, nor held so well for Punjab's context, particularly the possibility of establishing innovative and economical model schools. Alternatives to infrastructure provision can also be effective for addressing overcrowding, for example as shown by the Insaf Afternoon Schools Programme. Emerging evidence (as in World Bank/FCDO, 2020) suggests that school infrastructure investment is not in general an effective intervention to boost learning outcomes.

### **11.1.3 To what extent was PESP2's design based on a sound and comprehensive gender and equity analysis in its target areas, and to what extent were gender and equity issues appropriately integrated into the design?**

**PESP2 consistently emphasised gender and equity considerations but these were not systematically addressed in the design and implementation of programme activities.**

DFID maintained a strong focus on gender and equity considerations throughout PESP2, with increasing attention being paid to inclusivity. This has helped raise the profile of these issues in policy discussion, and contributed to the progress in the development and adoption of the IES. However, as was found in the research for IER1, and supported by the subsequent studies, gender and equity considerations have not been systematically addressed in activities under PESP2 (e.g. by ensuring that each intervention involved a specific analysis of gender and equity dimensions), and so has not helped to prompt such mainstreaming by GoPb. DFID also did not assess whether there may have been additional opportunities within the support provided to strengthen the focus on equity and gender.

### **11.1.4 To what extent are PESP2's components aligned with GoPb priorities and support from other development partners in the province?**

**PESP2 was strongly aligned with (and helped shape) GoPb priorities up to 2018, and with the World Bank as the other main development actor in education in Punjab.**

PESP2 provided a framework for support to the education sector in Punjab in line with GoPb priorities – as expressed, for instance, in the Chief Minister's 2018 goals. The components have been aligned around this. The practical mechanism for integration (for all except the school infrastructure component) has been provided by the TA support, which has been used to oversee and complement engagement across the programme, especially through providing capacity development support, and in contributing to monitoring performance against output objectives. TA was used effectively to respond to the agenda of the new government after 2018.

Over the period of the programme, the main other external support to education in Punjab has been provided by the World Bank, through its loan-funded Punjab education sector projects, which have provided budget support and TA (in part financed by DFID). PESP2 has been closely aligned with that provided by the World Bank, initially through using common DLIs and subsequently through coordinating the setting of RAF targets, and through cooperation in TA provision to complement initiatives.

### **11.1.5 To what extent did the PESP2 programme adapt effectively to changes in the context?**

The programme design provided flexibility to adapt to changes in context through the annual planning of SBS and regular revisions to TA work plans, as well as reallocating resources between components and adjusting logframe targets through Annual Reviews. TA was used effectively to respond to the priorities of the new government in 2018 and to the impact of Covid-19. A formal mid-term review (e.g. in 2016) might have provided a useful opportunity for reflection on the main strategic issues for the programme.

The design of PESP2 incorporated significant flexibility in the use of SBS (through the annual process of agreeing targets with GoPb) and TA (through the regular review and updating of work plans), as well as providing scope for reallocating funding between components – for instance following the decision not to proceed with the ATF component or the initiatives to support NGO-led schools through the NSP, but instead to increase direct funding for PEF programmes. This allowed the programme to respond to emerging evidence, new initiatives, and changes in context. The Annual Review process also was used to make regular adjustments to logframe targets.

Following the July 2018 elections, the new government did not articulate significantly different overall objectives for the education sector from those of its predecessor but it was keen to move away from the strongly top-down management style the Chief Minister had implemented through the Roadmap and Stocktake, and had differences in its priorities and emphasis for the sector. It also had a different vision of decentralisation in general, and for the sector, as reflected in PLGA 2019. DFID was able to use the start of the new TA (Cambridge Education) contract, and the planning process that this involved, to respond effectively to the priorities of the new government while taking forward progress in areas such as the IES and SEP. TA from I-SAPS has also been used effectively to support response to the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the education sector, though there have been gaps in the provision of TA while new contracts have been put in place.

While the design of the programme facilitated adaptive management in these respects, programme management would probably have benefited from enhancing one of the Annual Reviews near the mid-point of planned implementation (e.g. in 2016) into a formal Mid-term review which would have allowed a more comprehensive assessment of performance and emerging issues (particularly through bringing perspectives external to DFID to the process). The IER1 report produced as part of this evaluation provided an opportunity for such a review at the point at which the new government was coming to power in Punjab in mid-2018, and DFID responded proactively to address the specific recommendations that were made (see Table 24). However, this was at a late point in implementation (as the programme was then due to end in March 2020), and the IER1 report focused on specific areas of priority (SBS, the Roadmap and TA) rather than providing a comprehensive review of programme performance.

## **11.2 Findings on effectiveness**

### **11.2.1 To what extent and how did PESP2 contribute to improved education outcomes (including through strengthening drivers of education**

## **system performance)? To what extent were gender, disability, poverty, minority, or other equity-specific results achieved?**

**Progress has been made in Punjab in improving access to education and learning outcomes and the programme provided effective support to GoPb in this process, as well as highlighting the importance of disability and inclusion and contributing to the development of the IES, as well as supporting progress in priority districts. However, weaknesses in the results framework for the programme limit the extent to which judgements can be made about the programme's contribution to education outcomes.**

As measured by the logframe impacts (Table 44) and outcomes (Table 45) the programme's high-level objectives have generally been achieved. However, as discussed in Annex section W.4.2.1, two of the impact objectives (overall literacy rates and provincial GDP) can only very tenuously (over the timeframe of the programme) be causally related to programme activities, and the other (secondary completion rates) is not an appropriate impact measure. The focus on participation rates at the outcome level provides only a partial measure of success in keeping children in school, while there are significant issues in regard to the measurement of this indicator. The focus on a single indicator of learning outcomes relating only to Grade 3 performance limits the extent to which any broader assessment of overall outcome success can be made.

The programme supported the strong drive of the government up to 2018 towards increasing enrolment and participation, and the coherence and alignment of the sector on government goals, with an increasing emphasis on learning outcomes. In relation to the drivers of education sector performance, the programme was particularly focused on improving the effectiveness of teaching (through work with DSD/QAED and strengthening district delivery and supportive supervision), and in school performance management, but did not develop comprehensive measures of performance in these areas.

The implementation problems of the school infrastructure component have limited the extent to which the programme has contributed to delivering inputs in the form of an improved school environment. DFID's focus on engagement in priority districts (for instance for its support to PEEF scholarships, and PEF programmes), and on equity and inclusion, has ensured an equity focus on results, while both the PEEF support and the A3G programme have been targeted on girls – though as noted above the programme has not systematically carried out gender or equity analysis of its interventions. Further details of specific results achieved by the components are provided in the annexes.

### **11.2.2 What were the contributions of each component and the combination of components to achieving results? To what extent were synergies realised?**

**Support to PEF programmes and PEEF scholarships can be judged to have contributed directly to expanding access to education. The results of SBS are harder to determine because of the lack of evidence that this led to overall increases in spending on education or increases in the budgets of targeted organisations. TA has contributed to some important policy and organisational reforms that have transformational potential.**

As summarised in Table 22, the components largely (with the exception of the school infrastructure component) achieved their output objectives, as they were defined in the logframe. Results in terms of expanded access to education can be attributed to the direct

financial support to PEF and the PEEF scholarships (in each case the result of providing funding through well-established and tried and tested programmes). The results (in terms of increased enrolment) of the SBS support are more difficult to determine because of the lack of evidence that this support led to an overall increase in public spending on education, or increases in the budgets of targeted organisations (that were related to their achieving targets), though the overall package of support to the Roadmap and SBS (and policy dialogue) in pursuit of the Chief Minister's 2018 goals may have made an important contribution, and in general (as shown in Annex section G.5.2), funding to most key sector organisations increased.

Potentially transformational impact, in terms of improved policies and strengthened organisational capacity, is likely mainly to have been the result of TA, particularly in working with especially receptive partners, such as QAED, and where these have enjoyed strong government support. Although TA support was provided to PEF, this does not seem to have been very effectively complementary to the financial support, since there has been only limited progress in building PEF's capacity or resolving key issues about the policy framework within which it operates. In general, 'synergies' between components have related to a common geographical focus (on the eleven priority districts) or the use of TA to provide capacity development or other forms of support to engagement with specific organisations.

The review of TAMO support (focused on the three case study organisations) found that it had played a significant role in providing support to departments in the development and implementation of organisational reform. TAMO support that assisted the process of transformation from DSD to QAED was perhaps the most significant example. TA provided to PEC coincided with the restructuring of PEC, as the system of exam design was changing, and the TA provided by TAMO contributed to the vision, design, and implementation of this change. The improvements that have resulted from the TA to PEC have strengthened the existing systems and staff capacity to the extent that these new processes have been institutionalised at PEC. The implementation plan prepared for PCTB was found to be a useful tool for when there are changes in department leadership, in so far as it enabled continuity of implementation focus. TAMO and Roadmap support also developed the district delivery system, and greatly strengthened the availability and flow of information.

The evaluation of the second phase of TA found that, under the first results area (see p.15), there have been potentially transformative initiatives to improve CPD and the LND. It appears likely that these will be taken forward as there appears to be commitment from the Government and key sector organisations, though the Covid-19 outbreak has delayed progress. Under the second results area, substantial progress has been made in developing the IES, and having this accepted by GoPb, as well as in the SEP providing a strengthened planning framework for SpED, but it does not appear that the recommendations from the various studies relating to PEF will be implemented, and it is also unclear whether the suggested approaches to PPPs for education will be adopted by GoPb. The third results area has been less successful as there does not seem to be high-level GoPb interest in taking forward the ambitious reformed approach to district delivery that was developed, nor has there been significant progress in strengthening PFM, though there have been improvements in data.

Overall, potentially sustainable improvements to systems and processes have been made in relation to CPD and the LND (with QAED), the APF (with PEC), and the SIF (with PMIU).

### **11.2.3 To what extent and how did the design, management, and governance arrangements, partnership and coordination arrangements, and use of innovative approaches for the programme influence the achievement of results?**

**Management and governance arrangements have generally worked well to ensure effective implementation and to address problems encountered (with the exception of the slow initial progress in addressing problems with the infrastructure component). The TA providers played an important role in coordination. The record of innovative approaches has been mixed, with the extent to which pilot initiatives have led on to effective implementation strongly related to the extent of ownership.**

Management arrangements for the programme focused on regular meetings of a Programme Steering Committee and around a Joint Results Framework, in particular focusing on the RAF and budget support. Some former DFID key informants considered that the Joint Results Framework lacked effective government co-ownership. Up to 2018, progress was strongly driven by the Roadmap, with the Roadmap support team exerting a strong influence. Generally speaking, management arrangements worked well, with concerns about weak performance (for instance in the early stage of TAMO support) being effectively addressed in a reasonably timely way, with the conspicuous exception of those related to the school infrastructure component. The TA programmes, working across the range of interventions, have played an important role in coordination.

The record of the programme in regard to promoting innovative approaches has been mixed. PIEP successfully developed the IVS model with PEF, but failed to establish a viable model for supporting the education of children with SEND in government schools. There has been substantial progress in developing the new CPD model and the APF, as well as approaches for reaching adolescent girls who are out of education in the A3G programme. The attempt to develop innovative approaches for school infrastructure does not appear to have been successful. The failures with PIEP and school infrastructure both appear to be related to lack of effective ownership or leadership from government partners, combined with over-ambitious delivery targets. This suggests that attempts to develop innovation either need to be effectively led by government or promoted through project designs that can be thoroughly tested before there is commitment to implementation.

### **11.2.4 To what extent and how did the context (e.g. policy, political engagement, staff turnover, coordination within and between levels of government etc.) influence the extent to which results were achieved?**

**The period up to 2018 was marked by a consistent GoPb policy direction, continuity in both GoPb leadership and the DFID team, and a favourable fiscal context. The period since 2018 has seen the new government developing its policy positions for education, severe fiscal pressures, high turnover in key leadership roles, and from 2020 the impact of Covid-19. The programme was able to respond to these challenges principally through the TA teams.**

The period up to 2018 was generally marked by a consistent policy direction and a high level of continuity in key leadership positions from GoPb, as well as a fiscal environment that permitted increasing public expenditure. There was also continuity in the DFID education team, as well as (up to 2017) a dedicated DFID team member based in Lahore. The period



after the 2018 elections saw a hiatus in policy while the new government developed its policies and priorities, the abandonment of the Roadmap and Stocktake as the main management mechanism for the sector, severe fiscal difficulties that constrained the ability of the Government to fund both existing programmes and new initiatives (with PEF being particularly affected), and a high level of turnover in the key position of Secretary of SED, as well as changes in the leadership of other sector organisations. The programme was, however, able to work flexibly to respond to these challenges (and the impact of Covid-19), including through the new TA team, and to take forward areas of work that had been developed earlier in the programme.

## **11.3 Findings on efficiency**

### **11.3.1 How effectively was the programme managed and implemented (by DFID, service providers, and partners)?**

**The effectiveness of programme management during the period up to 2018 was facilitated by a stable DFID team and good relationships with SED. The change in government in 2018 presented a challenge (especially with the high rate of turnover of SED leadership) but DFID/FCDO has been able to respond to priorities. While DFID's management of PESP2 provided considerable flexibility the lack of formalised involvement of GoPb in some key decisions (such as the selection of TA providers and the termination or modification of programme components) militated against effective local ownership. Problems with the performance of contractors were encountered in relation to both TAMO and TACE. DFID responded effectively to the former but there were long delays until issues with the management of the school infrastructure component were satisfactorily resolved.**

Management of the programme benefited from a stable DFID team who had an especially strong working relationship with GoPb partners over the period up to 2018. Over the bulk of the period of PESP2 implementation both DFID and other key informants considered that there was effective collaboration between DFID and SED, reflecting the strong GoPb ownership of the Roadmap, and with effective formal and informal cooperation and information-sharing between SED, DFID, and the TA consultants. However, the strong focus within the Stocktake process on reporting against specific targets tended to militate against discussion of wider strategic issues and knowledge-sharing.

Significant management problems have been encountered in the areas of: (i) school infrastructure (SCRIP), with weaknesses identified both in the contractor's management of the programme and DFID's response to addressing the contractor's performance; (ii) implementation of the PIEP SED pilot, where the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) was judged to be dysfunctional; and (iii) TAMO's initial performance, until rectifying measures were successfully taken.

Some specific problems with the quality of TA provided and partner dissatisfaction were noted under each of the TA providers, but these were generally satisfactorily resolved. Recommendations on TA included in IER1 were taken into account by the second phase TA provider, and were successfully implemented in so far as they were feasible given the relatively short timeframe of the second phase contract.

Engagement with partner institution programmes (including through TA) have worked well where there has been strong leadership and well-established and managed systems (e.g. QAED, PEF programmes, PEEF). SED, under long-serving Secretaries, and working closely with and enjoying the confidence of the Chief Minister, facilitated leadership around the Roadmap process. Engagement has been less successful where organisational leadership has been weaker and less consistent, or where progress has depended on factors outside the organisation being supported, especially political commitment (e.g. clarification of PEF's strategic role).

Outside the specific case of Humqadam-SCRIP, DFID's management and engagement was generally regarded as effective by key informants. However, it was noted that over time (reflecting pressure on DFID's administrative budget) DFID staff have become less directly engaged in policy dialogue and with partner organisations (such as PEF), with the TA providers playing a relatively greater liaison role, particularly as less DFID staff time was spent in Lahore. Key informants in partner organisations would have welcomed more direct engagement with DFID staff.

The relationship with SED weakened in the latter part of the programme, reflecting the break that the new political government wished to make with the previous government's Roadmap approach, the lack of a dedicated DFID presence in Lahore and reduced travel by the Islamabad-based DFID team, and the high level of turnover of sector management staff (notably as Secretary of SED). However, a recognition of the value of the PESP2 TA and the funding of infrastructure through PMIU has strengthened relationships in the last phase of the programme.

A more general criticism of the DFID programme management approach from some key informants, however, contrasted the DFID programme with the World Bank, noting that the latter was jointly designed from the start and led to clear agreement on all elements of the programme with government. In contrast, GoPb was not closely involved in key steps in the DFID process, including the drafting of the Business Case, the taking of some subsequent decisions involving substantial changes to programme components, or the selection of TA contractors (who initially at least lacked sufficient local knowledge), and with little clear accountability when the programme was off-track to achieve its objectives (for instance in relation to school infrastructure).

### **11.3.2 Was the programme implemented in line with its planned budget and timetables? Did the programme meet its milestone objectives?**

**The programme was generally implemented in line with the planned budget and timetable except for the later than planned start to the provision of TA through TAMO, and long delays to the school infrastructure component. The programme has met its overall milestone objectives as set out in the logframe but these have been frequently modified and have paid insufficient attention to measuring system performance.**

The programme as a whole, and its individual components, has generally been implemented in line with the planned budget (which was increased during implementation) and timetables, with the major exception of the school infrastructure component, whose implementation was substantially delayed, and the initial delay in contracting TAMO. Time extensions to the programme have mainly been to allow satisfactory completion of this component, but have also permitted a third phase of TA to follow up on key priorities, as well as to assist in the



response to the impact of Covid-19 on the education sector. The programme has generally met its milestone objectives (reflected in its overall score of 'A' in each of the annual reviews). However, milestone objectives have been frequently modified and adapted, and, as noted above, there has been insufficient focus in the setting of targets on measuring the performance of key elements of the education system, while the lack of a fully specified theory of change limits the extent to which causal link can be established between specified outputs indicators and higher-level outcome results.

### 11.3.3 To what extent did the programme provide VFM?

**No comprehensive assessment of the VFM of the programme is possible. Spending on PEEF scholarships and PEF programmes was highly cost effective in reaching target beneficiaries. TA has generally been cost effective while that of SBS is questionable because of the difficulty in establishing to what extent the provision of SBS contributed to the achievement of targets. The cost effectiveness of school infrastructure through Humqadam-SCRIP has been low, but VFM of the school infrastructure component improved substantially with the PRSCP and TCF components. However, the prioritisation of school infrastructure spending in the latter part of the programme does not appear consistent with international evidence about the most cost effective ways of improving learning outcomes, and the severe funding pressure faced by other parts of the education system at the time.**

It is not possible to make a comprehensive assessment of the cost effectiveness of the programme as a whole – mainly because it is not possible to make an empirically robust estimate of the impact that the programme has had in relation to specific relevant metrics (such as increasing participation or improving learning outcomes). A summary assessment of VFM issues for each component is included in Table 22.

The evaluation considered that the PEEF scholarships and support to PEF programmes was highly cost effective, and that in general TA is also likely to have been cost effective. The cost effectiveness of SBS is rated as 'questionable' because of the difficulty in establishing that the funds provided have actually led to the targets set being achieved, or to aggregate expenditure on sector priorities increasing. The cost effectiveness of the school infrastructure component has been low, given the long delays in implementation, reductions in targets, and increased costs of delivery, though the cost effectiveness of the PRSCP and TCF components has been much higher than that of Humqadam-SCRIP.

A consequence of the long delay in implementation of the infrastructure component has been that programme expenditure over the final three years has been dominated by spending on school infrastructure which has accounted for more than 70% of programme expenditure in this period (see Table 41). A recent review (World Bank/FCDO, 2020) of evidence on 'best buys' for education expenditure (see Table 49) classifies spending on school buildings as in general a 'bad buy' unless other sector priorities are being effectively addressed. The design of PESP2 appropriately embedded support to school infrastructure within a comprehensive sector reform process, and PESP2's funding for school infrastructure through PMIU contributed to a significant increase in development budget execution, indicating that this expenditure was a high priority for GoPb. However, it is questionable whether, by this late point in programme implementation, such a high level of further spending on school infrastructure was the most effective use of programme resources.

Had there been flexibility for reallocation, consideration of international evidence on ‘best buys’ suggests higher priorities might have included additional spending directed to giving information (to parents) on the benefits, costs, and quality of education; providing structured lesson plans with linked materials and ongoing teacher monitoring and training; targeting teaching instruction by learning level not grade; reducing travel times to school (e.g. through additional support to the NSP), providing additional merit-based scholarships to disadvantaged children and youth (e.g. through PEEF), and supporting pre-primary education (ages three to five). It is particularly notable that the high levels of infrastructure spending supported by the programme coincided with periods of considerable financial stress for PEF.

## 11.4 Findings on sustainability

### 11.4.1 To what extent are the results achieved by PESP2 sustainable?

**Results achieved in expanding access to education through support to PEEF and PEF should yield sustainable results for the pupils benefiting, and school infrastructure constructed by PMIU and TCF should be sustainable while there are more challenges for the sustainability of infrastructure built under Humqadam-SCRIP. Strengthened policies and systems may be sustained for reforms to CPD, the IES and information flows from schools. Sustainability depends on continued GoPb commitment and prioritisation which is uncertain in some areas (e.g. for PEF, decentralisation model) and may be threatened by continuing fiscal pressure and the impact of Covid-19, which will have set back progress achieved in access, participation and learning.**

Table 22 provides a summary assessment of sustainability issues for each component of the programme. Results achieved at the individual pupil level through improving access to education should have sustained results for learning, while school infrastructure developed through the PSCRIP and TCF should be sustainable because the models used have relatively low and well-understood maintenance needs. Beyond this, sustainability depends on having achieved transformational impact towards more effective policies and systems, and sustained GoPb commitment to specific initiatives that have been developed and taken forward under PESP2. This currently appears strong in some areas (such as the reformed CPD system) and uncertain in others (for instance full implementation of the SIF, and adaptation of the district delivery system developed in the light of decentralisation reforms, and the future of PEF).

Covid-19 led to the long closure of schools, adverse shocks to livelihoods, and the disruption of the implementation of some initiatives, as well as having a long-term negative fiscal impact. The full impact is yet to be determined, but it is likely to lead to a setback in participation and learning equivalent to several years of progress made during the period of PESP2.

### 11.4.2 To what extent and how successfully did the design and implementation of PESP2 foster sustainability?

**The flexible provision of TA in the final phase of the programme has contributed to sustainability, but this largely depends on the extent to which transformational impact has occurred (which the programme could have targeted and measured more directly) and future political commitment.**

Sustainability depends principally on the extent to which transformational impact has been achieved leading to strengthened policies and organisations, and political commitment is

maintained (as discussed in section 11.4.3 below) including through ensuring ownership of initiatives within responsible organisations, which was not always achieved. The decision to provide a third phase of TA (in part to help take forward priority initiatives), as well as working closely with the World Bank-funded TA team embedded in PMIU, has helped to sustain recent initiatives. A stronger focus in the management of the programme on tracking key elements of sector performance (such as the effectiveness of teaching) could have contributed to greater sustainability.

#### **11.4.3 To what extent and how has GoPb engagement and ownership of PESP2 been achieved and maintained during implementation?**

**PESP2 was developed in line with agreed GoPb priorities and has been responsive to changes in priorities including following the change of government in 2018, particularly through the responsive use of TA. Challenges to ownership reflected both factors internal to GoPb, and features of programme design and management – such that GoPb felt it had limited influence over some components and decisions. The programme had little structured engagement with civil society, reflecting the top-down accountability model within the education sector.**

PESP2 was strongly aligned with jointly developed priorities and approaches led by the Chief Minister under the previous political government, and has sought to be responsive (especially through the use of TA) to the differing priorities and preferred approaches of the current government. Government ownership (i.e. from the senior political level) has therefore generally been strong, but there are some factors that have militated against this.

Some of these are internal to GoPb - these included tensions between the mainstream bureaucracy (in SED) and the parallel systems developed by the Roadmap, so strong political leadership was not necessarily reflected in ownership throughout SED (or in other sector organisations), while the high turnover of Secretaries in SED in the most recent period has militated against effective leadership.

Others relate to features of programme design and management. Some components (notably Humqadam-SCRIP) have been managed outside direct government control, so that ownership and engagement has been limited, as government officials have not felt able to exercise influence over them. Some key informants (mainly within government) considered that the fact that the TA providers reported to DFID and were not directly accountable to government (unlike the World Bank TA that is managed by PMIU) undermined ownership and threatened the effectiveness and sustainability of the TA support provided. Others considered that this disadvantage was offset by the greater flexibility that the PESP2 TA provided compared to the World Bank TA, which was strongly focused on achieving predefined DLIs.

The critical role of government ownership reflects the very top-down accountability model within the Punjab education sector, which was reinforced by the Roadmap and Stocktake process. The programme has had relatively little structured engagement with CSOs, other than where they have had a role in programme delivery, or individual researchers and academics. This reflects the limited role of CSOs in the formal policy process, and is in spite of DFID's own support of advocacy programmes that have engaged CSOs (for instance through TEP).

The Community Study found that community members were aware of key elements of education policy and initiatives, and welcomed what was seen as better teacher performance,

behaviour, communication, and responsiveness, which was attributed to these initiatives, along with significant improvements in infrastructure, associated with school buildings, classroom furniture, and drinking water facilities. However, community members had little awareness of SMCs and there was no structured process of accountability of government schools to their communities.

## 11.5 Findings on impact

### 11.5.1 Were there any unintended or negative effects of the programme?

**Implementation problems with Humqadam-SCRIP had a negative reputational effect and contributed to DFID temporarily embargoing communications about DFID's education sector work. The Roadmap model was replicated in other sectors through the SMU.**

The problems encountered in implementation of Humqadam-SCRIP has serious adverse reputational effects for DFID. Similarly, it had a negative effect on IMC's reputation and demoralised its contractors, but it is not possible to assess if there were any unintended effects on communities. Concern about reputational damage also prompted DFID temporarily to embargo communications about DFID's education sector work beyond direct stakeholders (i.e. restricting the provision of information to the general public through the news or social media).

Potential negative consequences of the Roadmap related to concerns about possible perverse incentives and gaming of targets at the local level, and whether the heavily top-down nature of target-setting provided insufficient space for local priorities and perspectives within the context of decentralisation. The School Survey found that this system had created stress for a significant minority of head teachers, who felt they were being held accountable for aspects of school performance that they could not control.

On the positive side, lessons from the Roadmap experience promoted the expansion of the model into other sectors, including health and solid waste management, and the establishment of the SMU as the organisational mechanism to manage sectoral Roadmap processes.

## 12 Conclusions

### 12.1 Progress and reform in education in Punjab

The information available suggests that there have been important improvements in the performance of the education system over the period of PESP2. There are more children in school and learning outcomes have shown a generally positive trend. However, children in school are not always in the appropriate grades for their age, many children are not completing school, and learning outcomes remain low for many pupils. Access to education and learning outcomes achieved are dependent on socioeconomic status, while many teachers have an inadequate grasp of their subject matter. Covid-19 has reduced enrolment of (in particular) younger children, and it is likely that the negative impact of school closures and other disruption on participation and learning outcomes will disproportionately affect the most vulnerable children and amounts to a setback of several years in the progress made.

Over the period of PESP2, the GoPb has shown strong commitment to education with an increasing shift in focus from a principal emphasis on increasing enrolment to paying greater explicit attention to learning outcomes and inclusion. This commitment has been reflected in public spending which has generally continued to prioritise education, as well as an active process of development of policies, initiatives and organisational reform, and effective cooperation with the UK and the World Bank as the main external providers of financial support to the sector. It has led to increases in enrolment both in government schools and through PEF programmes with private schools, improved infrastructure and facilities in government schools, and increases in the number and qualifications of teachers. Important policy initiatives have been taken in relation to ECE and inclusive education, and in enshrining the right to education in law (though these remain to be fully implemented).

However, the lack throughout the period of a comprehensive education policy has constrained the achievement of coherence and alignment on learning objectives. This has resulted in a lack of strategic guidance for spending decisions, and unresolved issues about priorities and focus including in relation to clarifying the role of the private sector in fulfilling sector policy objectives and establishing an appropriate regulatory and partnership policy.

Up to 2018, the Roadmap provided a framework of targets, a focus for highlighting the political priority that the Chief Minister had placed on education, and a generally effective process of performance monitoring down to school level, with strong sanctions where progress was not achieved. The Roadmap and Stocktake process was effective in aligning the education system on the achievement of specific short- and medium-term targets but not in itself sufficient to guide comprehensive policy and organisational reform.

Continuing weaknesses in public financial management have also militated against ensuring resources have been allocated to address critical priorities. Only limited progress was made in implementing the model of decentralisation of education management through DEAs that was developed by the previous government, and uncertainty remains about how the decentralisation approach embodied in the PLGA 2019 will be implemented for education. The difficult fiscal context since 2018 and the impact of school closures in response to Covid-19 in 2020 (as well as the high rate of turnover in key sector leadership roles) have posed significant challenges for taking forward the implementation of reforms – though the response to Covid-19 has also stimulated awareness of alternative approaches to delivering education.

Sustaining and taking further progress in improving access to education and learning outcomes, especially in the wake of Covid-19, is likely to require a focus of action in the following areas:

- Identifying and effectively reaching (including through remedial support) children who are out of school or whose learning has been most significantly disrupted, as well as those with special educational needs and disabilities;
- Ensuring teachers (in both the government and private sectors) have adequate subject knowledge, use appropriate teaching methods, and are effectively motivated and managed;
- Ensuring effective and sustainable PPP arrangements for education, with the framework of a comprehensive policy towards private education including the appropriate regulatory and facilitating roles for government.
- Implementing a model of decentralised management of education that enables schools to control a greater share of resources while improving accountability especially to pupils, teachers and communities.

## **12.2 The contribution of PESP2**

Over the period from the start of 2013 to the middle of 2018, DFID, through the PESP2 programme, built on a long track record of engagement in Punjab to support the Chief Minister's strong commitment to improving access to, and the quality of, education. The Roadmap and Stocktake process provided the main instrument for driving and monitoring improvements in the education system, and PESP2 played a central role in implementing this, including encouraging a stronger emphasis on learning outcomes. PESP2 provided a combination of SBS, direct financial support, and TA to support the achievement of targets set out (from 2015) in the Chief Minister's 2018 Education Goals (Figure 9). After the change of government following the July 2018 elections, which led to the abandonment of the Roadmap model, DFID/FCDO worked with the new government (particularly through TA provision under PESP2) to help support its development of policies and initiatives in a period of fiscal stress, followed by the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic.

The overall design approach of the programme was appropriate to achieve its key initial objectives of supporting the achievement of increased enrolment in education, and provided valuable flexibility especially in relation to SBS and TA (which successfully supported many policy and organisational reform initiatives). Spending through established and effective programmes from PEF and PEEF provided cost effective ways to boost access and learning.

The programme was less well-designed to focus on and achieve systemic improvements. While the original logframe structure correctly emphasised the importance of tracking the performance of key elements of the education system (such as the effectiveness of teaching, and the quality of school governance), during implementation more emphasis was placed on tracking the implementation of specific reforms and high level results. Without the monitoring of results achieved in improving the delivery of key elements of learning, and in the absence of a fully articulated theory of change, it is difficult to trace the causal impact of support through PESP2. Better tracking of system performance and management against a fully articulated Theory of Change might have provided clearer guidance for strategic decisions for the programme – especially through a formal mid-term review.



PESP2's contribution was also constrained by some design and implementation weaknesses for specific components, including school infrastructure, which suffered from major delays and cost escalation, and SBS which was insufficiently well-integrated with the budget process, while also not succeeding in ensuring that weaknesses in PFM were addressed.

The record of support to achieving transformational impact (e.g. organisational strengthening and improved policies and systems) varied across organisations and policy areas. The district delivery system developed under the Roadmap required substantial modification in the light of the changed approach to decentralisation favoured by the new government after 2018. Engagement with QAED was generally successful in supporting organisational reform and in piloting new approaches to CPD, including potentially transformational changes towards a much more flexible and cost-efficient CPD model. The programme supported development of the IES and SED during 2019, following earlier less successful initiatives on these issues. Less progress was made in strengthening the capacity of PEF, or improving the policy and financing arrangements under which it operated.

With hindsight, the overall effectiveness and contribution of PESP2 might have been improved in the following ways:

1. Better design of the school infrastructure component: for instance, de-linking support to developing innovative approaches from the objective of achieving ambitious implementation targets, and recognising that effectiveness and sustainability (and local ownership) required strengthening government delivery and management systems, rather than seeking to bypass them.
2. Cancellation or fundamental restructuring of the school infrastructure component at an earlier stage, including potentially reallocating resources to higher forms of spending likely to have a greater impact on learning.
3. Ensuring SBS was properly aligned with the budget process, and that disbursement was linked to demonstrated improvements in PFM performance, and to the provision of enhanced resources to targeted organisations and functions.
4. Encouraging a more systematic approach to analysing and addressing gender and equity considerations throughout the programme (and in government).
5. Strengthening the initial design of TA support to include deeper analysis of the institutional and organisational context, as well as obtaining systematic feedback on TA performance from stakeholders, as well as more effective engagement in management and ownership from SED.
6. Enhancing the M&E approach for support to scholarship programmes to allow more rigorous estimates of impact to be made.
7. Better design of some initiatives planned as pilots, including the PIEP pilot on improving provision for children with SEND in mainstream government (SED) schools, A3G, and the LUMS/NOP scholarship support, in addition to piloting improved approaches for school infrastructure. Pilots were most successful (e.g. for the IVS, and the reformed CPD system) where there was strong ownership from the organisations ultimately responsible for implementation, in these cases from PEF and QAED, respectively.
8. The full articulation (and use to guide programme management) of a complete theory of change. This might have helped address some of these areas of weakness by encouraging a stronger analysis of the causal links by which results could be achieved and identifying bottlenecks and constraints.



9. A logframe structure which identified improvements in the performance of key functions (such as the effectiveness of teaching) at the outcome rather than output level, and tracked these through collecting more data on how functions were being performed, with targets set at this level.

## **13 Lessons and recommendations**

### **13.1 Lessons**

#### **13.1.1 Lesson on the Roadmap and stocktake process**

1. The Roadmap and Stocktake process was an effective driver of education sector performance, at least in the specific context of Punjab and the Chief Minister's management style and strong commitment to education. Elements of this approach are likely to be widely applicable. This includes the strong focus on clearly defined and measurable targets, and programmes of action to support their attainment. However, the effectiveness of the approach was constrained by the absence of a broader sector policy framework to guide priorities and choice of targets, and the weakness of PFM, and it is less clear that it was appropriate to achieve more complex policy objectives.

#### **13.1.2 Lesson on SBS**

2. SBS needs to be strongly focused on PFM improvement and effectively aligned with the budget (both in its timing and the process for setting priorities) to have the best prospects of achieving impact.

#### **13.1.3 Lessons for support to scholarship programmes**

3. There should be a clearer articulation of the objectives of scholarship programmes, and how these can be achieved (i.e. the theory of change), especially the wider social objectives beyond the direct benefits to those awarded scholarships.
4. Equity and inclusion objectives (including those related to gender and disability) should be explicitly incorporated into scholarship programme design.
5. Monitoring, evaluation, and learning should be built into the programme design from the start, and should be linked to building the capacity of partners in these functions. These functions should support a robust VFM framework.

#### **13.1.4 Lesson from support to special and inclusive education**

6. The experience with DFID/FCDO's commitment to addressing special and inclusive education suggests that long-term sustained engagement and advocacy can ultimately yield progress even when an issue is not initially accorded a high priority by the partner government.

#### **13.1.5 Lesson from support to PEF**

7. PEF's experience has continued to demonstrate the viability and effectiveness of well-managed and designed PPP arrangements in education, but also their vulnerability in the absence of a clear long-term government strategy and sustainable funding arrangements.

### **13.1.6 Lessons from support to school infrastructure**

8. Large-scale infrastructure programmes pose particular challenges and require particular skills for effective procurement and contract management by the agency commissioning them. This must be recognised and effectively addressed throughout the design and implementation process, including in the design of contract arrangements.
9. Effective accountability mechanisms (including active media scrutiny) are required to prompt awareness of stakeholder concerns and encourage remedial action. The more transparency there is in providing information about performance, and communicating stakeholder concerns, the greater are the incentives for problems to be addressed.
10. There can be important trade-offs between the objective of rapid delivery and a focus on encouraging innovation in construction. If innovation is agreed by stakeholders to be an important priority, the design of the programme should ensure that there is a well-designed lesson-learning and piloting process that is subject to effective stakeholder review and expert scrutiny. If the priority is rapid results, using simple, tried and tested approaches may be best, even if these have acknowledged weaknesses.

### **13.1.7 Lessons for programme design and management**

11. Learning-focused support to education requires a focus on the performance of key functions (including the effectiveness of teaching, the environment for learning and the quality of school management and governance). An appropriate structure of objectives for education reforms should emphasise measures of the performance of these functions which should be reflected in the logframes of programmes providing development assistance to these reforms.
12. The articulation of a theory of change (informed by an appropriate conceptual framework), and programme management that is strongly informed by it, may encourage more rigorous attention to be given to key steps in the causal chain by which results are achieved, and hence may improve programme management. The conceptual framework used for the evaluation has proved to be a useful analytical tool for assessing education information and classifying education reform programmes and initiatives.
13. Initiatives that are justified as, and intended to be, pilots of new approaches need to have effective engagement and ownership from key stakeholders, and also need to be appropriately (and explicitly) designed and managed to maximise the likelihood of success.
14. Gender and equity considerations should be systematically addressed in all aspects of programme design and management.

## **13.2 Recommendations**

### **13.2.1 Recommendations to the Government of Punjab**

The recommendations to GoPb originally made in IER1 remain valid, in that it should:

- 1) Develop an improved policy framework for the education sector that is evidence-based and sets out clearly defined medium-term objectives, and that articulates the actions and (in particular) public spending required to achieve these objectives.
- 2) Ensure a strong focus within this policy framework (and in other specific programme actions) on gender, equity, and inclusion to address continuing inequalities in education access and performance. This may include additional data collection and analysis to help improve policy, including on so far relatively neglected issues such as learner preparedness (e.g. the influence of health, nutrition, and the home and social environment on learning prospects).
- 3) An education evidence and information strategy framework should be developed. This strategy should ensure that all information held by government organisations is, so far as feasible, made available for independent analysis, and that a culture of using evidence systematically to inform government policy decisions is fostered. The strategy should emphasise continuing to strengthen information on education sector performance, especially the quality and coverage of information on learning, including to allow a more detailed understanding of the influence of poverty and social factors on learning achievements.
- 4) Ensure that the quality of PFM for education is improved, in particular with a view to improving the rate of budget execution for the non-salary and development budget, and to ensuring the policy framework to guide spending decisions is clear. The main elements of a PFM reform process should include:
  - a) development and annual updating of a costed sector plan to provide directions to SED and other education sector organisations;
  - b) strengthening the budget process through budgeting based on strategic plans, the inclusion of budget demands from lower tiers, and the introduction of appropriate costing mechanisms and challenge functions at SED;
  - c) SED should also consider piloting school-based budgets in some districts, to allow for greater transparency and better financial management;
  - d) the FMC should be re-established in SED to continue the reforms on internal audit, the production of budget execution reports, and general improvements in PFM for education service delivery; and
  - e) SED and PMIU should play a stronger role in the oversight and coordination of donor-funded programmes, including reporting against a common government-led monitoring framework.

In addition, GoPb should:

- 5) Resolve outstanding issues relating to the role of PPPs in education, and the regulatory relationship with private education providers.
- 6) Ensure that teachers in both government and private schools have adequate subject knowledge, use appropriate teaching methods, and are effectively motivated and managed, and develop and track measures of teacher effectiveness.

- 7) Take forward effective implementation of the Inclusive Education Strategy, Special Education Policy, and Early Childhood Education Policy.
- 8) Resolve outstanding issues relating to the decentralisation of education sector management, with a strong emphasis on strengthening the management role and capacity, and effective local accountability, of schools and head teachers.
- 9) Build on initiatives (such as the ALP and Taleem Ghar) that have been developed in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, with a view to providing more effective online and offline teaching resources and options.
- 10) Ensure sufficient stability and effectiveness in the senior management of key sector organisations.

### **13.2.2 Recommendations to FCDO**

FCDO's future programmes are likely to be significantly smaller in financial terms than past support. In this context, it may be difficult to justify the direct financing of services (as with the funding of PEF programmes, the provision of SBS, and indeed contributions to ongoing scholarship programmes) with no clear system transformational impact. This also highlights the importance of having clear strategic objectives to guide intervention, based on a robust and fully articulated theory of change that identifies ways in which development assistance can best be used to support a more effective and inclusive learning-oriented education system. It should be recognised that this may involve difficult trade-offs. For example, funding of scholarship programmes may be straightforward to justify in terms of direct (transformational) impact on lives, while not in itself bringing about organisational or policy change.

The following approach is therefore recommended for future FCDO support to education:

- 1) Programmes should be developed around addressing well-defined problems and should be based on a fully articulated theory of change (specifying causal pathways and identifying critical assumptions, including those relating to ownership) that focuses where possible on using well-evidenced ways of supporting transformation through capacity development and policy reform. This theory of change should explicitly articulate the factors that affect the performance of key functions for an effective, learning-oriented education system, and be reflected in a structure of objectives (and logframe) that emphasises these.
- 2) Where evidence on what will work best is lacking and initiatives need to be developed and tested, research should be supported and pilot initiatives undertaken based on a rigorous design, and with a clearly specified pathway to scale-up and adoption that is agreed with key stakeholders.
- 3) Programmes should use TA that is managed through a clearly structured long-term agreement with GoPb and partner organisations that promotes local ownership and engagement but that also ensures an emphasis on agreed transformational objectives. They should have a strong M&E focus on tracking progress against these objectives, as well as on the effective delivery of specific TA outputs and the quality of relationships with partner organisations, while providing sufficient flexibility to adapt to changing needs, evidence, and context.

- 4) TA providers should be selected based on their proven ability to work effectively in the local context and to mobilise both high-quality (in both educational, technical, and 'soft' consultancy skills terms) international and local expertise, and to provide effective support both to policy development and implementation.
- 5) Targeted financial support should be made available to complement the TA provided in order to: (i) fund research and pilot initiatives where appropriate; (ii) selectively provide resources where these can be used to achieve high development impact, especially in conjunction with transformational reforms; and (iii) to help resolve key delivery bottlenecks for improving organisational and system performance. This may in principle be delivered through the government budget or in parallel to it, depending on the specific context and problem being addressed. Funding may also be provided to NGOs and CSOs where there is a clear strategic rationale for this in relation to the theory of change governing the intervention.
- 6) The programme should have a strong emphasis on improving access to, and the use and sharing of, information, including a focus on the use of information by parents and communities, as well as for school management, and on building knowledge through research and communication (for instance through providing funding for research, with clear governance arrangements to ensure what is funded is responsive to both government and civil society needs).
- 7) The programme should be actively managed by FCDO with a view to developing and implementing a joint vision with government and other stakeholders for key elements of the education sector, and to take account of both opportunities and challenges, including those posed by political change.
- 8) The technical focus of support should take account of both international experience and local evidence on what is likely to be effective, as well as taking forward selected promising initiatives from previous support. This is likely to include the following:
  - a) a strong focus on gender, equity, and inclusion, both in the specific choice of areas of action and in the way that activities are designed and managed;
  - b) supporting and improving the effectiveness of teachers through an emphasis on improved classroom practice, with appropriate supportive tools, strengthened accountability for performance, and incentives linked to evidence of teaching effectiveness;
  - c) strengthening school-level management and governance, including for the planning and use of financial and staff resources;
  - d) supporting community and parental engagement – in particular through sharing information about school performance and learning effectiveness; and
  - e) building on the successes of PPPs in education (for instance through PEF) to establish sustainably financed and managed models that ensure effective regulation where this is appropriate.

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## Annex A Terms of reference for the Performance Evaluation

### A. Background: Punjab Education Sector Programme 2

1. Punjab is Pakistan's biggest province and home to over 100 million people – around 56% of the country's population. In spite of sustained efforts to reform education over the past decade, the number of out of school children remains substantial and the quality of education delivered through the public school system is poor. As a result of its size, Punjab has the highest number of out of school children (13 million of which 6.8 million are girls) aged 6-16 years, and the highest number of children with low learning levels in Pakistan. Pakistan cannot hope to end its education emergency without a substantial sustained increase in both the access and quality of education that children receive in Punjab. There is an acute need to address the challenges arising from multiple forms of social exclusion, in all districts of Punjab. While there has been progress on gender equality in primary education, other parts of the province, girls remain markedly disadvantaged as do the poorest children and those with disabilities. The 2018 goals aim to have a major emphasis on improving the learning outcomes of children studying in Government schools while continuing to push for the remaining out-of-school children to attend. The Government has set ambitious targets and budgets to improve learning outcomes for the complex public and low-fee private system that includes 54,000 schools and 10.5 million children.

2. Since 2009, DFID has promoted an integrated range of interventions to strengthen Government systems and build institutions. An estimated one million more students are now attending school every day and an estimated 50,000 more teachers are turning up to school to teach everyday under the supervision of District Education Officers. The overall learning environment has also improved as 94.7% schools now have four basic facilities including boundary walls, running water, toilets and electricity.

3. In spite of recent progress, there are a number of binding constraints to transformational reform of education in Punjab. The Punjab Education Sector Programme (PESP 2) builds on the UK's previous support to the Government of Punjab (GoPb), to reform and transform delivery of education in Punjab. It will complement the UK-supported Punjab Education Reform Roadmap. The UK has allocated £420 million over six years between 2012/13 and 2018/19.

4. In addition to working through government to ensure every child in Punjab has access to a good quality education, PESP 2 will expand low cost private schooling to increase access especially in eleven districts identified as low performing compared with the rest of the province.

5. PESP 2 adopts a 'whole system approach' that comprises of eight components.

- I. **Sector Budget Support** component provides funds to the GoPb to improve access to and quality of education in government schools. The government school system has the largest reach in the province. Over 10.6 million students study in 54,000 Government schools in Punjab (£170.2 million).
- II. **School reconstruction and rehabilitation** component to build additional classrooms in existing government schools and provide a limited number of missing

facilities such as boundary walls, washrooms, electricity, and water and sanitation. This is managed through the Humqadam project, implemented by IMC Worldwide (£104 million).

- III. **Financial aid to the Punjab Education Foundation (PEF) to improve access to and quality of Punjab's low fee private school sector**, through an Education Voucher Scheme (EVS), New Schools Programme (NSP), and Foundation Assisted Schools (FAS) programme (£68.6 million).
- IV. **Targeted support to PEF to tackle social exclusion and inequality by identifying and enrolling out of school children in the lowest-performing 11 priority districts in Punjab**. (£10.8 million).
- V. **Support to the Special Education Department (SpED) for an inclusive education programme** to provide children with mild disabilities with formal schooling opportunities in mainstream government and PEF schools (£7 million).
- VI. **Support to the Punjab Education Endowment Fund (PEEF)** to provide scholarships for talented female secondary school students from poor households in the 11 priority districts to study at intermediate level; and for male and female students at intermediate level to study at tertiary level (£10.9 million).
- VII. **Support to the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) National Outreach Programme (NOP)**. A scholarship programme for talented male and female students from poor households to study at a leading university and become role models to build aspirations among people from disadvantaged areas (£7.3 million)
- VIII. **A Technical assistance component to deliver the programme and manage key components through TAMO** - comprising Adam Smith International (ASI) and McKinsey - providing support to the GoPb, the Chief Minister's Education Roadmap process and other partners in the PESP II programme (£39.7 million).

6. The programme is driven by its logical framework. The intended impact, outcomes and outputs of PESP II are:

#### **Impact:**

'More educated people in Punjab making a social and economic contribution'; which will be measured by the literacy rates of 10 – 15 year olds disaggregated by gender; primary and secondary completion rates by disaggregated by gender and education attainment of the working age population disaggregated by gender.

#### **Outcome:**

More children in school, staying longer and learning more


#### **Outputs:**

- I. Strong leadership and accountability in education delivery;
- II. High quality teaching and learning;

- III. High quality school infrastructure;
- IV. Improved access to school especially in priority districts through the Punjab Education Foundation; the Punjab Inclusive Education Programme; and Scholarships;
- V. Top political leadership engaged on education reform agenda; and
- VI. High quality technical assistance to government stakeholders.

7. The programme's original Theory of Change, as outlined in the business case, is provided below.

While this outlines to an extent the originally envisaged relationship between outputs, the outcome and the impact of the programme, the theory of change remains 'undeveloped', and aspects of the programme have changed during implementation. An Evaluability Assessment of the programme conducted in August 2016 (see Annex V) noted that the vertical and horizontal logic is sometimes unclear, with intended causal pathways and interlinkages not always defined.



## B. Purpose, Objectives and Scope:

8. PESP II is a large and complex programme. While an evaluability assessment noted that the conditions are not in place for either a full-scale impact evaluation or a quasi-experimental

approach, there is scope for a performance evaluation that assesses the contribution of the programme components to outcome level results.

9. The specific **purpose** of the evaluation is to;

- I. The purpose is to conduct a performance evaluation of PESP 2 and its contribution to the outcome as stated in the programme's logical framework (more children staying in school longer and learning more) with specific reference to the 11 districts where education access and learning outcomes for girls and boys are particularly low. The evaluation will assess the contribution of the five outputs to the outcome and consider whether there are other causal links that may need to be addressed and that have not been identified in the programme design.
- II. Serve accountability purposes by assessing the extent to which the programme and its component parts are delivering, or are likely to deliver, intended outcomes and impact.
- III. Provide DFID with information to make course correction decisions where possible and to inform future programme design at the end of the programme.

10. The **objectives** of the evaluation will be:

- I. To examine key data sets for the outcome and for outputs and to present results at the interim stage and at the end of the programme against the indicators and to assess what progress has been made (or not) and what contribution DFID has made
- II. To conduct primary research and draw on other sources (studies) to examine why and how change happened as a result of the programme; with a focus on gender, disability, social exclusion and poverty and teasing out how the components came together to affect results. It would be helpful to provide case study examples to unpack why some districts have performed better, what are the key drivers of improvement and bottlenecks for progress.
- III. To identify key lessons for future programmes including on missing elements of the programme or outputs/components that made little difference to results.
- IV. To usefully examine synergies between the components/outputs and how they acted together or not.

11. **Scope**: The successful evaluation supplier will design and carry out a performance evaluation of PESP II, being strongly mindful of both feasibility and utility considerations.

12. The evaluation should assess all outputs or components of the programme and determine to what extent possible they contribution to outcome level results. The evaluation should also test the theory of change, this may require a re-articulation of the theory of change, and determine whether causal links hold or whether there are potentially missing elements in the programme design. Given the underdevelopment of the programme-level theory of change, it is envisaged that the supplier will need to engage proportionately with stakeholders to articulate the intended causal linkages and assumptions within the programme in order to inform the evaluation.

13. A full theory-based evaluation may not be possible, but the evaluation should, nonetheless, focus on the programme's key causal links, as prioritised by the programme team and stakeholders. The evaluation supplier should look to:

- **Make maximum use of existing data** i.e. that held by DFID, GoPb, TAMO and other partners, and rely as much as possible on information generated by other studies such as RISE, Research for Equitable Access and Learning, ASER/ITA, the Harvard/World Bank sources – seeking to influence these as far as possible;
- **Prioritise coverage against Outputs (results)** rather than starting with components (activities), using parameters of strategic importance/spend, and adapting depth of evaluative effort for components accordingly;
- **Adopt a comparatively straightforward methodological approach**, using systematic analysis of secondary sources, supplemented by interviews and some primary data collection with beneficiaries (including children, parents and teachers) where required (see below).

14. Due attention should be given to ethical considerations in designing and carrying out the evaluation. DFID's 2011 principles for ethical standards in evaluation and research are included in Annex I.

15. **Risks and challenges:** The supplier should draw on local linkages to mitigate some of the challenges faced in carrying out evaluation in fragile and conflict-affected environments. It should also be noted that elections are due to be held in 2018, within the time frame of the evaluation. There are risks associated with that the lessons drawn out of this evaluation could not be taken up by the relevant departments.

16. Potential challenges around data availability are outlined in Section E of these terms of reference.

### **C. Evaluation questions and criteria:**

It is important that evaluation assesses Punjab's commitment to its own education reform agenda (e.g., through budget allocations and expenditure linked to actions (project implementation plans and standard operating procedures) in the 11 districts and Punjab as a whole). It is also important for the evaluation to ask at a high level to what extent DFID's contribution in terms of TA/finance is valued at provincial, regional, district and sub-district levels.

17. The evaluation should look to answer three overarching question, geared to the programme- wide level, rather than limited to individual programme components:

- I. To what extent have reforms have been implemented. I.e. What (net) changes to were witnessed in the areas affected by the project?
- II. To what extent have DFID funded activities and programmes contributed to observed changes in outcomes e.g. enrolment, attendance, completion, transitions and learning for different groups of children (boys and girls, children with disabilities, children from minority groups)? i.e. to what extent did the project make a plausible contribution to these changes?

### III. To what extent have the reforms contributed to changes in perceptions of quality of education and learning outcomes?

18. Within these three broad areas, an initial set of sub-questions was developed by the DFID programme team. These were then refined and linked to the OECD DAC criteria for both accountability and learning needs as part of the Evaluability Assessment. The full set of potential questions is included as Annex III. Currently the questions cover Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency (including VfM), and Sustainability.

19. It is expected that the evaluation supplier will further refine and prioritise these questions during the design and inception phase of the evaluation, building on work to articulate the theory of change and to ensure that specific issues of concern to key stakeholders, including DFID and the Government of Punjab, are taken into account.

20. Cross-cutting issues for the evaluation to consider include: equity of access and outcomes; systems reforms (governance, management, accountability, public financial management); inter- component synergies; power relations and lessons learned. There should be a focus on gender, socio-economic and disability difference in results and in explaining any key factors that have contributed to, for example improvements (or not) in access, retention and learning at the primary, secondary and tertiary level for girls, children with disabilities, the poorest children and minority groups (and how these factors intersect); any improvements (or not) to the recruitment and retention of female teachers and leaders at different levels of the education system, and of female district education staff. Gender equity and representation of people with disabilities and from minority groups should also be considered in any improvements to the teaching and learning curriculum. In addition, attention should be placed on analysing the intersection of social exclusion on the basis of, for example of religion, caste, class, tribe, ethnicity, language, disability etc. In appraising individual components/outputs, attention should be placed on inter- component synergies. Capacity strengthening issue should be covered across all components/outputs clearly defining exactly what the support is aiming to deliver.

### D. Methodology and further key considerations for evaluation design:

21. The evaluation methodology will be underpinned by the programme's broad theory of change, the individual theories of change that support individual components/outputs and the PESP logical framework as well as individual M & E frameworks developed for the 6 components/outputs where applicable. The supplier will be required to facilitate and support DFID in refining and finalizing the programme's theories of change so that they provide a firm analytical framework for the evaluation. The evaluation supplier will be expected to develop an appropriate mixed methods approach, using as far as possible the secondary data already generated; drawing on the other studies being conducted in Punjab; and triangulating/filling any gaps with primary research in targeted communities. The supplier will be expected during the design phase to assess what evidence is already available from monitoring and administrative data and what additional data they might need to collect.

22. While there is specific methodology (OECD) for evaluating Sector Budget Support, it is not expected that the evaluation adopt this detailed methodology given the technical challenges and extensive time and resources required. Instead, it is suggested that resources be oriented to maximising feasibility and utility of the evaluation as outlined above.

23. Specific methods might include, but are not limited to:



- I. Stakeholder mapping to determine who key interlocutors and respondents are including donors, all levels of government (federal, provincial, district, sub-district), the private sector, NGOs, Disabled Peoples' Organisations, researchers, parent and teacher organisations and children; and their level of interest in/influence over the programme;
- II. Systematic analysis of documentary data, using a structured framework;
- III. Systematic analysis of baseline data with mid-term and /or end line studies;
- IV. Analysis of quantitative data, particularly to identify trends;
- V. Budget analysis;
- VI. Focus or group discussions with groups of programme beneficiaries (including children, parents and teachers), paying particular attention to gender, disability, poverty, minority group and intersecting equity concerns;
- VII. Semi-structured interviews with key informants;
- VIII. Gender, disability, poverty, minority group and equity analysis focusing on barriers to access, retention, completion, transition and learning;
- IX. Contribution analysis;
- X. Social exclusion analysis;
- XI. Presentation of findings
- XII. Evidence-based recommendations.

24. Evaluators should ensure that at a minimum data collected be sex-disaggregated and, where possible, additional information about socio-economic characteristics should be collected e.g. ethnicity, religion, income levels, disability, especially where they are relevant to understanding how a programme rolls out (e.g. who benefits, who has access), and how impacts vary across groups (i.e. design the evaluations with sub-group analysis in mind).

25. Where possible, unit cost data for the programme inputs and outputs should be collected, or where collected by a third party, analysed, to allow for cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis.

26. Target audiences will be the key stakeholders in education in Pakistan including: (i) Elected representatives from federal and provincial assemblies, (ii) Officials from Government of Punjab (GoPb) (iii) Donors including DFID, the World Bank, UN agencies, the EU, Asian Development Bank (iv) think tanks and researchers; and (v) representatives of civil society such as parent groups. The evaluation findings will also be of interest to the wider development community working in education.

#### **E. Data Considerations:**

27. PESP's programme monitoring systems are comprehensive and include a wide range of data sources, including household surveys. While these are not specifically designed with



evaluation in mind, they should provide a comprehensive body of evidence to support the evaluation. The evaluation supplier should ensure they are joined up with the different data sources and surveys that are already planned through the wider programme.

28. Following is the list of existing data sets that the evaluation supplier may wish to draw on in the design phase of this work. The first table lists sources on Punjab. Some sources are shared. These sources should be used to the maximum extent possible without affecting the rigour of the proposed studies to avoid costly duplication of data collection.

- I. Programme Management and implement Unit (PMIU) monitoring data (started in 2004 till date).
- II. Nielsen's eight waves of six-monthly data from 36,000 households in all 36 districts since 2011-12.
- III. Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement (PSLM) Survey.
- IV. PIFRA data
- V. Pakistan Examination Commission (PEC) data.
- VI. DFID's six monthly learning assessment data.
- VII. PMIU monthly learning pulse data (collected by MEAs).
- VIII. Directorate of Staff Development's quarterly assessment data
- IX. District Teachers Educators (DTE'S) teachers monitoring data.
- X. ASER's several waves of data (2010-15) and beyond if available, including gender, disability and poverty analysis.
- XI. PEF's six monthly learning assessment data for partner schools.
- XII. Special Education Department data on children with disabilities
- XIII. REAL/IDEAS Teaching Effectively All Children (TEACH) Pakistan research project data
- XIV. Any other dataset identified during literature review.

29. The Logical Framework, attached to the business case, gives the outcomes that will be tracked by the monitoring elements of the programme. Where indicators have been in place since the start of the programme, baseline data is available. Where indicators have been added at a later date as part of logframe revision, later baselines are available (ranging from 2012 up to August 2015).

30. As part of the initial design and inception phase of the evaluation, the evaluator should review data available and establish the extent to which gaps exist that might require additional data to be generated.

## **F. Outputs**

31. The following outputs are expected from the contractor:

- I. Once the contract has been awarded (within the second quarter of 2017), a three month initial inception period will follow. At the end of three months the evaluation supplier will be expected to deliver an **inception report**, to include: detailed approach and methodology; workplan; articulated theory of change; finalised evaluation questions (following stakeholder engagement) organised by the OECD DAC criteria; a detailed evaluation framework that makes clear intended data sources, collection methods and analytical approach to answer the evaluation questions; a clear communication and dissemination (or influence and use) plan that focuses on maximising the utility of the evaluation.
- II. After initial feedback, this inception report should be finalised by the end of month four of the evaluation.
- III. At this stage there will be a **break clause in the contract**. Should the design (provided in the inception phase) fail to be of sufficient quality or the contractor feel that they are not in a position to deliver the work, then the contract will be terminated and DFID reserve the right to retender. Final budgets for the work to be carried out will be agreed at this time.
- IV. **Interim reports** on available findings in **February 2018** and **February 2019** to inform the programme and feed into thinking on future programming.
- V. A **final evaluation report**, in draft by **February 2020** to inform the annual review, and finalised in March 2020.
- VI. Both reports should contain short executive summaries (3-4 pages), pulling out headline findings and recommendations. These reports should also be accompanied by a presentation and a facilitated session with DFID and other stakeholders to feedback the results. Further summary products or presentation material may also be required – the evaluator should propose appropriate approaches in the communication and dissemination plan within the inception report.
- VII. The evaluator should transfer final data sets to DFID in a usable format – DFID will have unlimited access to the material produced by the supplier.
- VIII. DFID will have access to all material produced by the supplier under this evaluation.

32. All reports must be rigorous and thorough, and pay especially careful attention to the presentation and interpretation of data, the strength of the evidence being presented and associated claims around causality, correlation or fact. At the same time the reports should be **highly readable and accessible**, paying close attention to visualisation of data, presentation of text and overall aesthetics of the document. Jargon should be avoided and complex ideas and findings should be described using plain language.

33. The evaluator should outline in their bid their proposed internal mechanisms for quality assurance. The inception report, any baselines and the final evaluation report will go through DFID's own internal quality assurance processes – sufficient time should be allowed for this

process (10 day turnaround) and incorporation of any feedback within the proposed workplan. The inception report and all other reports produced need to be signed off by the Punjab Education Sector Programme (PESP) team at DFID and (where needed) by Government of Punjab.

## **G. Work plan:**

### **34. *Activities and timeline:***

Indicative Contract Start 09th June 2017

**Phase 1:** Design: 3 month inception and design phase, with a fourth month for finalisation. At this point there will be a break clause in the contract where the Supplier will require formal approval from DFID prior to starting work on Phase 2: 15th September 2017. In addition to close consultation with programme designers and implementers, the design phase may also include primary data collection to inform the evaluation design.

**Phase 2:** Indicative Implementation: 15th September 2017 – 31st March 2020. The Contract will include options to scale down if deemed necessary by DFID.

**35. *Budget:*** The overall budget for this evaluation and research programme is within a framework of up to £1.5 million.

## **H. Skills and qualifications:**

36. The evaluation team should have a sound understanding of research and evaluation designs and methods, in particular of carrying out performance evaluations of complex programmes in fragile and conflict affected states. They should understand the strengths and limitations of different approaches and how to accurately interpret and present findings to both researchers and non-researchers. The team will require a broad set of skills to be able to effectively design and conduct a complex and rigorous evaluation.

37. The evaluation team will need to be flexible in the approach to designing the evaluation to ensure that the study designs and programme designs are as closely linked as possible to allow for the most rigorous design feasible.

38. The evaluation team will need to demonstrate a strong presence in and experience of Pakistan, in particular in Punjab, providing evidence of partnership with relevant local organisations.

39. The team will have a demonstrated ability to communicate complex studies and findings in an accessible way for non-technical readers, including presentation of data in visually appealing ways, highly structured and rigorous summaries of research findings and robust and accessible synthesis of key lessons from across different studies.

40. The evaluation team will need to have a mix of skills that covers:

- I. The education sector including but not limited to low-fee private schools, public private partnerships in education, education systems and reforms, girls education and learning, education for children with disabilities and minority groups;

- II. Quantitative research methods
- III. Qualitative research methods, including community and participatory research methods.
- IV. Proven skills in the application of mixed methods;
- V. Financial analysis, the private sector and economics;
- VI. Poverty and vulnerability assessments;
- VII. Political economy analysis;
- VIII. Presentation of reports, data visualisation, and synthesising findings;
- IX. Research and evaluation communications and uptake;
- X. Management of simultaneous research and evaluation programmes;
- XI. A good grounding in the literature of the ethnography in the Punjab;
- XII. Using contribution analysis as an approach;
- XIII. Gender, disability, poverty and minority group analysis and equity and social inclusion analysis;
- XIV. Experience in private sector development in the education sector;
- XV. Experience in application of configurational methods for case study based evaluation.

41. The evaluation supplier will need to be able to guarantee sufficient people to be able to implement and manage the evaluation within the tight timeline.

42. While the team composition should be defined by the evaluation supplier, it will need to ensure that a full programme team is available for the full duration of the programme, with key personnel based full time in Pakistan. The quality of human resources service providers include in their offers will be a key element in the evaluation process. Any attempt to change key personnel post-award will be regarded as a significant variation in terms of their tendered offers and may have commercial ramifications.

43. The evaluation supplier will need to comply with DFID's policies on fraud and anti-corruption and cooperate with checks and balances programme staff will require from them for the duration of the evaluation e.g. annual audited statements, policies on management of funds.

## **I. Governance, Reporting and Contracting arrangements**

44. The successful bidder will report directly to DFID Pakistan to the Lead Adviser for PESP II and the Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) for the programme. There will also be close collaboration with the PESP II programme manager. If necessary, implementing agencies (e.g. the Technical Assistance Management Organisation) may be called upon to facilitate

logistics and access to programme sites, beneficiaries and key stakeholders. However, it is crucial that the team implementing the research and evaluation work is independent of those delivering the programmes under study.

45. It is expected that the evaluators will work closely with DFID and other stakeholders at all stages of the evaluation particularly the design phase. The design studies will be independently quality assured and will be agreed by the PESP II Lead Adviser, Evaluation Adviser in DFID Pakistan and the Senior Education Adviser...

46. The evaluation supplier will need to maintain regular contact with DFID Pakistan, the Governments of Punjab and other key partners to ensure the outputs are delivering products that meet requirements.

47. A steering committee will be convened for the evaluation – membership to be determined. The steering committee will review evaluation products and engage in regular meetings (e.g. quarterly).

48. **Reporting requirements:**

- I. Quarterly progress reports on the implementation of the evaluation, which will include financial data and updated financial forecasts, and research and presentation to key stakeholders;
- II. Annual contribution to the DFID Annual Review report of the overall programme, to be completed by the Technical Assistance Management Organisation in January 2018 and January 2019;

49. **Performance management:** The Service Provider will be responsible for managing their and any sub-contractors' performance and tackling poor performance. They will be required to demonstrate strong commitment towards transparency, financial accountability, due diligence of partners and zero tolerance to corruption and fraud.

50. DFID will manage performance through key performance indicators. Payment will be linked to the delivery of outputs and key performance indicators identified in the inception phase and implementation phase.

51. **Duty of Care and Security Requirements:** The appointed Service Provider will be responsible for the duty of care, safety and well-being of their Personnel and Third Parties affected by their activities under this contract, including appropriate security arrangements. They will also be responsible for the provision of suitable security arrangements for domestic and business property (see details in Annex II).

## **Annex I**

### **DFID's ethical principles**

I. Researchers and evaluators are responsible for identifying the need for and securing any necessary ethics approval for the study they are undertaking. This may be from national or local ethics committees in countries in which the study will be undertaken, or other stakeholder institutions with formal ethics approval systems.

II. Research and evaluation must be relevant and high quality with clear developmental and practical value. It must be undertaken to a sufficiently high standard that the findings can be reliably used for their intended purpose. Research should only be undertaken where there is a clear gap in knowledge. Evaluations might also be undertaken to learn lessons to improve future impact, or in order to meet DFID's requirements for accountability.

III. Researchers and evaluators should avoid harm to participants in studies. They should ensure that the basic human rights of individuals and groups with whom they interact are protected. This is particularly important with regard to vulnerable people. The wellbeing of researchers/ evaluators working in the field should also be considered and harm minimised.

IV. Participation in research and evaluation should be voluntary and free from external pressure. Information should not be withheld from prospective participants that might affect their willingness to participate. All participants should have a right to withdraw from research/ evaluation and withdraw any data concerning them at any point without fear of penalty.

V. Researchers and evaluators should ensure confidentiality of information, privacy and anonymity of study participants. They should communicate clearly to prospective participants any limits to confidentiality. In cases where unexpected evidence of serious wrong-doing is uncovered (e.g. corruption or abuse) there may be a need to consider whether the normal commitment to confidentiality might be outweighed by the ethical need to prevent harm to vulnerable people. DFID's fraud policy will apply if relevant.

VI. Researchers and evaluators should operate in accordance with international human rights conventions and covenants to which the United Kingdom is a signatory, regardless of local country standards. They should also take account of local and national laws.

VII. DFID-funded research and evaluation should respect cultural sensitivities. This means researchers need to take account of differences in culture, local behaviour and norms, religious beliefs and practices, sexual orientation, gender roles, disability, age and ethnicity and other social differences such as class when planning studies and communicating findings. DFID should avoid imposing a burden of over-researching particular groups.

VIII. DFID is committed to publication and communication of all evaluations and research studies.

Full methodological details and information on who has undertaken a study should be given and messages transmitted should fully and fairly reflect the findings. Where possible, and respecting confidentiality requirements, primary data should be made public to allow secondary analyses.

IX. Research and evaluation should usually be independent of those implementing an intervention or programme under study. Independence is very important for research and evaluation; in fact evaluations in DFID can only be classified as such where they are led independently. Involvement of stakeholders may be desirable so long as the objectivity of a study is not compromised and DFID is transparent about the roles played. Any potential conflicts of interest that might jeopardise the integrity of the methodology or the outputs of research/ evaluation should be disclosed. If researchers/ evaluators or other stakeholders feel that undue pressure is being put on them by DFID officials, such that their independence has been breached, this should be reported to the Head of Profession for Evaluation who will take appropriate action.

X. All DFID funded research/ evaluation should have particular emphasis on ensuring participation from women and socially excluded groups. Consideration should be given to how barriers to participation can be removed.



## **Annex II**

### **Duty of care**

The Supplier is responsible for the safety and well-being of their Personnel (as defined in Section 2 of the Contract) and Third Parties affected by their activities under this contract, including appropriate security arrangements. They will also be responsible for the provision of suitable security arrangements for their domestic and business property.

The Supplier is responsible for ensuring appropriate safety and security briefings for all of their Personnel working under this contract and ensuring that their Personnel register and receive briefing as outlined above. Travel advice is also available on the FCO website and the Supplier must ensure they (and their Personnel) are up to date with the latest position.

52. This Procurement will require the Supplier to operate in a seismically active zone and is considered at high risk of earthquakes. Minor tremors are not uncommon. Earthquakes are impossible to predict and can result in major devastation and loss of life. There are several websites focusing on earthquakes, including <http://geology.about.com/library/bl/maps/blworldindex.htm>. The Supplier should be comfortable working in such an environment and should be capable of deploying to any areas required within the region in order to deliver the Contract.

53. This Procurement will require the Supplier to operate in conflict-affected areas and parts of it are highly insecure. The security situation is volatile and subject to change at short notice. The Supplier should be comfortable working in such an environment and should be capable of deploying to any areas required within the region in order to deliver the Contract.

54. The Supplier is responsible for ensuring that appropriate arrangements, processes and procedures are in place for their Personnel, taking into account the environment they will be working in and the level of risk involved in delivery of the Contract (such as working in dangerous, fragile and hostile environments etc.). The Supplier must ensure their Personnel receive the required level of training.

Tenderers must develop their Tender on the basis of being fully responsible for Duty of Care in line with the details provided above and the initial risk assessment matrix developed by DFID (see Annex 1 of this ToR). They must confirm in their Tender that:

- They fully accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care.
- They understand the potential risks and have the knowledge and experience to develop an effective risk plan.
- They have the capability to manage their Duty of Care responsibilities throughout the life of the contract.

If you are unwilling or unable to accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care as detailed above, your Tender will be viewed as non-compliant and excluded from further evaluation. Acceptance of responsibility must be supported with evidence of capability and DFID reserves the right to clarify any aspect of this evidence. In providing evidence Tenderers should consider the following questions:

- a) Have you completed an initial assessment of potential risks that demonstrates your knowledge and understanding, and are you satisfied that you understand the risk management implications (not solely relying on information provided by DFID)?
- b) Have you prepared an outline plan that you consider appropriate to manage these risks at this stage (or will you do so if you are awarded the contract) and are you confident/comfortable that you can implement this effectively?
- c) Have you ensured or will you ensure that your staff are appropriately trained (including specialist training where required) before they are deployed and will you ensure that on- going training is provided where necessary?
- d) Have you an appropriate mechanism in place to monitor risk on a live / on-going basis (or will you put one in place if you are awarded the contract)?
- e) Have you ensured or will you ensure that your staff are provided with and have access to suitable equipment and will you ensure that this is reviewed and provided on an on- going basis?
- f) Have you appropriate systems in place to manage an emergency / incident if one arises?

### **Annex III: Indicative Evaluation Questions**

|                      |   |   |
|----------------------|---|---|
| <b>Relevance</b>     | To what extent does PESP II respond to the needs of children and parents in Punjab?   | <p>Was PESP II's design (including its component activities) the best way to meet the educational needs of parents, children and the Government of Punjab?</p> <p>Did the design (including the seven component activities) remain relevant over time?</p>  |
|                      | To what extent is PESP II, including its project components, aligned with the policies and priorities of GoPb, DFID and other actors implementing education programmes in the province? | <p>How well are individual components aligned with /integrated into wider PESP II design, and/or with other education programmes in the province? How well did the LUMS and PEEF components complement each other?</p> <p>To what extent do individual components, and the overall programme, contribute to the GoPb's Education Roadmap?</p> <p>To what extent has the programme been implemented in synergy with the Roadmap? Are there any areas of dissonance? Can the additionality of DFID SBS funds be assured or is there evidence of displacement?</p>   |
|                      | To what extent was the design and implementation of PESP II gender- and equity-sensitive?   | <p>Was PESP II's design based on a sound and comprehensive gender and equity analysis in its target areas?</p> <p>To what extent did PESP II's design, including within its individual components, integrate gender and equity issues, including those identified in the gender and equity analysis, above?</p>   |
| <b>Effectiveness</b> | To what extent were PESP II's outputs and outcomes achieved?  | <p>What results were achieved against the six Output targets? (for example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Output 1 (Stronger leadership and accountability): To what extent has PESP II contributed to a better managed and more accountable education system in Punjab by building the capacity of and linkages between key institutions in the School Education Department?</li> <li>Output 2 (Better teacher performance and better teaching): To what extent has a better quality education in terms of teaching and learning been delivered for children in Punjab, including for girls, children with disabilities and minority groups, been delivered by PESP II?</li> <li>Output 3 (High-quality infrastructure): To what extent has a better learning environment been created for children, including for girls, children with disabilities and minority groups in the Punjab by PESP II in terms of facilities and infrastructure?</li> </ul> |

|  |                              |  |
|--|------------------------------|--|
|  |                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Output 4 (Improved access to schools, especially in priority districts): To what extent has PESP II improved access to education for children, including girls, children with disabilities and minority groups from priority districts in Punjab?</li> <li>• Output 5 (Top political leadership engaged on education reform agenda in the Punjab): To what extent has greater demand for education in Punjab been stimulated by PESP II?</li> <li>• Output 6 (High-quality technical assistance to government stakeholders that builds sustainable systems and processes): To what extent has TA helped government to build sustainable systems and processes?</li> </ul> <p>(Influencing): To what extent did SBS help drive and incentivise the GoPb to deliver on policy priorities around improved learning outcomes?</p> <p>To what extent has PESP II improved GoPb's Public Financial Management for education?</p> <p>To what extent did the achievement of the five Outputs contribute to more children in school, staying longer, and learning more (the Outcome) in 2018, compared to 2015 (baseline)? (Was the target of supporting 90,000 additional primary school children and 60,000 secondary school children by 2018/19 with the additional tranche of £70m in SBS met?)</p> <p>Which project components, and combinations of project components, made the most significant contributions to Outcome achievement? Through which specific pathway? Which least?</p> <p>Were there any unintended or negative effects of the programme?</p> <p>Were any gender, disability, poverty, minority group- or other equity-specific results achieved? (e.g. increased female staffing at the Directorate of Staff Development and increased numbers of female District Education Officers; gender sensitive curricula/learning materials; increased data disaggregation by PMIU; increased enrolment of out-of-school children and girls). Did programme components systematically, and to the same degree, integrate gender and equity concerns?</p> |
|  | Why did achievements happen? | <p>What internal factors (e.g. programme design and management, governance structure and institutional arrangements, staffing, DFID systems, partnership and coordination arrangements, use of participatory approaches in institutional capacity building etc) caused the observed changes, and affected whether or not results were achieved?</p>  |

|                |   |   |
|----------------|---|---|
|                |   | <p>What external factors (those related to the external operating environment e.g. policy changes, political engagement, staff turnover, co-ordination between SED departments etc) caused the observed changes, and affected whether or not results were achieved?</p> <p>How did innovation or the lack of it influence the achievement of results?</p> <p>How did synergies (or lack of them) between project components affect the achievement of results, e.g. between the SBS and other components, and between the LUMS and PEEF components?</p> |
| Efficiency/VFM | Was PESP II cost-efficient?   | <p>Was PESP II implemented in the most cost-efficient way compared to alternatives?</p> <p>Which programme components represent value for money in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, economy and equity? What was the value for money for the programme as a whole?</p>   |
|                | Was PESP II implemented in a timely manner?   | <p>Did individual components take place according to the planned implementation schedule?</p> <p>Did the programme as a whole meet its milestone objectives?</p>  |
| Sustainability | To what extent did PESP II promote sustainability?  | <p>Did PESP II design and implementation incorporate sustainability measures within or across its components, such as capacity building of departments within SED, civil society organisations, school management systems and communities?</p> <p>To what extent has the GoPb's engagement and ownership of PESP II been fostered throughout implementation?</p>  |
|                | To what extent is it likely that the benefits of PESP II will continue after it finishes? | <p>Are the sustainability measures as implemented within and across components, sufficient to continue the benefits of PESP II after 2018?</p> <p>Are all components equally sustainable, or are there differences?</p>   |

## **Annex IV**

### **Project Information Summary**

#### ***What support will the UK provide?***

The UK will support a range of interventions that will build on previous support to the Government of Punjab, and speed up reform of the education sector in the province. In addition to working directly through government to achieve systemic reform, PESP 2 will have a particular emphasis on improving access to education, and quality of learning outcomes, in eleven districts that have been identified as low performing compared with averages for Punjab.

This focus, which will include working with the private sector and civil society organisations, in addition to government, will seek to deliver equitable access to better quality education across the province.

#### ***How much funding does the UK expect to provide?***

The UK will provide up to £420M million over six years between 2012/13 to 2020.

#### ***What need are we trying to address?***

Punjab is Pakistan's biggest province, comprising 56% of its total population. In spite of sustained efforts to reform education over the past decade, the number of out of school children is substantial and the quality of education delivered through the public school system remains poor. 39% of girls and 21% of boys are out of school.

There is an especially acute need to address the challenges arising from multiple forms of social exclusion, concentrated on eleven districts, chiefly located in South Punjab. While there has been good progress on gender equality in education in other parts of the province, girls remain markedly disadvantaged in these districts, as do the poorest children, those with disabilities, and those with group based disadvantages including language and caste.

At the same time, a number of binding constraints to transformative reform of public sector education remain in Punjab, in spite of recent progress. These include finding a long term solution to managing politically motivated transfers, as well as rationalisation of the way in which teachers are distributed in schools across the province, and establishment of a credible examination system.

#### ***What will we do to tackle this problem?***

PESP 2 will provide a holistic approach to supporting education reform in Punjab, working through government, the private sector, and civil society.

The programme will include sector budget support to the Government of Punjab, in alignment with the World Bank Project Appraisal Document finalised in 2012. Funding will be subject to satisfactory progress made by government on a range of agreed indicators, including the tackling of binding constraints to systemic reform. Work with the Government of Punjab will be underpinned politically through the Punjab Education Reform Roadmap process, headed by the Chief Minister and DFID's Special Representative for Education in Pakistan.

In addition to working directly with government to strengthen the public school system, PESP 2 will have a strong focus on building the capacity and quality of Punjab' burgeoning low cost private sector. Work in this area will focus on transforming the capacity of the Punjab Education Foundation,

as well piloting approaches to providing soft loans to education entrepreneurs, with a particular emphasis on areas that are currently under-served by the private sector,

In order to tackle issues of social exclusion and inequity of provision, PESP 2 will work through civil society and a targeted post-graduate scholarships programme for the poorest children, to raise awareness of the importance of education in districts that currently underperform. This work will be underpinned by a school infrastructure programme that will ensure that basic facilities, often a major cause of children, and particularly girls, remaining outside education are in place in all schools in the province.

### ***Who will be implementing this programme?***

PESP 2 will be implemented by a number of actors, including the Government of Punjab through the School Education Department and its agencies, particularly the Punjab Education Foundation.

Other implementing organisations will include two technical assistance teams, one focused on school infrastructure, and the other on providing support to government as well as management, with DFID Pakistan, of a range of parallel programmes. These organisations will contract with a range of specialist suppliers as required to deliver the programme.

### ***What will change as a result of our support?***

This programme will contribute significantly to the UK's aim of ensuring that 4 million more children in Pakistan are in school, staying longer, and learning more. The Government of Punjab is targeting 1.2 million children over the next three years. PESP 2 will add another million to this total, including many of Punjab's poorest and most marginalised children, helping the province reach 98% of the Millennium Development Goal by 2017/18.

In addition, the UK's support to the Government of Punjab will have a significant impact on tackling binding constraints to reform of the sector, and to improving the quality of teaching and learning outcomes.

### ***What outputs will we be able to attribute to UK support?***

1. Stronger leadership and accountability
2. Better teacher performance and better teaching
3. High-quality infrastructure
4. Improved access to schools, especially in priority districts
5. Top political leadership engaged on education reform agenda in Punjab
6. High-quality technical assistance to government stakeholders that builds sustainable systems and processes

### ***How will we determine whether the expected results have been achieved?***

Evaluation and research for PESP 2 will serve three purposes. It will: (i) increase understanding of the dynamics of Punjab's education system, and demonstrate the impact of DFID's investment; (ii) test innovative approaches to tackling entrenched issues, and use this evidence to scale up successful interventions; and (iii) contribute to the global evidence base on education.



## Annex B Summary evaluation framework

| EQ   | Evidence source                       |
|--|---------------------------------------|
| <b>LEVEL ONE QUESTIONS</b>   |                                       |
| 1. How accurate and complete are the available measures of education sector performance and to what extent can valid conclusions about sector performance be drawn on the basis of these?  | RESP                                  |
| 2. To what extent has educational attainment (learning outcomes) improved in Punjab over the period of PESP2?  | RESP                                  |
| 3. To what extent have there been improvements in educational participation, including in measures of enrolment, retention, and transition?  | RESP                                  |
| 4. How has education performance differed in relation to gender, poverty, location, and other factors, and to what extent has equity in education improved?  | RESP                                  |
| 5. To what extent have the ingredients of education system performance at school level strengthened over the period of PESP2: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• preparedness of learners for school;</li> <li>• effectiveness of teaching;</li> <li>• the provision of learning-focused inputs; and</li> <li>• effectiveness of management and governance?</li> </ul>   | RESP, School Survey, Community Survey |
| 6. How does education sector performance compare with the targets set?   | RESP, EPRR                            |
| 7. What have been the main education sector policy and organisational reform initiatives over the period of PESP2? How effectively have they been implemented?   | EPRR, School Survey<br>DEMS           |
| 8. To what extent has the education system in Punjab been effectively aligned around learning objectives, and coherent in pursuing these objectives? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent were learning and inclusion objectives of education policy?</li> <li>• Were the goals clearly articulated? Were the various stakeholders aware of the goals, and their role in achieving them?</li> <li>• Was accurate, relevant information available in the system? Was it used to guide policymaking?</li> <li>• Were the incentives of actors across the system strongly aligned and linked to improvements in student learning?</li> </ul> | EPRR, RESP, PFER, DEMS                |
| 9. To what extent has public finance for education supported achievement of sector goals?  | PFER                                  |
| 10. What factors explain the extent of progress achieved? What have been the constraints on further progress?  | EPRR, PFER, RESP                      |

**LEVEL TWO QUESTIONS****Relevance:**

1. How appropriate was PESP2's design (including its components) as a way to meet the educational needs of parents and children, and the priorities of GoPb, originally and over time?
2. To what extent was PESP2's design based on a valid theory of change that was appropriate to the context of implementation?
3. To what extent was PESP2's design based on a sound and comprehensive gender and equity analysis in its target areas, and to what extent were gender and equity issues appropriately integrated into the design?
4. To what extent are PESP2's components aligned with/integrated into the wider PESP2 design, and with other education programmes in the province?
5. To what extent did the PESP2 programme adapt effectively to changes in the context?

**Effectiveness:**

6. To what extent and how did PESP2 contribute to improved education outcomes (including through strengthening drivers of education system performance)? To what extent were gender, disability, poverty, minority, or other equity-specific results achieved?
7. What were the contributions of each component, and the combination of the components, to achieving results? To what extent were synergies realised?
8. To what extent and how did the design, management, and governance arrangements, partnership and coordination arrangements, and use of innovative approaches for the programme influence the achievement of results?
9. To what extent and how did the context (e.g. policy, political engagement, staff turnover, coordination within and between levels of government etc.) influence the extent to which results were achieved?

**Efficiency:**

10. How effectively was the programme managed and implemented (by DFID, service providers, and partners)?
11. Was the programme implemented in line with its planned budget and timetables? Did the programme meet its milestone objectives?
12. To what extent did the programme provide VFM?

**Sustainability:**

13. To what extent are the results achieved by PESP2 sustainable?
14. To what extent and how successfully did the design and implementation of PESP2 foster sustainability?
15. To what extent and how has GoPb engagement and ownership of PESP2 been achieved and maintained during implementation?

**Impact:**

16. Were there any unintended or negative effects of the programme?

All of the Level Two EQs have been addressed in each of the following background evaluation studies:

Case studies for IER1 (examining results of SBS, Roadmap, and TAMO TA)

TAMO TA Management Study

PEEF Scholarship Study

LUMS/NOP Scholarship Study

Special Education Study

PEF Study

School Infrastructure Study

TA Update Study

Questions 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, 10, and 15 have also been informed by additional data collection on programme design and management issues (PDMR)

## Annex C List of evaluation products and authors

### C.1 Inception phase

**DQA of survey data:** Lead Author: Monazza Aslam. The researchers undertaking the analysis were Fatiq Nadeem and Neelgoon Safdar of IDEAS, under the direction of Rabea Malik (IDEAS). Methodological support was provided by Matthew Powell of OPM.

**Inception Report:** Stephen Jones (OPM, Team Leader). OPM: Tanya Lone (Joint Project Manager), Ian MacAuslan (Joint Project Manager), Dr Shrochis Karki, Matthew Powell; Dr Monazza Aslam (DQA, District Study design); IDEAS (DQA, District Study, literature review, component study designs): Dr Faisal Bari (Deputy Team Leader), Dr Rabea Malik, Amal Aslam, Fatiq Nadeem, Neelgoon Safdar; CDPR (stakeholder analysis, communications strategy): Dr Ijaz Nabi, Hasaan Khawar, Usman Khan, Hina Shaikh, Zara Salman, Fatima Habib.

### C.2 Evaluation products for IER1 (2018)

**EPRR1:** Dr Faisal Bari, Dr Rabea Malik, Sameea Sheikh (IDEAS). The EPRR includes a review of the Roadmap and Stocktake, prepared by Umair Javed, Dr Ijaz Nabi (CDPR), with support from Ben French (OPM, Quality Assurance Reviewer).

**RESP1:** Dr Monazza Aslam (OPM consultant), Dr Rabea Malik, Amal Aslam, Fatiq Nadeem, Neelgoon Safdar (IDEAS), Peter-Sam Hill (OPM, Quality Assurance Reviewer).

**PFER1:** Faisal Rashid, Nyda Mukhtar (OPM), Usman Khan, Muhammad Arshed (OPM consultants), Nicola Ruddle (OPM, Quality Assurance Reviewer).

**Review of TA management arrangements:** Tanya Lone (OPM).

**TAMO documentation review:** Nihan Rafique (OPM).

**Case study of curriculum:** Nihan Rafique, Tanya Lone (OPM), Dr Khalid Mahmood (OPM consultant).

**Case study of teacher training:** Dr Faisal Bari, Dr Rabea Malik, Sameea Sheikh (IDEAS).

**Case study of PEC:** Dr Shrochis Karki, Zara Majeed (OPM),

### C.3 Evaluation products for IER2 (2019)

**EPRR2 update:** Dr Rabea Malik (IDEAS).

**RESP2 update:** Dr Monazza Aslam (OPM consultant), Stephen Jones (OPM), Dr Rabea Malik, Fizza Raza, Fatiq Nadeem, Safa Kashaf, Neelgoon Safdar, Rabia Zulfikar, and Zara Raheem (IDEAS).

**PFER2 update:** Faisal Rashid (OPM), Usman Khan, Muhammad Arshed (OPM consultants), and Nicola Ruddle (Adviser, OPM).

**DEMS:** Dr Faisal Bari, Sameea Sheikh, and Fizza Raza, with support from Dr Rabea Malik, Neelgoon Safdar, and Sophia Richards (IDEAS).

**Evaluation study of Punjab PEEF intermediate scholarships:** Dr Faisal Bari, Rabia Zulfikar, Sophia Richards, and Semal Farid (IDEAS). Advice on survey design was provided by Dr Rabea Malik (IDEAS) and Maham Farhat (OPM). Survey support was provide by Mohammad Malick and Ahsan Tariq (IDEAS Survey Team).

**Evaluation study of LUM/NOP:** Dr Shrochis Karki, Ayesha Kurshid, and Maham Farhat (OPM).

## **C.4 Evaluation products for the draft Final Evaluation Report (2020)**

**EPRR3 update:** Maheen and Stephen Jones (OPM).

**RESP3 update:** Neelgoon Safdar (consultant to OPM) provided an update and edit of RESP1.

**PFER3 update:** Usman Khan, Muhammad Arshed (OPM consultants).

**Evaluation study on support to PEF:** Stephen Jones, David Jeffery (OPM), and Fatima Aftab (OPM consultant), with research support from Sophia Richards and advice from Dr Faisal Bari (IDEAS).

**Evaluation study on support to special and inclusive education:** Stephen Jones (OPM) and Fatima Aftab (OPM consultant), with research support from Sophia Richards and advice from Dr Faisal Bari (IDEAS). Public finance data were provided by Usman Khan (OPM consultant).

**Evaluation study on school infrastructure:** Anam Bashir, Stephen Jones (OPM), Maheen Zahra, and Salman Ishfaq (OPM consultants).

**Community Study:** Dr Shrochis Karki, Anam Bashir, Neelgoon Safdar, and Zara Durrani (OPM). The field researchers included Bilal Afzal, Sameena Rafiq, Erum Ashraf, Waseem Nawaz, Imrana, and Anjum Seemab. Advice and review was provided by Dr Rabea Malik (IDEAS).

**School Survey:** This study was led by Dr Monazza Aslam, Dr Rabea Malik, and Dr Sahar Asad. The OPM Survey Team included Iftikhar Cheema, Aneela Sardar, Abida Bashir, Abdul Rashid Bhatti, Kashif Khan, and Jana Harb. Quality assurance review was carried out by Michele Binci and Peter-Sam Hill (OPM). The final report was edited by Stephen Jones and Jana Harb (OPM).

**TA Update Study:** Stephen Jones (OPM), Fatima Aftab, and Usman Khan (OPM consultants), with research support from Sophia Richards (IDEAS).

## **C.5 Supplementary evaluation products (2021)**

**Supplement to RESP (RESP4).** This includes preliminary data from the 2020 EMIS and LND data up to February 2020. Prepared by Neelgoon Safdar (OPM consultant).

**Supplement to PFER (PFER4):** This includes analysis of 2019/20 expenditure data. Prepared by Usman Khan (OPM consultant).

**Supplement to EPRR (EPRR4):** This includes an assessment of progress with policy and reform initiatives (including those developed under PESP2) up to January 2021, a review of the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the education sector in Punjab, the response by government, and how FCDO has supported this under PESP2. The report also includes an assessment of the TA provided under the final phase of support (from August 2020). Prepared by Stephen Jones (OPM) and Neelgoon Safdar (OPM consultant).

**Supplementary update to the school infrastructure study.** This has reviewed developments in both the PMIU and IMC components up to the end of 2020. Prepared by Anam Bashir (OPM) and Maheen Zahra (OPM consultant).

## Annex D Use and Influence Plan

### D.1 Overall approach to communications

The communications approach for the evaluation has been guided by the following principles:

#### **Focus on a two-way communication interface**

A two-way stream allows for course correction and provides a feedback loop. A focal person from the communications team will be part of the evaluation team precisely to provide this input during the roll-out of the evaluation. It will also be important to take advantage of windows of opportunity that may open more suddenly, to allow greater impact if the response/feedback is rapid enough.

#### **Knowledge brokering while strengthening research uptake**

At different stages of the evaluation there may be a need to undertake activities more akin to 'knowledge brokering', rather than simple dissemination of information to the intended users of the findings. These activities may go beyond just informing and enabling access to information. They could include helping stakeholders to make sense of and to apply research/evaluation results, or being actively involved in the decision-making processes to improve the use of evidence, such as participating in advisory committee meetings hosted by government departments or hosting multi-stakeholder workshops with policymakers to develop implementable recommendations.

#### **Conducting stakeholder mapping**

A stakeholder analysis and mapping was undertaken during the Inception Phase of the evaluation, which included mapping the interest and influence of each stakeholder, and assessing the appropriate communication tools. A list of the stakeholders identified, and their anticipated interest in the evidence generated, is provided in Table 23.

**Table 23: List of evaluation stakeholders**

| Preliminary list of evaluation stakeholders |                                    |                                   |   |
|---|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|
| Prioritisation ranking                      | Research uptake focus area         | Group name                        | Primary stakeholders  |
| Primary evidence users                      | GoPb–DFID policy dialogue PESP2    | GoPb                              | GoPb (particularly the SED, but also Chief Minister, Punjab Cabinet, Planning and Development Board, Finance Department, Local Government Department)         |
|   |                                    | Donor and PESP2 partners          | DFID Pakistan   |
|   |                                    |                                   | PESP2 implementers  |
| Secondary evidence users                    | Wider Pakistan education community | Development partners in education | European Union (EU), DFAT, World Bank, ADB, GIZ, USAID, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), UNICEF  |
|   |                                    | Government and policymakers       | Punjab Provincial Assembly, GoPb officials at district and local level, education officials from other provinces/federal level                                |
|   |                                    | Education practitioners           | NGOs and CSOs involved in delivery of education support (including Save the Children, Idara-e-Taleem-o-Agahi)   |
|   |                                    | General public                    | End beneficiaries (children, parents, teachers), civil society, media   |
|   |                                    | Pakistan research community       | Local education researchers, academics, and opinion leaders   |
|   | Global education community         | Development partners              | Wider global development community working in education (other parts of DFID, other development partners)   |
|   |                                    | International research community  | International education researchers and academics (especially working on educational reform in fragile contexts through SBS, TA, and infrastructural support) |

### Maintain active communication with stakeholders

Active communication with stakeholders will be maintained using different means and formats, via multiple forums, to ensure accessibility. Holding regular events (seminars, workshops, talks) and developing templates for the publication and dissemination of findings will be an important component of the Use and Influence Plan. Social media has become an important place to spread information and invite debates, and can be effective in this case.

### Tailoring communications to audience requirements

Evaluation results and related communication outputs will be tailored to audience requirements as no one product or method of communicating research findings can appeal to, and facilitate uptake for, all of the different audiences.

### Understanding political sensitivities

All of this is going to be rolled out keeping in view sensitivities around some of the components of the programme under review. For example, revisions in curriculum relevance and content,



encouraging girls to attend schools, revisiting teacher recruitment processes etc. may invite strong reactions from relevant stakeholders. Communication of the evaluation findings could be particularly complex around the election period, when a negative finding may face a strong political and official backlash.

### **Developing the Use and Influence Plan as a ‘live’ document**

Communication activities will be designed for impact, ownership, and adaptation. The plan will thus be developed as an evolving tool, offering space and flexibility to incorporate changes in both approach and deliverables, based on the principles of adoptive planning. As is the case with delivery plans, not every communication plan is complete at the outset: rather, it represents the contours of the approach. What is important is that the plan is monitored and corrected when necessary.

### **Communications will be responsive to the timing of dissemination**

Clearly, it is not possible to decide what messages will be communicated before the evaluation exercise begins. The idea will be to communicate early and often so that relevant stakeholders, especially GoPb does not hear about the results of the evaluation from more public sources, such as newspapers. Hence it will be ensured that pertinent information is shared regularly. In the initial stages it may be useful to begin identifying ‘windows’ when stakeholders may be particularly interested in discussing project evidence and implications.

## **D.2 Communications products/activities for IER1**

**Blogs:** A set of online articles was published on the jointly managed CDPR-IDEAS development policy blog *Pakistan Growth Story*. The first article, by Umair Javed, was on the use of the roadmap approach for public service delivery, and was titled ‘Implementing complex reforms: The Roadmap approach in Pakistan’. The second blog was on the importance of PFM for improving service delivery and was titled ‘Public finance to improve development outcomes’.

**Infographics:** CDPR produced two infographics to present key facts from the work on DQA and public finance. The first infographic, derived from the work on DQA, emphasised the key messages stemming from CDPR’s analysis of access according to gender, location, and wealth. It also presented key findings on quality of education, by focusing on learning outcomes and teacher quality. The second infographic was on public finance, with a focus on how public expenditure is allocated and used, focusing on the development and non-development budgets. The communication strategy envisaged attaching these infographics to blogs produced by IDEAS, and disseminating them as special newsletters.

**Stakeholder workshops:** CDPR helped organise two stakeholder workshops to findings of IER1. The first workshop took place on 5 July 2018 and discussed the methodology and preliminary findings. The discussion from this workshop yielded useful comments that were addressed in revision of the IER draft report. Incorporating the comments from various stakeholders, including DFID, a revised and final report was made ready. A second workshop was then held on 11 October 2018 in order to present the final draft to the stakeholders. This workshop also targeted a similar group of stakeholders, aiming for wider private sector participation.

**Policy talks:** To target secondary stakeholders, two policy talks were held under CDPR’s Lahore Policy Exchange banner. The first policy talk took place on 6 July 2018, on the Roadmap case study. The discussion covered a review of seven years of the Roadmap approach in Pakistan. Dr Ijaz Nabi moderated the session and the panel included the lead researcher of the Roadmap case study, Umair Javed, and the Managing Associate at the Chief Minister’s SMU implementing the reform, Akbar Malik. The second policy talk was held on 19 September 2018, on the public finance

component of the evaluation. The discussion centred on strengthening the link between finance and development outcomes. The session was moderated by one of the lead researchers of this analysis, Usman Khan. The panel included Faisal Rasheed, OPM consultant and co-researcher of the work, and Punjab's Secretary Finance, Hamid Yaqoob Sheikh.

### D.3 Communications products/activities for IER2

**Infographics:** CDPR developed four infographics explaining the new governance structure under the Roadmap approach, associated challenges, and recommendations:

- 'Governance structure for school education in Punjab': This infographic covered the features of the PLGA, the changes in the new system, and their implications for education delivery.
- 'District management structure for education delivery': This covered the revision in the management structure, with the new roles and responsibilities of AEOs, DDEOs, DEOs, CEOs, and District Commissioners.
- 'Delivery challenges under the new governance structure': This infographic covered some key governance challenges, such as the issue of fixed lumpsum funding, multiple responsibilities of District Commissioners, and under-representation of the local education sector through the platform of the DEAs.
- 'Monitoring Punjab's schools under the Roadmap approach': This knowledge product described the key features of the Roadmap approach, how it was executed, and who executed it.
- 'How can we improve the Roadmap approach?' This infographic put across practical recommendations to the reform process to make it more inclusive and to ensure it focused more on quality parameters.

**Stakeholder workshop:** CDPR facilitated in organising a stakeholder workshop event to present the draft findings of IER2. The workshop was held on 24 September 2019 in Lahore, and was attended by government representatives, academics, and policymakers. On the basis of the discussion, and comments raised by the stakeholders, further revisions were incorporated in the final revision of IER2.

### D.4 Communications products for the Final Evaluation Report

**Infographics:** CDPR produced infographics on inclusive education (based on the evaluation study on special and inclusive education), Community Study and the School Survey report, which were completed in October 2020 and February 2021 respectively.

**Stakeholder workshops:** OPM, in collaboration with CDPR, organised a stakeholder workshop to present the draft Final Evaluation Report which took place (online) on 11<sup>th</sup> February 2021. The workshop obtained feedback on the findings and recommendations that was taken into account in the finalisation of the report.

**Policy talks:** CDPR organised a session of its Lahore Policy Exchange on 'Leaving no one behind: The role of special education in Pakistan', on 12 February 2020. The session discussed the state of special education in Pakistan, as well as the initiatives that the Government has been undertaking to improve the accessibility of education for people with disabilities. The panellists included Syed Javed Iqbal Bukhari – Secretary Special Education, GoPb; Muhammad Afzan Munir – Senior Research Analyst, Idara-e-Taleem-o-Agahi; and Dr Faisal Bari, Senior Research Fellow, IDEAS.

CDPR also carried out a Lahore Policy Exchange webinar on issues related to Covid's impact on education delivery/assessment on 28<sup>th</sup> January 2021. The panellists included Mr. Ijaz Bajwa – Head of Program Evaluation and Research, The Citizens Foundation; Mr. Qaiser Rashid – PD Project

Management and Implementation Unit, School Education Department; Ms. Baela Jamil – CEO, Idara-e-Taleem-o-Agahi; and Dr. Faisal Bari, Senior Research Fellow, IDEAS.

**Other dissemination products:** CDPR produced blogs based on the studies discussed in the Lahore Policy Exchange. CDPR will produce an edition of its Newsletter based on the Final Evaluation Report.

OPM will develop a policy note based on the final evaluation report which will be distributed through OPM's website and social media links.

All the background studies prepared for the evaluation will be available from the OPM website. Opportunities are being examined for journal publications based on the evaluation.

It is planned to use the Final Evaluation Report as the basis for an article in a leading Pakistan newspaper. This will be complimented by short videos and blogs.

Key findings from the evaluation formed part of a submission to the UK Parliament's International Development Committee investigation on UK Aid to Pakistan.

## Annex E Consolidated list of recommendations from the evaluation

### E.1 Overview

The PESP2 evaluation has provided recommendations to both DFID/FCDO and GoPb and partner organisations covered in evaluation studies. This annex provides a consolidated list of recommendations prepared at each stage of the evaluation. Only for the recommendations to DFID prepared in the First Interim Evaluation has there been a formal process of review and acceptance of recommendations, and documentation of actions taken, as shown in Table 24 below.

### E.2 Recommendations from IER1

#### E.2.1 Recommendations to GoPb

GoPb should do the following:

- 1) Develop an improved policy framework for the education sector that is evidence-based, that sets out clearly defined medium-term objectives, and that articulates the actions and (in particular) public spending required to achieve these objectives. The ESP that is currently being prepared should, so far as possible, contribute to this. The impetus to education reform that has been provided by the Roadmap and Stocktake process needs to be maintained under whatever future management arrangements for sector policy are envisaged.
- 2) Ensure a strong focus within this policy framework (and in other specific programme actions) on gender, equity, and inclusion, to address continuing inequalities in education access and performance. This may include additional data collection and analysis to help improve policy, including on so far relatively neglected issues such as learner preparedness (e.g. the influence of health, nutrition, and the home and social environment on learning prospects).
- 3) An education evidence and information strategy framework should be developed. This strategy should ensure that all information held by government organisations is, so far as feasible, made available for independent analysis, and that a culture of using evidence systematically to inform government policy decisions is fostered. The strategy should emphasise continuing to strengthen information on education sector performance, especially the quality and coverage of information on learning, including to allow a more detailed understanding of the influence of poverty and social factors on learning achievements. The findings of the DQA conducted for this evaluation should be of value in identifying areas of relative weakness in current data collection that could be addressed.
- 4) Ensure that the quality of PFM for education is improved, with a view in particular to improving the rate of budget execution for the non-salary and development budget, and to ensuring the policy framework to guide spending decisions is clear. The main elements of a PFM reform process should include the following:
  - a) Development and annual updating of a costed sector plan, to provide directions to SED and other education sector organisations.
  - b) Strengthening the budget process through budgeting based on strategic plans, the inclusion of budget demands from lower tiers, and the introduction of appropriate costing mechanisms and challenge functions at SED.

- c) SED should also consider piloting school-based budgets in some districts to allow for greater transparency and better financial management.
- d) The FMC should be re-established in SED to continue the reforms on internal audit, the production of budget execution reports, and general improvements in PFM for education service delivery.
- e) To improve budget execution, decentralised tiers of the education system, such as DEAs and school councils, should be empowered to take decisions and develop internal capacity (as required under PLGA 2013) to implement development activities (such as construction).
- f) SED and PMIU should play a stronger role in the oversight and coordination of donor-funded programmes, including reporting against a common government-led monitoring framework.

## **E.2.2 Recommendations to DFID**

### **Focus of DFID support**

- 1) DFID should work with the new GoPb to ensure that support provided under PESp2 is effectively focused on an agreed agenda of priorities that should include (based on the recommendations to the Government set out above):
  - a) strengthening the policy and management framework for education, including continued support to the Roadmap process or its successor;
  - b) strengthening the attention paid to equity and gender in education policy, programmes, and public spending;
  - c) continuing to improve information on the performance of the education system; and
  - d) improving the quality of PFM for education, including through reviewing jointly with Government the reasons for the relatively limited progress made to date.

### **Review of PESp2 in the context of government change**

- 2) The components of DFID's PESp2 programme should be assessed (in the forthcoming DFID annual review) to ensure that they are effectively oriented towards supporting agreed priorities over the remainder of the programme. Specific issues to consider include the following:
  - a) the extent to which there may be flexibility to reallocate resources to reflect any change in priorities;
  - b) reviewing and strengthening the formulation of the theory of change for the remainder of the PESp2 programme; and
  - c) reviewing the approach to ensuring systematic attention is paid to equity, inclusion, and gender issues (see Recommendation 4).

### **TA management**

- 3) DFID should work with the new TA provider to ensure the following:

- a) The planning of TA support to each organisation to which it is provided is informed by an institutional and organisational assessment that identifies the main challenges to and constraints on effective organisational performance.
- b) The process of selecting consultants to provide TA ensures that these consultants have the appropriate experience and technical and capacity development skills that are required by each organisation.
- c) There are clearly defined reporting processes in place to ensure systematic and timely feedback on TA provider performance. This needs to ensure that any problems or concerns with the quality or effectiveness of TA can be identified and addressed quickly, and that information on TA performance will be available so that a rigorous assessment of the results of the TA can be made.
- d) Equity, inclusion, and gender issues are effectively mainstreamed in the design and implementation of TA (see Recommendation 4).

Progress in implementing the TA management recommendations was assessed in the TA update study (see Annex P), which found that:

‘IER1 was used extensively by the TA team in developing their initial work plan including in the selection of areas of focus. Attempts were also made to implement recommendations related to strengthening M&E systems such as carrying out institutional assessments and introducing a feedback tool for partner organisations, though there was some difficulty in getting partner organisations to engage proactively with this process. While the proposed changes in approach to M&E have in principle been helpful, in practice it is not clear that these have significantly improved the performance of TA particularly because of the short time frame of the programme (so there has been only limited scope for sustained organisational capacity development) and the rapid turnover of senior leadership in key roles.’

The following recommendations were made subsequently on the basis of the evaluation study on Cambridge Education TA:

- 1. GoPb should conduct a review of the results of the TA provided and develop an explicit strategy to ensure the most effective use is made of the outputs that have been produced.
- 2. GoPb should consider how to ensure greater stability in key leadership positions in the sector.
- 3. DFID should review the findings of this report jointly with GoPb, I-SAPS, and Cambridge Education (as the providers of TA under PESP3), to consider what further scope there may be for supporting the taking forward of initiatives developed through the TA, with a view to ensuring that the most promising initiatives are taken forward.

### **Equity, inclusion, and gender**

- 4) DFID should ensure that equity and gender considerations are effectively addressed throughout the components of PESP2, and in particular that equity, inclusion, and gender considerations are explicitly considered in the design and implementation of PESP2 components. The approach should draw on DFID guidance and best practice, but should include consideration of the following:

- a) Ensuring data disaggregation by sex and in a form that allows so far as is feasible the analysis of equity considerations, particularly in relation to poverty-related differentials in education access and attainment.
- b) Joint programme development and review, including both sector and gender and inclusion specialists, to ensure gender and inclusion perspectives are fully incorporated in design and programming.
- c) Ensuring that gender and equity targets/indicators are explicitly included within sector-specific goals.
- d) Conducting specific gender and inclusion analysis, including examining how and why the programme components might influence the achievement of inclusion objectives.
- e) The use of participatory gender and inclusion audits, including to help organisations (especially those supported through PESP2) to assess the extent to which their activities are supporting/hindering gender equity.

### **E.2.3 Progress on implementing agreed recommendations to DFID from IER1**

The document below (prepared by DFID as at 19 July 2019) records follow-up action based on the agreed Action Plan published in the Evaluation Management Response to IER1.



**Table 24: Progress on implementing agreed recommendations to DFID from IER1<sup>51</sup>**

| ACCEPTED RECOMMENDATION   | ACTION PLAN   | FOLLOW-UP/ACTION TAKEN   |
|---|---|--|
| <b>Recommendation 1:</b><br>Develop an improved policy framework for the education sector that is evidence-based, that sets out clearly defined medium-term objectives, and that articulates the actions and (in particular) public spending required to achieve these objectives. The ESP that is currently being prepared should, so far as possible, contribute to this. The impetus to education reform that has been provided by the Roadmap and Stocktake process needs to be maintained under whatever future management arrangements for sector policy are envisaged. | <p>The ESP addresses the need to have clear medium-term objectives and actions. The plan will also be costed, which will bring in focus to have clear budget allocations.</p> <p>The Roadmap and Stocktake process has already been transitioned and handed over to the new DFID TA delivered through Cambridge Education and the Government's PMIU.</p> <p>The New Deal document also provides an overview of the new government's priorities in the education sector for the next five years in the province.</p> | <p>A costed ESP for SED is almost finalised. PMIU is now preparing to apply for its implementation grant to the Global Partnership for Education.</p> <p>Since the arrival of the new government in Punjab, the Roadmap and Stocktake process are happening at the Chief Minister level. However, the DFID-funded TA team is assisting the Secretary SED to continue Secretary-level monthly Stocktake meetings. DFID also requested the Minister SED to start these performance review / Stocktake routines on a quarterly basis. DFID will continue to lobby with the Minister and Secretary to continue these routines.</p> <p>The New Deal for Education is finalised, and the Secretary Delivery Unit has also prepared an action plan for its implementation; however, the routines for Action Plan review meetings have yet to be agreed.</p> |
| <b>Recommendation 2:</b><br>Ensure a strong focus within this policy framework (and in other specific programme actions) on gender, equity, and inclusion, to address continuing inequalities in education access and performance. This may include additional data collection and analysis to help improve policy, including on so far relatively neglected issues, such as learner preparedness (e.g. the influence of health, nutrition, and the home and social environment on learning prospects).   | <p>The ESP focuses on bringing in gender and equity elements at the policy and planning levels. The Education Sector Analysis highlighted the gender disparities in public sector enrolment and has recommended to improve this in the ESP. Gender and equity elements will be extensively addressed in the ESP under quality, access, governance, and technical and vocational training and enrolment.</p>   | <p>The proposed ESP for the next five years aims to address gender, equity, and inclusion as key policy priorities. The ESP is currently undergoing review, after an independent appraisal. Once the ESP is finalised, we will be able to comment on how far it has been successful in addressing this aspiration.</p> <p>The DFID-funded TA team has also developed the Special Education Department Policy and is working on the IES.</p> <p>From this year onwards, some of the disability indicators data will also be collected by PMIU during the ASC.</p>   |

<sup>51</sup> Prepared by DFID (as at 19 July 2019).

| ACCEPTED RECOMMENDATION  | ACTION PLAN  | FOLLOW-UP/ACTION TAKEN   |
|--|--|--|
| <p><b>Recommendation 3:</b></p> <p>Continue to strengthen information on education sector performance, focused on continuing to improve the quality of information on learning, particularly to allow a more detailed understanding of the influence of poverty and social factors on learning achievements. The development of a broader information strategy framework should be considered, including seeking to ensure that all information held by government organisations is, so far as feasible, made available for independent analysis. The findings of the DQA conducted for this evaluation should be of value in identifying areas of relative weakness in current data collection that could be addressed.</p> | <p>The Education Sector Analysis analyses the influence of poverty and socioeconomic factors on learning achievements, and, based on this analysis, the ESP will address how the barriers in this will be eliminated through policy and better data collection.</p> <p>We will continue to explore opportunities for more comprehensive data collection on learning outcomes and their correlation with socioeconomic factors.</p> | <p>SED and PMIU in particular continue to explore ways of improving the availability, quality, and use of data. Support is being provided to PMIU in this by DFID TA. <u>There is a need for the DFID TA team to go back to the findings of the DQA to ensure gaps in data are being addressed.</u></p> <p>SED is also increasingly making information and data available to researchers for independent analysis. And a memorandum of understanding has been signed between SED and LUM's School of Education to facilitate data-sharing.</p> |

| ACCEPTED RECOMMENDATION   | ACTION PLAN   | FOLLOW-UP/ACTION TAKEN  |
|---|---|---|
| <p><b>Recommendation 4:</b><br/>Ensure that the quality of PFM for education is improved, with a view in particular to improving the rate of budget execution for the non-salary and development budget, and to ensuring the policy framework for guiding spending decisions is clear. The main elements of a PFM reform process should include:</p> <p>a) development and annual updating of a costed sector plan to provide directions to SED and other education sector organisations;</p> <p>b) strengthening the budget process through budgeting based on strategic plans, the inclusion of budget demands from lower tiers, and the introduction of appropriate costing mechanisms and challenge functions at SED;</p> <p>c) SED should also consider piloting school-based budgets in some districts to allow for greater transparency and better financial management;</p> <p>d) the FMC should be re-established in SED to continue the reforms on internal audit, the production of budget execution reports, and general improvements in PFM for education service delivery;</p> <p>e) to improve budget execution, decentralised tiers of the education system, such as DEAs and school councils, should be empowered to take decisions and develop internal capacity (as required under PLGA 2013) to implement development activities (such as construction); and</p> <p>f) SED and PMIU should play a stronger role in the oversight and coordination of donor-funded programmes, including reporting against a common government-led monitoring framework.</p> | <p>The ESP is already a costed plan which provides direction to future budget allocations to all departments under SED.</p> <p>DFID is strongly advocating for the establishment of the FMC within SED. The purpose of the FMC is to strengthen the public financial system in SED and to encourage a bottom-up approach to budget demands. The process of the FMC's formulation is still pending.</p> <p>The new government's approach is moving from a centralised-based model to a more district-/school-level, decentralised approach. This could help in empowering the DEOs, ensuring better budget execution, and implementation of development activities.</p> <p>PMIU already plays the role of coordination hub for donors, analysing data, and undertaking stocktake routines.</p> <p>With DFID's support, budget execution is reviewed and discussed regularly through the PESP2 steering committee meetings.</p> | <p>The ESP simulation model and its implementation plan mentioned future budgetary requirements to achieve ESP objectives.</p> <p>DFID-supported TA has provided some assistance to SED on the budget-making process. <u>However, much more could be done in this regard by the FMC, when this is established.</u> DFID continues to lobby with the Secretary SED to get the FMC operational soon. However, at the moment these functions are being addressed through PMIU and some support from the DFID TA team.</p> <p><u>School-based budgeting has not been piloted</u> and there are no plans to do this until after the devolution of functions to the district and sub-district levels is complete.</p> <p>DFID continues to lobby with SED to establish the FMC in SED.</p> <p>GoPb has recently introduced a new local government law and it is being proposed to further devolve the administration of the education department to Tehsil level. The Secretary SED delivery unit is currently taking a lead on formalising decentralisation in SED. One of the objectives of the decentralisation is to transfer power to local governments to allow independent management and decision-making.</p> <p>PMIU continues to play an important role in the oversight and coordination of donor-funded programmes. The recommendation to adopt a common results framework has yet to be agreed and actioned.</p> |

| ACCEPTED RECOMMENDATION  | ACTION PLAN   | FOLLOW-UP/ACTION TAKEN   |
|--|---|--|
| <p><b>Recommendation 5:</b><br/>Focus of DFID support:</p> <p>DFID should work with the new GoPb to ensure that support provided under PESP2 is effectively focused on an agreed agenda of priorities that should include (based on the recommendations to the Government set out above):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) strengthening the policy and management framework for education, including continued support to the Roadmap process or its successor;</li> <li>b) strengthening the attention paid to equity and gender in education policy, programmes, and public spending;</li> <li>c) continuing to improve information on the performance of the education system; and</li> <li>d) improving the quality of PFM for education, including through reviewing jointly with Government the reasons for the relatively limited progress made to date.</li> </ul> | <p>DFID is working closely with GoPb (directly aligned with its priorities) and through the TA to ensure the focus of its support in the recommended areas supported through the formulation of new plans.</p> <p>DFID is continuing its support to the Roadmap process through its TA and through building the capacity of PMIU.</p> <p>DFID leads the process on ESP; the gender and equity elements are effectively addressed in the plan.</p> <p>This is also done through the Education Sector Analysis and ESP process. Also, the analysis of education reform policy and performance under the PESP2 evaluation provides significant insights into the performance of the education sector in Punjab.</p> <p>DFID works closely with SED through the dedicated TA on PFM reforms in education.</p> | <p>DFID continues to work closely with Minister SED and the Secretary SED to align its priorities. A DFID-funded TA workplan until March 2020 was prepared in collaboration with SED and associated departments.</p> <p>DFID continues to lobby with the Minister and Secretary SED to re-establish Roadmap routines in the department.</p> <p>Gender and equity elements are being addressed in the new Punjab Education Programme that DFID is developing.</p> <p>The DFID PESP2 evaluation team continues to assess the performance of the education system. DFID TA should consider ways of improving information in the Government on education systems performance (see comment above).</p> <p>DFID continues to work closely with SED through a dedicated TA team on PFM reforms.</p> |

| ACCEPTED RECOMMENDATION  | ACTION PLAN   | FOLLOW-UP/ACTION TAKEN   |
|--|---|--|
| <p><b>Recommendation 6:</b><br/>Review of PESP2 in the context of government change:</p> <p>The components of DFID's PESP2 programme should be assessed (in the forthcoming DFID annual review) to ensure that they are effectively oriented towards supporting agreed priorities over the remainder of the programme. Specific issues to consider include the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) the extent to which there may be flexibility to reallocate resources to reflect any change in priorities;</li> <li>b) reviewing and strengthening the formulation of the theory of change for the remainder of the PESP2 programme; and</li> <li>c) reviewing the approach to ensuring systematic attention is paid to equity, inclusion, and gender issues (see Recommendation 4).</li> </ul> | <p>DFID's current annual review, and the team's engagement with the new government has already assessed to ensure effective support on upcoming government priorities:</p> <p>DFID has already been responsive to new government priorities and has reallocated the remaining US\$ 4.8 million SBS funding to expand the Sustainable Transition and Retention in Delivering Education (STRIDE) initiative in 20 districts of Punjab.</p> <p>The theory of change has been revised with the help of the evaluation team.</p> <p>DFID has ensured that equity and inclusion is addressed through the ESP, and the current TA also addresses these elements in its support to SED.</p> | <p>Since the arrival of the new government in Punjab DFID's support is effectively oriented towards its priorities in Punjab. Some of the key interventions include the following:</p> <p>DFID's SBS of £4.8 million has been reallocated to the STRIDE initiative in 20 districts of Punjab.</p> <p>DFID signed an Exchange of Letters with GoPb for £35 million as earmarked financial aid for a school construction and rehabilitation project until March 2020.</p> <p>Equity and inclusion elements are being addressed through some new components under PESP2: e.g. Advancing Action for Adolescent Girls, Research and Advocacy for Inclusive Education etc.</p> |

| ACCEPTED RECOMMENDATION   | ACTION PLAN   | FOLLOW-UP/ACTION TAKEN   |
|---|---|--|
| <p><b>Recommendation 7:</b><br/>TA management</p> <p>DFID should work with the new TA provider to ensure that:</p> <p>a) the planning of TA support to each organisation to which it is provided is informed by an institutional and organisational assessment that identifies the main challenges to, and constraints on, effective organisational performance;</p> <p>b) the process of selecting consultants to provide TA ensures that these consultants have the appropriate experience and technical and capacity development skills that are required by each organisation;</p> <p>c) there are clearly defined reporting processes in place to ensure systematic and timely feedback on TA provider performance; this needs to ensure that any problems or concerns with the quality or effectiveness of TA can be identified and addressed quickly, and that information on TA performance will be available so that a rigorous assessment of the results of TA can be made; and</p> <p>d) equity, inclusion, and gender issues are effectively mainstreamed in the design and implementation of TA.</p> | <p>DFID's new TA's terms of reference ensure that the support provided to SED and its departments is provided through evidence- and data-driven approaches</p> <p>The TA is required to bring in experts in all workstreams with DFID consultation. The terms of reference also require the TA to attract a wider market to get better options.</p> <p>DFID works closely with the TA provider and gives systematic monthly/fortnightly feedback on its performance. The annual review process and quarterly steering committee meetings with SED and all stakeholders provide a triangulated approach on the TA's performance. This information is used to improvise on the areas of support provided by the TA. DFID also has a centralised Strategic Relationship Management system that provides feedback on the supplier's performance on operational and compliance levels. It also strengthens VFM and increases the development impact with the supplier.</p> | <p>DFID had worked with the TA team to ensure compliance with these recommendations:</p> <p>a) The TA team is currently conducting an institutional assessment for PEF, which began in July 2019. QAED institutional assessment has already started. TA team's downstream partner - I-SAPS – has also been tasked to start work on the restructuring of local government, considering the new local government legislation.</p> <p>b) The TA team has adopted a rigorous process whereby all consultants are vetted by their Senior Management Team to ensure that they have the required skill set appropriate for the required job. The TA team has also shared CVs / profiles of key personnel with DFID for consultation. The TA team has also hired local consultants who already have relevant experience and are subject experts. <u>The TA team should do more to share CVs of short-term TA staff, both national and international, particularly where they are being contracted for significant pieces of work.</u></p> <p>c) The TA team has operationalised a feedback mechanism whereby each department reports back on its performance in the last quarter. This is reported to DFID in the quarterly progress report. <u>It would be good if the TA team could report what actions (if any) are being taken to address the feedback from the government, particularly where this relates to the quality of outputs produced.</u></p> <p>d) There are several equity and inclusion-related activities which are being mainstreamed, such as the development of the IES and SEP, and an inclusion lens being adopted in LND videos.</p> |

| ACCEPTED RECOMMENDATION  | ACTION PLAN  | FOLLOW-UP/ACTION TAKEN   |
|--|--|--|
| <p><b>Recommendation 8:</b><br/>Equity, inclusion, and gender</p> <p>DFID should ensure that equity and gender considerations are effectively addressed throughout the components of PESP2, and that equity, inclusion, and gender considerations are explicitly considered in the design and implementation of PESP2 components. The approach should draw on DFID guidance and best practice, but should include consideration of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) ensuring data disaggregation by sex and in a form that allows, so far as is feasible, the analysis of equity considerations, particularly in relation to poverty-related differentials in education access and attainment;</li> <li>b) joint programme development and review including both sector and gender and inclusion specialists, to ensure gender and inclusion perspectives are fully incorporated in design and programming;</li> <li>c) ensuring that gender and equity targets/indicators are explicitly included within sector-specific goals;</li> <li>d) conducting specific gender and inclusion analysis, including examining how and why the programme components might influence the achievement of inclusion objectives; and</li> <li>e) the use of participatory gender and inclusion audits, including to help organisations (especially those supported through PESP2) to assess the extent to which their activities are supporting/hindering gender equity.</li> </ul> | <p>DFID has led the process of the Education Sector Analysis, which analyses gender and equity under all components in the education sector. This will be addressed under the new ESP:</p> <p>This is set to be addressed in the ESP and DFID will ensure that the data gathered through DFID surveys adhere to these principles to get more informed analysis in gender and equity.</p> <p>The next Business Case will address this and will incorporate gender and inclusion perspectives in the design and programming. DFID also has a separate component for SpED, which works on inclusive access for children in schools.</p> <p>This is addressed under the ESP.</p> <p>This could be done under the scoping exercise for the new Business Case and through TA.</p> <p>This is not part of the design of the current programme; however, this could be addressed through the new programme design.</p> | <p>Most data are sex disaggregated and can be used for planning purposes. Data on poverty-related differentials in relation to education access and attainment are still hard to come by. <u>TA could explore if some of the existing datasets could be used to provide this analysis.</u></p> <p>DFID's partnership with SED continues and the upcoming Punjab education programme has a greater focus on inclusion and gender.</p> <p>Addressed in the ESP, in Table 4.</p> <p>This is ongoing.</p> <p>This has not been planned. We look forward to the next PESP evaluation report to provide broad insights in this regard.</p> |



## **E.3 Recommendations on scholarship programmes**

### **E.3.1 Recommendations on PEEF**

1. DFID should support a strengthening of PEEF's monitoring systems for the intermediate scholarship programme, to provide consolidated information on completion rates, academic performance, and subsequent educational progression.
2. DFID should support or encourage a quantitative impact evaluation study which would be able to assess scholarship recipients' academic performance and subsequent educational progression against a robust counterfactual, help explain variations in performance, and provide a stronger basis for assessing VFM.
3. PEEF should consider undertaking a review of selected aspects of its scholarship policies, including the level of financial support provided.

### **E.3.2 Recommendations on LUMS/NOP**

Since DFID support has now ended and similar support is not envisaged in the future, recommendations are addressed to LUMS for the future of the NOP.

1. LUMS should articulate a clear strategy for the NOP, and formalise it in the form of a strategy document, which should be publicly available.
2. LUMS should increase its investment in meeting equity targets, particularly reducing gender imbalance and provincial disparities, as well as enrolling more students with disabilities.
3. LUMS should not consider its standard of merit as a settled issue, but should continue to discuss and assess this as part of its selection process.
4. The NOP Centre should strengthen its internal and external communication with stakeholders.
5. The NOP Centre should strengthen some aspects of services it already provides to scholars.
6. LUMS should continue to engage with and support NOP scholars after they graduate, perhaps in addition to the general engagement that takes place with other alumni.
7. LUMS should reconsider its current framing of the NOP scholars and the scholarship programme in the LUMS community.

## **E.4 Recommendations on support to special education**

### **E.4.1 Recommendations to GoPb**

1. GoPb (working with SED and SpED) should resolve outstanding issues relating to the consistency of the IES and SEP, and improving coordination and the definition of roles between SED and SpED.

2. There should be a strong and coordinated focus on improving data on SEND in a form that will be practically useful for policy purposes, building on the progress that has been made.
3. The Government should use the implementation plans for the IES and SEP as the basis for developing annual budgets and plans.
4. The Government should review funding arrangements for PEF and the SpED development budget, to improve the rate of budget execution and to allow expansion of the IVS by PEF as part of the commitment to inclusive education.

#### **E.4.2 Recommendations to DFID**

1. DFID should provide continuing advisory and TA support (especially after the ending of the Cambridge Education TA support in March 2020) for implementation of the IES and SEP, including to help resolve outstanding issues relating to data and relative responsibilities, to encourage effective coordination between SED and SpED, and to build on the success of the PIEP PEF pilot. Further DFID support to the Government should be aligned with the implementation plans for the IES and SEP.
2. DFID should continue to support advocacy and stakeholder dialogue to ensure perspectives from disabled people and children inform policymaking and strategy implementation.

### **E.5 Recommendations on PEF**

These recommendations were made noting that comprehensive recommendations for improving PEF systems and structures have already been developed through the TA support provided.

#### **E.5.1 Recommendations to GoPb**

1. GoPb should articulate and implement a policy framework for PPPs in school education which addresses the appropriate regulation of private schools and the relationship between the public and private sectors, as well as the range of PPP arrangements envisaged to be implemented or tested.
2. Within this policy framework, a medium- to long-term vision for PEF should be agreed as a basis for strategy and budget decisions.
3. This vision should set out the relative roles and priorities for PEF's programmes, and how these will be used to achieve education policy objectives, which should go beyond increasing numbers enrolled to address retention and transition elements of participation, with a strong focus on improving learning outcomes.
4. Financing arrangements should be put in place that provide financial stability and that support an agreed strategy for PEF, including the future of each of its programmes, and appropriate systems development and staffing, and which involve a transfer of core funding of PEF programmes to the recurrent budget.
5. The reintegration of the PSSP into PEF should be completed.

## **E.5.2 Recommendations to DFID**

1. Future DFID support to PEF should focus on addressing strategic and operational issues, rather than supporting enrolment expansion as a core objective, and should take place within (and supporting) an agreed policy framework for PPPs.
2. DFID should support the strengthening of data and research to inform PEF's policies and programmes.

## **E.6 Recommendations on school infrastructure**

### **E.6.1 Recommendations for the remainder of IMC's Humqadam-SCRIP infrastructure component**

1. In the upcoming amendment, DFID and IMC should take into account challenges in previous rounds, as well as anticipated delivery risks.
2. IMC and DFID should assign focal persons with responsibility for relationship management with each other, and with the Government.
3. Management and governance arrangements within IMC's Humqadam-SCRIP team should be restructured to facilitate rapid decision-making and avoid unnecessary delays.

### **E.6.2 Recommendations to IMC**

1. IMC should focus on setting systems which ensure that the planning and design phase of the programme is able to deliver modest yet safe, attractive, accessible, equitable, and durable learning environments that meet local needs
2. The design of facilities should take into account locally available building materials, and skills and techniques among local artisans.
3. IMC should incorporate robust systems for assessing risks, and continuous monitoring, evaluation, and reporting from the very beginning of the programme. M&E should be undertaken in an open and transparent manner by a multi-disciplinary team.
4. IMC should focus on developing a financial management system to secure VFM. For example, a cost database would work as a useful benchmark for monitoring progress on the VFM front.

### **E.6.3 Recommendations to DFID for school infrastructure investments**

1. Targets must be realistically set, taking into account timeframes and available capacities.
2. School infrastructure interventions require greater planning at the conception/inception stage. The planning stage must recognise the context of the target areas.
3. Where infrastructure investments form part of wider programmes, adequate resourcing must be ensured from the beginning, with dedicated governance structures, risk mechanisms, and monitoring arrangements.

4. For infrastructure programmes, arrangements for third-party verification must be established from the very start of the programme's implementation. Continuity in such arrangements must also be ensured.
5. The design phase should be informed by environmental and social assessments,
6. Keeping in view programmes' size and complexity, a comprehensive theory of change should inform the programme design. In particular, the theory of change must take into consideration the complexity and context of innovations, and push for evidence-based interventions that have been piloted/tested.
7. A stronger commitment to gender and equity concerns at the inception stage must be supplemented by a similarly strong commitment to these concerns at the implementation stage.
8. A rigorous monitoring strategy is needed right from the start to allow for a focused and robust follow-up of the targets and to prevent the identification of a bigger shock at the end of the implementation year/period.
9. Clarity of terms in contracts is essential, particularly where adherence to infrastructure quality and safety standards is concerned. For infrastructure programmes in particular, processes for design approval, handovers, and liability must be clearly laid out.
10. Innovations must be backed by evidence and/or piloted during the inception stage by the service provider, before moving on to the implementation stage.
11. Alternatives to infrastructural provision can be sought and established at the inception stage, as opposed to being considered as mitigation efforts.
12. Adherence to good financial planning and management practices must be a mandatory requirement for all partners. Fiduciary risks can be mitigated through a number of measures, including the involvement of local communities, the maintenance of good baseline information, setting up site supervision, and reporting, monitoring, and verification procedures.

#### **E.6.4 Recommendations to GoPb for school infrastructure interventions**

1. Coordination efforts with various stakeholders should be prioritised, in order to achieve the desired results in the most efficient manner.
2. Considering the current population growth rate of 2.1% in Punjab, plans to accommodate or address overcrowding in the future must ensure the sustainability of infrastructure provision through maintenance and climate-friendly buildings.
3. Given the limited availability of land, alternatives to accommodate students should also be considered.

### E.6.5 Additional recommendations on school infrastructure from Supplementary Evaluation Study

1. It is essential that FCDO, Humqadam-SCRIP, and TCF determine appropriate mitigation measures in order to address possible risks to programme delivery should handovers be delayed.<sup>52</sup>
2. It is important to consider maintenance arrangements, in particular given the limited NSB funds available for schools<sup>53</sup>. This is particularly key for IMC schools, where maintenance costs are expected to be higher. One approach to streamline maintenance measures may be to prepare and share standardized documentation pertaining to maintenance arrangements at the time of handover. Similarly, for the R&R component within PSCRIP, plans for maintenance of innovative inputs such as the makerspaces, upgradation of IT equipment, must be established.
3. Uniform reporting mechanisms across suppliers can allow for easier comparative analyses. This pertains to reporting on targets that are common to all three suppliers: classroom construction and per unit costing, per unit technical/operational costs, handovers, and number of quality concerns raised and addressed.
4. In the context of the Covid-19 pandemic and resulting school closures, it is worth exploring how the meaning of access to education has changed now that distance learning is underway and there is significant dearth of digital infrastructure. Secondly, social distancing requirements in the near future may mean that instead of a 40 children per classroom estimate, only a much smaller number can be accommodated until the end of the pandemic. This may further exacerbate access related limitations.

As FCDO plans to conduct a Value for Money exercise for the infrastructure component towards the end of the program<sup>54</sup>, important aspects to consider in this exercise include:

1. The methodology should emphasise the quantification of benefits and the required data gathering and analysis, taking into consideration the availability and quality of existing data<sup>55</sup>. Moreover, qualitative assessment through perception surveys which provide an opportunity to gather experience of the community level stakeholders should also be considered.
2. A representative minimum sample for each of the three components (IMC, TCF and PMIU) which considers the geographical variation in civil works, choosing sites which have adequate data available, and avoiding sites where construction is still on-going, or schools are non-functional.
3. The infrastructure experts should be tasked with the evaluation of the primary facilities (classrooms, toilet blocks, furniture) with every facility evaluated against a robust criterion discussed in the grading matrix.
4. Efficiency assessment must include a review of the life cycle of the facilities. The aspects to be considered to determine this include school design and construction

<sup>52</sup> The evaluation team cannot comment further on what measures may be required as the SOP for handover processes has not been made available at the time of writing.

<sup>53</sup> At the time of writing, discussions pertaining to increasing the NSB funds are underway.

<sup>54</sup> According to the Annual Review 2021, FCDO will be conducting a VFM exercise before the PCR process.

<sup>55</sup> Via UKAID, 2012 "Measuring and Maximising Value for Money in Infrastructure Programmes".

specialisation, material specification, labour quality, hazardous impact and environmental impact.

5. The exercise should take account of international evidence that the cost effectiveness in relation to achieving improved learning outcomes of spending on school infrastructure is generally low (e.g. it is classified as a “bad buy” in World Bank/FCDO 2020) in considering, for instance, whether funds should have been redirected to more cost effective forms of support, given the context following long delays in implementation.

## Annex F Data sources on education sector performance

### F.1 Summary of the DQA<sup>56</sup>

#### F.1.1 Methodology of the DQA

The focus of this analysis was on identifying the extent to which existing secondary data sources can provide robust and *good-quality indicators of performance*. Therefore, the analysis undertaken involved both a desk review-based DQA of secondary datasets as well as an identification of *potential indicators that could be generated* from within these datasets that are quality measures of PESP2 performance.

The following resources were reviewed and evaluated with respect to dimensions identified within the frameworks:

- an assessment of the planning documents that relate to the dataset;
- a review of the final dataset;
- a review of any final reports/publications (online and hard copies).

Documentation was reviewed for information on concepts, definitions, and classifications used, and to assess the quality of data collection and analysis. This included making an assessment about coverage, sampling (where relevant) and response errors, questionnaire design and training for field workers for data collection, as well as how the data are managed. Access to information and data and accessibility were also evaluated.

The final survey datasets for which the DQA was undertaken are the following:<sup>57</sup>

- The PSES (previously known as Nielsen) household dataset, covering eight waves of 37,000 households, between November 2011 and December 2015 (using the same questionnaire).
- The LND data: Bi-monthly testing. A number of different tests and questionnaires have been used for this. They cover the period 2015–17.
- The DFID 6MA data, covering the period 2014–17.
- Several waves of data from the ASERs (2012–16).
- PSLM survey, 2012–16.

The administrative datasets for which DQA was undertaken were as follows:

- The ACS/EMIS, covering the period 2012/13–2016/17.
- The PSC, covering data collected in 2011/12 and 2016/17.

The DQA examined available survey plans and design documents to assess the following dimensions for each of the datasets listed above:

<sup>56</sup> This section is drawn from the DQA report produced as part of the evaluation inception phase.

<sup>57</sup> Dates refer to the period covered by the DQA exercise (which was undertaken in 2017 for the survey sources, and 2019 for administrative sources). No update of the DQA was undertaken to take account of any possible changes in data collection methodology. However, a more detailed review was undertaken of the ASER methodology, focusing on the extent to which valid comparisons over time could be made from the data presented.







1. quality dimension 1: integrity;
2. quality dimension 2: methodological soundness;
3. quality dimension 3: accuracy and reliability;
4. quality dimension 4: serviceability;
5. quality dimension 5: accessibility; and
6. quality dimension 6: training and fieldwork review.

## F.2 Summary of DQA findings: survey sources

This section presents the summary DQA findings for the survey datasets and administrative data, using the legends shown in Table 25.

**Table 25:      Legends for DQA tables**

| Legend for DQA dashboard  |   |
|---|---|
|    | Strength of the survey/indicator  |
|    | Relative less strong part of the survey that has potential for revision |
|   | Relative weakness of the survey that can be revised                     |
|  | Critical weakness of the survey that compromises its ability to assess  |

### F.2.1 DQA survey datasets

DQA summaries are presented below for: (i) the PSES; (ii) the LND survey on learning outcomes; (iii) DFID 6MA data; (iv) ASER; and (v) PSLM.

**Table 26: Dashboard summary: Nielsen/PSES household surveys**

| DQA indicator               | Description            | Dashboard value | Notes  |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|--|
| Survey design               | Target population      |                 | 1,000 households per district for 36 districts, with a non-response rate of 3.1% per district. The most knowledgeable household member/s are questioned in the survey to gather detailed information for children aged 4–16 years old. The survey features a household roster as well, and includes questions on socioeconomic background for all household members. |
|                             | Sampling design        |                 | The design of the sample follows a multi-stage cluster-based random sample.  |
|                             | Non-response treatment |                 | Information not made clear. The non-responded instrument is replaced by the following: <i>'the substitution of a selected respondent if required is made by another person in the same vicinity with profile that matches the original respondent.'</i>  |
|                             | Sampling procedure     |                 | Stratified multi-stage design which uses Enumeration Blocks for urban areas and village/Mouza boundaries for rural areas.  |
| Sampling representativeness | National               |                 | Data neither representative nor available for the national level.  |
|                             | Province               |                 | Data may not be representative at the provincial level.  |
|                             | District               |                 | Data may not be representative at the district level. <sup>58</sup>  |
|                             | Urban/rural            |                 | Data can be disaggregated by urban/rural.  |
|                             | Gender                 |                 | Data can be disaggregated by gender.   |
|                             | Age                    |                 | Data can be disaggregated by age.  |
|                             | Socioeconomic Status   |                 | Data can be disaggregated by some measure of SES. The socioeconomic section features an income and employment status category for the chief wage-earners and everyone else in the house.   |
|                             | Disability             |                 | Data can be disaggregated by disability for wave 7 and wave 8, which features questions on types of disability for children in special schools (public and private).   |
| Questionnaire               | Pilot testing          |                 | No information available.  |
|                             | Methodology            |                 | No information available.  |

<sup>58</sup> The background document says that the sample is representative at the district level. However, interviews with key personnel show otherwise. This is explained in more detail below in the assessment of source data.

| DQA indicator  | Description                                | Dashboard value | Notes  |
|--|--|-----------------|--|
|  | Length                                     |                 | Four modules for household roster, education, health, and socioeconomic background, with 104 questions in the entire survey. Fatigue for the respondent might not be an issue.   |
|  | Translation                                |                 | No information available.  |
|  | Enumeration process                        |                 | No information available.  |
| Fieldwork and Data management                            | Quality control                            |                 | No information available.  |
|  | Data processing                            |                 | No information available.  |
|  | Data editing                               |                 | No documentation on the treatment of missing data, variable ranges, editing, or imputation of data.  |
| Which indicators does this database have information on? | Literacy rate                              |                 | No information available.  |
|  | Enrolment/attendance rates (gross and net) |                 | The survey collects data on whether a child is currently enrolled in school or not, the type of school attended, and the current class in which the child is enrolled. Along with child age, this information should allow the calculation of GER and NER.         |
|  | Participation rates                        |                 | The education module provides information about children from age four to 16 years about being enrolled in a general school or madrasah. This information can be used to see how many children are in school or not, and if they are, the type of school attended. |
|  | Student learning outcomes                  |                 | No information available.  |
|  | Transition rates                           |                 | No information available.  |

| DQA indicator | Description                  | Dashboard value | Notes   |
|---------------|------------------------------|-----------------|---|
|               | Completion rates             |                 | The education module provides information about children from age four to 16 about being enrolled in a school or madrassah, and also dissects this by the class in which the child is enrolled, which allows us to calculate completion rates.                                      |
|               | Drop-out rates               |                 | The education module provides information about children from age four to 16 dropping out of school, and whether they chose to go to another school or continue education elsewhere. This allows us to calculate drop-out rates and also provide estimates of reasons for drop-out. |
|               | Teachers number and quality  |                 | Some perception-based information about the quality of teachers and the satisfaction of the household with their schools is available.  |
|               | School environment           |                 | The survey also features some information about household satisfaction with the school administration and programmes developed in the school nested as responses to questions for 'reasons for never attending school' or dropping out.   |
|               | Finance                      |                 | No information available.   |
|               | Accountability relationships |                 | No information available.   |

**Table 27: Dashboard summary of the LND assessment data**

| DQA indicator               | Description            | Dashboard value | Notes  |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|--|
| Survey design               | Target population      |                 | There are around 43,000/49,000 schools in Punjab that have K-5 students, which seem to be the target population. It is unclear how the sample schools are selected or if all the schools are visited since the website mentions all grades.                                    |
|                             | Non-response treatment |                 | The data present themselves as census data, so no response becomes irrelevant. However, the raw data have incomplete observations, suggesting that the whole tool was not administered.  |
|                             | Sampling procedure     |                 | According to their website, students are chosen on a random basis. The sampling documents do not make this clear and the exact technique is not specified.   |
|                             | National               |                 | Data neither representative nor available for the national level.  |
| Sampling representativeness | Province               |                 | Documentation reports the dataset to be representative at the provincial level.  |
|                             | District               |                 | Documentation reports the dataset to be representative at the district level.  |
|                             | School                 |                 | Data are not representative at the school level, only six pupils tested/school.  |
|                             | Urban/rural            |                 | Data can be disaggregated by urban/rural through the EMIS ASC data.  |
|                             | Gender                 |                 | While it may be possible to disaggregate the data by school/gender through the EMIS ASC data, there is no individual-level/child-level information available for this level of disaggregation.   |
|                             | Age                    |                 | Data cannot be disaggregated by age.   |
|                             | Socioeconomic Status   |                 | Data cannot be disaggregated by a measure of SES.  |
|                             | Disability             |                 | Data cannot be disaggregated by disability for wave 7 and wave 8.  |
| Questionnaire               | Pilot testing          |                 | LND went through a testing/pilot phase between March and September 2015. Tablets, which are used to record the assessment, minimising data compilation errors, were pilot tested between March and September 2015. Further information/data from this phase are not available. |

| DQA indicator  | Description                     | Dashboard value | Notes   |
|--|---------------------------------|-----------------|---|
|  | Methodology                     |                 | The questionnaire itself is provided in an Android application. It unclear from both the documentation and the raw data the number of total questions administered per student and per school. Similarly, there is no sampling methodology for selecting each student in a class; it is unclear if this has been consistent across time. The number of students tested in each class remains the same irrespective of class size. |
|  | Length                          |                 | 5–10 questions available on an Android application, which changes with each attempt; fatigue for the respondent might not be an issue.  |
|  | Translation                     |                 | No information available.   |
|  | Enumeration process             |                 | Electronic enumeration through tablets so data are real-time updated.   |
| Fieldwork and data management                            | Quality control                 |                 | Monitoring and Evaluation Assistants (MEAs) collect these data through monthly monitoring so issues of cheating etc. are not addressed. Electronic enumeration through tablets so data are real-time updated.   |
|  | Data processing                 |                 | Electronic enumeration through tablets so data are real-time updated.   |
|  | Data editing                    |                 | No documentation on the treatment of missing data, variable ranges, editing, or imputation of data.   |
| Which indicators does this database have information on? | Literacy rate                   |                 | No information available.   |
|  | Enrolment rates (gross and net) |                 | No information available.   |
|  | Participation rates             |                 | No information available.   |
|  | Student learning outcomes       |                 | The data reveal the results of a test to third graders for English, maths, and Urdu. The data for these tests are comparable over the months. A limited number of SLOs are tested. However, as the SLOs being tested are drawn from the 6MA dataset, the LND data are comparable to that dataset. Taking into account issues with the sampling methodology would suggest that performance cannot be compared across schools.      |
|  | Student attendance              |                 | No information available.   |

| DQA indicator | Description                  | Dashboard value | Notes                     |
|---------------|------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|
|               | Retention rates              |                 | No information available. |
|               | Transition rates             |                 | No information available. |
|               | Completion rates             |                 | No information available. |
|               | Drop-out rates               |                 | No information available. |
|               | Teachers number and quality  |                 | No information available. |
|               | School environment           |                 | No information available. |
|               | Finance                      |                 | No information available. |
|               | Accountability relationships |                 | No information available. |



**Table 28: Dashboard summary of DFID 6MA data**

| DQA indicator               | Description            | Dashboard value | Notes  |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|--|
| Survey design               | Target population      |                 | <p>The survey is implemented in 115 girls' schools, 107 boys' schools, 109 non-primary schools, and 113 primary schools. These schools have 5,800 students and are located in 36 districts. The overall margin for error in the sample size is 1.2%.</p> <p>Separately, the test is delivered to PEF, CARE, and other private schools, as well to compare their performance; a total of 4,150 students are tested, with a margin of error of 1.2%.</p> <p>The total sample amounts to 9,950 students in the sample, with an error of 1.2%.</p> |
|                             | Non-response treatment |                 | The data specify the sample size to be lower in some cases when some selected students in each class are absent. However, no information is present on non-response. In fact, the available information suggests that there is no treatment of non-response.   |
|                             | Sampling procedure     |                 | Students are chosen on a random basis according to the PISA sampling strategy weighted according to geographical area, gender, and school level.   |
|                             | National               |                 | Data neither representative nor available for the national level.  |
| Sampling representativeness | Province               |                 | Data claim to be representative at the provincial level.   |
|                             | District               |                 | Data claim to be representative at the district level.   |
|                             | School                 |                 | Data claim to be representative at the school level only for Grade 3.  |
|                             | Urban/rural            |                 | Data can be disaggregated by urban/rural through the EMIS ASC data.  |
|                             | Gender                 |                 | Data can be disaggregated by gender.   |
|                             | Age                    |                 | Data cannot be disaggregated by age.   |
|                             | Socioeconomic status   |                 | Data cannot be disaggregated by a measure of SES.  |
| Questionnaire               | Disability             |                 | Data cannot be disaggregated by disability for wave 7 and wave 8.  |
|                             | Pilot testing          |                 | The survey instruments and methodology went through field tests which were used in the design of the paper in order to ensure that it would be understood by as many students as possible.   |
|                             | Methodology            |                 | The sampling strategy is different for government and PEF schools but uses the PISA sampling methodology:  |

| DQA indicator  | Description                     | Dashboard value | Notes   |
|--|---------------------------------|-----------------|---|
|  |                                 |                 | <p>1. Government schools: Schools are allocated across nine divisions in Punjab, which proceeds with an explicit stratification across all schools. Following this, the schools are allocated based on the gender of the schools and type of the school. In the third stage, schools are filtered based on a probability proportional to size method selection.</p> <p>2. PEF schools: The schools are allocated proportionally across EVS, NSP, and FAS programmes. Following this, schools are allocated across districts. In the third stage, schools are filtered based on a probability proportional to size method selection.</p> |
|  | Length                          |                 | The test has eight questions for maths, six for English, and seven for Urdu, with the total length of the test not being long and not causing fatigue.  |
|  | Translation                     |                 | Word problems for maths are also available in the local language.   |
|  | Enumeration process             |                 | No information on the electronic enumeration process is available.  |
| Fieldwork and data management                            | Quality control                 |                 | <p>This data are collected by various checks and processes set in place to ensure the validity of the dataset.</p> <p>The test papers were delivered to the invigilators a day or two before the tests and the invigilators are external parties, which has introduced some transparency into the process. Post the test, the exams were sealed to ensure their validity.</p>   |
|  | Data processing                 |                 | There is no information available to assess data processing.  |
|  | Data editing                    |                 | No documentation on the treatment of missing data, variable ranges, editing, or imputation of data.   |
| Which indicators does this database have information on? | Literacy rate                   |                 | No information available.   |
|  | Enrolment rates (gross and net) |                 | No information available.   |
|  | Participation rates             |                 | No information available.   |

| DQA indicator | Description                  | Dashboard value | Notes   |
|---------------|------------------------------|-----------------|---|
|               |                              |                 |   |
|               | Student learning outcomes    |                 | The data reveal results of a test to third graders for English, maths, and Urdu. The data for these tests are comparable over the bi-annual time periods. These SLOs combine the score for equally weighted questions to give us a combined score of the percentage scored by the student. Child-level information is available on learning outcomes. |
|               | Student attendance           |                 | No information available.   |
|               | Retention rates              |                 | No information available.   |
|               | Transition rates             |                 | No information available.   |
|               | Completion rates             |                 | No information available.   |
|               | Drop-out rates               |                 | No information available.   |
|               | Teachers number and quality  |                 | No information available.   |
|               | School environment           |                 | No information available.   |
|               | Finance                      |                 | No information available.   |
|               | Accountability relationships |                 | No information available.   |

**Table 29: Dashboard summary of ASER data**

| DQA indicator               | Description            | Dashboard value | Notes   |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|---|
| Survey design               | Target population      |                 | All districts of Pakistan. 30 villages per district and 20 households per village in rural areas. For urban areas, number of blocks selected per district ensures significance.   |
|                             | Non-response treatment |                 | Systematic sampling is used to select households till the required sample is achieved. No response recorded in survey, but not available in raw data.   |
|                             | Sampling procedure     |                 | Stratified two-stage design. Primary sampling units selected through probability proportional to size technique. Secondary sampling units selected through systematic sampling.   |
|                             | National               |                 | Data representative at the national level.  |
| Sampling representativeness | Province               |                 | Data representative at the provincial level.  |
|                             | District               |                 | Data representative at the district level.  |
|                             | School                 |                 | Data are not representative at the school level.  |
|                             | Urban/rural            |                 | Data can be disaggregated by urban/rural for districts where both areas were sampled.   |
|                             | Gender                 |                 | Household data can be disaggregated by gender.  |
|                             | Age                    |                 | Household data can be disaggregated by age.   |
|                             | Socioeconomic status   |                 | Household data can be disaggregated by socioeconomic status, measured by house type and presence of assets.   |
| Questionnaire               | Disability             |                 | Household data can be disaggregated by child disability from 2015 onwards.  |
|                             | Pilot testing          |                 | ASER was piloted in 2008. Assessment tools were piloted in 2011. Additionally, there is an intensive tool review and testing process each year.   |
|                             | Methodology            |                 | Village information sheet, school observation sheet, and household survey. Assessment tools administered as part of the household survey consist of simple tests of language (Urdu/Sindhi/Pashto), English, and arithmetic. |

| DQA indicator  | Description                     | Dashboard value | Notes   |
|--|---------------------------------|-----------------|---|
|  | Length                          |                 | Two modules in the household. Each child aged five to 16 years must be tested, which might give rise to respondent or enumerator fatigue.                   |
|  | Translation                     |                 | Enumerators are local volunteers, so data collection is conducted in the local language. It is unclear if tools are translated.                             |
|  | Enumeration process             |                 | Data quality reviewed in the field. While enumerators have been trained, it should be noted that they are volunteers, rather than paid career enumerators.  |
| Field work and Data management                           | Quality control                 |                 | Head office team monitors district coordinators. District coordinators monitor village enumerators. Enumerators have detailed field instruction booklets.   |
|  | Data processing                 |                 | Data cleaning at district level, then head office level. Data entry at head office through software.  |
|  | Data editing                    |                 | No documentation on the treatment of missing data, editing, or imputation of data. Variable ranges are available in coding manual.                          |
| Which indicators does this database have information on? | Literacy rate                   |                 | Mother's and father's education levels recorded to allow for some literacy measures   |
|  | Enrolment rates (gross and net) |                 | Household data have information on educational status of children aged three to 16 years. Information on student age and class also available.              |
|  | Participation rates             |                 | Household data have information on educational status of children aged three to 16 years.   |
|  | Student learning outcomes       |                 | Assessment of language (Urdu/Sindhi/Pashto), English, and arithmetic administered to children aged five to 16 years.  |
|  | Student attendance in school    |                 | School data have information on students physically present on the day of the survey.   |
|  | Retention rates                 |                 | No information available.   |
|  | Transition rates                |                 | No information available.   |
|  | Completion rates                |                 | The instruments collect information about children from age three to 16 years about being enrolled, the type of school they are enrolled in, as well as the |

| DQA indicator | Description                  | Dashboard value | Notes  |
|---------------|------------------------------|-----------------|--|
|               |                              |                 | current class/grade in which the child is enrolled, which allows us to calculate completion rates. |
|               | Drop-out rates               |                 | Household data have information on educational status of children aged three to 16 years.          |
|               | Teachers quality             |                 | School data have information on teacher attendance and qualifications.                             |
|               | School environment           |                 | School data have information on access to infrastructure and facilities.                           |
|               | Finance                      |                 | School data have information on funding.   |
|               | Accountability relationships |                 | No information available.  |

**Table 30: Dashboard summary of PSLM survey**

| DQA indicator               | Description            | Dashboard value | Notes  |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|--|
| Survey design               | Target population      |                 | The survey is implemented in all provinces of Pakistan, excluding FATA and some military-restricted provinces. The sample size that these enumeration blocks yields is a total of 36,002 households in Punjab.                                   |
|                             | Non-response treatment |                 | The documents with the data specify non-response and the treatment of non-contact and refusal households as problematic since the non-contact and refusal households are excluded from covered primary (PSU) and secondary (SSU) sampling units. |
|                             | Sampling procedure     |                 | Households are chosen based on a stratified two-stage sampling procedure.  |
|                             | National               |                 | Data representative at the national level.   |
| Sampling representativeness | Province               |                 | Data claim to be representative at the provincial level.   |
|                             | District               |                 | Data claim to be representative at the district level.   |
|                             | School                 |                 | Data are neither collected nor representative at the school level.   |
|                             | Urban/rural            |                 | Data can be disaggregated by urban/rural.  |
|                             | Gender                 |                 | Data can be disaggregated by gender.   |
|                             | Age                    |                 | Data can be disaggregated by age.  |
|                             | Socioeconomic status   |                 | Data can be disaggregated by measures of SES, which include income and a household spending module.  |
| Questionnaire               | Disability             |                 | Data are not available for disability within the household members.  |
|                             | Pilot testing          |                 | There is no indication of field tests or pilot studies being done.   |
|                             | Methodology            |                 | The questionnaire is implemented in a procedural stratified two-stage sampling strategy using a system of PSUs and SSUs which select 36,002 households from the sampling unit of the 1998 census.  |
|                             | Length                 |                 | The survey has five different modules which are carried out at different points in time, to reduce the overall fatigue for the respondent.   |
|                             | Translation            |                 | The entire survey is translated into Urdu for implementation.  |
|                             | Enumeration process    |                 | The sources are cross-checked both in the field and outside the field by supervisors in the office. Moreover, the data entry procedure takes place in the  |



| DQA indicator  | Description                                | Dashboard value | Notes  |
|--|--|-----------------|--|
|  |  |                 | Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS) office itself, which means the data are subject to frequent checks, both for consistency and for data entry errors.  |
| Field work and Data management                           | Quality control                            |                 | The sources are cross-checked both in the field and outside the field by supervisors in the office.  |
|  | Data processing                            |                 | The data are processed at the PBS office in Islamabad. The documentation states that they undergo consistency checks as well.  |
|  | Data editing                               |                 | No documentation on the treatment of missing data, variable ranges, editing, or imputation of data.  |
| Which indicators does this database have information on? | Literacy rate                              |                 | Literacy rate can be measured using the data based on questions that ask all individuals aged 10 and over whether they can read or write with understanding and a final question asking if they can solve a simple maths problem. A detailed description is included in the indicator section. |
|  | Enrolment/attendance rates (gross and net) |                 | Attendance rates can be measured from the underlying data by using variables capturing whether a child is enrolled in school or not, and their age. A detailed description is included in the indicator section. Because these are household survey data, true enrolment figures may differ.   |
|  | Participation rates                        |                 | Participation rate is measured in the survey based on an individual going to school or not. A detailed description is included in the indicator section.   |
|  | Student learning outcomes                  |                 | No information available.  |
|  | Retention rates                            |                 | No information available.  |
|  | Transition rates                           |                 | No information available.  |
|  | Completion rates                           |                 | The instruments collect information about children from individuals aged four years and above about being enrolled, the type of school they are enrolled in,   |

| DQA indicator | Description                  | Dashboard value | Notes  |
|---------------|------------------------------|-----------------|--|
|               |                              |                 | as well as the current class/grade in which the child is enrolled, which allows us to calculate completion rates.  |
|               | Drop-out rates               |                 | Drop-out rates are measured based on whether the individual is currently studying in a school or not, and whether they previously studied in a school or not. A detailed description is included in the indicator section. |
|               | Teachers number and quality  |                 | No information available.  |
|               | School environment           |                 | No information available.  |
|               | Finance                      |                 | No information available.  |
|               | Accountability relationships |                 | No information available.  |

## F.2.2 Summary of DQA: administrative data sources

DQA summaries are presented below for: (i) ASC/EMIS; and (ii) PSC.

**Table 31: DQA of ASC/EMIS**

| DQA indicator               | Description            | Dashboard value | Notes  |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|--|
| Survey design               | Target population      |                 | All public schools in all 36 districts of Punjab.  |
|                             | Non-response treatment |                 | Since this is an administrative data collection conducted by SED there would be no schools for which there is non-response.  |
|                             | Sampling procedure     |                 | Administrative data, no sampling.  |
|                             | Data type              |                 | Time series data which can generally be used to construct a balanced panel for all the years.  |
|                             | National               |                 | Data representative for the provincial level.  |
| Sampling representativeness | Province               |                 | Data representative at the provincial level.   |
|                             | District               |                 | Data representative at the district level.   |
|                             | School                 |                 | Data representative at the school level.   |
|                             | Urban/rural            |                 | Data can be disaggregated by urban/rural.  |
|                             | Gender                 |                 | Data can be disaggregated by gender.   |
|                             | Age                    |                 | Data can be disaggregated by age.  |
|                             | Socioeconomic status   |                 | Data cannot be disaggregated by socioeconomic status.  |
| Questionnaire               | Disability             |                 | Data for children with SEND are available for 2014/15 onwards.   |
|                             | Pilot testing          |                 | No information for the pilot is given.   |
|                             | Methodology            |                 | Although the survey instrument has been provided and basic information is available about the MEAs using tablets to collect the data, no field manual or other documentation is available. |
|                             | Length                 |                 | The survey consists of a basic background sheet and two rosters, which amount to a total of three modules.   |
|                             | Translation            |                 | Enumerators are local volunteers, so data collection is conducted in the local language. The survey instrument is also in the local language.  |

| DQA indicator  | Description                     | Dashboard value | Notes  |
|--|---------------------------------|-----------------|--|
|  | Enumeration process             |                 | Data quality review conducted in the field. Data entered through tablets, which eradicates enumeration errors. Enumerators received training.  |
|  | Indicator link                  |                 | Variables can be used to track indicators.   |
| Fieldwork and data management                            | Quality control                 |                 | MEAs are supervised by the District Monitoring Officer. Since MEAs are also tasked with monthly monitoring, they visit at least four schools per day and are rotated to prevent the formation of a relationship with school staff. Information is gathered through tablets, with an online monitoring application. |
|  | Data processing                 |                 | Data are collected on electronic tablets. There is no further information available.   |
|  | Data editing                    |                 | No documentation on the treatment of missing data, editing, or imputation of data. Variable ranges are available in questionnaire.   |
| Which indicators does this database have information on? | Literacy Rate                   |                 | No information available.  |
|  | Enrolment rates (gross and net) |                 | The enrolment rates can be measured through the available information on enrolment in classes, school type, and population information obtained from external sources.   |
|  | Participation rates             |                 | The participation rates can be measured through the available information on enrolment and population from external sources.   |
|  | Student learning outcomes       |                 | No information available.  |
|  | Student attendance              |                 | No information available.  |
|  | Retention rates                 |                 | Please refer to the indicator sheet for further information.   |
|  | Transition rates                |                 | Please refer to the indicator sheet for further information.   |
|  | Completion rates                |                 | Please refer to the indicator sheet for further information.   |
|  | Drop-out rates                  |                 | No information available   |
|  | Teachers quality                |                 | Please refer to the indicator sheet for further information.   |
|  | School environment              |                 | Please refer to the indicator sheet for further information.   |
|  | Finance                         |                 | The information for school council/NSB and Farogh-e-Taleem Fund amounts usage provides a basis for financial information for the data.   |
|  | Accountability relationships    |                 | The information on school councils serve as basic information on the accountability of each school.  |

**Table 32: DQA of PSC**

| DQA indicator                 | Description            | Dashboard value | Notes   |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|---|
| Survey design                 | Target population      |                 | All private schools in all 36 districts of Punjab.  |
|                               | Non-response treatment |                 | Unclear how all private schools are identified and whether they are willing to provide data.  |
|                               | Sampling procedure     |                 | Administrative data, no sampling.   |
|                               | Data type              |                 | Cross-sectional dataset.  |
|                               | National               |                 | Data not representative for the national level.   |
| Sampling representativeness   | Province               |                 | Data representative at the provincial level.  |
|                               | District               |                 | Data representative at the district level.  |
|                               | School                 |                 | Data representative at the school level.  |
|                               | Urban/rural            |                 | Data can be disaggregated by urban/rural.   |
|                               | Gender                 |                 | Data can be disaggregated by gender.  |
|                               | Age                    |                 | Data cannot be disaggregated by age.  |
|                               | Socioeconomic status   |                 | Data cannot be disaggregated by socioeconomic status.   |
| Questionnaire                 | Disability             |                 | Data on disability not available.   |
|                               | Pilot testing          |                 | No information for the pilot is given.  |
|                               | Methodology            |                 | Although the survey instrument has been provided, a field manual or other documentation is not available.   |
|                               | Length                 |                 | The survey consists of a one-sheet instrument.  |
|                               | Translation            |                 | No information about translation into local language being done.  |
|                               | Enumeration process    |                 | MEAs in 2011 and private consultants in 2016.   |
| Fieldwork and data management | Indicator link         |                 | Variables can be used to track indicators.  |
|                               | Quality control        |                 | No information is made available.   |
|                               | Data processing        |                 | There is no further information available.  |
|                               | Data editing           |                 | No/limited documentation on the treatment of missing data, editing, or imputation of data. Variable ranges for most variables are available in questionnaire. |

| DQA indicator  | Description                     | Dashboard value | Notes  |
|--|---------------------------------|-----------------|--|
| Which indicators does this database have information on? | Literacy rates                  |                 | No information available   |
|  | Enrolment rates (gross and net) |                 | Only GERs can be calculated if survey data are combined with external population data.           |
|  | Participation rates             |                 | Participation rates can be calculated if survey data are combined with external population data. |
|  | Student learning outcomes       |                 | No information available.  |
|  | Student attendance              |                 | No information available.  |
|  | Retention rates                 |                 | Please refer to the indicator sheet for further information.                                     |
|  | Transition rates                |                 | Please refer to the indicator sheet for further information.                                     |
|  | Completion rates                |                 | Completion rates can be calculated if survey data are combined with external population data.    |
|  | Drop-out rates                  |                 | No information available.  |
|  | Teachers quality                |                 | Please refer to the indicator sheet for further information.                                     |
|  | School environment              |                 | Please refer to the indicator sheet for further information.                                     |
|  | Finance                         |                 | No information available.  |
|  | Accountability relationships    |                 | Please refer to the indicator sheet for further information.                                     |

### F.3 Overview of data sources for analysis of education sector performance

This section provides information on the data sources that have been used for the analysis in Chapter 5. Full details are included in the RESP report. Table 33 provides information on the participation and access indicators identified.

**Table 33: Indicators of education access and participation**

| Indicator                         | Definition  | Dataset   | DQA source |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|------------|
| <b>Education participation</b>    |   |   |            |
| School participation rate         | <i>School participation rate</i> can be measured as the number of children aged within a given range (i.e. five to nine years) who report currently attending or being enrolled in school as a ratio of the total population of that age times a 100. For example, a school participation rate for children aged five to nine years of 96% would mean that 4% of children within that age range are not in school. The participation indicator looks at broader school attendance irrespective of class levels.   | Data analysed:<br>PSES<br>ASER<br>PSLM<br>MICS                | DQA I      |
| Student attendance/enrolment rate | <p>The <i>gross and net enrolment/attendance rates</i> convert the participation of the population according to education levels.</p> <p>The <i>gross enrolment/attendance rate</i> (GER) is the percentage of the population who are at school at a given level of education out of the number of school-age population corresponding to that level of education. GERs can even be over a 100%.</p> <p>GER = (the number of children in primary school/total population of primary-age children)*100</p> <p>The <i>net enrolment/attendance rate</i> (NER) is the percentage of school-age children in the group who are in school at a certain level of education in accordance with the age out of the total number of children in the school-age group.</p> <p>NER = (the number of children of primary age and in primary school/total population of primary-age children)*100</p> <p>While this indicator is similar to participation, it has been calculated from a different variable in the dataset – namely the class the child is enrolled in.</p> | Data analysed:<br>PSES<br>ASER<br>PSLM<br>MICS<br>EMIS<br>PSC | DQA I      |
| Drop-out rate                     | <p><i>Student drop-out rates</i> calculate the percentage of children of school-going age who have completed Grade 1 of primary school but who report being out of school currently.</p> <p>Since these surveys gather cross-sectional (and not time series) data, a proxy for drop-out has been used. Children have been classified as drop-outs if they are currently out of schools but were previously in school.</p>   | Data analysed:<br>PSES<br>ASER<br>PSLM<br>MICS                | DQA I      |
| Transition rate                   | <i>Primary to secondary transition rate/progression to secondary school</i> calculates the number of children attending the first grade of secondary school who were in the last grade of primary school during the previous school year.   | None identified   | DQA I      |



Table 34 provides information on the indicators of educational attainment and learning outcomes.

**Table 34: Indicators of educational attainment and learning outcomes**

| Indicator  | Definition   | Dataset   | DQA source |
|--|--|---|------------|
| <b>Pupil learning outcomes</b>   |  |   |            |
| Student learning outcomes  | <i>Student learning outcomes</i> are typically measured in various different ways, such as through international assessments, national assessment programmes (curriculum-based or otherwise), and increasingly through citizen-led assessments and via smaller-scale household and school surveys. They range from those assessing basic literacy and numeracy to those that assess more advanced competencies.  | Data analysed:<br>LND<br>DFID 6MA data<br>ASER<br><br>Data from reports: TEACH, PEC, MICS, preliminary evidence from SABER SD | DQA I      |
| <b>Other indicators that proxy for 'learning'/attainment within a system</b> |  |   |            |
| Adult literacy rate  | <i>Adult literacy rate</i> is the percentage of people aged 15 and above who can both read and write with understanding a short simple statement about their everyday life. However, different data collection agencies/organisations or governments may use less stringent thresholds to measure this outcome. These types of indicators can typically be calculated using household survey data.   | Data analysed:<br>PSLM  | DQA I      |
| PCR  | <i>PCR</i> , or gross intake ratio to the last grade of primary education, is the number of new entrants (enrolments minus repeaters) in the last grade of primary education, regardless of age, divided by the population at the entrance age for the last grade of primary education.<br><br>Since information on repetition is not available in the mentioned data, PCR was approximated through the following formula:<br><br>$\text{PCR} = (\text{number of children in Grade 5} / \text{number of children aged 9}) \times 100$<br><br>Comparison of GER and NER statistics from these surveys shows that children are not in age-appropriate classrooms. In light of this, the above formula does not provide useful information and has been excluded from the analysis below. | Data analysed:<br>PSES<br>PSLM<br>ASER<br>PSES  | DQA I      |

Table 35 sets out the indicators that are available to measure the four school-level 'ingredients' contributing to learning. It is worth noting that all the sources reported are based on raw averages<sup>59</sup> and no analysis has been undertaken to control for aspects such as ability or family background.

<sup>59</sup> Significance levels of group-wise differences for raw averages are available for some indicators.

**Table 35: Indicators for ingredients of school-level learning**

| Indicator   | Definition  | Dataset  | DQA source      |
|---|---|--|-----------------|
| <b>Prepared learners</b>  |   |  |                 |
| Student attendance/enrolment rate in 'pre-primary'                | Pre-primary GERs and NERs (enrolment in <i>katchi</i> /pre-primary/ECE/kindergarten etc.).  | Primary data analysed:<br>ASER<br>MICS<br>ACS/EMIS<br>PSC                              | DQA I<br>DQA II |
| School readiness  | <i>School readiness</i> at the primary level is the percentage of children in Grade 1 who have attended an early childhood programme (preschool, <i>katchi</i> , nursery, etc.) in the previous school year.  | Data from reports:<br>MICS   |                 |
| Child nutrition and health  | Various measures of health and nutrition, including anthropometric measurements, minimum acceptable diet, and immunisation.   | Data from reports:<br>MICS   |                 |
| Early childhood development index                                 | <i>Early childhood development index</i> tracks the development status of children (three to four years) as a foundation to future learning and well-being. Children are assessed on literacy-numeracy, physical, socio-emotional, and learning domains. The index is the percentage of children who are on track within at least three of the mentioned domains.   | Data from reports:<br>MICS<br>Preliminary evidence from SABER (literacy-numeracy only) |                 |
| Support for learning at home and in school                        | Various measures of learning materials at home (books), child involvement in early stimulation and response activities with household adult members, and parental involvement in learning in the school.  | Data from reports:<br>MICS   |                 |
| Pupil attendance rates  | Headcount report of children present in school (compared to enrolments) on day of visit.  | Primary data analysed:<br>ASER   | DQA I           |
| <b>Effective teaching</b>   |   |  |                 |
| Teacher qualifications, attendance, and experience                | Various measures of key inputs into a child's schooling experience (with teachers being the most critical one).   | Data analysed:<br>ASER<br>ASC/EMIS   | DQA I<br>DQA II |
| Teacher competence, types of training received, teaching practice | Teacher competence is measured by assessing teachers' ability to spot pupil mistakes and content knowledge of material they teach. Content of training received is assessed by asking whether they received training on specific elements (teaching diverse pupils, multi-grade and multi-lingual settings etc.). Teaching practice is assessed through classroom culture, along with use of instructional methods and socio-emotional skills, through classroom observation. | Data from reports:<br>Preliminary evidence from TEACH and SABER SD<br>PEC PASL         |                 |
| <b>Learning-focused inputs</b>                                    |   |  |                 |

| Indicator   | Definition   | Dataset  | DQA source      |
|---|--|--|-----------------|
| Availability of inputs such as electricity, boundary walls, functional toilets etc. | Various measures of physical school inputs as identified in surveys (percentage of available facilities, students per facility).   | Data analysed:<br>ASER<br>ASC/EMIS<br>PSC  | DQA I<br>DQA II |
| <b>Skilled management and governance</b>  |  |  |                 |
| SMC   | Various measures, including number of SMC members and annual meetings, and NSB spending. However, these do not provide information on the effectiveness of governance.   | Data analysed:<br>ASC/EMIS   | DQA II          |
| Head teacher training, autonomy, and knowledge                                      | Head teacher training through pre-/in-service training on specific elements (school administration, instructional leadership, finance/human resources management, etc....); head teacher autonomy through school-level decision-making; head teacher knowledge assessed through understanding of school infrastructure, school knowledge, and teacher ability. | Data from reports:<br>School leadership study and preliminary evidence from SABER SD |                 |

## Annex G Analysis of education expenditure<sup>60</sup>

### G.1 Data used


The analysis in this section is based on the data extracted from the Civil Accounts of the Punjab Government and District Governments prepared by the Accountant General, Punjab. The extracted data were cleaned for any visible errors and consolidated to execute the analysis. The analysis has also used the GDP deflator to convert current price data into constant (2007/8) price series. Both current and constant price trends are presented. Spending is incurred by SED at the provincial level and by district/local governments at the district level, so analysis has been presented at the total aggregate, provincial, and district levels.

### G.2 Trends in provincial education expenditure

#### G.2.1 Total expenditure

As shown in Figure 23, between 2010/11 and 2013/14, an average of 18% of the total provincial expenditure was for education. This fell to 15% on average between 2014/15 and 2016/17. However, it increased by one percentage point in 2017/18 to 16%, with a further increase to 21% in the following year, 2018/19, before falling back to 17% in the most recent year (2019/20). The non-development proportion fell from 22% in the period from 2010/11 to 2013/14 to 20% in the period from 2014/15 to 2019/20, while for development it increased from 6% in the period from 2010/11 to 2013/14 to 8% in the period from 2014/15 to 2019/20. School education remains the biggest area of employment for the Government, occupying on average 45% of the annual salary expense since 2010.

**Figure 23: School education as a share of total GoPb expenditure**





<sup>60</sup> This is adapted from the 2021 PFER Supplementary Update (PFER4) and the 2021 PFER Update (PFER3), for Section G.6.

School education expenditures continued to increase both in current (Figure 24) and constant (Figure 25) price terms up till 2018/19. In the most recent year the total nominal expenditures increased by 20%, and in real terms the expenditures increased by 9.3%, though this increase is significantly less than the increase in the province's overall expenditure, which decreased by 23.7%.

School education expenditure (consolidated school education development and non-development [current] expenditure) increased at the rate of 18.1% per annum in nominal terms for the period 2010/11 to 2012/13, and by 11% between 2013/14 and 2019/20. In real terms, the growth for the same periods was 11% per annum and 6% per annum, respectively. The school education budget between 2010 and 2013 increased by 19% per annum on average in nominal terms and by 12% in real terms. Budget execution rates between 2013/14 and 2010/20 were on average 86.0%, compared to the execution rate of 87.5% between 2010/11 and 2012/13. The development expenditure between 2013 and 2020 increased at 11.3% per annum in real terms. The portion of development expenditure increased to 12% in 2019/20, from just 9.4% in 2018/19. A key reason for the increase in this development funding was the release and expenditure of PESP2 funding for school construction implemented through PMIU. The total salary expense (total development plus non-development) remained at 79%.


**Figure 24: School education expenditure (current prices)**




**Figure 25: School education expenditure (constant prices)**

## G.2.2 Budget execution

Figure 26 shows that the utilisation rates for development budget were less than 50% for most of the years covered, with the exception of 2013/14 and 2018/19, when they were close to 80%. The execution of the development budget further increased to 87% in 2019/20, primarily as funding was allocated against small schemes and the overall allocation shrank substantially. This trend of high development budget utilisation with falling absolute amounts highlights that SED has limited capability to undertake development spending. The high utilisation of the non-development budget reflects the fact that is dominated by salary costs.

**Figure 26: Budget execution rates for school education**


**Figure 27: Budget execution in education (current prices)**

The overall utilisation rate for school expenditure (Figure 27) has varied between 80% and 92% of the original budget, with the highest ever utilisation seen in 2017/18 and 2019/20, and the lowest ever in 2018/19. It is important to explain the reason for more than 100% utilisation in 2017/18 of the non-development budget: during this year, the original budget estimate of 'secondary education' (which is of course an important part of school education) in the provincial non-development budget was fixed at PKR 12.7 billion, compared to a budget estimate of PKR 30.4 billion in 2016/17. This was unrealistically low. The reason is that it did not include any allocation for the activities of PMIU, Punjab Education Sector Reform Programme (PESRP). However, the allocation for PMIU was provided through a supplementary grant during the year. As a result, the revised estimate for 2017/18 for 'secondary education' increased to PKR 31.6 billion. Due to the provision of a huge amount of resources through the supplementary grant, the actual expenditure for the year 2017/18 for school education was higher than the original budget estimate. The expenditure was, of course, lower than the revised estimate for the financial year.


### G.2.3 Non-development expenditure


PFER1 reported that out of the total school education budget, the non-development (current) budget on average was 87% of the total consolidated (provincial and district) budget between 2010/11 and 2016/17. However, this percentage went down by 2 percentage points for 2018/19 and reached 85%, then increasing back to 89% in the most recent year 2019/20. In terms of expenditure, the share of non-development dropped by 2 percentage points in 2017–20 (88%) as compared to its average value of 92% between 2010 and 2017. This means that although the share of non-development was increased in budget estimates, it decreased in terms of actual expenditure (Figure 28).



**Figure 28: Non-development budget and expenditure (constant prices)**

Moreover, in 2019/20 the split of the non-development budget continued to be in favour of salary budgets, which represented 85.7% of the non-development budget and 89.6% of the non-development expenditure. 99% of the salary budget under non-development was utilised in 2017/18. However, in 2018/19 the utilisation fell to 82%, which improved back to 95% in 2019/20 (Figure 29).


**Figure 29: Non-development salary budget and expenditure (constant prices)**

**Figure 30: Non-development non-salary budget and expenditure (constant prices)**


PFER1 reported that the non-salary non-development budget grew by 16% on average per annum in nominal terms and by 11% in real terms between 2010/11 and 2016/17, but non-salary non-development expenditure only grew by 11% in nominal terms and 6% in real terms for the same period. The budget for non-salary non-development for 2019/20 decreased by 14.3%, while the expenditure fell by the same amount (Figure 30). As highlighted in PFER1, in 2017/18, however, there was a major issue in the budget estimate for the non-salary non-development budget at the provincial level, which reflected a substantially lower budget for the year in comparison.

#### G.2.4 Development expenditure

Consistent with what was reported in PFER1, the development budget has remained a small component of the overall school education budget and expenditure in 2017–20 (Figure 31). It represented 19.2% of the total budget in 2017/18, which was substantially reduced in the following year to 8.7% (in 2018/19), while recovering to 11.3% in 2019/20. The share in expenditure for the development component was 12% in 2019/20, an increase from 9.4% in the previous year. The utilisation of the development budget was around 47% in 2017/18, which almost doubled to 87% in 2018/19, before increasing to almost 100% in 2019/20. This increase is due to reduced resources and higher allocations being made to small schemes, and also progress on the school construction programme. Also at the district level, development funds are being used to pay for salary expense, as payments to Account 5 are usually delayed.

**Figure 31: Development budget, expenditure, and execution (constant prices)**

The development budget primarily comprises non-salary items (investment in school infrastructure – e.g. school buildings, additional rooms, boundary walls etc.). The Punjab Growth Strategy 2023 presents evidence that the accumulation of capital stock in education has growth multipliers greater than one for all major sectors of the economy, therefore this represents an important segment of expenditure. The RISE Punjab Strategy has also made similar claims. Expenditure trends are shown in Figure 32.

**Figure 32: Non-salary development budget, expenditure and execution (real)**


## G.2.5 Provincial and district expenditure

In constant price terms, district spending increased from PKR 65 billion in 2010/11 to PKR 110 billion in 2019/20, whereas at the provincial level it was PKR 21 billion for the same year, which is PKR 2 billion less than in 2018/19. It is, however, important to note that on average

95% of the district expenditure was used for payment of salaries between 2010/11 and 2019/20 (Figure 33). In 2019/20 the share of salaries in district expenditure was 93%, leaving little resources for non-salary purposes – which has put school administrations under financial stress as additional resources were spent on managing the impact of Covid-19.



The real growth in district expenditure for school education was 12% per annum from 2010 to 2013, whereas there was only 3% growth in provincial expenditure for school education. During the period from 2013/14 to 2019/20 the district expenditure for school education increased by an average of 5.7% per annum, which is much lower than the preceding period. In 2019/20 there was a substantial increase of 14.6% from 2018/19. However, some of this may be the reversal of expenditure that was reduced in 2018/19. Most of the district expenditure in 2019/20 was for salaries and the NSB was spent on the response to Covid-19. The above also implies that very little was spent on development by the district governments.

**Figure 33: Provincial and district spend on education (constant prices)**



### G.3 Comparison of trends before and during PESP2

A comparison of the data shown in Figure 34, Figure 35, and Figure 36 suggests that during the PESP2 period the growth rates in education budgets and expenditures showed slight increases compared to the immediately preceding period, with the largest increase being for development expenditure.

**Figure 34: Growth in total education budget and expenditure<sup>61</sup>****Figure 35: Growth in non-development education budget and expenditure**

<sup>61</sup> Average annual growth in constant prices.




**Figure 36: Growth in development education budget and expenditure**


Figure 37 and Figure 38 show absolute changes in yearly nominal budgets. The increments on the non-development side have been consistently positive, while those on the development side have been variable. This suggests a lack of planning and budgeting on the non-development side, where a simple percentage increase is usually applied to previous year's budget. The development budget in the last two years (2017–19) fell sharply due to a lack of resources; however, it recovered in 2019/20.

**Figure 37: Annual change in school education budget (current prices)**



**Figure 38: Annual change in education expenditure (current prices)**

## G.4 Comparison of the education and health sectors

As compared to the health sector, the education sector reported lower growth in budget and expenditure between 2010/11 and 2019/20 (Figure 39 and Figure 40). While the average growth in health sector nominal expenditure was 25% and 19%, respectively, during this period, education nominal expenditure experienced a 12% increase and a 6% growth in real expenditure between 2010/11 and 2019/20.


**Figure 39: Health and education expenditure (current prices)**



**Figure 40: Health and education expenditure (constant prices)****Figure 41: Education and health expenditure increments**

Between 2011/12 and 2013/14, the increments in education expenditure were more than those in health expenditure (Figure 41). However, between 2014/15 and 2016/17, health expenditure increments were larger than those for education, reversing again in 2017/18 and 2018/19. However, in 2019/20, because of the Covid-19 emergency, the expenditures in health were substantially higher than those in education.


Except for 2018/19, when budget execution rates for both health and education were at par, at 80%, on average the budget execution rates from 2013/14 to 2019/20 have been higher in the health sector as compared to the education sector, primarily as health execution has gone down (Figure 42).

**Figure 42: Education and health budget execution rates**

## G.5 Education expenditure at district level and by education sector institutions

### G.5.1 District level

As shown in the data analysis section above, the majority of the school education budget is spent through the districts. However, even after the elections and the announcement of the PFC Award, the level of development resources provided to districts has not increased. For the most recent years, the real development expenditure increased by 74%. On the other hand, the non-development expenditures in real terms increased by 7.2% in 2019/20 over the previous value. Over the longer term, the district budgets between 2010 and 2013 increased by 12.3% per annum. The overall development expenditure in districts between 2010 and 2020 grew at 1.4% per annum, while non-development expenditure grew by 7.3% per annum over the last decade in real terms (Figure 43).

**Figure 43: District development and non-development expenditure (constant prices)**

The districts continue to experience a state of uncertainty, inadequacy of resources, and limited financial management expertise. The delivery of education services at the district level is still being managed under a partial interim PFC. Releases are being made monthly, and mostly with delays. It is also not clear if all districts are getting shares as per the PFC formula or some *ad hoc* arrangement as some complain more about resource shortages than others. In terms of resources, the uncertainty on devolution and implementation of the PLGA 2019 has meant that the overall resource envelope is locked. The district Chief Executive Officers complain about meeting their regular budget, and in several months have even struggled to pay salaries. In some cases the already small amount of development funding is used to pay for salaries, as these cannot be stopped.


#### Key district-level issues

- The monthly transfers to Account 5 are delayed every month.
- Not enough resource to pay off liabilities, such as leave encashments.
- Development budget releases being used to pay salaries.
- The uncertainty in monthly transfers mean that planning is difficult.
- Court cases ongoing by unpaid teachers from the second shift school programme.
- No separate budget provided for special education schools.
- NSB is already inadequate and this year has been spent on Covid-19 SOPs.


GoPb was able to speed up the school construction programme funded by PESP2. Districts were able to fund the Covid-19 SOPs using the NSB but this has resulted in a shortage of funds to pay for other regular expenditures for the districts. The interim PFC for next year is being worked on by the Finance Department; however, it is not anticipated that the share to districts will increase. The status of PLGA is still unclear as the Government is making further amendments. In short, a resource crunch at the service delivery level and weaker financial management capability continue to limit service delivery in the education sector.

## G.5.2 Expenditure on education sector institutions


**Figure 44: Expenditure of PEC (constant prices)**




The expenditure of PEC (Figure 44) has remained fairly stagnant after a jump in 2015/16. Data from the last two years show an anomaly. However, upon inquiring it was explained that due to the restricting of the commission in 2017/18, most of the salary expense was booked late and thus is showing in 2018/19. The average salary expenditure between 2017 and 2019 is the same as in previous years. The figures for 2019/20 are similar to those of 2017/18, and thus maybe the same error incurred in 2017/18.

**Figure 45: Expenditure of DSD/QAED (constant prices)**


The large increase in real expenditure by QAED shown in Figure 45 in 2019/20 reflects increased expenditure on CPD, which was booked as a human resource cost.

**Figure 46: Expenditure of PMIU (constant prices)**


The fall in the real value of PMIU expenditure after 2015/16 probably reflects a fall in disbursements of the NSB.

**Figure 47: Expenditure of PEF (constant prices)**

The PEF expense in the most recent year has gone down since the discontinuation of budgetary support under PESP2, and also because of the lower priority accorded to PEF by the new government after 2018.

**Figure 48: Expenditure for free textbooks (constant prices)**

In the most recent year, spending on free textbooks (Figure 48) increased by PKR 400 million, but this represents a fall in constant price terms.

**Figure 49: Expenditure for PEEF (constant prices)**

Data for PEEF for 2019/20 are not available.

## G.6 Punjab Education Budget 2020/21

On 15 June 2020, GoPb announced a provincial budget worth PKR 2.2 trillion for the year 2020/21. To incorporate the economic stimulus because of Covid-19, the ADP was increased by 9.42% from PKR 308 billion last year to a total of PKR 337 billion this year.<sup>62</sup> The overall budget allocated for SED this year is PKR 350.1 billion, out of which PKR 27.6 billion is the development budget. While the total allocation for school education has improved from PKR 336.63 billion in 2019/20, the amount allocated under ADP was higher the previous year, at a total of PKR 34 billion.<sup>63</sup>

The total number of education schemes for the year 2020/21 is 24, consisting of 10 ongoing and 14 new schemes. All these schemes are claimed to be aligned with the short-, medium-, and long-term actions and aims set out in the education strategy chapter of the RISE framework document.

PKR 80 million has been earmarked for the TaleemGhar programme and the related strengthening of digital infrastructure, identifying missed SLOs, and content generation, to ensure a continuity in the learning process.<sup>64</sup> PKR 13.5 billion has been allocated for school councils and another PKR 3 billion for Daanish Schools. Moreover, under the PPP model, PKR 22 billion has been budgeted for new initiatives of PEF and PEIMA.<sup>65</sup> Another PKR 7.47 billion is allocated for special education institutions working under DEAs in local governments.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>62</sup> [www.dawn.com/news/1563807](http://www.dawn.com/news/1563807)

<sup>63</sup> <https://finance.punjab.gov.pk/system/files/ADP202021.pdf>

<sup>64</sup> [www.dawn.com/news/1563807](http://www.dawn.com/news/1563807)

<sup>65</sup> <https://finance.punjab.gov.pk/system/files/bspeech202021.pdf>

<sup>66</sup> <https://finance.punjab.gov.pk/system/files/cb202021e.pdf>



## Annex H Evaluation of support to the Roadmap and Stocktake process<sup>67</sup>

### H.1 Findings

#### H.1.1 To what extent has the Chief Minister's Roadmap provided an appropriate approach for managing improved education sector performance? Has it been based on valid assumptions?

The Roadmap and Stocktake process was largely an effective vehicle for creating and sustaining momentum for education sector reform in Punjab. It was able to ensure buy-in from the political leadership, build the capacity of government bodies, and provide strategic guidance and problem-solving support. This is reflected in the achievement of the main targets set by the Roadmap, as well as in the replication of the Roadmap process in other sectors, like health and solid waste management, through the establishment of the SMU. However, some key informants considered that the strongly top-down nature of the target-setting process meant that there was limited scope for consultative inputs from a wide range of stakeholders into the setting of priorities.

Each of the three case studies found evidence that the setting of Roadmap targets, and their monitoring through the Stocktake process, raised the profile of the policy area, facilitated cross-departmental cooperation, ensured a focus of management attention on achieving short-term targets, and prioritised the provision of funding to reach targets. The main reform areas targeted related to the following:

- Driving improvements in PEC examination conduct and providing support to reduce issues of cheating and exam leakage. There was much less attention on exam design, and on the use of PEC data (though the production of a PEC annual report was targeted).
- A consistent focus on driving improvements in monitoring and management of teacher training infrastructure, materials development for trainings, and integrating assessments to create feedback loops between student learning and teacher training. This included driving a change in the primary support role of DTEs from mentoring to monitoring. The introduction of assessments and increased monitoring drove this change. From 2015 onwards, there was a consistent focus on teacher quality in the Roadmap. Teacher quality was primarily assessed through SLOs.
- PCTB featured prominently in the Chief Minister's Education Roadmap and the Stocktake process, under the quality component of the reform agenda; in particular, the streamlining of the curriculum from Grades 1 to 5, and the production and distribution of high-quality textbooks adapted to local standards.

The case studies also found that direct engagement with the Stocktake process was limited to the most senior level of management of the organisations involved. This may have been efficient and may have contributed to a clear senior management focus, but it also meant that there was some lack of understanding of, and engagement, with the Roadmap targets within each organisation. There was some perception (for instance in PCTB) that the top-down

<sup>67</sup> This text is taken from IER1 Section 4.1. It is based on documentation reviews and KIIs, including for the case study organisations (QAED, PCTB, and PEC).

target-setting was not aligned closely with the needs of the department, and, in the area of teacher quality, that targets may have generated inappropriate incentives.

### **H.1.2 To what extent have gender and equity considerations been integrated into the Roadmap and Stocktake process?**

Gender, equity, and wider inclusion considerations were not explicit in the design of the Roadmap approach, and while there was some attention to gender and equity considerations these were not systematically mainstreamed in its implementation. In the case studies, there was no explicit focus on gender or equity in any of the targets set. The focus from the first phase of the effort in 2011 was the enrolment of all children, while accurate gender-disaggregated data were only effectively captured after the roll-out of the PSES. District school participation rate heat maps were not disaggregated by sex, although later iterations of the Stocktake provided summary disaggregated enrolment data. Similarly, the 6MA and LND test data on SLOs were also tracked, recorded, and presented as an average across all children for the concerned grade level. This is likely a result of the overall target of 75% correct answers by 2018 being set in non-gender-disaggregated terms.

Equity considerations were reflected in some specific interventions, such as initiatives focused on bonded child labourers in brick kilns, the proposal to abolish school fees for government schools, and targeted voucher programmes under the PPP component of the 2018 goals. However, systematic efforts at analysing structural constraints and improving access to public and PEF-supported private schools for children from highly marginalised backgrounds were absent from the reform design. While there was geospatial analysis carried out by the Roadmap team to determine bottlenecks in persisting K-5 enrolment gaps at the district level across rural and urban areas, it is unclear whether the findings of this analysis were subsequently used to address equity concerns.

### **H.1.3 How has the Roadmap contributed to improvements in education sector performance?**

The Roadmap contributed to improved education sector performance principally through:

- emphasising (through the Chief Minister's hands-on involvement) the high political priority accorded to the education sector;
- focusing management attention (through the regular and frequent Stocktakes) on the achievement of clearly formulated short- and medium-term objectives; and
- encouraging a data-driven approach to policy and focusing on strengthening education data systems and capacity to collect and analyse data (especially through PMIU).

The areas targeted by the Roadmap in relation to the case studies had been identified as critical to improving education sector performance, through strengthening teacher quality, enhancing the integrity of the examination system (more than improving its content), and curriculum streamlining and textbook provision. The areas covered by the case studies had a strong focus on improving drivers of education performance at school level, particularly on improving the effectiveness of teaching, and on improving learning-focused inputs (textbooks around an improved curriculum).

None of the targets set in any of the three case studies directly related or made reference to equity objectives, or referred to gender, disability, poverty, or minority groups.

### **H.1.4 How has the Roadmap contributed to the implementation of policy and organisational reforms for education?**

The first phase of the Roadmap was successful in institutionalising key merit-based policies for the recruitment of district managers, the tenure of key decision makers in SED and other associated stakeholders, and maintaining the merit-based recruitment of teachers institutionalised in preceding reform efforts. Respondents confirmed that throughout the duration of the Roadmap, its stress on maintaining continuity of leadership within SED (a minimum three-year term for key officials) was successfully implemented, except in rare circumstances – such as during the 2013 elections, or when key officers had to report for mandatory in-service training.

The Roadmap was not involved in the detail of the process of the implementation of reforms within key organisations (such as PMIU, PEC, DSD/QAED, and PCTB), but identified these as high priorities and focused reform design and strategic input at higher levels of decision-making. In particular, its focus on institutional capacity, learning and teaching quality, and assessments ensured that human resource, technical, or legal reforms relevant to key organisations were monitored through the Stocktake traffic lights, and, where required, often pushed through under the heading of ‘key decisions for the Chief Minister’.

In the case study areas, targets focused on implementing elements of the overall education strategy, including those set out in the ESP, at the level of specific organisations. The Roadmap was the principal administrative process guiding and prioritising implementation. In the case study areas, no targets were set relating to the production of policies, except for the enactment of legislation to enable the adoption of a new textbook policy in 2012.

The Roadmap and Stocktake played a role in taking forward major organisational reforms in all three of the case study areas, but subsequent Stocktakes did not engage with specific organisational issues once these had been implemented. For PEC, the 2013 Stocktake included developing and supporting the implementation of an improvement plan for the organisation. For teacher quality, the 2016 Stocktake included a target to ‘Implement a new enhanced vision to transform QAED as an institution into a centre of excellence’, as part of the organisational transition from DSD to QAED. The 2014 Stocktakes had a strong focus on resolving legal conflicts between PCA and PTB, and then on implementing the new PCA/PTB organisation structure (PCTB).

### **H.1.5 How has the Roadmap contributed to alignment around learning objectives, and system coherence in pursuing the objectives?**

Neither the Roadmap targets as initially developed (from 2011) nor the ESP (2013/17) were explicitly focused on learning objectives – the focus was on improving education access and quality. Learning only became an explicit overarching goal (in the Roadmap) from 2015. There was coherence at the senior policy level around this objective, but it is not clear how far this coherence carried down through the system to the classroom. There was some concern about how far incentives encouraged alignment around learning objectives. M&E systems were developed to track performance against learning objectives, but, as discussed in the RESP, the information available on learning outcomes had limitations in regard to assessing how much progress had been achieved.

The ESP had significant limitations in providing a strategic framework for the sector. It did not set targets or fully articulate how the broad reform areas identified would contribute to

achieving objectives. Nor did it provide a clear basis for prioritisation or public expenditure decisions. In this context, the Roadmap and Stocktake process played a critical role in setting targets and following through on their implementation. The main weaknesses in coherence and alignment resulted from the continuing weakness of the strategic framework for public finance for education, and the focus of the Roadmap and Stocktake process on a small set of short- and medium-term (through to 2018) goals, whose prioritisation and rationale was not fully developed. In addition, key informants had concerns about how far appropriate incentives were provided at local level, and the risk of gaming targets. However, this evaluation will not provide evidence on the extent to which this may have been a problem until the District Study is completed during the next phase of the evaluation.

### **H.1.6 To what extent were learning and inclusion objectives of education policy?**

The policies and targets in Punjab over the course of the PESP2 period have primarily prioritised the goals of improving access and enrolment, and reducing the number of OOSC. The approach to the expansion of enrolment has relied on expanding PPPs, some scholarship programmes (not universal or large-scale), and enrolment drives. The low-fee private sector has continued to grow over this period, with little regulation, and is absorbing increasing numbers of pupils. Punjab has not built new government schools. Resources have instead been directed towards the expansion of different forms of PPPs: allocation to PEF has increased with a view to expanding the flagship FAS programme, and new models of partnerships, with private actors adopting dysfunctional government schools, have been developed and implemented.

Achieving quality – as opposed to learning – is cited as a key policy goal in policy documents. However, the concept of quality has not been clearly defined or operationalised. Learning outcomes did not become a tracked goal through the Roadmap until 2015.

There is some evidence of thinking about inclusivity – but that is limited to access rather than learning. Stipends and scholarship programmes are designed to improve access for the low-income cohorts. Gender remains a policy concern. Punjab is in the process of developing a disability-focused IES.

ECE, remedial education, and nutritional and public health interventions in the early years are arguably some of the most pro-poor policy instruments with the potential to radically improve the trajectory of access and learning in school for the most marginalised children. While some progress has been made during the period of PESP2, there has not been a comprehensive approach to inclusivity and equity.

### **H.1.7 Were the goals clearly articulated? Were all stakeholders aware of their goals, and their role in achieving them?**

Goals are assessed (on the basis of the review of documentation and KIIs) to have been clearly articulated through the form taken in the Roadmap. The process of Stocktake meetings set and renewed expectations from the district-level bureaucracy. However, while the goals were clearly articulated for the top tiers of management (for example, the provincial-level bureaucracy and even to some extent the district-level bureaucracy), stakeholders at the grassroots (teachers, head teachers, others) have not been embedded in the information and feedback loops as they were designed and implemented. They are also excluded from

participation in the design of policies that impact their work environments and professional developments. While there has been decentralisation of responsibility for implementation, there has been limited decentralisation of goal-setting, or of the incorporation of local perspectives.

### **H.1.8 Was accurate and reliable information available in the system? Was it being used to guide policymaking?**

While information management systems for education had existed prior to PESP2, they have been strengthened and expanded during the PESP2 period – thanks in large degree to support provided through the PESP2 programme and DFID support to the Roadmap process. The use of data for policymaking and accountability has increased during this period. The ASC continues on a yearly basis, and now collects information on a wider range of indicators. The DSD (now QAED) has set up mechanisms for collecting information on a very large and detailed set of pedagogy- and learning-related variables. PEC has digitised its databases. PITB has piloted technology which can track individual children's progress over time.

Punjab has improved its use of data in education most markedly for the Roadmap and the Stocktake meetings, focused on setting and measuring performance against defined targets. However, beyond this, there is a lack of policies of, or a culture of, entrenching the use of evidence in policymaking, and to ensure that the data collected are effectively used.

### **H.1.9 Were the incentives of actors across the system (teachers, school managers, district managers, provincial departments) strongly aligned and linked to improvements in student learning? If not, what were they linked to?**

Varying degrees of progress have been made with regard to the structuring of incentives for different stakeholders in the education system. The Roadmap – which emerged as the defining reform of the PESP2 period – strongly influenced incentives for the district managers and redefined them to a large degree. It linked the performance of district-level bureaucrats to the targets set. To the extent that learning targets were included, their incentives were (in principle) linked to improving learning. However, mostly the focus and effort has been on increasing enrolments. This process, along with greater data collection in schools, has also impacted school managers and teachers. It is important to note, however, that this Stocktake process was a very high-stakes one in practice (because of the threat of dismissal or re-posting that officials faced, especially during the early stage of Stocktakes), and created pressures directly for district managers, and by extension for teachers, school leaders, and others in the delivery chain. There are concerns that this may have led to perverse incentives, inaccurate information, or attempts to game the system, but no hard evidence on the scale and significance of any possible effects of this type is yet available.

Pecuniary incentive mechanisms also remain weak in Punjab. Years of service and seniority remain the key criteria for career progression for most actors (teachers, heads, and district managers). Salaries for teachers are usually raised across the board. A nuanced system of performance-based rewards has not been developed. This is partly because this remains a complex policy issue globally as well – with very mixed evidence emerging in the area of performance-based pay. There are concerns that linking tests to monetary or professional development incentives for teachers in a straightforward way creates perverse incentives, such as teaching to the test or neglecting students that are struggling the most or most at risk.



### **H.1.10 What factors (internal and external) influenced the extent to which results were achieved?**

The analysis and interview accounts highlight a number of factors that contributed to the relative effectiveness of the Roadmap process. One particular one highlighted across the board by government, donor, and TA providers was the reform drive of the Chief Minister himself, and the success of the Roadmap in harnessing this drive to their advantage. As one respondent put it, the desire to see quick results on the part of the Chief Minister (known for his preference for ‘Punjab speed’) fitted well with the overall ethos of deliverology and the relentless pursuit of particular targets. Sir Michael Barber’s political role in creating this synergy was identified as a key contributor in this regard.

Heightened competition on the delivery of social services between different provinces, and the rise of a potent political challenger within the political landscape of Punjab itself, was also identified as a key external factor. The repeated association of the incumbent government with large-scale infrastructure projects (to the detriment of social service delivery) served as a strong motivator for the political leadership. Similarly, the cultivation of a strong system of rewards and punishments helped motivate the provincial bureaucracy. Other factors include the continuity of leadership within the Roadmap team, and their ability to draw on a high-quality pool of managers, which were strong internal factors influencing results. The fact that the top leadership of the Roadmap remained largely intact over its whole period of implementation is likely to have played a key role in generating institutional memory and the ability to learn and use lessons from experience.

### **H.1.11 How effectively was support to the Roadmap delivered, managed, and implemented?**

For the results it achieved, and the scale of the activity it was managing, the Roadmap process can be deemed highly efficient. For most of its implementation, the effort was managed by a lean team, often of no more than seven full-time individuals, with continuity of leadership.

With McKinsey having provided support to the Roadmap process since its inception, the TA component of PESP2 was (from 2014) provided by the TAMO, formed as a consortium between ASI and McKinsey. Integration of the Roadmap and other TA took place at two levels. The first was that the Roadmap’s budgetary and management process was subsumed under PESP2, as a sub-contract implemented by McKinsey. The amount allocated for Roadmap implementation and management was included within a basket of £39.8 million allocated for TA, which also included TAMO and evaluation contracts. The second level of integration was programmatic, through the unified PESP2 logframe, which delineated responsibilities for the Roadmap team. The 2018 goals developed by the Roadmap team were prioritised within PESP2’s overall results framework. This meant that three of the outcome-level indicators (1, 3, and 4) that dealt with participation rates, learning outcomes, and student attendance were directly relevant to the Roadmap team.

Through the course of several additions and revisions of the programme, the Roadmap team was made responsible for implementing quality- and accountability-related output indicators as well, such as those pertaining to the frequency and quality of data collected by MEAs, under the PMIU (Output Indicator 1.2). The literacy and numeracy assessment initiated by the Roadmap team in late-2014 was also made part of the integration process, with the Roadmap team helping TAMO develop and contract the assessment, and being responsible for the analysis of the data (Output Indicator 2.2). The Roadmap’s approach for improving learning

and teaching quality was encapsulated through what it called a ‘quality wheel’, which was a strategy centred on six determinants drawn from lessons in the earlier phases of implementation (2011–15), as well as international best practices.

In 2016, the PESP2 logframe was revised to include a new output (Output 5) pertaining to the engagement of political leadership with education reforms. Responsibility for implementation of this particular output rested with the Roadmap team. Key informants described this phase of integration as a way of delineating clearer responsibilities in implementing the reform agenda, with the Roadmap team leveraging its extensive experience in mobilising the Chief Minister’s office, along with the SED leadership, in taking key decisions and maintaining oversight of the reform process.

The capacity-building component of the Roadmap’s team within PESP2 was most visible through its support at the district level, and the joint ownership of the Divisional Field Coordinators placement. By placing qualified delivery specialists at the divisional level (nine in total), the Roadmap–TAMO partnership attempted to replicate provincial oversight, accountability, and planning mechanisms at the district level. These were done through District Review Committees using monthly data-packs on progress against performance indicators to performance manage their personnel. These data-packs, developed by SED’s PMIU, tracked student and teacher attendance, the availability of essential teaching and learning resources, the state of school infrastructure and facilities, and the performance of a sample of students on early grade literacy and numeracy tests, as well as the prevalence of multi-grade teaching and overcrowded classrooms.

During 2017, the contract arrangements changed so that the McKinsey support was contractually separated from TAMO. This does not appear to have impacted adversely the support provided.

#### **H.1.12 Were there any unintended or negative effects from the Roadmap process?**

The main potential negative consequences of the Roadmap related to concerns about possible perverse incentives and gaming of targets at the local level, and whether the heavily top-down nature of target-setting provided insufficient space for local priorities and perspectives within the context of decentralisation. However, evidence on which to make an assessment of the significance of these effects is not yet available and will be collected for the next phase of the evaluation process (through the District Study).

The Roadmap and Stocktake substituted for, but did not fully address, the lack of an articulated policy framework for the sector, particularly to guide public expenditure decisions.

Lessons from the Roadmap experience promoted the expansion of the model to other sectors, including health and solid waste management, and the establishment of the SMU as the organisational mechanism for managing sectoral Roadmap processes.

## **H.2 Conclusion**

The Roadmap and Stocktake process provided the main instrument for driving and monitoring improvements in the education system, and DFID support played a central role in facilitating this. The Roadmap provided a clear framework of targets, a focus for highlighting the political priority that the Chief Minister placed on education, and an effective process of monitoring,



with strong incentives for achieving progress. The main challenge for the future is to institutionalise the monitoring and performance management system. There are also potential concerns to address about the extent to which the Roadmap and Stocktake process provided appropriate and effective incentives provided through the education system, particularly in the absence of a comprehensive policy framework.

## Annex I Evaluation of the use of Sector Budget Support<sup>68</sup>

### I.1 Findings

#### I.1.1 To what extent was SBS appropriately designed and managed to achieve its objectives, including through the use of the RAF and coordination with the World Bank?

Between 2004 and 2007, GoPb implemented PESRP, with support from the World Bank. Building on this, the World Bank, DFID, and CIDA provided further support to GoPb through PESP1 between 2009 and 2012. DFID allocated up to £80 million for the PESP1 programme.

In 2012, GoPb requested further support for a second phase of PESRP from the World Bank, DFID, and CIDA. DFID, working with the World Bank and GoPb, designed PESP2 and pushed for a programme with a stronger focus on results. The World Bank allocated \$350 million for three years from 2012 to 2015. Through the PESP2 Business Case, DFID allocated £100 million of SBS from 2013 to 2019, of which £53 million was fully aligned with the World Bank's programme from 2013 to 2015. Funding was released against the achievement of DLIs. To support the delivery of the Chief Minister's 2018 Education Roadmap goals, an additional £70 million was added to the SBS component through a Business Case Addendum in 2015, increasing the total SBS to £170 million. This increase in SBS also aimed to strengthen systems and build institutional capacity, and further enhance the ability of DFID to engage, influence, and maintain policy dialogue with GoPb.

Complementing this increase in SBS, and in order to track progress against the SBS, DFID agreed an RAF with GoPb in 2015.

The DLIs specified for the World Bank project that guided the initial years of DFID's SBS were primarily based on professional development of teachers, teacher recruitment, rationalisation of teachers, and teacher performance incentives; improving the allocation and execution of NSB; decentralisation of resource management; vouchers for private schools; and stipends for secondary school girls. Later, RAF areas made these indicators more specific and targeted, with the identification of education institutions responsible for areas monitored by the DLIs. The RAF also introduced PFM reforms to improve the general management of the public resources for education (since a large portion of funds were provided through SBS measures could not be put in place to safeguard the additional funds only).

The close integration of the RAF targets with the Roadmap process makes it difficult to assess the relative contribution of SBS (i.e. whether the provision of SBS provided an additional reform incentive beyond that provided by the Roadmap, and so whether it would be valid to attribute the results achieved against the RAF targets to SBS). However, some features of SBS design may have militated against an effective provision of incentives. Specifically, the setting of RAF targets did not align well with the fiscal year of the Government. RAF indicators were confirmed a quarter into the Government's fiscal year, and so could not be incorporated into the budget preparation for that year.

<sup>68</sup> This text is taken from IER1 Section 4.2. It is based on documentation reviews and KIIs, including for case study organisations (QAED, PCTB, and PEC). The findings in the Final Report are supplemented by reviews of the use of SBS as part of the evaluation studies on support to PEF and special education.

### **I.1.2 To what extent was the design of SBS based on a valid theory of change that was appropriate to the context of implementation?**

DFID did not develop a theory of change for SBS to clarify the causal mechanisms by which it was anticipated to achieve results. The Evaluation Inception Report noted that the OECD CEF for budget support provides a general framework for understanding how results may be achieved. The CEF distinguishes:

- direct outputs of budget support (specifically improved integration of external assistance into budget and policy processes);
- induced outputs, including positive changes in the quality of public policies, the strength of public sector institutions, the quality of public spending, and consequent improvements in public service delivery; and
- outcomes – positive effects for final beneficiaries due to improved policy management and public service delivery.

If SBS has been based on a valid theory of change, it should be possible to trace a clear causal link between the setting of targets in the RAF, the provision of budget support in line with the achievement of the agreed targets and expenditure in line with the budget, and the delivery of specific results. The case studies did not provide evidence that the process of target-setting and financing through the RAF was providing additional incentives for implementation, or that it was leading to additional resources for the organisations supported. This was because SBS funds were seen as being provided to SED, were not integrated into the budget process, and there was no evident link to the level of resources provided to the organisations responsible for implementation:

- For staff within PEC, there appeared to be no awareness within the organisation of the RAF targets, and no expectation that resources available to PEC would be dependent on the achievement of the targets.
- In relation to teacher training, SBS targets were judged to have influenced QAED to an extent, informing expected deliverables from the department. This has helped QAED set short-term goals and provided incentives to perform against these goals. However, there was no evidence of a direct link between the money provided to QAED and achievement of RAF targets. Although QAED has been relatively dependent on donor project resources, SBS does not appear to have directly increased the resources available to the organisation.
- The RAF and SBS appeared to have had limited influence on the decisions taken by PCTB. However, the RAF was judged to be useful in having provided guidance for priorities for TA. The fact that PCTB is revenue-generating and largely self-funding limited the significance of potential financial transfers from the Government.

The provision of SBS does not appear to have contributed in general to a strengthening of the budget and public expenditure process, so this element of the CEF theory of change does not appear to have held. It is, however, possible that policy dialogue around the RAF contributed to the setting of priorities and the quality of policies and programmes. Nevertheless, in practice it is not possible to isolate the results from the provision of SBS from the Roadmap process, to which the process of target-setting was closely linked.

### **I.1.3 To what extent were gender and equity issues appropriately integrated into SBS design and implementation?**

There was no explicit attention to gender or equity issues in the RAF targets set in the three case study policy areas, and indeed up to 2016 none of the targets specified in the RAF made any explicit reference to equity. From 2017, targets have been set within the results area 'equitable access to education'. These have been focused on supporting the implementation of new evidence-based enrolment interventions in priority districts, and on PEF achieving enrolment targets. In addition, under the results area 'strong leadership and accountability', targets have since 2017 been set for improvements in teacher and student attendance in the five lowest-performing districts.

No targets have been set at any point in the RAF that have been disaggregated by sex, or that have explicitly addressed gender equity issues.

### **I.1.4 To what extent and how has SBS contributed to the education sector?**

Between FY 2012/13 and FY 2016/17, SBS made up on average 2% of the total school education expenditure, with SBS peaking at 4% of the total expenditure in FY 2013/14 and dropping to 1% of the total expenditure in FY 2015/16 and FY 2016/17 (see Figure 50). SBS therefore represented a small percentage of total education expenditure. However, it accounted for a much greater proportion of non-salary expenditure (Figure 51), peaking at over 25% in 2013/4, though falling to 7% in 2016/17.


While the aggregate share of expenditure represented by SBS was low, the relatively higher share of non-salary expenditure may have enabled programmes and initiatives to be implemented that would not otherwise have been. However, as noted in the PFER, rates of budget execution for non-salary expenditure have been well below 100%, so it is not clear that availability of funding has been a binding constraint on expenditure.

As noted above, it is difficult to isolate the effect of SBS, and so to draw firm conclusions about its contribution. The following points can tentatively be made:


- DFID, through SBS, has provided a small but potentially significant (to the extent that it in fact increased resources for non-salary expenditure) share of total expenditure during a period in which education sector performance has improved.
- SBS may have had some effect on incentivising GoPb to deliver on improved learning outcomes and complementing the Roadmap process.
- Although PFM reforms have been a focus of attention in the RAF throughout the period in which SBS has been provided, there do not appear to have been significant or sustained improvements in PFM for education.
- SBS has been strongly focused (through the choice of RAF results areas and indicators) on strengthening key drivers of education performance at school level, in particular through the focus on, for instance, DSD/QAED, PEC, PTCB, and PMIU. However, it is not possible to establish a clear causal link between the selection of areas and targets in the RAF and improved performance.
- Policy dialogue around the RAF may have had some effect in encouraging alignment around learning objectives and coherence in pursuing the objectives, though the Roadmap and Stocktake process has been the main mechanism for incentivising performance within the education system. Successive annual reviews of PESP2 have highlighted the role of

SBS in improving DFID's access to policy and programming dialogue with the Government.

**Figure 50: SBS in comparison to total school education expenditure**



**Figure 51: SBS in comparison to total non-salary expenditure**



### I.1.5 To what extent were SBS funds additional or is there evidence of displacement?

The provision of SBS through the RAF has not been linked to the performance of aggregate public expenditure on education. In 2015 a condition was set in the RAF that 'annual component of additional PKR 20 billion budget (approved by the Chief Minister) tranche is released to ensure reform across the Punjab Government's 2018 goals'. This was assessed as achieved by June 2016. The June 2016 RAF notes that 'since RAF related SBS goes into the larger pool of funds transferred to the SED, which is then reallocated, the additionality of DFID funds shall be reflected as a real increase in the education budget'. As shown in the

PFER, while the education budget and spending has increased in real terms over the period of PESp2, the rate of increase has been slower than in the period immediately preceding PESp2, and the share of education in total provincial spending has fallen. In the following year, a RAF target was set that the 'Government of Punjab ensures that PEF is financially resourced to achieve PEF expansion plan targets'. The June 2017 RAF assessment judged this as achieved.

While the lack of clear targets makes it difficult to assess the overall additionality of SBS, one indicator is the extent to which public spending has increased for the organisations which have been the main focus of attention in the RAF: in particular, PEF, PEEF, PMIU, PEC, and DSD/QAED. Information provided in Annex section G.5.2 shows that in general there have been significant increases in spending on each of these organisations during the period of PESp2's implementation.

### **I.1.6 Was SBS disbursed in line with its planned budget and timetables?**

SBS appears to have been disbursed in line with its planned budget and timetable, except to the extent that disbursements have been temporarily delayed because agreed targets have not been met. Funds were fully disbursed in 2015. In June 2016, £2 million out of £5 million was withheld under the DSD capacity development and reform area, £2 million out of £5 million for SED capacity development and reform, and £1 million out of £5 million for each of PCTB and PMIU support. In November 2016 the withheld payments were made except, for £1 million for PCTB and £0.5 million for PMIU. In July 2017 there was full disbursement of all agreed funds, except for 50% of the £3.75 million for DSD (moved to November 2017), 20% of the £3 million for SED and PMIU (moved to July 2018), and 50% for PFM rolled over to 2018 (reflecting that this area was assessed as off-track).

### **I.1.7 Were there any unintended or negative effects from SBS?**

No unintended or negative effects from SBS have been identified.

## Annex J Evaluation of TAMO technical assistance<sup>69</sup>

### J.1 Introduction

The assessment of TA provided by TAMO has been based on the following:

- a review of documentation on TAMO support;
- a review of TA management arrangements (presented as a background paper) based on a documentation review and KIIs;
- case studies that covered the provision of TA on curriculum, teacher training, and examinations (presented as background papers), based on documentation reviews and KIIs; and
- a review of the experience of TA aimed at strengthening PFM for education in SED, which was undertaken as part of the PFER, also based on documentation review and KIIs.

### J.2 Overview of TA support through TAMO<sup>70</sup>

TAMO's workplan was derived from the programme logframe, the Government's delivery priorities, and the RAF, and was agreed with DFID and the SED. The logical bifurcation of the logframe indicators and associated activities was into four buckets, according to activities that supported: (i) access; (ii) quality; (iii) equity; and (iv) governance and PFM related indicators.

#### J.2.1 TAMO activities in Year 1

In the first year (2014–15), work focused on establishing the programme and setting some standard protocols for working. This included:

- consolidating gains in student and teacher attendance;
- improving the value of school visits by MEAs and AEOs; and
- developing new approaches to improve teaching and learning outcomes in schools.

TAMO also strengthened data-driven performance management systems at the district level, through DRCs and pre-DRC meetings (chaired by the Deputy Commissioner and the Chief Executive Officer of the DEA concerned, respectively), so that the district interventions became more responsive to local challenges. As a first step towards improving the quality of teaching and learning, with the approval of SED, TAMO helped the newly formed PCTB to streamline and prioritise the most essential SLOs for Grades 1–10. TAMO also introduced the independent, sample-based six-monthly assessments to gauge improvements in the literacy and numeracy level of Grade 3 students enrolled in public sector and PEFsupported schools, and in parallel supported the Government to strengthen assessments and examinations. TAMO supported the Roadmap to introduce a tablet-based early grade literacy and numeracy assessment, through which a sample of Grade 3 students in all government schools were tested against Grade 2 literacy and numeracy indicators.

TAMO and the Roadmap helped GoPb to introduce the Chief Minister's goals to transform the quality of education by 2018. This meant that by Year 2, the scope of work to be undertaken

<sup>69</sup> This text (except for Section J.2) is taken from IER1 Section 4.3. It is based on documentation reviews and KIIs, including for the case study organisations (QAED, PCTB and PEC).

<sup>70</sup> This text is taken from TAMO (2018), Section 4.



by TAMO expanded considerably; consequently, so did the need for full-time specialist and generalist human resources and short-term consultants.

### **J.2.2 TAMO activities in Year 2**

In the second year (2015/16), TAMO continued its support to core quality initiatives, such as teacher training and textbook and teacher guide development for Grades 1, 2, and 3. Textbooks developed by PCTB with TAMO support were easier for students to follow, and focused on learning with understanding. Additionally, the revised teacher guides were more prescriptive and more closely aligned to textbooks.

Alongside this, TAMO increased its focus on data usage and institutional development, strengthening district routines, and increasing coordination down the district delivery chain, and accountability up the delivery chain. TAMO also supported PEF to expand its schools in the province's southern districts, in partnership with local CSOs.

### **J.2.3 TAMO activities in Year 3**

In the third year (2016/17), the focus on teaching and learning quality continued, with a steady increase in support to SED and other bodies on governance issues. On quality, this included working with PCTB and developing textbooks for Grades 4 and 5, overhauling induction and in-service training for teachers, and introducing a quality culture in Punjab's schools – beginning with increasing the skill level and doubling the number of AEOs, and providing them with appropriate training to support and supervise teaching and learning. On the governance side, this included supporting the introduction of DEAs by working with SED and developing a set of rules that would enable the authorities to function effectively; the establishment of an FMC within SED; the development and pilot testing of an Education Human Resource Management Information System; the establishment of the Secretary's Delivery Unit; and enhancing the M&E capacity of PEF.

### **J.2.4 Year 4**

In the fourth year (2017 to early 2018) TAMO went into transition mode: consolidating TA, developing forward-looking plans for its counterpart departments, and embedding its innovations in government standard protocols, routines, and rules. SED was in the process of rebranding DSD as QAED, and updating its structures and routines. TAMO played a key role in helping the organisation envision and deliver organisational restructuring and alignment. TAMO also developed a forward-looking institutional plan for the organisation and associated content, teacher, and leadership development frameworks. TAMO also supported QAED to increase the focus on quality, and developed and implemented two sets of quality standards to ensure quality training materials and delivery of training.

A sector plan and associated institutional development plan were prepared for SpED; institutional development plans were also prepared for PEC and PCTB. New routines were developed for AEOs and coaching was provided to low-performing AEOs. Training modules were developed for the leadership of newly formed DEAs, and rules were developed to roll out the Free and Compulsory Education Act. An assessment policy framework was developed to improve the value addition of, and establish coherence between, the various assessments and examinations in the province. This framework provides SED with some options to consider how assessments within the province can be administered and how data can be used to inform teacher training, curriculum, and policy decisions. At the request of SED, TAMO also

developed a compendium of all acts, rules, and policies relevant to the department. TAMO transferred management of the FMC and the Education Human Resource Management Information System to SED.

## **J.3 Findings**

### **J.3.1 To what extent has TA through TAMO provided an appropriate approach for building capacity? Has it been based on valid assumptions?**

Each of the three case study areas found that the TA provided through TAMO was relevant in terms of providing technical support to bridge certain capacity gaps within the relevant counterpart government departments, and that these gaps were identified in close collaboration with the department leadership. The TA was very relevant to the needs of the department leadership; however, relevance beyond the department leadership (management and technical staff) varied. The case studies found as follows:

- The support provided by PEC was very relevant to the appetite within PEC to improve the quality of the (design of the) exams. The TA provided by TAMO was extremely relevant to building PEC staff's capacity to design exams, and was critical to preparing them to do their job.
- The support provided to QAED aimed to strengthen and improve the reform DSD was undertaking or experiencing at the time. TAMO has given significant institutional support in helping QAED achieve a strategic focus through improving and setting of standards in training quality in terms of content and delivery.
- The support provided to PCTB closely reflected the needs of the PCTB leadership at the time. However, some of the technical support was somewhat misaligned with the needs of PCTB's technical staff, who needed support in building systems and capacities.

Evidence from the case studies indicates that a comprehensive and systematic process of identifying needs before initiation of TA ensures that technical support is relevant to the needs of partner organisations. Each of the three TA case studies found that TA support areas were identified in a collaborative manner, primarily between the department leadership and the TA partners, often with other staff members unaware of the discussions and decisions. The Chief Minister, through the Roadmap process, played a large role in driving the reform agenda.

The absence of an institutional needs assessment beyond the level of the department leadership has led to some gaps in terms of TA provision, at least as perceived within the supported organisations. In the case of PEC, for instance, although support has been provided to improve the technical component and the process of exam design, limited support has been provided to improve the subject content of the exam papers.

A close working relationship between the TA and partner organisations was found to enable an exchange of knowledge that was conducive to capacity development. TA support was more likely to build the capacity of department staff when it was provided in close collaboration, to enable course correction and learning from interactions. For instance, the TA provided to QAED was fully collaborative: where both parties were willing to cooperate to understand the gaps that existed, this helped constantly refine the process and outcomes of technical assistance. Whereas some of the TA provided to PCTB, while designed to involve close engagement to build department capacity, could not be implemented in the same way, and this resulted in reduced buy-in and limited capacity development of the department.

### **J.3.2 To what extent have gender and equity considerations been integrated in the TA design and provision?**

In the case study examples, there was no evidence of the explicit integration of gender and equity considerations in the TA design and planning. While improving equity features prominently in PESP2's objectives and in the TAMO Inception Report, this was in general addressed through specific interventions under the 'equity and inclusive education' area, rather than being mainstreamed into all TA design and delivery.

### **J.3.3 To what extent and how has TA provided through TAMO contributed to the education sector?**

The main areas of support provided by TAMO are summarised in Table 36. The sub-sections below classify the TA support according to the main types of contribution, drawing on the more detailed findings from the case studies where appropriate.

#### **J.3.3.1 Improvements in education sector performance, including equity-specific results**

Support to PEC has aimed to improve the quality and governance of the examination system. Support to PMIU has helped to strengthen information.

Equity-specific interventions have focused on the PIEP, and support to the development of SpED's sector plan and associated support to SpED.

#### **J.3.3.2 Implementation of policy and organisational reforms**

There have been aspects of support to organisational reforms in each of the main areas of support. The most wide-ranging has probably been the support to district education delivery, which will be reviewed in the next phase of the evaluation through the District Study.

In each of the areas covered by the three case studies, TA has played a significant role in providing support to departments in the development and implementation of organisational reform. The TAMO support that assisted the process of transformation from DSD to QAED is perhaps most significant among the case study areas. The TA provided to PEC coincided with the restructuring of PEC, as the system of exam design was changing, and the TA provided by TAMO contributed to the vision, design, and implementation of this change. The improvements that have resulted from the TA to PEC have strengthened the existing systems and staff capacity to the extent that these new processes have been institutionalised at PEC.

TA support in developing medium- to long-term organisational plans and standardised operational documents, such as job descriptions or SOPs enabled a shift away from an individual-driven to a department-driven approach to planning and management. The implementation plan prepared for PCTB was found to be a useful tool for when there are changes in department leadership, in so far as it enabled continuity of implementation focus.

#### **J.3.3.3 Strengthening drivers of education performance at school level**

TAMO has aimed to contribute to strengthening the quality and performance of teaching through its support to QAED and to PEF's Academic Development Unit. Support to PCTB has aimed to improve the curriculum and textbooks available in schools. Support through PMIU to improve the management of NSB transfers for school councils should have contributed to improving school-level management – this will be assessed as part of the District Study.

### J.3.3.4 Improving alignment of learning objectives, and system coherence in pursuing the objectives

In the case study examples, TAMO support was principally focused on improving the capacity and performance of specific organisations, and so did not play a role in improving alignment and system coherence. The main contribution of TA more broadly has been in the development of information systems, and capacity to implement and manage them, particularly through support to the PMIU. In addition, support to SED has aimed to strengthen governance routines and processes and new education initiatives. However, this has not been reviewed in detail in this phase of the evaluation.

**Table 36: Main areas of TAMO support**

| Organisation function       | TAMO's support  |
|-----------------------------|---|
| PCTB                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prioritising curriculum following merger of curriculum and textbook boards.</li> <li>• Revising primary school maths, English, and Urdu textbooks and teacher guides.</li> <li>• Strengthening institutional support to enable PCTB to lead the development of high-quality textbooks.</li> </ul>  |
| PEC                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improving the design and content of exams.</li> <li>• Improving the delivery and monitoring of exams.</li> <li>• Improving the marking and reporting of exams.</li> <li>• Strengthening the support functions, such as communications, human resources, and finance.</li> </ul>  |
| PMIU                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improving the efficiency of data collection, analysis, and reporting.</li> <li>• Capacity-building of District Monitoring Officers, Senior Data Processors, and MEAs.</li> <li>• Supporting the introduction of new initiatives.</li> <li>• Supporting improvements to the management of NSB for school councils.</li> </ul>   |
| PEF                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expanding the outreach of PEF by supporting its core programmes, and forging partnerships with CSOs to enrol children in the lowest-performing districts.</li> <li>• Improving the quality of education delivered by PEF schools by supporting PEF's Academic Development Unit.</li> <li>• Institutional strengthening of PEF by supporting M&amp;E and data management functions.</li> </ul>                                  |
| SED                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supporting the planning of education reform initiatives.</li> <li>• Strengthening governance routines and processes with SED.</li> <li>• Strengthening the introduction of new initiatives to improve access, equity, and the quality of education.</li> <li>• Strengthening SED's budgeting and financial management capacity.</li> <li>• Delivering communications for outreach support around SED's initiatives.</li> </ul> |
| District education delivery | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthening of district routines and performance management practices.</li> <li>• Capacity-building of district officials.</li> <li>• Institutional support focused on roll-out of DEAs.</li> </ul>  |
| SpED                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Designing, delivering, and monitoring PIEP and PEF schools.</li> </ul>   |

| Organisation function | TAMO's support  |
|-----------------------|---|
|                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Developing a SpED sector plan, an institutional strengthening plan, and programme planning documents.</li> <li>Designing new interventions to strengthen the department, raise awareness of special education, provide co-curricular books to special institutions, and strengthen the delivery of vocational education.</li> </ul>  |
| QAED                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Developing training content and learning resources for QAED training programmes offered for teachers, teacher trainers, and education managers.</li> <li>Delivering some targeted training programmes.</li> <li>Review and improvement of existing in-service training and refresher programmes at the provincial, district, and sub-district levels.</li> <li>Support to improving in-class lesson observation processes and tools for teachers.</li> </ul> |

### J.3.4 To what extent did TAMO support help to build sustainable systems and processes?

There are examples of the sustainability of systems and processes developed with TAMO support (in the sense of their being maintained beyond the end of support provision). For instance, the changes made to exam design with TAMO support have persisted, even after the completion of this TA to PEC. These changes have been formalised within PEC.

By contrast, when TA support to improving public finance for education was provided through TAMO, progress was made in developing system improvements but this has not been consistently sustained. For example, the FMC cell piloted in SED has not been continued beyond the end of TAMO support. Support was provided by TAMO in providing Budget Execution Reports, but these are not being produced regularly and systematically.

### J.3.5 How effectively have partner organisations been able to use TA, and what factors have constrained the effectiveness of use?

Evidence from the case studies suggests that partner organisations have been able to use and implement TA support and output most effectively when it has been provided through close engagement and effectively elicited stakeholder feedback.

Close engagement with the partner organisations has a positive influence on the quality of the TA provided and the effectiveness of its use. Both physical proximity between departments and TA staff (determined by TA modality – embedded or external) and the accessibility of TA staff help determine the closeness of engagement between TA and government. Close engagement helps ensure that the TA provider engages in knowledge-sharing, understands the needs of partners, and is able to modify according to needs.

In the case of PEC, TAMO employed two modalities of support: support provided through embedded internal TA, and additional support provided through targeted external TA. This allowed a comparison of TA modality. The embedded TA provided was considered to be of extremely high quality, and key PEC staff unequivocally noted the high impact of the TA on PEC's work. Views on the effectiveness of the TA provided through targeted external support were more ambivalent in comparison. In the case of PCTB, the lack of engagement in TA

support meant that PCTB staff felt marginalised and excluded from the process of reform, resulting in low ownership and buy-in of TA outputs in the areas of curriculum and textbook.

Relatedly, incorporating departments' feedback through constant feedback loops was crucial in ensuring effectiveness of use. In the case of QAED, most TA was effective because the process of engagement from problem identification to the provision of TA involved constant feedback loops between the two organisations.

### **J.3.6 What factors (internal and external) influenced the extent to which results were achieved?**

The main factors identified as influencing results were the quality of the TA and the capacity of the organisation to use TA effectively. No evidence was found about external factors.

### **J.3.7 How effective were the management arrangements for TA provision, including engagement with stakeholders, and M&E systems, in ensuring that stakeholder priorities are met?**

TAMO management arrangements (including the quality of team leadership) did not consistently ensure the provision of TA of adequate quality, and M&E systems for TA were not sufficiently formalised to facilitate an effective response and lesson-learning during the early part of implementation. However, in both areas, arrangements were significantly improved in the latter part of the contract period.

Adaptiveness and flexibility were crucial in ensuring that TA support was relevant to stakeholder priorities. Management changes made over the last year of TAMO implementation helped improve flexibility. However, limitations on the resources available in this final year made it difficult for TA to respond to some emerging needs of the Government.

Planned, formal mechanisms for eliciting feedback on TA performance were often lacking and not consistently applied across TAMO support. The lack of government documentation on TA processes and approvals indicates that government feedback was mostly obtained through non-systematic, informal means.

The review of TA management arrangements found that TAMO did not initially have an adequate M&E system to analyse the effectiveness of TA activities, and to derive lessons. While a M&E system was developed on the basis of feedback from DFID through various reviews, it could not be fully implemented due to the TA contract completion. This meant that TAMO could not fully evaluate and improve its work to assess how far what was being produced was in fact meeting stakeholder needs.

### **J.3.8 Were there any unintended or negative effects from the TA provided?**

No examples were identified from the case studies.

## **J.4 Conclusions**

The TA provided through TAMO appears to have been largely effective but performance has been variable. It is likely that performance could have been stronger if there had been more attention to institutional and organisational assessment in designing TA support, and a strong M&E system, particularly one that encouraged structured feedback from the intended

beneficiaries of TA so that any emerging concerns about the TA quality could have been addressed in a timely fashion. A stronger M&E system would also have allowed more complete and convincing assessments of the results achieved to be made.

DFID has not mainstreamed gender and equity considerations in its interventions and so has not helped to prompt such mainstreaming by GoPb, or assessed whether there may have been additional opportunities within the support provided to strengthen the focus on equity and gender.



## **Annex K   Evaluation of support for PEEF intermediate scholarships<sup>71</sup>**

### **K.1   Overview of the evaluation study**

DFID has provided funding for 27,500 intermediate-level scholarships for female students from 11 less developed districts of Punjab (and, in addition, funding has been provided for 500 undergraduate-level scholarships for both male and female students in Punjab) that are provided by PEEF. The evaluation study has focused just on the intermediate scholarship programme.

### **K.2   Methodology**

The study has involved a review of secondary data and documentation, KIIs, and a telephone survey of scholarship recipients. The survey sample was drawn from scholarship recipients in 2013, 2014, and 2015: that is, in the first three years of DFID funding to the programme. This time period was selected because the majority of these students were expected to have completed their intermediate studies during 2015 to 2017, and therefore it was expected that they could provide information about their educational progression and the impact of the scholarship on their lives. The beneficiaries of all three years were pooled together and a sample of 1,105 females was drawn out of a total of 25,576 beneficiaries. The sample size and survey approach was designed to provide a statistically representative picture of the population as a whole. However, the approach does not permit causal judgements to be made about the impact of the scholarships, since there is no counterfactual.

### **K.3   Summary of findings**

#### **K.3.1   How appropriate and effective have the management, administrative, and governance systems been for the PEEF intermediate scholarship scheme?**

The PEEF intermediate scholarships scheme appears to have been generally effectively, and efficiently and appropriately managed. However, the monitoring system does not provide information on the academic and completion performance of recipients, nor has there been any attempt to evaluate impact.

The evaluation found that PEEF selection and disbursement mechanisms appeared to be effective, and administrative processes were regarded as fair, transparent, and sustainable. PEEF's proactive approach of selecting the candidates based on their board examinations ensured that all eligible candidates were given a fair opportunity to receive the scholarship.

PEEF's management appeared to function well in light of its resource limitations. The support of various intermediaries, such as the educational boards of Punjab, the students' intermediate institutions, and the Bank of Punjab, kept the costs of executing the programme low. The scholarship's selection and disbursement timelines, and its logistical needs, were met through intermediaries' support. For example, because several scholars reside in poorly documented addresses, routing all mail through the institutions ensures that correspondence reaches the

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<sup>71</sup> This text is taken from IER2 Chapter 7, which summarises the PEEF Scholarship Evaluation Study.

scholars in a timely fashion. Without the intermediaries' support, the programme could not be carried out on a large scale.

While the secondary review signalled the programme's overall effectiveness, it also showed that there were gaps in PEEF's monitoring mechanism. PEEF representatives claimed that it monitored students' performance through the support of the intermediaries. However, these data, if collected, were not digitalised or accessible. Furthermore, the scholars were being offered no additional support apart from the stipend to support them during their education, and to ensure that they did not drop out.

In the primary study, PEEF beneficiaries who had received the scholarship in 2013, 2014, and 2015 were asked about their experience of the scholarship, and its impact on their lives. Their self-reported data corroborated PEEF's assertion that its processes were efficient. However, it also confirmed that the monitoring mechanism was lacking.

The data suggested that PEEF did not monitor students' performance during their intermediate study. PEEF representatives stated that the students were required to meet specific benchmarks; however, almost half of the students were unaware they had to meet any benchmarks. Paradoxically, among scholars that responded that they were required to meet benchmarks, more than half stated that they did not report to anyone on the completion of these benchmarks. It was apparent from the analysis that PEEF was not accurately collecting these data. The benchmarks did not incentivise the students – or, rather, the lack of benchmarks did not dissuade the students from studying.

Secondly, in order to mitigate the information gap that resulted from differences in PEEF's and DFID's mandate, respondents were asked about their intermediate experience and how receiving the scholarship improved their life chances. The research team asked the respondents a series of questions, such as what they were currently doing, their highest educational level, and their plans to pursue full-time employment, or if they were planning on starting a family. This information was used to comment on the programme's long-term impact.

### **K.3.2 To what extent and how has PESP2 support helped to strengthen the management, administrative, and governance systems? Were there any implementation challenges?**

DFID provided only limited initial support to help strengthen PEEF management. There has been no subsequent comprehensive review of PEEF since 2014, and DFID did not ensure that PEEF would collect the information necessary to allow an assessment of impact to be made.

### **K.3.3 What proportion of beneficiaries have completed intermediate studies, and what examination results have they achieved? What factors have influenced the completion rates and results achieved?**

The survey found that 98.5% of scholarship recipients completed intermediate studies, 96% of them within two years. 75% of those completing received examination scores in the top division. It was not possible to identify factors explaining differences in performance.

**K.3.4 To what extent did scholarships enable beneficiaries to continue their studies beyond intermediate level?**

73.3% of beneficiaries had completed higher education (11.3% of them to master's level or higher). While there is no reliable counterfactual as a basis for comparison, this suggests that the scholarships have made a positive contribution.

**K.3.5 To what extent have the life chances of scholarship recipients been improved?**

More than 70% of survey respondents reported that the scholarship had positively influenced their lives, and improved the way family and peers perceived them. 97% considered that it had positively changed their future prospects. 34.6% reported that they would not have (at least immediately) carried on with intermediate studies without the scholarship.

**K.3.6 Were there any unintended or negative effects?**

Only a very small minority of scholarship recipients reported any negative experience due to being scholarship recipients.

**K.4 Conclusions**

DFID has been able to route funding through a well-established structure and set of systems that has evolved to provide effective management of the scholarship system, which appears (within the constraints of the information available to this study) to operate in a transparent way and to reach the intended beneficiaries. The size of the scholarship grant has, however, been eroded by inflation and the issue of what might be its optimal level has not been determined – as well as its priority under the new government since 2018, and in a difficult fiscal context. In addition, monitoring information on the school completion and academic performance of beneficiaries was not available, and had to be collected through the survey. While it would in principle be possible to conduct a quantitative impact evaluation of the scholarship programme, this has not been done.

## Annex L Evaluation of support for LUMS/NOP scholarships<sup>72</sup>

### L.1 Overview of the LUMS/NOP and DFID support

The LUMS/NOP scholarship programme was set up in 2001 to ensure that talented students from disadvantaged backgrounds from across Pakistan could get the opportunity to attend LUMS, a leading private university. In 2013, the NOP Centre was established at LUMS to cater solely to the NOP scholarship.

Under the NOP scholarship programme, LUMS provides comprehensive support to potential NOP scholars, from outreach activities to graduation from LUMS and beyond. This support largely involves the following activities:

- providing financial support in the form of tuition fee waivers and stipends;
- conducting outreach activities;
- providing guidance on the application process;
- hosting a summer coaching programme to prepare prospective students for entrance exams;
- conducting a pre-semester orientation to prepare NOP scholars socially and academically; and
- providing ongoing counselling and support services.

DFID's support to the NOP began in 2013 with the main aim of providing financial support to students from underprivileged backgrounds. The intention was to provide not just higher education opportunities but also transformative opportunities for students from disadvantaged backgrounds. DFID's support comprised the following elements:

1. **Creation of the NOP Centre** – this can be seen as organisational development or capacity-building support to LUMS.
2. **Funds for NOP scholarships (and NOP-like scholarships)** – this is direct funding to provide financial assistance to students.
3. **Ambassador programme** – this was a way to engage NOP scholars to return to their communities and share their experiences about the NOP.

DFID has provided £7.2 million in support to the LUMS/ NOP under PESP2. The NOP is a scholarship programme for talented students from disadvantaged households, to enable them to study at LUMS, a leading private university in Pakistan.

### L.2 Methodology

The evaluation focused on the NOP scholarship programme between 2013 and 2018. The assessment is structured along the OECD DAC criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability. Given the lack of baseline data and competitive data, establishing a counterfactual, and therefore estimating causal impact, was not possible. A number of data

<sup>72</sup> This text is taken from IER2 Chapter 8, which summarises the LUMS-NOP Scholarship Evaluation Study.

sources were used by the evaluation team: this included documentation provided by LUMS and DFID, KIIs, selected secondary/administrative data provided by LUMS, an online survey of NOP scholars, and case studies of some NOP scholars. The evaluation encountered challenges with a lack of comparative data on NOP, and especially non-NOP scholars, a lack of financial data, and low response rates from research participants. These have been mitigated, to the extent possible, through the triangulation of information from different stakeholders.

## **L.3 Summary of findings**

### **L.3.1 To what extent was the design of the LUMS component an appropriate way to meet the educational needs of parents and children, and the priorities of GoPb?**

DFID support to tertiary education was presented as being experimental, and was different in focus compared to other aspects of the PESP2 programme. Beneficiaries (though relatively disadvantaged) had already performed well in the education system and were likely to proceed to higher education. The support provided significant benefits to the individuals supported and was in line with government priorities. However, it is not clear to what extent any wider social benefits were realised.

### **L.3.2 To what extent was the LUMS component's design based on a sound and comprehensive gender and equity analysis, and to what extent were gender and equity issues appropriately integrated into the design?**

The focus on gender and equity was limited in the NOP scholarship programme. While outreach activities increased significantly, there was limited to no improvement in terms of equity considerations among those selected for the scholarships. DFID had limited influence on programme design. Support to NOP targeted the poorest districts of Punjab, largely in line with the PESP2 design, but missed out on the worst performing districts in the country, i.e. districts in Balochistan.

### **L.3.3 To what extent and how has the LUMS component contributed to improvements in education sector performance, including equity-specific results?**

Given the lack of a counterfactual, it is not possible to assess changes to the education sector performance based on DFID's support to NOP. However, the relatively small number of beneficiaries and limited explicit attention to outreach mean it is unlikely that the programme had any significant short-term results in improving education sector performance. NOP scholars were not more likely to be female, students with disabilities, or from minority groups. There is some evidence that DFID support was provided to students from relatively poor households, although they were not necessarily from the poorest households in Pakistan.

### **L.3.4 How effectively was the LUMS component implemented?**

NOP implementation processes were largely effective, and there is evidence of learning and positive changes to programme design and management over time.

### **L.3.5 How did LUMS utilise DFID funding and support to implement its NOP? Did this represent VFM?**

DFID supported 742 students, or 1,829 student years in total. There was a relatively minor overspend of PKR 9 million at the end of the programme. 90% of total expenditure was for tuition fee waivers, followed by salaries, wages, and amenities (3%), and senior management support costs (2%). Financial reporting and VFM analysis provided to the team were not sufficiently detailed, so it has been difficult to assess efficiency, and to attribute costs to programme activities. The returns to investments in higher education could be realised many years after the programme, which makes VFM analysis impractical at this stage.

### **L.3.6 To what extent were synergies with other components (particularly PEEF) realised?**

There was no evidence of synergies that were realised as a result of targeting PEEF students or collaborating with other aspects of PESp2 support.

### **L.3.7 What impact has the LUMS scholarship had on the careers and life trajectories of the NOP scholars?**

Assessment of impact has been challenging due to the lack of a counterfactual, as well as confounding factors. If they had not received NOP support, NOP scholars were likely to pursue higher education opportunities in other institutions, particularly in public universities. NOP scholars generally felt that they performed well academically, in comparison with other students, but they felt they did not perform as well socially. There was little evidence of systematic or widespread discrimination towards NOP scholars, but NOP scholars still faced challenges in their integration into the LUMS environment. LUMS has had a positive influence on access to job opportunities, although it is unclear if there are differences between NOP and non-NOP students.

### **L.3.8 To what extent are the results achieved sustainable?**

The results achieved in terms of supporting students in completing high-quality tertiary education are fairly sustainable, as these students will be able to continue to draw on their education and experiences throughout their lives.

DFID's support was critical in establishing and sustaining a dedicated NOP Centre to coordinate the entire NOP scholarship process. Support to the ambassadors programme was not sustainable, as this component has been phased out. The size and scope of the NOP has been negatively affected by the end of DFID funding. The master's component of the NOP scholarship is no longer in place, and it is too early to confirm how the overall programme will be affected by the end of DFID funding.

## **L.4 Conclusions**

DFID's support has allowed LUMS to substantially expand the NOP. However, it is not clear whether the scholarships can be maintained at the same size following DFID's withdrawal. The removal of the master's component of the NOP provides an early indication that not all aspects of the programme are likely to continue in the future.

This expansion has, in turn, expanded the diversity base for the university, with students from very different social, economic, and/or financial backgrounds attending the prestigious university. With DFID's support, LUMS has been able to expand its outreach activities substantially, reaching a much wider range of students from around the country. The strong emphasis on merit – and perhaps subsequent lack of effective outreach and support activities to identify and recruit diverse students – has meant that the NOP scholarship has not been able to achieve gender or geographical parity yet, but the movement is in the right direction.

The targeting of the NOP was generally appropriate, with a focus on relatively poor households, although these were not always the poorest households in Pakistan. Students receiving scholarships in well-established public schools or private schools have also benefited from the programme. Although deserving both academically and financially, many of these students could have gained access to other higher education institutions if they had not received the NOP scholarship.

The withdrawal rate and separation rate for NOP scholars were not substantially different from those for the general LUMS student body. The support NOP scholars received both before applying and after being admitted to LUMS, including in terms of counselling services, could have contributed to this situation.

Without DFID support, the trajectory of the NOP scholars would have been varied. At the bachelor's level, most students would have continued to pursue a degree in another private or public university, but the evaluation findings suggest that only a small proportion of master's students would have been likely to continue with their studies. Many NOP graduates face difficulties integrating socially, for a range of reasons, but mostly related to their socioeconomic background. Significant efforts are being made to minimise these tensions to support NOP scholars during their time at LUMS. After graduation, NOP scholars earn across a wide range of salaries, but their earning seems to be largely consistent with the average starting salary for LUMS graduates.



## **Annex M   Evaluation of support to special and inclusive education<sup>73</sup>**

### **M.1   Introduction**

This evaluation study examines the performance and contribution of support to special and inclusive education under PESP2, within the wider context of the development of special and inclusive education policies in Punjab over the period of the programme. The evaluation uses evidence from a review of data and documentation, and KIs.

### **M.2   Summary of PESP2 support**

DFID's support to special and inclusive education (to address the needs of children with SEND) under PESP2 has involved the following main elements:

- Pilot initiatives for special education with SED and PEF under PIEP from 2014 to 2017, funded through budget support.
- SBS, which specifically since 2017 has been provided against targets agreed in the RAF related to SpED policy and organisation, but with some support for PEF.
- TA to SpED, provided initially by ASI through TAMO and since October 2018 by Cambridge Education. This has included some capacity development support as well as most recently support to development of an SEP and training for teacher master trainers.
- TA (also provided by Cambridge Education during 2019) for the development of the IES, led by SED.

### **M.3   Special and inclusive education in Punjab**

Education policy up to 2018 in Punjab was mainly driven by the objectives of increasing enrolment and improving education quality, with a focus on aggregate targets. Over the whole of the PESP2 period up until late 2019 there was no clearly formulated government policy on children with SEND – so there was no officially defined framework for classifying, identifying, measuring, and developing responses to meet the needs of children with SEND across the whole educational system. Provision was restricted to those served by SpED's specialist institutions. Organisational responsibilities for special education were not defined beyond SpED's activities, and SED did not play an effective role in addressing SEND. The most significant initiatives in the early stages of the period were the PIEP pilots. The IES and SEP documents that were finalised by December 2019 have for the first time formally defined SED's responsibility for children with mild and moderate SEND and set out a comprehensive policy framework. Implementation plans for the IES and SEP have been developed and costed.

The lack of a policy (and of targets such as those set under the Roadmap) has limited the extent to which children with SEND have been effectively served in mainstream schools. The organisational structure for SpED after devolution to DEAs has posed challenges for the effective management of SpED institutions, while the average rate of execution of the SpED development budget has been only 21.2%.

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<sup>73</sup> This is based on the executive summary of the Special Education Evaluation Study.

There is a lack of comprehensive and consistent data on SEND in Punjab, though the data available from survey sources have improved in recent years. As a result, it is not possible to provide more than a partial and incomplete assessment of the scale and characteristics of SEND, though there is evidence of significant regional variations within the province, and of correlation between different kinds of exclusion.

The lack of adequate data on prevalence makes it impossible to assess with any accuracy the extent to which the needs of children with SEND are being addressed, though it is clear both that the level of provision is inadequate and that it has not improved. Increases in enrolment in SpED institutions have slowed over the PESP2 period compared to previous years. While there has been some improvement in provision for the small number of beneficiaries of the IVS in PEF schools, there is no evidence that provision for SEND in mainstream government schools has improved. There are no data available on the quality of education provided to children with SEND, or the results achieved.

SpED has been under-resourced as regards effectively meeting the needs of children with severe or profound SEND, while SED has had neither a clear mandate nor effective capacity to address SEND within mainstream schools. There are multiple barriers to inclusive education for children with SEND relating to social attitudes, lack of teacher training, lack of appropriate diagnosis, inappropriate facilities, and poverty. The limited progress over most of the period of PESP2 reflects the relatively low priority attached to SEND under the previous government, as compared to the objectives of achieving aggregate improvements in participation and learning outcomes.

## **M.4 Findings on support to special education in Punjab**

### **M.4.1 How appropriate was the design of support to special education as a way to meet the educational needs of parents and children, and the priorities of GoPb, originally and over time?**

The original objective of PIEP was appropriate but weaknesses in its design and implementation prevented it achieving the intended results. The subsequent shift of focus to SpED was understandable but represented a limiting of the scope for achieving systemic change in line with the original objectives of DFID intervention, while SBS proved not to be an effective instrument to support SpED. However, DFID's continued engagement on these issues, and its flexible TA, has enabled it to respond to a need for support as government receptiveness to addressing SEND has strengthened.

### **M.4.2 To what extent was the design of support to special education based on a valid theory of change that was appropriate to the context of implementation?**

The support provided has not been based on an explicitly formulated theory of change. It was envisaged that the PIEP pilots would create interest and build ownership in the Government for a greater focus on addressing children with SEND. While this did happen with PEF, the pilot had little impact on SED. DFID's sustained focus over many years on advocacy related to disability in general, and addressing SEND in particular, and continued attention to these issues in the TA support provided, has ultimately contributed to progress in developing the IES and SEP during 2019. Underlying capacity constraints and a lack of sufficient government funding have limited the results achieved by policy and organisational support to SpED. SBS provision was based on the assumption that the provision of resources for SpED's

development budget and other expenditure would increase as a result of including targets in the RAF, but this did not occur.

#### **M.4.3 To what extent was support to special education aligned with/ integrated into the wider PESP2 design, and with other education programmes in the province?**

The main area where support to special education has been directly aligned with other PESP2 support was the PEF element of the PIEP pilot. However, there does not appear to have been coordination of direct financial support to PEF with a potential expansion of the IVS. There has also been an overlap between districts of focus under PIEP and subsequent initiatives, and DFID's 11 target districts.

There has been no other significant donor support to special or inclusive education, making DFID's consistent engagement on these issues particularly valuable.

#### **M.4.4 What has DFID support to special education achieved?**

The main results achieved from DFID support are as follows:

- Development of the elements of a viable approach for mainstreaming children with SEND in PEF (but not SED) schools, and a sustained increase in the number of children with mild or moderate SEND in PEF schools (through the use of vouchers).
- Contributions to organisational strengthening in SpED, in particular the restructuring of the Director General's Office.
- Contributions to the development of the IES and the SEP, which mark significant progress in establishing both a policy framework and implementation plans for addressing SEND in the future. The SEP and the launch event have helped raise the profile of, and awareness of, children with SEND, and the latter represented the first large-scale event undertaken by SpED.

While the RAF targets were largely achieved, it does not appear that DFID succeeded in protecting development funding to SpED, and it is questionable whether the achievement of the targets can be attributed to DFID support.

#### **M.4.5 To what extent and how did the design, management, and governance arrangements, partnership and coordination arrangements, and use of innovatory approaches for support to special education influence the achievement of results?**

The PIEP pilots represented an important innovation in the context of Punjab. Weaknesses in the design and management (including of the partnership arrangements) limited their impact but they do appear to have developed a viable model for encouraging inclusion in PEF schools. Weaknesses in the design of SBS also limited both its impact and the impact of the TA provided, as discussed above. However, DFID's continued engagement with SpED, and with inclusive education and the needs of disabled children, has helped to contribute to the results achieved.

**M.4.6 To what extent and how did the context (e.g. policy, political engagement, staff turnover, coordination within and between levels of government) influence the extent to which results were achieved?**

The lack of initial focus by GoPb and SED on addressing SEND (with other objectives for the education sector taking priority) presented a challenge that PIEP sought to address, but with only limited success. During 2019, the new government has been receptive to taking forward work on developing the IES that DFID has supported through its TA provision. Lack of coordination between SED and SpED (and lack of government commitment to funding SpED's development budget) has been a continued challenge for effective DFID support.

**M.4.7 How effectively was support to special education managed and implemented (by DFID, service providers, and partners)?**

In general, the provision of TA to SpED was well-managed and implemented (at the level of producing the intended outputs), though, as noted, problems were encountered with the development of the SEP, though these were eventually resolved. There were significant weaknesses in the management of PIEP through the PIU, which contributed to its achieving only limited results. DFID's lack of sustained field presence in Lahore may have reduced its influence and capacity for effective engagement with partners.

**M.4.8 Was the support to special education implemented in line with its planned budget and timetables? Did the component meet its milestone objectives?**

The implementation of PIEP was delayed relative to the original timetable, and it did not meet its milestone objectives. However, the provision of TA proceeded in line with plans, including the completion of the SEP and its implementation plan, and the provision of support for teacher training.

**M.4.9 To what extent did support to special education provide VFM?**

The limited results achieved suggest that outside the support to PEF and some progress in building SpED organisational capacity, the component is unlikely to have achieved significant VFM to date, and in particular the provision of SBS does not appear to have provided VFM since it did not lead to the planned increases in SpED development expenditure. The VFM provided by TA was limited by the failure of the Government to provide resources for implementation, for instance, of the 2017 SpED sector plan.

**M.4.10 To what extent are the results achieved by the support to special education sustainable?**

The increased enrolment in PEF schools using the IVS has been sustained by PEF reducing the initial target so as to allow resources to be used over a longer period of time, and then by requesting schools keep children enrolled even though no additional funding has been provided.

Sustained progress depends largely on the extent to which the current Government's commitment to addressing inclusive and special education is translated into effective implementation of the policy framework developed, including the setting of realistic targets and the backing of these with adequate public spending.

#### **M.4.11 To what extent and how has the engagement and ownership of key stakeholders in support to special education been achieved and maintained during implementation?**

The limited success of the SED PIEP pilot meant that the commitment of Government to addressing SEND was not initially strengthened, though PEF's engagement and commitment has continued even without further funding. The provision of SBS to SpED was also intended to strengthen government commitment but this appears to have had limited success. DFID has, however, been the only main donor that has provided significant and consistent support and advocacy for addressing disability in education (and more generally). This consistency of engagement and focus (especially as disability has been given a higher priority in DFID's corporate objectives) leaves DFID well placed to provide further support in the future, and has contributed to DFID being regarded as the most important donor partner in this area.

### **M.5 Conclusions**

DFID's initiative through the PIEP pilots was innovative and highly relevant to the context. Design and management weaknesses meant that the SED element of the pilot was not a success, but the PEF element was regarded as a success by PEF, which has been keen to roll out the pilot further – but it has lacked sufficient funding to do so on a significant scale.

The subsequent decision by DFID after the evaluation of the PIEP pilot to switch the bulk of support to SpED does not appear to have been justified by the subsequent results achieved, and appears to have represented a move away from the primary objective of fostering the inclusion of children with SEND in mainstream schools.

Some progress has been made in strengthening organisational capacity and developing a policy framework for SpED, but the unwillingness of GoPb to fund SpED's development budget, and continuing capacity constraints, have militated against achieving additional results. It is likely that more results could have been achieved for the same level of funding if additional resources had been provided directly to PEF for additional expansion of the IVS and to SpED, rather than through providing SBS, which was not matched by increases in government funding to the targeted institutions.

Over the last year, however, potentially very significant progress has been made in clarifying the responsibilities for education for children with SEND in Punjab, and in developing the elements of strategies to improve the identification and addressing of their educational needs, including clarifying the relative responsibilities of SED and SpED. The collection of data on children with disability in schools has also been strengthened.

DFID's sustained advocacy of an inclusive approach to education, and an increased focus on disability (when other major donors have not emphasised this issue), is likely to have influenced the increasing receptiveness of the new government in Punjab to addressing this issue, which was not highlighted in the New Deal policy statement.

While implementation plans for the IES and SEP have been developed, additional strategic and capacity development support will be required to make further progress, as well as sustained political commitment, particularly to ensure the sufficient allocation of budget (especially development) resources.

## M.6 Lessons

The following lessons can be identified for engagement in similar contexts:

1. Long-term sustained engagement and advocacy can yield progress when the political context becomes more favourable.
2. Pilot programmes need to ensure effective engagement by and ownership from key stakeholders, and they need to be appropriately designed and managed to maximise the likelihood of success.
3. As was found in the evaluation of other SBS provided under PESP2 (in the First Interim Evaluation Report), the modality used has not ensured that financial resources are in fact allocated in support of targets, and the use of budget support (rather than direct funding) is problematic as regards achieving sectoral objectives within what is still a weak budget system, particularly during a period of intense fiscal stress.

## **Annex N    Evaluation of support to the Punjab Education Foundation<sup>74</sup>**

### **N.1    Overview of the evaluation study**

The objective of this evaluation study is to assess the performance and contribution of DFID's support to PEF within the wider context of the development of policy towards private education and PPPs in education policies in Punjab over the period of PESP2. The study is based on a review of documentation on policies and initiatives related to the role of the private sector in (basic) education in Punjab over the period of PESP2, including research literature, a review of the wider literature on PPP in education, internationally and in Pakistan; a review of documentation and data on PEF programme implementation; as well as KIIs.

Under PESP2, DFID has provided direct financial support to PEF and some sector budget support to GoPb against targets related to PEF performance. DFID has also provided TA aimed at strengthening PEF's programmes and organisational capacity, as well as the policy environment for PPPs in education.

### **N.2    PEF's performance**

PEF operates three programmes, constituting different forms of PPP:

- The FAS programme aims to improve access of children to quality education through low-cost private schools by providing a per child subsidy.
- The EVS provides a choice to families below a certain income threshold to send their children to designated low-cost private schools.
- The NSP supports the establishment of new private schools in areas that lack access to education facilities.

In addition, PEF initiated the PSSP, under which the management of poorly performing government schools was transferred to private providers. The PSSP was subsequently transferred to PEIMA.

Over the period of PESP2, enrolment in PEF programmes (not including the PSSP) has increased by about 130%.

The main role that PEF has played in GoPb policy has been in providing a well-established, effectively run, and low-cost means of achieving the objective of expanding enrolment, with a particular focus on disadvantaged areas, both urban and rural. However, the Government has yet to develop a wider policy approach towards the role and regulation of private education, the relationship between public and private education, and the role of PEF in achieving more complex policy objectives, including improving access, increasing retention, and improving learning outcomes across the educational system. PEF successfully established the PSSP as a new initiative but the transfer to PEIMA (which has consistently had management problems) contributed to a loss of momentum, and it is anticipated that the PSSP will be transferred back to PEF management.

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<sup>74</sup> This is based on the Executive Summary of the PEF Evaluation Study.



The new government that came to power in Punjab in 2018 was originally sceptical about PEF's role and performance, as reflected in the funding squeeze over 2018/19, but it subsequently appeared to have been persuaded of PEF's effectiveness and PEF is now seen as a central pillar of future education strategy. However, recent allegations of the registration of a substantial number of fictitious students at some PEF schools, and the response to this, may have undermined PEF's position, while the extremely high rate of turnover of senior leadership of PEF over the most recent period has militated against the implementation of a clear strategic direction.

PEF remains one of the largest and most successful PPP schemes in education worldwide, and has developed and consolidated its role over the period of PESP2, substantially increasing enrolment. There is also evidence of it achieving learning outcomes which have generally been better than in government schools, at significantly less cost, though it is not possible reliably to trace the performance of learning outcomes in PEF schools over the whole PESP2 period.

PEF successfully launched the PSSP, and has increased enrolment in its core programmes (up till 2018/19), while also refining the model of each programme through the successive phases and seeking to strengthen core functions of supervision, testing, M&E, and teacher training. Significant progress has been made in strengthening PEF systems (including IT, such as the development of the electronic voucher cards for the EVS), to which DFID support has contributed, as described below. However, as shown in the institutional review (Cambridge Education, 2019b) there is substantial scope for strengthening PEF's processes and systems, and making them more efficient.

Sustained progress on increasing organisational and programme effectiveness has been constrained by persistent staffing shortages and an eroded value of the per student subsidy provided to partner schools, as well as the lack of a clear policy and strategic framework for addressing broader objectives beyond achieving increased enrolment.

## **N.3 Assessment of PESP2 support: findings**

### **N.3.1 How appropriate was the design of support to PEF as a way to meet the educational needs of parents and children, and the priorities of GoPb, originally and over time?**

PEF has provided an effective and low-cost means of making progress towards Punjab's goals of improving education access. Sustained support from DFID to the organisation, and funding of its programmes, has therefore been highly appropriate as regards meeting needs and priorities. Providing direct financial aid has been more likely to ensure that the funding provided has been in fact additional and used by PEF, compared to the results from providing SBS to support other sector organisations, given the lack of progress over the period of PESP2 in strengthening PFM for education. The provision of TA was appropriate as a means of complementing financial support and potentially strengthening PEF's management and programme performance. In relation to the selection of targets for PEF support, these have focused largely on increasing enrolments. This has therefore not provided any particular additional incentive to move beyond enrolment to the objectives of retention, transition, and improved learning outcomes.

### **N.3.2 To what extent was the design of support to PEF based on a valid theory of change that was appropriate to the context of implementation?**

Key assumptions for the effectiveness of the PEF programmes (which were already well-established, except for the PSSP) have held. In relation to the wider conditions for effective PPPs in education, conditions have generally been met in that PPP arrangements are well-designed and implemented. However, the regulatory environment for the private sector in general is not fully developed.

PEF has lacked the resources and staff capacity to make full use of the TA provided, and weakness in the long-term financial commitment to PEF has limited the sustainability of the enrolment expansion achieved with DFID funding support.

### **N.3.3 To what extent was the design of support to PEF based on a sound and comprehensive gender and equity analysis, and to what extent were gender and equity issues appropriately integrated into the design?**

Socioeconomic equity considerations have been built into the design of DFID support to PEF mainly through the focus on 11 priority districts.

### **N.3.4 To what extent was support to PEF aligned with/integrated into the wider PESP2 design, and with other education programmes in the province?**

Support to PEF has been aligned with the wider objectives and focus of the PESP2 programme. There have been specific links through the focus on priority districts, and the development of the IVS for children with mild disabilities. DFID support has been generally aligned with World Bank budget support.

### **N.3.5 What results have been achieved by DFID's support to PEF in relation to:**

#### **N.3.5.1 ...improvements in education sector performance relating to increased enrolment and improved quality of education, including equity-specific results (in relation to gender, disability, poverty, and minority groups)?**

DFID support has contributed to substantial increases in enrolment in PEF schools, with a particular focus on children in disadvantaged areas and on girls. It is less clear how far this has contributed to either a net increase in enrolment or to improved and sustained educational participation. There are also limited data available on improvements in learning outcomes.

#### **N.3.5.2 ...improving PEF's organisational effectiveness?**

DFID TA has undertaken comprehensive reviews of PEF's programmes, systems, and organisational performance, and produced proposals for improving PEF's organisational effectiveness. However, progress in implementing these proposals to date appears to have been limited, and constrained by the lack of a clear government vision of PEF's future role, as well as a lack of confidence of current PEF management in key proposals that were developed by the TA programme.

#### **N.3.5.3 ...improving the effectiveness of the programmes to which DFID has provided support?**

DFID has, through the TA support provided, made recommendations for strengthening the effectiveness of PEF's programmes. PEF has made incremental changes to new phases of

programmes aimed at strengthening performance. These have been informed by advice and analysis provided by the TA, but PEF has not generally had the financial resources or staff to fully implement the recommendations provided, and the current PEF management does not endorse key aspects of the proposals made.

#### **N.3.5.4 ...strengthening the policy framework for private education and PPPs in education?**

DFID has provided support to the development of a PPP strategy, which was being finalised towards the end of the TA programme. This should provide an opportunity to strengthen the policy framework, but it has yet to be adopted and implemented by GoPb, though it was reported to have been accepted and was said to be awaiting cabinet approval. DFID support for PEF has contributed to the new government increasing its commitment to PEF, after showing initial caution about its future role.

#### **N.3.6 To what extent were synergies with other components of PESP2 realised?**

Some synergies have been realised with support to special and inclusive education, and through the geographical focus of DFID support on priority districts.

#### **N.3.7 To what extent and how did the design, management, and governance arrangements, partnership and coordination arrangements, and use of innovatory approaches for support to PEF influence the achievement of results?**

DFID's engagement with PEF was mainly, during the latter part of the programme, handled through the TA provider. PEF management noted in KIIs that they had appreciated the greater and more direct involvement of DFID staff that had occurred during the earlier phases of support, and which had been important in improving TAMO's performance.

#### **N.3.8 To what extent and how did the context (e.g. policy, political engagement, staff turnover, coordination within and between levels of government) influence the extent to which results were achieved?**

During the period up to 2018, there was strong government support for PEF's role in the overall education strategy, focused on boosting enrolment, and for incremental improvements in PEF programme management. There appears, however, to have been less government interest in resolving policy issues about PEF's long-term role, or in moving beyond a focus on increasing enrolment in measuring PEF's performance. The worsening of the fiscal context from 2018 led to cuts in PEF funding from the Government, which checked its expansion. These factors limited the effectiveness of DFID support.

An initial lack of commitment to PEF by the new government after the 2018 elections contributed to a continuing funding squeeze in the remainder of the 2018/19 financial year, as well as to staffing changes. However, government commitment to PEF has now increased so that the full budget was provided in 2019/20.

**N.3.9 How effectively was support to PEF managed and implemented (by DFID, service providers, and partners)?**

The provision of financial aid has been against agreed targets and has been effectively managed by DFID, and used and accounted for by PEF. In general, PEF has been satisfied with the provision of TA, though for both service providers some key informants had reservations about the effectiveness of management and the quality of engagement in the early stages of support.

**N.3.10 Was the support to PEF implemented in line with its planned budget and timetables? Did the component meet its milestone objectives?**

DFID financial support appears to have been provided in line with planned budgets and timetables, and milestone objectives were met. TA produced the planned outputs in line with workplans developed during implementation.

**N.3.11 To what extent did support to PEF provide VFM?**

PEF as an organisation has been highly cost effective in providing access to education – especially for children from relatively poor and disadvantaged households – that is on average as least as good as that provided by government schools, at considerably lower cost. Providing financial support to allow an expansion of PEF's programmes therefore implies that DFID has achieved excellent VFM. However, this would have been improved if more progress had been made in improving PEF's organisational effectiveness, developing an appropriate policy and financing framework, and achieving a stronger focus on participation and learning outcome objectives, rather than just enrolment objectives.

**N.3.12 To what extent are the results achieved by the support to PEF sustainable?**

The sustainability of DFID support is constrained by the lack of a stable long-term policy and financing framework for PEF, and a lack of progress in implementing improvements to PEF processes and systems, including those identified through TA review.

**N.4 Conclusions**

Over the period of DFID support through PESP2, PEF has continued to be a highly effective organisation which has achieved a large increase in enrolment and made incremental improvements in its core programmes. PEF also introduced the PSSP, which is an important innovation in using private management to improve low-performing schools. PEF has continued to be, including under a new government and after a period of uncertainty, a centrepiece of the strategy for improving educational access, as it has demonstrably provided a cost-effective means of increasing enrolment.

DFID's support has played an important role in helping to finance the expansion of enrolment and the consolidation of PEF programmes, including strengthening PEF's focus on districts that face particular disadvantages.

However, despite these successes, relatively little progress appears to have been made over most of the period in addressing some core issues for PEF. First, a broader policy framework for PPPs in education, and a regulatory framework for the private sector, remain to be

implemented, along with a long-term strategic vision for PEF's role and focus. Second, PEF's financing arrangements have remained precarious, in part as a result of its continuing to be treated as a development scheme funded through the ADP, rather than a core part of recurrent expenditure. Third, there has been continued underinvestment in PEF staffing and systems. Fourth, the strategic focus has remained on increasing enrolment in PEF programmes, rather than on keeping children in school, improving learning outcomes, and seeing PEF programmes as an instrument for wider systemic improvements in school education. Fifth, data available to guide PEF decisions (e.g. on the location of OOSC) remain weak and PEF still lacks an effective research function.

As a result, while DFID's TA support has provided potentially useful strategic and organisational guidance for PEF, the recommendations made have been only partially implemented.

The design of DFID's support to PEF under PESP2 recognised these challenges and needs from the start but did not generally succeed in addressing them. The main focus of support (as measured by logframe targets) remained on aggregate enrolment throughout the whole period of the programme. The overall effectiveness of DFID support (and of PEF as an organisation) might have been increased if the provision of resources had been more directly linked to progress in systems strengthening, rather than just to achieving enrolment targets.

## **N.5 Lessons**

PEF's experience has continued to demonstrate the viability and effectiveness of well-managed and designed PPP arrangements in education, but also their vulnerability in the absence of a clear long-term government strategy and sustainable funding arrangements.

## Annex O Evaluation of support to school infrastructure<sup>75</sup>

### O.1 Introduction

#### O.1.1 Infrastructure support overview

DFID's infrastructure support to PESP2 originally consisted of the SCRP, also known as the Humqadam-SCRP project, which was implemented in Punjab by IMC Worldwide, with an original budget of £104 million in parallel with a similar project in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). The SCRP was originally intended to meet 60% of the need for additional classrooms in Punjab, and as well to provide essential facilities in existing schools. The original design of the component emphasised a reliance on community contracting and innovative approaches to construction. Because IMC Worldwide did not get Board of Investment approval to operate in Pakistan until April 2015, the period between 2013 and 2015 was an extended inception stage.

Subsequently (following a programme review in 2018), there was a reallocation of £35 million of the school infrastructure funding to be managed directly by GoPb through the SED PMIU, called the PSCRP, a further component of £4.7 million implemented by TCF (focused on government schools managed privately under the PSSP).<sup>76</sup> Activities undertaken have included: the construction of additional classrooms in schools; the provision of missing facilities, such as toilets, drinking water, and boundary walls; the rehabilitation of 'dangerous schools';<sup>77</sup> and (for the PSCRP component only) the rehabilitation and revitalisation of science and IT labs; and the upgrading of model schools.

Key targets have been revised during the implementation period. For Humqadam-SCRP, the objectives was reduced from construction of 23,000 classrooms and provision of missing facilities in 3,315 schools, to 4,508 classrooms and 1,989 toilets. For PSCRP, the scope includes constructing 2,000 classrooms, and 110 model schools. For TCF, the scope includes 600 classrooms and 100 toilet units. The infrastructure support has been given a no-cost extension up to July 2021.

#### O.1.2 School infrastructure policies and progress

Over the period of PESP2, school infrastructure policy has focused on the upgrading of existing government school facilities, including the provision of additional classrooms. Progress has been made in ensuring that all government schools meet basic infrastructure requirements. However, the number of students per classroom has increased over the period of PESP2 as enrolment has increased more rapidly than classroom provision.

#### O.1.3 Methodology

The school infrastructure evaluation study covered implementation up to January 2020, and was based on documentation provided by IMC, PMIU, SED, TCF, and DFID, and KIIs. The evaluation encountered a number of challenges, related in particular to a lack of access to documentation on some key decisions taken during the course of implementation. The

<sup>75</sup> This is based on the executive summary of the School Infrastructure Evaluation Study.

<sup>76</sup> £5 million of programme expenditure was covered by the International Climate Fund (ICF) as a result of estimated carbon savings from the use of Chinese brick bond technology in construction. The Evaluation Team was able to obtain only limited information about the basis of this calculation and the rationale for the allocation of funds, and has not sought to evaluate it.

<sup>77</sup> For the IMC component only.



supplementary study covered the period up to January 2021 focusing on the extent to which the component was on course (through the SCRP, PSCR, and TCF components) to achieve its revised objectives.

## **O.2 Findings: Relevance**

### **O.2.1 How appropriate was the design of the infrastructure component, and specifically the decision to engage an external contractor, rather than working through government systems?**

The infrastructure component of PESP2 began in a context marked by a heightened UK Government focus on results and corporate standards in development. Concern about this and about fiduciary and corruption risks in Pakistan, as well as the lack of a monitoring and implementation body to work with SED at the time, influenced DFID's original decision to engage an international contractor for the infrastructure component, rather than going through government systems. This decision proved problematic, given the delays and implementation difficulties encountered and the ultimate decision to go back to partial implementation through government systems.

### **O.2.2 How appropriate was the original construction modality in the context of the country?**

It is not possible to determine whether the original construction modality of community contracting was appropriate, as this approach was neither piloted nor implemented on the ground, though there was some evidence of its practicality to deliver to scale in KPK, as demonstrated by the success of the conditional grants programme,. Moreover, there was some ambiguity in regard to the understanding of community contracting. IMC's decision to switch from community contracting to commercial contracting was not backed by systematic evidence gathered via piloting in the inception stage.

### **O.2.3 How appropriate has been the revised approach following the 2018 programme restructuring?**

The programme restructuring of 2018 was appropriate in that it reduced IMC's scope of work and acknowledged the benefits of going through the government systems for timely achievement of targets. At the same time, some persistent issues at the root of underachievement (for instance, insufficient capacity within DFID's infrastructure team) were not addressed until late 2019 (when a permanent SRO was assigned for the infrastructure component) and in this regard the programme restructuring was incomplete. Following the adoption of a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP), IMC's contract review in July 2018 recognised IMC's difficulties with implementation, but did not provide solutions. IMC's scope reduction led to the initiation of PSCR in August 2018. PSCR's initial scope of work was ambitious and not backed by an assessment of, and did not take account of, bureaucratic delays and other external challenges. The TCF component, initiated in March 2019, also faced delays as it was placed on hold<sup>78</sup> until September 2020. PSCR and the TCF component have

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<sup>78</sup> This was done in response to the negative media coverage of the Humqadam-SCRP component in August 2019.



not sought to promote innovation in design<sup>79</sup>, since the designs being used are the standard ones used for government schools all over the province.

#### **O.2.4 To what extent was the infrastructure component's design based on a valid theory of change that was appropriate to the context of implementation?**

The *explicit* assumptions underlying the infrastructure component's theory of change were appropriate. Insufficient school infrastructure does lead to overcrowding in classrooms, and consequently low attendance, retention, and completion rates in Punjab. The implicit assumptions have not been backed by research, and did not hold so well for Punjab's context, particularly that of establishing innovative and economical model schools. Alternatives to infrastructural provision can also be effective for addressing overcrowding: the Insaaf Afternoon Schools Programme is a case in point.

#### **O.2.5 To what extent was the infrastructure component's design based on a sound and comprehensive gender and equity analysis, and to what extent were gender and equity issues appropriately integrated into the design?**

While the infrastructure component did recognise some gender and equity issues at the initial design stage, little specific attention was paid to gender and equity considerations during implementation nor where possible implications comprehensively analysed.

#### **O.2.6 To what extent was the infrastructure component aligned with/integrated into the wider PESP2 design, and with other initiatives and programmes in Punjab?**

The infrastructure component was anchored within the objectives of the PESP2 programme (and focused on schools that were not receiving other construction support), but not well-aligned to it in relation to governance and information management systems. Integration within the whole PESP2 programme had the drawback that component-specific problems with implementation were not automatically flagged for high-level management concern, as would have been the case for a standalone project. PSCRП enjoys better coordination and alignment with the rest of government as it is being managed by SED through PMIU.

### **O.3 Findings: Effectiveness**

#### **O.3.1 To what extent has the infrastructure component in Punjab achieved its objectives in improving the quality and quantity of school infrastructure? What results have been achieved by IMC, GoPb, and TCF?**

For the period that this evaluation principally covers (up to January 2021), in terms of numbers of units of construction, the infrastructure component has missed its original objectives by a large margin. The final targets for Humqadam-SCRП were less than a quarter of the original target. The PSCRП targets were also redefined. Moreover, the infrastructure component did not achieve the desired quality until 2020<sup>80</sup>, as the percentage of failed inspections for

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<sup>79</sup> In the case of TCF, however, energy efficient lighting has been introduced in addition to standard classroom designs.

<sup>80</sup> By September 2020, nearly 1300 of 1800 quality issues raised by Cardno had been addressed.

Humqadam schools was consistently more than the baseline target of 8.8%. The PMIU component has performed well against the targets set primarily because of its use of standard C&W designs, hands-on leadership, the decentralisation of procurement for the Rehabilitation and Revitalisation (R&R) component, and the utilisation of existing Punjab government staff. The TCF component, which also uses C&W designs, has worked within its budget and is on course to achieve its overall construction targets.

**O.3.2 To what extent did the programme management and governance arrangements on the supplier's side influence the achievement of results? What were the key challenges encountered, and how appropriately did the supplier respond to these problems encountered?**

There were significant weaknesses in IMC's management of the programme. Management arrangements for Humqadam-SCRP were too centralised – to the programme's detriment – and were unable to balance quality/programme/cost considerations. It was not until Contract Amendment 10 in September 2020, when FCDO revised performance management processes via KPIs based on four workstreams, that sustained improvements in performance occurred. For governance, the Humqadam steering committee meetings allowed a forum for discussion on scope and with service providers, but did little to address the problems identified, in part due to the low frequency of the meetings.

PSCR's management benefited from local expertise, as well as more effective relations and synergies with the rest of government. TCF's established working relationship with DFID/FCDO and the government, and its in-house technical and managerial capacity, in addition to the availability of a panel of pre-approved contractors, has facilitated progress in a very tight implementation timeframe.

**O.3.3 To what extent did the programme design and innovation influence the achievement of results? What were the key challenges encountered, and how appropriately did the stakeholders respond to these problems encountered?**

The incorporation of the infrastructure component within the wider PESP2 programme contributed to its problems receiving insufficiently urgent and high-level DFID attention. The component warranted its own governance, risk, and accountability arrangements. Proposed technical innovations were not sufficiently critically reviewed and piloted. DFID's team lacked global and national experience of implementing infrastructure programmes of a similar scale, and there was limited policy and practice guidance for this component. As a result, much corrective action was reactive rather than pre-emptive. The complications in IMC's design and poor adherence to the Pakistan Building Code were responsible for quality weaknesses in both legacy schools and schools that were based on set designs. PMIU and TCF, on the other hand, focused on very simple designs, which has aided timely delivery.

**O.3.4 To what extent and how did the context influence the extent to which results were achieved?**

The local context – geographical and construction-related – has significantly influenced the achievement of results. However, IMC encountered challenges in effectively mitigating foreseeable risks. Under PSCR, PMIU is on track to achieve results largely because of its association with government systems especially its close association with SED. TCF's strong

knowledge of the context and good working relationships with DFID/FCDO and the GoPb have helped achieve progress.

## **O.4 Findings: Efficiency**

### **O.4.1 How effectively was the infrastructure component managed and implemented by DFID? How appropriately did DFID respond to the implementation problems encountered?**

DFID's management of the infrastructure programme was deficient on various fronts. These include the procurement and contract arrangements process, accountability mechanisms, and limited internal staffing resources and technical capacity<sup>81</sup>. These factors affected DFID's ability to respond to poor performance by the service provider. DFID has effectively taken corrective measures to address these root causes (those pertaining to staffing and the contracts management process); however, these actions have only been taken in the last two years of implementation – particularly as reputational risks have increased as a result of media scrutiny. With PSCR, FCDO's role is in line with standard practice, one of programme management level around coordination, albeit with more frequent information sharing, with considerable autonomy for PMIU to deliver targets as they considered fit. With TCF, FCDO's management has been effective given the tight timelines for delivery of targets.

### **O.4.2 Was the infrastructure component implemented in line with its planned budget and timetables? Did the component meet its milestone objectives?**

The infrastructure component was not implemented within the planned budget because of IMC's underestimation of unit costs for Humqadam-SCRCP classrooms. IMC's lack of previous construction experience in the region, its inability to establish political linkages, and the change in modality also meant that it could not assign realistic timelines to its targets, resulting in non-achievement of the milestones. PMIU's PSCR component, after an initial revision of targets, is on track to meet the milestone objectives by the revised timeline. The TCF component also saw two revisions in scope; as of now, it is on course to achieve its targets within the given timeframe.

### **O.4.3 To what extent did the infrastructure component provide VFM?**

The infrastructure component did not achieve VFM. The cost of construction of schools by IMC (taking account of TA and capacity-building costs), was significantly higher than the unit construction costs as estimated by GoPb and TCF, via the Comprehensive Schedule of Rates and the Market Rates System. Delays in IMC's registration, a drastic reduction in the scope, and smaller lots for contractors weakened economy and efficiency aspects of the component, thereby contributing to the non-achievement of VFM over the period of the programme evaluated.

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<sup>81</sup> Until late 2019, when a permanent SRO and additional staff was introduced for the IMC component.

## **O.5 Findings: Sustainability**

### **O.5.1 To what extent are the results achieved by the infrastructure component sustainable?**

The sustainability of the results achieved can only be conclusively ascertained a few years *after* completion. In the long-term, maintenance issues are likely to pose a challenge, particularly with the innovations implemented by IMC, given that the local capacity for maintenance is minimal. The PSCR and TCF schools, however, are likely to be more sustainable due to simple designs, and government ownership in the case of PSCR schools.

### **O.5.2 To what extent and how successfully did the design and implementation of the infrastructure component foster sustainability?**

While the overall design and implementation modalities are considered to be sustainable, the decision to involve an external contractor limited the component's sustainability in practice. Although Humqadam-SCR was intended to provide model schools displaying VFM and innovation, in practice its sustainability was compromised significantly because of its complicated design, contextually inappropriate innovations, and insufficiently specified maintenance requirements. In contrast, the PSCR and TCF components appear more likely to be sustainable based on its simple design, government ownership, community engagement, and maintenance protocols.

### **O.5.3 To what extent and how has the engagement and ownership of key stakeholders in the infrastructure component been achieved and maintained during implementation?**

Government ownership of the infrastructure component has been weak up until the establishment of PSCR, reflecting the Government's principal concern for rapid progress in construction rather than piloting innovative approaches. In addition, IMC had limited success in building its own effective relationships with stakeholders. Over the final years of implementation, government ownership of Humqadam-SCR has improved. At the community level, while Community Committees for School Infrastructure (CCSIs) were an active tool for community engagement, community concerns were not actively resolved. In contrast, the PSCR component appears to have established effective community engagement. TCF has also achieved good relationships with stakeholders.

## **O.6 Findings: Impact**

### **O.6.1 Were there any unintended or negative effects of the infrastructure component?**

The design issues in the Humqadam-SCR classrooms led to serious reputational damage to DFID's PESP2 support work, as well as other educational support in Pakistan. It also had a negative effect on IMC's reputation and demoralised its contractors. There is limited evidence to make an assessment of any unintended effects on communities.

## **O.7 Conclusions**

The evaluation has found significant weaknesses in DFID's management of the school infrastructure component at each stage:

1. The **original design** was based on untested assumptions and insufficient evidence.
2. DFID's focus on **gender and equity** concerns was limited and not systematically applied to the component.
3. In the **procurement process**, insufficient weight was paid to the importance of the selected company having prior registration and experience of implementation in Pakistan.
4. DFID underestimated the **obstacles to effective operation for an external contractor** inexperienced in working in Pakistan. In the final stage of the programme, DFID reverted to partial implementation through government procurement and management systems.
5. Until late 2019, DFID **lacked effective and stable staffing** for the infrastructure component – technical and managerial – at all levels.
6. The **contract management** process was poorly handled up until September 2020, when Contract Amendment 10 with IMC introduced new and effective ways of working .
7. The inadequate **performance and accountability arrangements** in the early stages of programme implementation resulted from the infrastructure component's design, as well as weaknesses in management that prevented timely action and learning. Although problems were evident all the way through implementation, DFID's management response was slow.

There were also significant weaknesses in IMC's management and performance:

1. IMC internal **staff capacity** at the programme management and leadership level did not have a thorough understanding of the context for construction in Pakistan, including its bureaucracy.
2. The **design and innovation** of implementation was not planned effectively.
3. The Humqadam-SCRP component initially suffered from poor **relationship management** on IMC's part. Engagement with stakeholders improved in 2020.
4. IMC **systems and processes** were not appropriate for management and reporting requirements.
5. IMC lacked effective arrangements for assessing **risk, monitoring progress, and evaluating impact**.
6. Humqadam-SCRP did not provide **VFM**, mainly because of the failure to meet the originally envisaged targets but also because its total unit costs were high.

The evidence collected points to better performance under the PSCRP and TCF components:

1. TCF has managed engagement and close coordination with the government reasonably. This is in large part due to TCF's pre-existing working and rapport with the government and experience working with the government systems. In addition, TCF's in-house capacity has meant that as a supplier, TCF has remained well-placed to deliver the target of school construction in Punjab.

2. Both PSCR and TCF components have established the importance of political economy context, the value for money in going through local contractors, and importance of adhering to simple designs when the objective is quick achievement of targets.

## **0.8 Lessons**

1. Large-scale infrastructure programmes pose particular challenges and require particular skills for effective procurement and contract management on the part of the agency commissioning them. This must be recognised and effectively addressed throughout the design and implementation process, including in the design of contract arrangements.
2. Effective accountability mechanisms (including active media scrutiny) are required to ensure awareness of stakeholder concerns and to encourage remedial action. The more transparency there is in providing information about performance, and communicating stakeholder concerns, the greater are the incentives for problems to be addressed.
3. There can be important trade-offs between the objective of rapid delivery and a focus on encouraging innovation in construction. If innovation is agreed by stakeholders to be an important priority, the design of the programme should ensure that there is a well-designed lesson-learning and piloting process that is subject to effective stakeholder review and expert scrutiny. If the priority is rapid results, using simple, tried and tested approaches may be best, even if these have acknowledged weaknesses.

## Annex P Evaluation of Cambridge Education Technical Assistance<sup>82</sup>

### P.1 Introduction

#### P.1.1 Overview

This evaluation study reviews the TA provided as part of PESP2, covering the period from October 2018 to March 2020, during which TA was provided by a consortium led by Cambridge Education, following the end of the previous contract in March 2018, where TA had been provided by TAMO, a consortium led by ASI. The TA provided by TAMO was evaluated as part of the first phase of the PESP2 evaluation, and the findings were presented in IER1. DFID contracted I-SAPS to provide a third phase of TA, initially covering the period from July 2020 to March 2021. This evaluation study focuses on the TA provided by Cambridge Education but takes the findings from the review of earlier TA as a point of comparison.

#### P.1.2 TA provided

TA provision under the Cambridge Education contract was based on three results areas:

1. Effective teaching and learning: This includes support to PCTB, QAED, and PEC.
2. Equitable access to education: This covers support to inclusive and special education, and PPPs, including support to PEF.
3. Good governance, management, and PFM reform: This encompasses district delivery (including the handover from the TA provided under the Roadmap, which guided education initiatives under the previous government); institutional reform; support to SED; and support to budget analysis, budget processes, and local government reform.

#### P.1.3 Methodology

Data collection for this study was mostly carried out between December 2019 and February 2020, with some relevant information included from later KIIs (in June and July 2020). The PCR produced by the TA team in March 2020 provides a comprehensive overview of the activities and claimed results, so evaluation assessments are made in the form of commentaries on the PCR. It is proposed that a light-touch review of the extent to which initiatives have been taken forward (including with the support of the third phase of DFID TA) and outcomes achieved be undertaken in late 2020, as part of data collection for the Supplement to the PESP2 Performance Evaluation.

### P.2 Summary of findings

#### P.2.1 To what extent has the TA provided an appropriate approach for building capacity?

Contractual arrangements for, and the timing of, the TA militated against effective government ownership or having sufficient time for sustained capacity development but provided

<sup>82</sup> This is based on the executive summary of the TA Update Study.



considerable flexibility to respond to changing demands. The coincidence of the TA contract beginning shortly after the new government assumed office had some advantages in allowing a clean break to be made, and for support to be provided to emerging government priorities. The approach sought to build on lessons from past experience and was based on a clear strategic vision in key areas. This has allowed a large number of potentially important initiatives to be taken forward. However, the lack of stable administrative leadership in SED (and delays in the making of key policy decisions at a senior political level) has been a key constraint on the ability of the TA to support sustained capacity development.

### **P.2.2 To what extent have gender and equity considerations been integrated into TA design and provision?**

The focus on equity under Workstream 2 was in part a response to recommendations from the evaluation of the earlier phase of DFID support, as well as to DFID's desire to make further progress in addressing the needs of children with disability, as well as the wider inclusion agenda set out in GoPb's New Deal document. Important progress has been made in developing the IES and SEP, and in considerably strengthening the collection of data on disability in the ASC. However, gender considerations have not been systematically integrated into all TA design and provision.

### **P.2.3 To what extent and how has TA contributed to the education sector?**

Under Workstream 1, there have been potentially transformative initiatives to improve CPD and LND. It appears likely that these will be taken forward as there appears to be commitment from the Government and key sector organisations, though the Covid-19 outbreak has delayed progress.

Under Workstream 2, substantial progress has been made in developing the IES and having this accepted by GoPb, as well as the SEP providing a strengthened planning framework for SpED. While there appears to be GoPb commitment to moving forward in these areas, full implementation of these policy developments has not yet occurred. It does not appear that the recommendations from the various studies relating to PEF will be implemented, and it is unclear whether the suggested approaches to PPPs for education will be adopted by GoPb.

Workstream 3 has been less successful as there does not seem to be high-level GoPb interest in taking forward the ambitious reformed approach to district delivery that was developed, nor has there been significant progress in strengthening PFM, though there have been improvements in relation to data.

### **P.2.4 To what extent did TA support help to build sustainable systems and processes?**

Potentially sustainable improvements to systems and processes have been made in relation to CPD and the LND (with QAED), the APF (with PEC), and the SIF (with PMIU). These have involved partner organisations with whom the TA team established particularly effective working relationships. While there has been no follow-on TA support from DFID to take forward initiatives, this can be done to some extent through the World Bank PESP3 TA.

### **P.2.5 How effectively have partner organisations been able to use TA, and what factors have constrained the effectiveness of use?**

The effectiveness of the use of TA has varied across different partner organisations. Overall, QAED and PEC have been able to utilise TA resources well. This includes the CPD and LND model, and the large-scale assessment and capacity-building of the staff, though PFM support was less successful. PMIU was already a high-capacity functioning organisation engaging effectively with TA in the development of the SIF. Due to a lack of clarity with regard to the curriculum, there was very limited engagement with PCTB. The extent to which partner organisations have been constrained in using TA has related mainly to: (a) rapid turnover of staff in key leadership positions; and (b) a lack of clear political direction on some critical issues, such as the model for implementing the PLGA for education, or on the future of PPP arrangements.

### **P.2.6 What factors (internal and external) influenced the extent to which results were achieved?**

A high rate of turnover of leadership staff in key organisations (most critically at the level of Secretary of SED) was a major constraint on the ability to achieve results (at the level of intended outcomes), especially as policy direction was not clear in some important areas. While DFID was regarded as supportive of the TA, the lack of a sustained DFID presence in Punjab was seen by some key informants as limiting the extent to which DFID could assist with navigating the political system and in building relationships.

### **P.2.7 How effective were the management arrangements for TA provision, including engagement with stakeholders, and M&E systems, in ensuring that stakeholder priorities were met?**

The overall work planning process, including the flexibility it incorporated, generally functioned well in what was a difficult environment. In most cases the TA provided was regarded by partner organisations as being of high quality, with some exceptions (for instance, the initial work on the SEP). Some key informants considered that stakeholder ownership would have been stronger if the TA had been managed through government systems, but this would have reduced flexibility.

### **P.2.8 Were there any unintended or negative effects from the TA provided?**

No unintended or negative effects of the TA provided have been identified.

### **P.2.9 To what extent and how were the recommendations from IER1 addressed?**

IER1 was used extensively by the TA team in developing their initial workplan, including in the selection of areas of focus. Attempts were also made to implement recommendations related to strengthening M&E systems, such as carrying out institutional assessments and introducing a feedback tool for partner organisations, though there was some difficulty in getting partner organisations to engage proactively with this process.

### **P.2.10 To what extent has implementation of the recommendations contributed to improving the performance of the TA provided?**

While the proposed changes in the approach to M&E have in principle been helpful, in practice it is not clear that these have significantly improved the performance of TA, particularly because of the short timeframe of the programme (so there has been only limited scope for sustained organisational capacity development) and the rapid turnover of senior leadership in key roles.

## **P.3 Conclusions**

The TA provided under the arrangement reviewed was most successful in those situations where there was relatively stable leadership in partner organisations and clearly agreed strategic priorities (such as the need to move to a more cost-effective CPD model from QAED). The lack of stable leadership in SED, and continuing uncertainty about key policy decisions, such as the form that decentralisation under the PLGA would take for education, and the lack of a clear view from government about district delivery approaches to replace the Roadmap and Stocktake, militated against the effectiveness of the TA provided, as did the short timeframe under which the TA was provided. As a result, while the record of achievement is substantial at the level of 'outputs', there has been only patchy progress in turning this into sustained improvements related to intended outcomes. Many initiatives have been undertaken which, as described in the PCR, have transformational potential, but with the ending of the TA arrangement there is no clear route by which DFID can support these initiatives being taken forward, though some can be supported through the World Bank's TA.

The context provided an opportunity in that the new TA arrangement approximately coincided with the formation of the new government, but it has taken time for the new government to develop detailed policy positions for education – with the difficult fiscal environment followed by the Covid-19 pandemic creating further challenges for taking forward new initiatives and investments. It was also difficult at the stage at which the bulk of data collection for the evaluation took place to make firm judgements on which of the initiatives would actually be sustained and taken forward by GoPb. The envisaged supplementary report (involving data collection towards the end of 2020) will provide a further opportunity for systematically assessing any further progress.

In comparison to the previous phase of TA support provided through TAMO and to the Roadmap, the short timeframe, more rapid turnover of key leadership staff, and the less clear policy direction (compared to that provided through the hands-on engagement in the sector of the previous Chief Minister) has made the environment in many respects more challenging. This is especially the case for achieving sustained system improvements or for bringing about significant strengthening of organisational capacity within key institutions. IER1 concluded that sustained and collaborative engagement with partner organisations had been the main factor determining the effectiveness of support under TAMO. This has been in some respects more difficult to achieve under the later phase of support, which has covered a wide range of technical areas and organisations over a shorter time period, as well as attempting to bring about a complete reformulation of the district delivery approach that had been developed over many years under the Roadmap and which was then abandoned by the new government.

## **P.4 Lessons**

1. Effective ownership of TA by key stakeholders is critical for achieving sustained results and ensuring effective ownership, and this needs to be considered in the design and management of TA programmes, while taking account of potential trade-offs with other objectives.
2. Realistic objectives for TA need to take into account the timeframe and stage of the political cycle, while delays in the handover of responsibility between contractors can contribute to losing momentum in reform efforts.

## Annex Q Evaluation of I-SAPS Technical Assistance

### Q.1 Introduction

This annex provides a light-touch review of TA under the extension of PESP2, through which I-SAPS was contracted to provide TA initially covering the period from July 2020 to March 2021. The evaluation study focuses on TA provided by I-SAPS between August and December 2020. Data collection for this study (through document review and KIIs) was carried out in January 2021. The quarterly reports produced by the TA team provide a comprehensive overview of the activities.

### Q.2 Summary of TA arrangements

The third phase of TA support was initially contracted from July 2020 to March 2021, with a budget of £1.3 million. The overall objectives for this TA are the following (as set out in the terms of reference – DFID (2020)):

- a. support SED in the implementation of priority initiatives started with support from PESP2, and ensure that these are embedded within government systems, particularly in view of Covid-19;
- b. test interventions that can be adopted and scaled up by the Government, and contribute to future DFID programme development;
- c. support SED in planning, particularly in view of the Covid-19 situation, and carry out analytical work where necessary; and
- d. provide relevant information and oversight of ongoing activities under PESP2 where necessary.

The scope of work set out in the terms of reference potentially covers taking forward the full range of initiatives supported through the Cambridge Education TA, as well as support to address issues specifically related to the impact of Covid-19 on the education sector, including the campaign to bring children back into school. A draft Inception Report for the third phase of TA was produced in August 2020. This emphasised an adjusted set of objectives, as follows (with less emphasis, given the limitations of time, on testing interventions):

- a. support SED in planning, implementation, and ensuring efficient education service delivery;
- b. support SED in the implementation of its priority initiatives and ensure that these are embedded within the government systems; and
- c. support adopting and scaling up interventions that can help achieve improved education outcomes and complement DFID programme development.

Coordination with the World Bank PESP3 TA team took place through initial meetings and sharing of workplans, to avoid duplication and to ensure, with SED, that government priorities were effectively covered, as well as through ongoing informal contacts. Coordination and continuity was facilitated by the fact that I-SAPS had been a partner in the previous PESP2 TA arrangement and the I-SAPS Governance Lead had worked in the previous TA team and

with SED. Members of the TA team noted that the transition from DFID to FCDO caused some delays and uncertainty with SED but that the working relationship with FCDO had been effective, with frequent reviews and monthly interactions, and that I-SAPS was provided with flexibility to respond to SED priorities.

### Q.3 TA provided

During the inception phase of the TA contract (from July to August 2020), discussions were held with key stakeholders at DFID, the Minister's Office, SED, QAED, PCTB, and PMIU to define the scope and workplan of this exercise. As a result, I-SAPS was able to create a list of activities to support education service delivery during Covid-19, which was contained in the Inception Report. The workplan was developed with the Minister and Secretary of SED, based on taking forward selected previous initiatives, supporting the response to Covid-19, and looking forward to the future. It was emphasised that all TA support must be embedded in the Government.

**Table 37: Summary of TA activities**

| Area of conceptual framework                                  | TA activities undertaken  |
|---|---|
| <b>Effective teaching</b>                                     |   |
| Multi-grade teaching and learning (TCF-operated PSSP schools) | Development of teacher guides for Grades 2–3 classrooms.<br>Programme orientation for all multi-grade teachers.<br>Curriculum mapping exercise for Grades 4–5 cluster.  |
| Strengthening teaching and learning                           | Development of conceptual framework and CPD model for elementary level.   |
| Teacher licensing in Punjab                                   | Not taken forward as not identified as a priority by SED  |
| <b>Learning-focused inputs</b>                                |   |
| ALP   | CARE toolkit, with revised academic calendar, lesson plan, and worksheets for Grades 1–8 (ALP).   |
| Planning support for transition and retention                 | Identification of locations and schools to scale up of Insaaf Afternoon School Programme in the remaining 14 districts.   |
| Ed tech and e-learning policy                                 | Draft of ed tech and e-learning policy in consultation with key stakeholders.<br>Technical working group formed with public and private sector experts to finalise policy.  |
| Taleem Ghar (ongoing)   | Supporting perception survey of Taleem Ghar use and effectiveness<br>Aligning Taleem Ghar lesson plans with the next year's revised academic calendar and facilitating development of model lesson plans to be used for content development |
| <b>Skilled management and governance</b>                      |   |
| PFM   | Analysis of budgets from an equity perspective.   |
| SIF   | Developed SIF manual, trained district staff, and finalised dashboard.<br>Data systems strengthening support to PMIU.   |
| Capacity-building of delivery managers                        | Training needs assessment carried out to identify capacity gaps.<br>Developed training modules for capacity-building of delivery managers and initiated online training.  |
| <b>Improved coherence and alignment</b>                       |   |

| Area of conceptual framework               | TA activities undertaken   |
|--|--|
| PPP policy                                 | Not taken forward as not priority for Minister's Office or SED   |
| School re-opening strategy                 | Development of costed school re-opening strategy.<br>Survey report on parents and teachers' perceptions of school re-opening and Covid-19.<br>Background note on reasons for recent book banning for PCTB. |
| Simulations and predictive modelling       | Development of predictive modelling report (for assessments).  |
| Communication and outreach                 | Ongoing.   |
| <b>Access and equity</b>                   |  |
| Campaign to bring children back to schools | Campaign material developed and shared with department.<br>Survey report on student drop-outs after school re-opening.   |
| Inclusive education                        | Policy dialogue for inclusive education with thought leaders.<br>Survey research among Christian community in Punjab (ongoing).  |

Table 37 and Table 38 provide a list of activities undertaken against the workplan, based on the Quarter 1 and Quarter 2 progress reports. Table 37 lists the main technical areas of activity in relation to the conceptual framework (Figure 7), and Table 38 classifies these by the partner organisation supported.

**Table 38: TA activities by organisation supported**

| Organisation supported | Activities undertaken   |
|------------------------|---|
| SED                    | <b>Covid-19-related support:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Drafting of policies and strategies, such as a) costed school re-opening strategy, and b) ed tech and e-learning policy.</li> <li>Development of CARE toolkit, with revised academic calendar, lesson plan, and worksheets for Grades 1–8.</li> <li>Development and sharing with SED of campaign materials to bring children back to school.</li> <li>Research exercises on a) parents and teachers' perceptions of school re-opening and Covid-19; b) survey report on student drop-outs after school re-opening; c) predictive modelling report.</li> </ul> |
|                        | <b>Multi-grade teaching and learning support</b> to TCF-operated PSSP schools: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Development of teacher guides for Grades 2–3 classrooms.</li> <li>Programme orientation for all multi-grade teachers.</li> <li>Curriculum mapping exercise for Grades 4–5 cluster.</li> </ul>   |
|                        | <b>Capacity-building of delivery managers</b> (district officials): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Developed training modules for capacity-building of delivery managers after training needs assessment</li> <li>Conducted online training of more than 3,200 officials (including CEOs, DEOs, DDEOs and AEOs) in all districts</li> </ul>   |
|                        | <b>Taleem Ghar (ongoing)</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Supporting perception survey of use and effectiveness</li> <li>Aligning lesson plans with revised academic calendar</li> </ul>  |



| Organisation supported | Activities undertaken  |
|------------------------|--|
| PMIU                   | <p><b>SIF:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Developed SIF manual, trained district staff, and finalised dashboard.</li> <li>Scaled up to all districts</li> </ul> <p><b>Insaaf Afternoon School Programme:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identification of locations and schools to scale up in the remaining 14 districts.</li> </ul> <p><b>Data systems strengthening</b> support to PMIU (monthly data review meetings).</p> |
| PCTB                   | <p><b>Covid-related support:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Development of CARE toolkit, with revised academic calendar, lesson plan, and worksheets for Grades 1–8.</li> <li>Background note on reasons for recent book banning for PCTB.</li> <li>Supporting development of rules and regulations in accordance with the PCTB Act 2015.</li> </ul>   |
| QAED                   | <p><b>CPD model support:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Development of conceptual framework and CPD model for elementary level.</li> </ul> <p><b>Capacity-building of delivery managers</b> (district officials):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Training facilitated through QAED.</li> </ul> <p><b>Institutional assessment of QAED</b> (ongoing).</p>   |
| Other                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Policy dialogue for inclusive education with thought leaders.</li> <li>Analysis of budgets from an equity perspective.</li> </ul>   |

## Q.4 Performance of the TA

The short timeframe of implementation limits the extent to which an assessment of the results achieved by the TA provided can be made, still less their likely sustainability. However, key informants from the Government considered that TA provision had been responsive to government needs, and effective, and that it would not have been possible to undertake the Covid-19 response activities without the TA support provided. Key informants considered that the TA team effectively led and managed the ALP initiative, working closely with (and being located in) PCTB to ensure effective communication and coordination, to manage the production of the large number of outputs (as well as quality control), and to effectively focus the government staffing resources that were drawn on. The implementation process was constrained by the need to agree financial resources to support logistics expenses borne by PCTB, and key informants considered implementation might have benefited from initial orientation workshops for the staff involved, had these been feasible. Key informants also provided a positive assessment of the back to school plan, especially its attention to psychosocial factors.

It was noted in particular that the strong local understanding and contacts of the I-SAPS team with SED and DEAs (as well as the I-SAPS in-house capacity) contributed to its effectiveness in implementation support, whereas earlier phases of TA had been more focused on policy.

The prospects for sustainability should be enhanced to the extent that the TA workplan has been driven by government priorities. However, while capacity-building has taken place

through some of the TA provided, and while the work undertaken has been fully documented and shared with the Government, it was judged by key informants that policy analysis capacity within the Government remains limited (and largely concentrated in PMIU). The combination of the effects of Covid-19 and fiscal constraints (as well as continuing high rates of senior staff turnover) has left the Government in a 'fire-fighting' mode, which is considered to have militated against effective planning and policymaking. In this situation, much of the TA support has been of necessity focused on implementation support. TA support has contributed to the development of the ed tech policy, with the working group established (including, for instance, telecom and ed tech solution providers), but the capacity of the Government to take this forward and implement it effectively remains uncertain.

## **Q.5 Summary findings**

This section provides summary answers to the TA-specific EQs in relation to this phase of PESP2 TA.

### **To what extent has the TA provided an appropriate approach for building capacity?**

The short timeframe for TA support, as well as the urgent needs relating to Covid-19, have limited the extent to which capacity development can be achieved. However, the response to Covid-19 has highlighted the importance of developing complementary online solutions and empowering schools (specifically through the use of NSB). Important staffing capacity for curriculum development has been built through the support to ALP, and capacity has also been built in delivery management. The main constraint on making use of the individual staff capacity developed is likely to be the effectiveness of key government organisations.

### **To what extent have gender and equity considerations been integrated into TA design and provision?**

Specific activities have had a gender and equity focus: for instance, the back to school campaign targeted girls; the predictive modelling exercise examined the factors influencing improved access and learning outcomes for girls; and I-SAPS has engaged with thought leaders on inclusive education issues, as well as working with a cross-party group of legislators to mainstream gender and equity concerns in education policy. There has, though, been no mechanism to integrate gender and equity into TA design and provision in a systematic way.

### **To what extent and how has TA contributed to the education sector?**

The TA support to the Covid-19 response, both through the ALP and other aspects of the school re-opening strategy, met a requirement that could not otherwise have been effectively addressed. While it is too early to assess the effectiveness of the school re-opening (taking place during February 2021) it is likely that the TA support has significantly strengthened education sector performance in dealing with the crisis. In other areas of support, the TA has been effective in delivering agreed workplan outputs but it is in general too early to assess the longer-term contribution that these will make.

### **To what extent did TA support help to build sustainable systems and processes?**

TA support has continued to take forward ongoing initiatives to strengthen systems and processes in the education sector, including for district delivery, SIF, data systems in PMIU,

and multi-grade teaching and learning support. These are all identified as government priorities, which should favour (but does not guarantee) sustainability.

**How effectively have partner organisations been able to use TA and what factors have constrained the effectiveness of use?**

The extent to which partner organisations have been able to make effective use of TA has depended on both leadership and technical capacity and resources – these have been relatively strong for QAED, PMIU, and SED. PCTB has had less capacity but received strong ministerial support for the ALP.

**What factors (internal and external) influenced the extent to which results were achieved?**

All activities undertaken were identified as priorities by the Minister of Education and SED, and so had government ownership. It is too early in general to compare the results achieved and hence the factors influencing performance.

**How effective were the management arrangements for TA provision, including engagement with stakeholders, and M&E systems, in ensuring that stakeholder priorities were met?**

The flexibility of the PESP2 TA arrangement, compared for instance to the tying of World Bank PESP3 TA to agreed DLIs, has allowed it to be used to address immediate priorities related to Covid-19, as well as to fill identified gaps to take forward key initiatives. There has been effective engagement with stakeholders, but given the short timeframe formal M&E systems have played a less significant role.

**Were there any unintended or negative effects from the TA provided?**

No unintended or negative effects of the TA provided have been identified.

## **Q.6 Overall assessment**

The final phase of TA under PESP2 provided by I-SAPS has provided a flexible and responsive tool that has played an important role in the GoPb response to the impact of Covid-19 on the education sector, and in supporting the continuation of initiatives developed with earlier PESP2 TA, though the delay between the end of the previous TA arrangement in March 2020 and the implementation of the new arrangement from August, and the process of transition from DFID to FCDO, provided some disruption. In comparison to the TA provided under the World Bank PESP3 programme, which is managed through PMIU, the PESP2 support has been more flexible and adaptive to meet immediate priorities. However, key informants considered that this arrangement has provided less policy leverage and engagement for FCDO than the World Bank possesses, since under the latter arrangement involves stronger GoPb commitment, as access to funding depends on achieving agreed DLIs to which TA is contributing. FCDO appears now to have limited direct interaction on policy issues with SED (as the amount of direct financial support has been reduced), with engagement depending on the TA partner, who has a good reputation and is trusted by SED.

## Annex R    Summary of the District Education Management Study

The DEMS forms part of the second interim phase of evaluation of PESP2. The purpose of the DEMS is to understand the way reforms in education undertaken at the provincial level have been experienced at the district level, how far they have been implemented, the extent to which they have led to improvements, and the challenges that remain. In particular, it provides evidence on how province-level reform initiatives have influenced education administration and management, finance, monitoring, information collection and information flow, and capacity-building in four selected districts of Punjab: Rahimyar Khan, Bhakkar, Rajanpur, and Rawalpindi.

To select the districts, the research team compared access and learning performance between 2012 and 2016. From the worst performing districts, two were selected that had shown improvement during the PESP2 period, and two were chosen that had consistently shown decline.

Based on conversations and work undertaken in the first interim phase, the research team identified four categories of reform that were most relevant to understanding change at the district management level. District management staff in all four districts were interviewed regarding these reforms, and their responses were analysed.

First, reforms in teacher recruitment, transfers and postings, training, and monitoring were discussed. The research team found that while reforms in recruitment policy have resulted in positive changes, such as reducing nepotism and the use of political influence, there are a few remaining challenges. The revised recruitment criteria do not take into account a candidate's motivation and aptitude to teach. Removal of the requirement to hold a specialisation in education has resulted in applicants that are only interested in teaching in the short term. The absence of differential incentives has resulted in an increasing number of teachers wanting to transfer to urban centres, which is causing severe teacher shortages in schools in remote areas.

Reforms in transfer policy have made the process purely merit-based, whereas previously it was riddled with political influence. However, bureaucratic delays still influence the speed at which a teacher's application may move through the system. The timing of transfers, if not aligned with school year timelines, creates problems at the school level, and the autonomy to conduct transfers does not reside at the appropriate level.

The reforms in teacher monitoring have greatly increased accountability for schools and teachers, and are generating valuable information that is used at the district level. However, several challenges remain relating to the subjectivity of the Roadmap indicators and MEA–school interaction that need to be explored further. Lastly, there are no training courses being offered to teachers since the discontinuation of the CPD programme. This gap needs to be filled since newly recruited teachers lack experiential knowledge and need training on pedagogical techniques.

Second, reforms in the Roadmap and Stocktake were explored. The research team found that these reforms are perceived to be positive across all districts. The Roadmap process seems to have led delivery processes within the entire education sector. The monitoring infrastructure put in place has driven accountability structures in a systematic manner and encouraged all

districts to perform better than before. Through the introduction of LND assessments, students are perceived to be learning substantially more than before. However, the targets are imposed on the district in a top-down manner and many respondents expressed that the indicators fail to account for the contextual realities in different districts. Having a standardised list of indicators of, and targets for, performance for each district fails to account for the variation across schools in each district, and the variety of challenges they face. Also, there were concerns raised regarding monitoring dominating the process of learning through an over-emphasis on indicators such as cleanliness and the availability of furniture, and limited focus on key ingredients of student learning. In addition, the subjectivity of MEAs' monitoring puts undue pressure on teachers, causing them to focus most of their efforts on ensuring their schools meet Roadmap targets, rather than focusing on teaching, which should be their primary job.

The third set of reforms explored in the study relate to the establishment of DEAs. Due to incomplete implementation, or the way the reform was manifested in practice, it does not seem to have achieved its intended purpose. Incomplete devolution means approvals have to be sought by higher-ranked officials, which slows down progress; many sanctioned posts in the district-level education bureaucracy remain vacant; and the authority to take localised decisions is not perceived to have been devolved to the right level.

Lastly, the study examined the districts' role in monitoring reforms through the introduction of AEOs in 2017. An AEO's responsibilities encompass mentoring and monitoring to achieve the targets set by the Roadmap indicators, with the ultimate aim of achieving improvement in the quality of education. The hiring of new AEOs was mostly received positively in all the districts. There is a general consensus that the shift from a widened role of AEOs (expanded over a broader geographical area) to a deepening role of AEOs (in fewer schools) has brought about various positive changes, which include better monitoring, complemented by mentoring sessions that include feedback based on lesson observations by the AEOs to help improve in-class teaching. AEOs also seem to have contributed significantly to increasing teachers' familiarity with the NSB usage procedure. Frequent training programmes for both AEOs and teachers are needed to ensure that the daily challenges that the AEOs are subject to during the field visits are addressed on a continuous basis. The flow of information has significantly increased: districts are now more aware of the challenges faced by teachers, and teachers have a channel to voice their concerns. However, there are no feedback loops to communicate this information further up the bureaucratic chain. Also, as with other officials, teachers and AEOs remain under pressure to achieve the desired targets for Roadmap indicators, which they often struggle to do.

## Annex S Summary of the School Survey

### S.1 Overview of the study

The School Survey forms part of the District Study element of the Performance Evaluation of PESP2. The District Study has focused on experience in four districts (Bhakkar, Rahimyar Khan, Rawalpindi, and Rajanpur). Separate reports have been produced on the DEMS and the Community Study. This report presents the findings of the School Survey, which seeks to provide evidence to answer the following question:

‘To what extent have the following ingredients of education system performance at the school level been strengthened over the period of PESP2:

- a. preparedness of learners for school;
- b. effectiveness of teaching;
- c. the provision of learning-focused inputs; and
- d. the effectiveness of management and governance?’

The timing of the evaluation precluded an evaluation design which would have enabled comparisons to be made against baseline data collected from schools to allow an assessment of changes over time. Instead, the School Survey aims to provide a snapshot of practices and education reform process outcomes at the school and classroom level.

The study design was based on identifying a set of hypotheses related to how education reform in Punjab has been intended to influence schools and teaching in schools, and on collecting data to test these hypotheses.

The four districts were selected from among those with the worst education indicators in Punjab between 2012 and 2016 (including but not restricted to those which had been identified as priority districts under PESP2), but distinguishing two districts (Bhakkar and Rahimyar Khan) which had subsequently performed relatively well on improving indicators, and two (Rawalpindi and Rajanpur) which had performed badly.

Within each school, the School Study aimed to collect data at the school and classroom level on:

- **outcomes** (access, quality, governance) or indicators of education sector performance;
- **process-level indicators** (effective teaching, financing, learner-focused inputs, monitoring, and governance) or the drivers of education performance at the school level;
- evidence of the implementation of policy and organisational reforms; and
- evidence of the alignment of learning objectives.

Four main instruments were designed and subsequently implemented at the school level: a school information sheet; a head teacher questionnaire; a teacher questionnaire; and a classroom observation tool.



Primary data were collected between September 2019 and November 2019 from 200 schools in the four selected districts.

## S.2 Findings on prepared learners

### Key EQ, associated hypotheses, and findings

#### **EQ: To what extent has the following ingredient of education system performance been strengthened over the period of PESP2: preparedness of learners for school**

In Punjab, ECE classrooms have been set up for three-year-olds. These are a playgroup-type setting run by what are called care-givers. This schooling level is followed by *katchi* class and then Grade 1. In the sampled schools, significant strides have not been made to 'prepare learners for school'. The survey findings indicate that ECE classrooms have not been fully set up, and where they have been reportedly set up, they are not always used for ECE purposes. Head teachers have also reported that their schools are not adequately equipped to handle ECE enrolments, and while both teachers and head teachers have noted that a lack of 'preparedness for schooling' does not pose a significant challenge to them in doing their jobs, head teachers believe that ECE attendance can not only equip children with literacy and numeracy skills but also familiarise them with the schooling environment in preparation for more schooling. No clear patterns have emerged across the 'poor-performing' and 'well-performing' districts.

#### **A1: ECE rooms have been set up and are being used appropriately**

There is mixed evidence with regard to this hypothesis. Just over 50% of the head teachers sampled across the 200 schools have reported that ECE classrooms have been set up and just over 40% of classrooms are actually being used for ECE classes. There are also sharp differences across districts in regard to the proportion of head teachers reporting rooms being set up (ranging from as low as 10% in Bhakkar to as high as 94% in Rajanpur) and usage (ranging from a low of 14% in Rajanpur to a high of 69% in Rawalpindi).

#### **A2: Schools are equipped and staffed to handle ECE enrolment**

While there has been an ECE policy in place for more than a decade, government schools are not yet effective sites for ECE instruction. A majority of the head teachers surveyed report that their schools are neither equipped nor staffed adequately for supporting enrolment. This is likely to produce a knock-on effect on the capacity of students to learn in higher grades.

#### **A3: Children are adequately prepared for school**

Head teachers' and teachers' perceptions regarding the notion of 'preparedness' varied. A majority of head teacher and teacher respondents in the sample did not view a lack of child preparedness for school as posing a significant challenge to their jobs. Many head teachers were of the opinion that parents' poor socioeconomic backgrounds, lack of parental education, and cultural norms were driving forces for low enrolment in early years.

#### **A4: Children are adequately prepared for school as a result of ECE enrolment**

An overwhelming majority of respondents believed that attending ECE improves child numeracy and literacy, and familiarises them with the school environment, hence preparing them for formal school. However, whether children in the sampled districts are adequately prepared for school was not directly assessed in the study.



## S.3 Findings on effective teaching

### Key EQ, associated hypotheses, and overarching finding

#### **EQ: To what extent have the following ingredients of education system performance been strengthened over the period of PESP2: effective teaching**

Effective teaching is a particularly challenging construct to measure successfully. However, there is evidence that some of the reform initiatives aimed at improving the effectiveness of teaching have come to fruition more than others. For example, while there is clear evidence that more qualified teachers have been hired in the sampled schools, teacher shortages continue to be reported.

Teachers have reported receiving training, though the exposure to training has varied by district and has not been uniform – at least based on the evidence from this study. Teachers have also reported being observed and provided with feedback through the reform initiatives, and there is evidence that they value this aspect of the initiatives. However, the frequency of feedback provision is lower than the frequency of being observed, and while the content of most trainings is useful for developing confidence in SLOs and pedagogy, teachers are not well trained on key aspects such as how to work with children with disabilities and those from more disadvantaged backgrounds.

In the classroom observations, teachers were engaged in teaching 90% of the time. While there are significant differences in practice across districts, writing on the board and lecturing are the main activities. Group work and activities in pairs do not happen very often. Teachers spend more time helping students to work on their own, and on helping students write on the blackboard. On average, about 90% of the students are actively engaged in the activities that the teacher expects them to engage in.

Teachers considered they cannot complete the teaching of the curriculum because it is over-ambitious.

Teachers are set learning targets, though the extent to which they were involved in setting the targets varied greatly across districts.

#### **B1: Schools have more and better qualified teachers**

This hypothesis has been further split into two parts: 1) there are more teachers in the schools; and 2) there are more qualified teachers in the schools – as a result of the reforms.

In terms of the first (there are more teachers in the schools), various indicators have been used and the School Survey findings have been triangulated with other data to identify the extent to which the hypothesis holds. The evidence is mixed. For example, using EMIS data, it would seem that there are far fewer schools with less than four teachers over the years, and this is clear evidence of the aim to provide more teachers in schools being achieved. However, the School Survey data present evidence that some districts are still facing teacher shortages. The School Survey data reveal that in the schools sampled, a majority of the sanctioned posts are filled. In terms of STRs, the evidence is again mixed, and it is not clear to what extent reforms aimed at reducing teacher shortages have truly had an impact. However, when exploring the incidence of multi-grade teaching, teachers have reported this to be low in Grade 3 classrooms.

In terms of the second sub-hypothesis (there are more qualified teachers in schools), the evidence broadly suggests that this is indeed the case. Both EMIS and this survey point to the fact that more qualified teachers (i.e. those with higher levels of general education) have been hired in Punjab's schools. However, almost half of the sampled teachers in the School Survey revealed that they are teaching subjects they did not specialise in in their final degrees.

#### **B2: Effective training and capacity-building support is being provided to teachers to improve teaching practices**

The evidence with regard to this hypothesis being met is mixed. This hypothesis is tested by exploring the following: teachers' exposure to training, teachers reporting being observed and provided with feedback, the content of training, and teachers' reported perceptions of the usefulness of training.

In terms of exposure to training, the evidence from the School Survey suggests that while all relevant teachers have been exposed to professional development cluster training, only two-thirds of the teachers reported being exposed to induction training at the time of recruitment. Given that all teachers should have received induction training, this finding is worth noting. A large percentage of teachers in the sample reported receiving capacity-building support from AEOs. In 'poor-performing' Rajanpur this support has been below average.

A key element of the CPD reforms associated with PESP2 was that classrooms were observed, and feedback was provided to teachers on their pedagogy and teaching techniques. With regard to teachers' reports of observation and feedback, almost universally teachers reported having their classes observed by DTEs during 2012–16. Teachers also mainly reported being observed on a regular basis, as envisaged in the reform initiatives. However, the frequency with which teachers are provided feedback by DTEs is lower than the frequency with which they are observed. There are also district-level variations in the frequency of observation and in the provision of feedback by DTEs, with Bhakkar (a 'well-performing' district) reporting lower than district-level percentages on both counts.

With regard to teacher reports on the usefulness of content and perceptions of the usefulness of training, a large percentage of sampled teachers reported receiving support from AEOs on SLOs and pedagogy. A large majority of teachers reported finding the content of induction training useful, specifically in relation to covering SLOs and pedagogy. Fewer teachers reported finding the content for this type of training very useful for identifying children with disabilities and those from poor/minority backgrounds. Similar observations were noted for the content of professional development cluster trainings by teachers, i.e. with a greater focus on pedagogy and SLOs, with little relevance of the training to addressing more marginalised children (i.e. those with disabilities and from disadvantaged backgrounds). Given that teachers reported very diverse classrooms (e.g. large numbers of children with different mother tongues), it would seem that most types of training are failing in regard to equipping teachers with the skills they actually need to teach these diverse classrooms. Overall, however, teachers value the trainings, and particularly the classroom observations and the feedback that is provided to them by DTEs.

### **B3: Head teachers and teachers are aware of, and trained in, inclusive education approaches addressing gender, disability, special needs, and social and economic disadvantage**

This hypothesis is not supported by the evidence. While head teachers and teachers are aware of the need for inclusive education approaches, they do not believe that the various trainings prepare them sufficiently for this. Head teachers and teachers reported adopting various inclusive practices in response to the diverse classrooms they face. It would appear that any inclusive practices that teachers and head teachers are observed to be adopting are more a result of an intuitive response by teachers to the situations they encounter, rather than being due to any systematic support or training provided by the system.

### **B4: Teachers are present, motivated, and engaged in teaching**

In the classroom observations, teachers were engaged in teaching 90% of the time. While there are significant differences in practice across districts, writing on the board (15% of the observed intervals) is the most common activity. A considerable amount of time is spent on lecturing (either with or without materials – 10% of the observed intervals). Teachers are also spending time on explaining concepts and checking students' understanding of concepts. Group work and activities in pairs do not happen very often. Teachers spend more time helping students to work on their own, and on helping students write on the blackboard. Testing is quite a regular activity and teachers spend a fair amount of time on it. Practising for LND was observed in 3.6% of the intervals observed, and students were being tested either verbally or through written tests in another 3% of

the intervals observed. On average, about 90% of the students are actively engaged in the activities that the teacher expects them to engage in.

The levels of motivations of teachers in Punjab (as based on the Perry Public Service Scale) are similar to those found in a study using a similar measure in KPK. A substantial minority of teachers consider the lack of community and parental engagement a significant challenge. This, together with concerns about a lack of teachers, excessive non-teaching responsibilities, and insufficient remuneration, suggests a minority of teachers may lack effective motivation.

#### **B5: Teachers believe that the curriculum can be effectively delivered**

Teachers were largely confident in their ability to complete the curriculum. However, Bhakkar once again reported a lower percentage of teachers who were able to complete the Taleemi Calendar. Among the factors identified by teachers as preventing them from completing the curriculum in a timely manner, an overly-ambitious curriculum (both ambitious for any child and specifically for the children these teachers teach) was noted to be the biggest constraint. In Bhakkar in particular, a large majority of teachers noted these as critical reasons for their inability to complete the curriculum in time.

#### **B6: Teachers are set learning targets**

93.8% of teachers reported that they were set learning targets during the last academic year, with a similar proportion indicating that the targets were achieved. However, there were substantial differences reported across districts in the extent to which teachers were involved in the setting of learning targets, ranging from 84% of teachers saying they were involved in Bhakkar to just 6% in Rajanpur.

## **S.4 Findings on learning-focused inputs**

### **Key EQ, associated hypotheses and overarching findings**

#### **EQ: To what extent (have) the following ingredients of education system performance been strengthened over the period of PESP2: learning-focused inputs**

Several PESP2 reform initiatives have focused on improving the learning environment for pupils in Punjab's schools through improving the provision of learning inputs. The provision of learning-focused inputs has happened in the sampled schools, albeit differentially across the districts. For example, just over three-quarters of teachers reported receiving teacher guides across the four districts. One way of looking at this is that teacher guides are still not universally available. In instances where they are available, learning materials are not always effectively used.

NSB funds were reported to be universally available by head teachers in the sampled schools, though there were reports of delays in receiving them. Most head teachers reported using these funds for infrastructure improvements and for the day-to-day running of their schools, rather than for hiring more teachers or in efforts that are likely to improve teaching quality. There is evidence that the school environment is broadly conducive to learning, though evidence has emerged of practices that may raise concerns.

Assessments were noted to be valued, though further probing has indicated that teachers find them stressful and note that these assessments may not always add value to children's learning in the schools in which they teach.

Overall, the evidence with regards to this EQ paints a mixed picture – with some evidence of progress but certainly room for improvement across the sampled districts.

#### **C1: Sufficient textbooks and other learning materials are available**

These inputs are not always sufficiently available. 78.8% of sampled teachers across the four districts reported receiving teacher guides in the past year, though there was variation, with 56.5% teachers in Bhakkar reporting receipt of guides. When received, a large majority of teachers

indicated finding these guides useful for lesson planning, though some critical challenges were highlighted by some.

Textbooks, on the other hand, were found to be widely available for each individual student during the classroom observations.

### **C2: Textbooks and other learning materials are being used effectively in classrooms**

A large majority of head teachers reported receiving Taleemi Calendars for primary grades, though compliance of the lesson planning with the calendar appears to improve in higher primary grades. Teachers' reports about receiving Taleemi Calendars were aligned with head teachers' responses. However, far fewer teachers in Grades 3 and 4 reported using the calendars for lesson planning as compared to head teachers, and there was variation by district.

### **C3: NSB resources are being provided to schools and effectively used by them**

NSB resources are being provided to school heads in the sampled schools although timeliness of the receipt of funds remains a challenge. Measuring 'effective' use is challenging as effectiveness is dependent on needs at the school level. NSB resources are used in different ways but a large percentage of school heads reported using them for infrastructure repairs and to meet the day-to-day running of schools, rather than to improve teaching quality as such.

### **C4: School and classroom environment is conducive to learning**

While the overall physical environment was reported to be conducive to learning, there were some findings which raised some concerns. Enumerators observed some incidents of corporal punishment. Although these were very few, given that enumerators were visiting on these days and the schools were potentially on their best behaviour, even observing a few such incidents is concerning. A lack of discipline among students was also raised as a concern by teachers. It was also observed that students were engaged in non-learning activities, such as making tea or cleaning the school.

### **C5: Assessments are useful tools within the schools**

While a number of teachers noted the LND assessments to be useful tools, when probed further they revealed several challenges associated with such assessments within their schooling contexts. In particular, they noted that these assessments add additional stress to their jobs, that they have often not received sufficient training to undertake the assessments, and often the assessments are at the cost of children's actual learning.

## **S.5 Findings on skilled management and governance**

### **Key EQ, associated hypotheses, and overarching findings**

#### **EQ: To what extent have the following ingredients of education system performance been strengthened over the period of PESP2: skilled management and governance**

Several reform efforts aimed at head teachers, and specifically at improving skilled management and governance, have been implemented, and these areas show positive improvements. One area that was identified as lacking was the training of head teachers – specifically, induction training and QAED leadership training, with very few head teachers reporting receiving this (though a large majority received support from DTEs), despite many acknowledging the usefulness of these trainings when they were received.

The head teachers in the sample across all four districts were generally found to be motivated towards public service. Head teachers reported having several mechanisms available to them to sanction non-performing teachers. However, not all of these accountability mechanisms are viewed

as the best means to hold teachers accountable, nor do head teachers feel that they always have the authority to use some of these mechanisms.

However, head teachers have received substantial support, both through DTEs and through AEOs. These findings support the hypothesis that monitoring through pre-DRC meetings has improved school performance.

School councils were available in all 200 schools and were viewed as a useful tool for community mobilisation by the school heads. They were found to meet often and included several different representatives, though female representation was still found to be lower than male representation and this was identified as an area for improvement. Schools were also found to be collecting timely and accurate data and using these data to inform school-based decisions.

Overall, the survey evidence presents a mainly positive picture – head teachers noted various significant improvements in their ability to lead effectively and having mechanisms in place to engage with critical stakeholders (e.g. at the district level or with DTEs and AEOs, or with others through regular school council meetings). However, the areas that require improvement include the provision of more effective training to all the head teachers via the different options available.

### **D1: Head teachers have the appropriate skills and training for their roles**

The evidence with regard to this hypothesis paints a mixed picture. For example, a small percentage of the sampled head teachers in this study reported receiving induction training specific to their roles (38%), but when they had received the training, head teachers reported finding it useful for developing relevant skills. In a similar vein, only 42% of the sampled head teachers reported receiving QAED leadership training (with primary standalone school heads receiving training more than other types of school heads). As with induction training, when they did receive the training, head teachers found it useful. A far greater percentage of head teachers (86%) reported receiving support from DTEs, and similarly large numbers reported engaging with AEOs, though there were variations by district. While the head teachers broadly perceived the induction training to have prepared them for their roles, it was noted that the content of the training did not focus on critical skills that they needed for effective management of their schools.

### **D2: Head teachers are motivated**

The Perry Motivation Scale (used in sub-section B4 above) has been used to estimate measures of head teacher motivation. Evidence suggests that there are significant differences between public service motivation scores of head teachers in poor-performing districts and those in well-performing districts, with those in the former significantly more attracted to policymaking. The evidence suggests that head teachers across all four districts are generally motivated towards public service. However, up to half of head teachers reported significant challenges related to pressure to meet targets, and insufficient time and resources to achieve them, which may reflect demotivation.

### **D3: Head teachers are able to effectively manage teachers and hold them accountable**

While head teachers now have several mechanisms available to them to sanction non-performing teachers, many of them feel that they do not always have the authority to use some of the mechanisms. Some of the accountability mechanisms (e.g. writing annual confidential reports) are not necessarily viewed as the best means of holding teachers accountable, with some school heads suggesting that they prefer to speak to their teachers directly rather than sanction them through sending reports to authorities.

### **D4: Schools effectively engage with, and are accountable to, their communities**

School councils are viewed as a useful tool for community mobilisation by the school heads. They were reported to meet often and to include representatives from the school, parent members, and those from the community. Female representation within the school councils was noted to be lower than male representation, particularly among community representatives. School heads reported that school councils (and other means of engaging with the community) are useful mechanisms for engagement.

**D5: Effective and supportive supervision is provided from the district level**

A large majority of head teachers reported receiving support from DTEs between 2012 and 2016. They also reported benefits from this support in regard to the development of their pedagogical skills, with far less emphasis on school and fund management.

**D6: Monitoring through the pre-DRC meetings has improved incentives for school performance.**

Head teachers mainly held positive views about the pre-DRC meetings and the impact they have had on their jobs as head teachers. They considered that these meetings had directly impacted school performance by helping them map school priorities through the School Development Plan, managing infrastructure, improve cleanliness, supporting their pedagogical skills, and helping them to improve these skills among their staff.

**D7: AEOs are providing effective and responsive support to the schools**

Head teachers have had regular interactions with AEOs since 2016. They also reported strong positive roles of the AEOs in various support activities for the school, and held mainly positive views about the support received from them.

**D8: Schools are collecting accurate and timely information for the district**

All of the sampled schools were found to be collecting timely and accurate information, though there were some variations by district. The sampled schools collected enrolment data by grade, student attendance data by grade, teacher attendance data by grade, as well as data on filled posts. Internal and external assessment data were also being collected. Head teachers also reported that these data were used for reporting to higher authorities.

**D9: Schools are using accurate and timely information to inform school decisions**

Schools were reported to be using the data they had collected for school development purposes. Data on school performance were used to guide teacher development and to motivate students to improve attendance.

## S.6 Conclusions

The picture that emerges from the study is that all the key reforms have been implemented and have had a significant impact on schools in the ways that were intended. Particularly to be noted are the flow (and use) of information and target-setting, the provision of support through AEOs and regular classroom observation, the provision and use of funds through the NSB, and the functioning of school councils and pre-DRC meetings, as well as the provision of teachers and learning inputs. The progress in target-setting and in the provision, flow, and use of information suggests that there is alignment at school level around key targets and objectives for the sector, though schools may still lack the resources and skills to achieve them.

However, in general, the implementation of some key reforms is incomplete at the school level, and in some cases inconsistent across districts. Key points are the following:

- Incomplete progress in establishing ECE rooms, and (more fundamentally) the fact that head teachers do not feel that schools are staffed or equipped to make full use of them.



- Incomplete provision of induction training and gaps in the training and related support provided, particularly in relation to inclusive education, and leadership and management skills for head teachers.
- Evidence of variability in teaching practice, some gaps in the provision of key resources (e.g. teaching guides), and incomplete use of the resources provided (e.g. the Taleemi Calendars).
- While classroom observation is regular, feedback to teachers is less frequent.
- NSB funds were only being used to a limited extent to strengthen teaching.
- Some evidence of continuing inappropriate practices like corporal punishment.
- Unwillingness of head teachers to make use of formal sanctioning and reporting mechanisms.

Other potential issues emerge from the study include the following:

- Concerns from teachers about the lack of effective community and parental engagement with schools.
- Evidence of stress on some head teachers related to pressure to achieve targets, while considering that they lack the resources or time to do so.

In relation to differences between the well-performing districts in the sample (Bhakkar and Rahim Yar Khan) and the poorer performing districts (Rawalpindi and Rajanpur), no clear evidence emerges of systematic differences in the extent of the implementation of reforms. In fact, where there are statistically significant differences between the two groups of districts the evidence suggests that the poorer performing districts have made more progress in implementation. This suggests that contextual factors rather than the effectiveness of implementation may be more significant in explaining differences in performance. However, the differences in implementation between districts in general is significant for some indicators.

The study does not seek to make recommendations but will be drawn on, along with a wider range of sources of evidence, to inform recommendations arising from the PESP2 Performance Evaluation as a whole.



## Annex T Summary of the Community Study

### T.1 Introduction and methodology

The Community Study focused on obtaining community-level stakeholder perceptions and experiences of the current state of the education system, and progress during this period.

Qualitative data collection took place in communities around a small sample of schools selected from those sampled in the School Survey (undertaken in parallel as part of the PESP2 Performance Evaluation's District Study) in the districts of Bhakkar and Rawalpindi. Building on the quantitative School Survey, which sampled 200 schools in four districts, the Community Study focused on communities around a sub-sample of eight schools in two of these four districts, to understand the perceptions of schooling at the community level. Key respondents included service providers at the school level, such as head teachers, teachers, and the SMC, and service users at the community level, such as parents and local leaders. Research tools included informal observations, focus group discussions, and KIs. Data collection was guided by a semi-structured questionnaire that explored respondents' current assessment of schooling, and changes over time in education participation, attainment, and some components of the learning process (preparedness of learners, quality of teaching, learner-focused inputs, and management and governance). These conversations included a total of 236 school- and community-level respondents during the research process.

### T.2 Key findings

#### T.2.1 Education participation and access

Schooling decisions in the communities are influenced by demand and supply factors. On the demand side are: socioeconomic conditions of the household; parental awareness; child health, interest, and gender; security considerations; and perceptions about the returns to education. Mothers are usually the primary decision makers when it comes to children's schooling in urban settings, while fathers play a more involved role in more rural environments, and particularly where schools are gender segregated. On the supply side, educational participation is influenced by the availability, proximity, and perceived quality of schooling, often defined in terms of observable characteristics of the school or the quality of personnel. Enrolment campaigns also play a key role in ensuring participation and attendance in schools.

Enrolment efforts in Punjab appear to be bearing returns, as both school and community respondents reported nearly complete enrolment at primary level, and almost no children who were never enrolled. Some groups of children remain side-lined from the mainstream. Children with physical, mental, or learning disabilities, for instance, continue to be largely invisible in communities. The presence of internal migrants and other minority populations were also linked to children being out of school. Moreover, issues of retention and drop-out occur at transition points to middle and high school levels.

The initial decision to enrol a child in school is not usually affected by the gender of the child, though girls often face more challenges if they have to travel long distances to attend school. The gender of the teachers and management team members also influence schooling decisions for children and engagement with parents. The expectations on girls in society, particularly as they transition to secondary and post-secondary education, continue to pose challenges for them to progress through the education system.

## T.2.2 Education quality

Community members' understanding of quality education largely pertained to school-level observables, such as visibly attractive school infrastructure, which they considered to have improved substantially, particularly in government schools. The Roadmap reform process has resulted in the recruitment of qualified teachers, increased monitoring, and more regular LND assessments, which have increased parental satisfaction. These have helped improve the communities' trust in public schools, as well as improving learning outcomes, over time. While parents of children who attend private schools perceived that these schools provide better quality education, overall community perceptions were mixed, as the type and location of private schools varied greatly.

Nearly all respondents perceived that girls perform better than boys across all schools. However, particularly in rural contexts, parents were concerned about the limited opportunities for social mobility for women. Many community members felt that children with physical disabilities were often blessed with other qualities – such as intelligence – which helped them to perform well in school. At the same time, teachers mentioned the difficulties of responding to the specific needs of children with disabilities, including mental disabilities. Low parental engagement, while not corroborated by parents themselves, limited learning among children, according to school level actors. Community respondents also noted the importance of individual child attributes in relation to their interests and performance in schools.

According to school- and community-level respondents, challenges related to the provision of quality education in public schools include the operationalisation of certain government policies and monitoring indicators related to the Stocktake and Roadmap reforms, along with language barriers, continued shortage of teachers, and gaps in teacher training.

## T.2.3 Provision of school-level inputs

**Preparedness of learners:** Community members expressed diverging views on the preparedness of learners before entering school. While parents, particularly those with better education, reported engaging in activities and sending their children to some form of organised learning before Grade 1, school and community leaders pointed towards the lack of parental focus on preparing children before entering school. Elder school-going siblings play an important role in easing the transition into school for younger children.

**Quality of teaching:** Community members are satisfied with improvements in the quality of teachers, through better teacher performance, behaviour, communication, and responsiveness in the last few years, as a result of changes in government policy. Yet school leaders are often overburdened and demotivated due to what they regard as excessive monitoring, changing teacher–student dynamics, and lack of useful feedback.

**Provision of learning-focused inputs:** Community members expressed satisfaction with the significant improvements in infrastructure, associated with school building, classroom furniture, and drinking water facilities, over the last few years. Although the NSB has improved resourcing, reservations remain regarding the allocation and taxation of these funds.

**Effectiveness of management and governance:** Community members were largely unaware of the existence of SMCs, and there was no formal process to select SMC members. Those community members familiar with SMCs regarded their role to be limited to the utilisation of NSB funds and the facilitation of conflict resolution. Head teachers served as the

key point of contact for parents to discuss any school-level issues, but these interactions were limited. Community members did not have any interaction with district education officials, though they generally had good relations with the school administration.

## **T.3 Conclusions**

### **T.3.1 Perceptions**

There is generally a substantial difference in the perspectives and perceptions of stakeholders when it comes to their role in education. Future education reforms will need to consider ways to bridge this gap between different groups so that key stakeholders across the spectrum become allies rather than adversaries in regard to the common goal of providing higher quality education to all children in Punjab.

### **T.3.2 Equity**

Although there are some improvements, conversations with community members identified gaps in access to and the quality of education by gender, disability, socioeconomic status, and geography.

### **T.3.3 Prioritisation**

Community members highlighted differences in the understandings of key concepts, such as quality and the ingredients of learning, and varying priorities within the education system. For instance, community members' understanding of quality education largely pertained to school-level observables, though this is only one component of the reform efforts.

### **T.3.4 Communication**

Discussions across stakeholders in education highlighted the lack of effective two-way communication between communities, schools, and district officials, which also contributes to differences in perceptions between the groups. More opportunities and channels for engagement would be useful to strengthen management and governance relationships.

### **T.3.5 Policy**

The findings of this study have clear implications for how policies are formulated, communicated, and disseminated at the local level. While parents and teachers are the primary stakeholders who are affected by these reforms, their levels of engagement in this process varies greatly, and their understanding and involvement in policy processes is limited.

Parents recognise the gains they have observed, and link those gains to well-known national policies, even as teachers tasked with implementing the same policies find them challenging. Although they report critical data to support the M&E of those policies, teachers and head teachers rarely know or understand how these data are used, or what they could do to improve in the future. Parents are expected to hold schools and education officials to account, but in reality their relationships with both schools and district authorities are tenuous. The use and understanding of data by all stakeholders needs to be improved, and effective interaction between schools and the communities they serve needs to be strengthened.

## Annex U Evaluation of Siyani Sahelian: Conclusions<sup>83</sup>

**The A3G programme has been delivered in an effective and efficient manner.** This report has found (using qualitative data collection) that not only have inputs of the programme been of sufficiently high quality and quantity, they have also reportedly been delivered in a timely and efficient manner on the whole. This evaluation has found that the A3G programme has been well designed. This has meant that it has not only been effectively delivered to those girls that it aims to target but that this has been done in an efficient manner. Planning and budgeting of inputs appear to have been comprehensive, with key targets being met. It would appear that resources are not only adequate for programme delivery but they have also reached schools and hubs in a timely manner. It would appear that there are adequate numbers of teachers delivering the programme and that these teachers are reported to be well-trained to deliver the curriculum. Impressive improvements in learning outcomes also provide evidence of the efficacy of this programme, particularly because it aims to reach highly marginalised girls.

**The success of the A3G programme (as measured through learning outcomes triangulated with qualitative interviews with key stakeholders) has provided evidence that improved learning outcomes through remedial learning are possible even in difficult settings:** Learning outcomes have been analysed using quantitative data across the Chalo Parho Barho<sup>84</sup>, Short-term Primary, and Short-term Middle strands of remedial learning. The results provided on numeracy and literacy outcomes have shown that girls who are enrolled in all these strands have benefited from the programme and have demonstrated improvements in their learning outcomes as measured between the baseline and the endline. These results are positive for both never enrolled and dropped out girls. This is a very encouraging finding as measuring progress in learning outcomes is an incredibly important goal for all education systems and in this scenario is even more encouraging given that the girls targeted by the A3G programme are amongst the most vulnerable and marginalised. Therefore, achieving these impressive results through a short-term programme that is remedial in nature, is targeting girls who otherwise would not receive an education and are potentially more challenging to teach, and are living in environments where cultural norms are resistant to their education, is even more laudable.

**Transport facilities matter more in environments with strong cultural norms and financially constrained households:** Long distances to schools, high travel costs, cultural norms resistant to educating girls, and unsafe journeys to and from school, are some of the huge challenges facing girls' education in many contexts. The provision of safe transportation to and from schools and education hubs can help alleviate parental concerns and financial pressures that may otherwise prevent girls from going to school. Qualitative data collected from the A3G programme have indicated that many girls would not otherwise have accessed schools or hubs had it not being for the provision of transport. Therefore, these evaluation findings would suggest that the provision of transport facilities form a critical additional input to improving girls' education and is, therefore, a very important characteristic of the A3G programme that could be replicated in other programmes given the extensive research base that indicates that distance to school and safety concerns remain a critical barrier for girls'

<sup>83</sup> This text is taken from OPERA (2020) pp. 92-3.

<sup>84</sup> A 45-day course for girls who have either never been enrolled in school or who might have dropped out in the past two years or less and might have been excluded from schooling subsequently due to disability, early marriage, child labour or due to some other marginalisation

schooling worldwide. In particular, DFID has recognised this issue through evidence from the Girls Education Challenge funding initiatives.

**There is evidence of improvements in non-cognitive outcomes of girls participating in this programme.** The quantitative and qualitative data analysis and results on the non-cognitive outcomes measured (such as girls' perceptions of aspirations and empowerment) would indicate that overall the A3G programme can be judged to have either a positive or no effect on girls' non cognitive outcomes. While the qualitative data provide an overwhelmingly positive indication of this positive result, the quantitative data show that whilst the A3G programme (across the various strands) has improved (and not worsened) non-cognitive outcomes for girls in a large number of cases, there are still many girls (according to the quantitative data) whose perceptions of their cognitive outcomes have remained the same before and after being part of the programme. This report would therefore recommend that this could be an area of further focus for the intervention, given these initial positive findings. It should be noted that participation in such programmes could potentially have a perceived negative impact on non-cognitive outcomes if participation in a programme increases awareness of these characteristics if participants become more aware of these characteristics by participating in the programme. Taking self-confidence as an example, participation in such a programme will change not only a girl's perception of what self-confidence is but will also change her judgement of her own self-confidence because the peer group to which she is now relating will have changed.

**Information sessions can help break down cultural barriers:** The findings from qualitative data gathered as part of this evaluation have indicated that parental information sessions have not only been run regularly but have largely been well attended. Stakeholders interviewed noted the value of these sessions in encouraging the enrolment and retention of girls in schools. The role of programme staff in raising awareness about the programme and in engendering trust in the programme has been highlighted as a key positive attribute of A3G. One suggested enhancement is to provide information sessions not just to parents of participants but also to participating girls and to the wider community who may not be aware of and involved in the programme already.

**Leveraging technology creatively is a potential opportunity to enhance programme delivery and reach.** Very preliminary (and limited in scope) qualitative analysis of the Edkasa intervention<sup>85</sup> suggests that the online delivery of courses could be a major virtue of this programme as it allows girls to study at home and for teachers to teach from anywhere when needed. It also overrides safety concerns and other barriers to girls going into educational institutions. It also helps resolve the problem of very limited qualified teachers in particular subjects such as STEM.

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<sup>85</sup> ITA have partnered with Edkasa which is a for-profit organization based in Lahore to provide online live classes for matric science subjects (Maths, Chemistry, Biology and Physics).

## Annex V World Bank EFO activities financed under PESP2<sup>86</sup>

This report provides a summary of EFO activities that have been financed by DFID under PESP2. A summary table of EFO activities and their status is provided below:

**Table 39: List of EFO activities**

| No. | Activity  | Deliverable                   | Status    |
|-----|---|-------------------------------|-----------|
| 1   | School improvement index                              | Report, plus dataset          | Completed |
| 2   | Non-salary budget formula revision                    | Report                        | Completed |
| 3   | PMF   | Report                        | Completed |
| 4   | SABER–Teachers  | Report                        | Completed |
| 5   | Classroom observation protocol                        | Instruments, manuals, report  | Completed |
| 6   | School council mobilisation strategy                  | Report                        | Completed |
| 7   | SDI Survey  | Report                        | Completed |
| 8   | School council mobilisation content development       | Animated videos, infographics | Completed |
| 9   | PEF report  | Report                        | Completed |
| 10  | District and provincial ed. department capacity study | Report                        | Completed |

### 1. School improvement index

The objective of creating a school improvement index was to provide schools with a roadmap to bring real gains in learning levels, enrolment of children, and teaching-learning practices in basic education. Towards this goal, the index has three functions: 1) monitor principal outcomes of schools; 2) serve as a diagnostic tool that provides information to school principals, teachers, education officials, and parents on the performance of individual schools; and 3) build accountability in schools through a publicly reported classification of schools on a regular basis. The index itself, which was finalised in 2018, consisted of the following five indicators: (1) learning outcomes; (2) student attendance; (3) teacher attendance; (4) teacher qualifications; and (5) school council participation.

### 2. NSB formula revision

The NSB was introduced in 2014, starting in nine districts and phased into all 36 districts by 2016. The revision to the NSB formula was finalised in April 2018. The new formula has been in use since by the government to allocate the NSBs. The revision of the formula was led by IDEAS, and consisted of a review of the current system, literature review, review of international experience, consultative sessions with principals and government officials, review of school data and simulation of potential school budgets, and several discussions between stakeholders. The final formula also includes a stronger concern over equity, prioritisation of districts in South Punjab, focus on missing facilities, a baseline of teachers and classrooms in each school, and an inclusion of ECE funding.

<sup>86</sup> This is a section of the full EFO report produced by the World Bank in July 2019.



### **3. Provincial monitoring framework**

The provincial monitoring framework was finalised in March 2018. The goal of monitoring and evaluation is to improve enrolment, classroom teaching practice, and student learning. Towards this goal the broad objectives of developing a provincial monitoring framework were to: a) gather information on how schools are doing; b) provide information to parents and the larger community for accountability purposes; and c) provide information to policymakers and school administrators who can come up with policy and actionable plans to improve teaching and learning.

### **4. SABER–Teachers**

A tool, SABER–Teachers, aims to develop evidence-based policies on teachers by collecting, analysing, synthesising, and disseminating comprehensive information on teacher policies in primary- and secondary-education systems around the world. SABER–Teachers is a core component of SABER (Systems Approach for Better Education Results), an initiative launched by the Human Development Network of the World Bank. SABER collects information about different education systems' policies, analyses it to identify common challenges and promising solutions, and makes the results widely available to help inform countries' decisions on where and how to invest to improve education quality.

The SABER–Teachers Punjab report presents results of the application of SABER–Teachers in Punjab, Pakistan. It describes Punjab's performance for each of the eight teacher policy goals, alongside comparative information from education systems that have consistently scored high results in international student achievement tests and have participated in SABER–Teachers. Additional information on Punjab's teacher policies and those of other countries can be found on the SABER–Teachers website.

### **5. Classroom observation protocol**

A new Mentoring Visit Form (MVF) was developed for the use of AEOs in the field. This followed a review of the evidence on classroom observations, consultations with teachers and principals, and several field pilots. Trainings of super master trainers and AEOs on the MVF were held with QAED support in the summer of 2018. Field implementation of the instrument was limited, however, for various reasons. AEOs did not develop a good understanding of the tool, the chain of command for AEOs was somewhat unclear, and classroom observation was just one of many responsibilities of AEOs.

Learning from these lessons, the 'Teach' tool was developed that was easier to understand, building on recent developments in the classroom observation literature. The field implementation in Punjab was very successful, with 96% of enumerators reaching certification. A working paper was published that documents the literature behind the tool, and a separate working paper documents the validity and reliability of the tool. The results of this were also presented at a seminar at LUMS School of Education. The new tool is now to be used by QAED and AEOs for the new phase of Teacher CPD.

### **6. School council mobilisation strategy**

Under DLI 8, of the Third Punjab Education Sector Project, the capacity of school councils needs strengthening to ensure that school councils are functioning effectively, and playing an active role in school management. As a first step, the SED requires a school council



mobilisation strategy which will define the areas of capacity-building for school councils, provide recommendations for the method and approach for capacity-building and provide input into the School Council Guidelines. A consultant has been hired for this purpose and has drafted the mobilisation strategy which was approved by the Secretary SED in June, 2018.

## **7. SDI Survey**

The SABER Service Delivery Survey combines two World Bank Group initiatives that produce comparative data and knowledge about education systems to improve education quality and performance: SABER and the Service Delivery Indicators (SDI). SDI measures what teachers know, how they teach, and the resources they have at their disposal, through measures such as teacher absence, teacher assessment, and textbook availability. These measures focus on the underlying systems that help generate learning outcomes. Data are collected in two rounds: a first round to collect all baseline indicators, and a second round to validate data collection instruments.

The SABER Service Delivery Survey presented the first comprehensive analysis of the learning crisis in Punjab. Several products have been generated from this activity. The main findings are reported in a PowerPoint, a short synthesis report, and a longer research report. Findings have been shared with main stakeholders, and further dissemination is planned for July – September 2019. The anonymised database itself is also available for researchers. A number of follow-up surveys are also being discussed, to collect further data on the sample of schools (building a longitudinal panel of schools like the LEAPS panel).

## **8. School council content development**

The activity aimed to mobilise school council members, by increasing the knowledge and participation. This followed the school council mobilization strategy developed in Point 6. In collaboration with PMIU, storyboards and characters were developed for video content. The main set of videos addresses basic topics such as the role of school councils, elections and constitutions, NSBs, identifying school needs, and the development of school-based action plans. These videos (11 in total) were produced in 3D animation. A second set of videos which are more information-focused has also been developed, including about the constitution of councils, use of NSB and excluded activities, seven stages of preparing SBAP, approval of the SBAP, and addressing grievances. These videos (seven in total) were produced in 2D animation. The videos are available on YouTube, and will be made available to school council members using a dedicated app. Moreover, infographics were produced.

## **9. PEF report**

The goal of this activity was to increase the public visibility of the results achieved by PEF, in light of major concerns about the sustainability of the PEF model. Four briefing notes were developed, along with five infographics, an institutional strategy for PEF, and a research paper. The report was discussed at a national conference on PEF in July 2019. The event was covered in several articles in the press.

## **10. District and provincial government capacity study**

Effective education service delivery essentially depends on the effectiveness of institutional arrangements, operational coordination, as well as management and service delivery capacities in place from provincial to district and school tiers. Therefore, the capacity study

analyses: (a) institutional and administrative structure of education departments at provincial and district levels; (b) the efficacy of horizontal coordination among departments, administrative units and stakeholders at provincial tier and at district tier; (c) the effectiveness of districts' vertical coordination mechanisms both upward with the provincial entities and downward with the service delivery units (sub-district and school levels); and (d) the institutional and human resource capacities, especially at district and sub-district level. The report has been finalised in July 2019.

## Annex W Programme Design and Management Review

### W.1 Objectives and approach

The PESP2 evaluation approach (to address Level Two EQs) involved carrying out evaluation studies on each of the main components of support provided under the programme. These have in principle enabled evaluation judgements to be made in relation to each component. However, these studies of individual components have needed to be supplemented by data collection and analysis at the level of the PESP2 programme as a whole that will examine the following issues (with the overall Level Two EQs, for which additional evidence will be provided by these exercises, shown in brackets):

- the overall design of the programme (including synergies between components) and hence the validity of the theory of change for the programme as a whole (1, 2, 3, 14);
- decisions taken during implementation, particularly to adapt to changes in the context and emerging evidence and lessons (5, 9); and
- the effectiveness of overall programme management and governance arrangements, including of engagement with (and ownership by) GoPb and other key stakeholders (8, 10, 11, 15).

The PDMR aims to answer the following questions:

1. How was the programme theory of change developed? To what extent and how has the theory of change been used to guide programme management decisions? Has it been reviewed or have the key assumptions and intervention logic been explicitly tested during implementation?
2. To what extent has the programme as a whole been implemented in line with planned budgets and timetables? What factors have influenced implementation?
3. To what extent and how has the implementation of PESP2 adapted to changes in the context and to evidence and lessons learned during implementation? What have been the main programme management decisions taken during implementation? What factors have influenced these decisions? What was the result of these decisions?
4. How was it intended that VFM of the programme should be monitored and measured?
5. To what extent has there been effective ownership of PESP2 by GoPb? How has this changed over the period of implementation, and why? How has the level of government ownership influenced the results achieved?
6. How effectively have programme management and liaison arrangements between DFID and SED operated? What factors have influenced the relationship between DFID and SED? To what extent have these arrangements contributed to effective collaboration and information-sharing during programme implementation?
7. To what extent and how has DFID engaged with civil society and other non-government stakeholders during programme implementation? How has this engagement influenced the programme?

8. To what extent and how has DFID engaged with other donors and international development agencies (particularly the World Bank) during programme implementation? How has this engagement influenced the programme?
9. To what extent and how have changes to DFID policies, budgets, and internal staffing and management arrangements during implementation influenced the programme?
10. How have lessons from PESP2 influenced the design of DFID's education portfolio in Pakistan, including planned follow-up activities in Punjab? To what extent and how have lessons influenced any other activities (e.g. education sector programmes outside Pakistan, other sector programmes in Pakistan)?
11. How could PESP2 have been made more effective? What should have been done differently?

The PDMR has involved the following research activities to obtain evidence:

- a review of documentation on the PESP2 programme design and implementation;
- KIIs with DFID staff, including those involved in earlier stages of management and implementation; and
- KIIs with GoPb and other stakeholders.

This annex is structured as follows. Section W.2 reviews the original design concept of PESP2, as set out in the 2012 Business Case. Section W.3 summarises the main changes to the programme during implementation, and provides information on spending over time and against the different components. Section W.4 reviews the structure of objectives and indicators. Section W.5 assesses the VFM approach for the programme. Section W.6 examines programme management issues, based in particular on KIIs. Section **Error! Reference source not found.** lists key informants for the PDMR.

## **W.2 Original design concept of PESP2**

### **W.2.1 Objectives and components**

PESP2 was designed to build on previous DFID investment (of £80 million) in education in Punjab through the initial PESP1 and the Punjab Education Sector Reform Roadmap (PEER), which began in January 2011, and reflected the high strategic priority accorded by the UK to supporting education in Pakistan. An evaluation of PESP 1 found that:

‘while PESP 1 has helped improve access and to some extent quality of education, further support is needed to deepen reform and improve learning outcomes. The UK’s investments to date have delivered impact in areas including student enrolment, teacher attendance, better quality facilities and a range of improvements in the management of public schools, including the introduction of independent district level monitoring. They have also helped improve the quality of teaching and learning, including the introduction of lesson plans. Gender parity indicators have improved, and parental choice, through the work of PEF, has increased.’

The Roadmap was considered to have increased UK access to, and influence with, policymakers, and to have provided an opportunity to harness strong political will for reform,

especially after the devolution of greater powers to provinces under the 18th Amendment to Pakistan's constitution in 2010.

The original design of PESP2, as set out in the November 2012 Business Case (DFID, 2012), built on previous UK support to GoPb and aimed to reform and transform the delivery of education in Punjab:

'In addition to working through government to ensure every child in Punjab has access to a good quality education, PESP 2 will focus on eleven districts identified as low performing compared with the rest of the province. Through a range of innovative interventions with the government, private sector and civil society organisations (CSOs), the programme will deliver equitable access to better quality education across the whole province.'

The programme planned to provide up to £350.3 million over six years between 2012/13 and 2017/18, and was based around seven components. The seven originally envisaged components were the following:

1. SBS to provide funds to GoPb to improve access to education and improve its quality in public schools. This was envisaged as being aligned with World Bank budget support, and it was envisaged that 'tranche releases will be subject to evidence of satisfactory progress made by government on a range of agreed indicators, including tackling binding constraints to systemic reform.'
2. A school infrastructure component to upgrade facilities in existing public schools, to ensure they are fit for purpose. This was envisaged as operating through school councils as this was expected to both reduce costs and increase quality, and it was envisaged as being managed through a separate TA component, since funding infrastructure through SBS was regarded as a 'blunt targeting tool with high corruption risks'.
3. Developing the low-cost private schools sector through expanding the capacity of PEF.
4. Piloting a credit guarantee scheme through an ATF component, focused on expanding low-cost private sector schools in under-served areas through participation in PEF's NSP.
5. The provision of targeted support through CSOs to tackle social exclusion and inequity in 11 low-performing districts.<sup>87</sup>
6. A scholarship programme for university-level study and girls' higher secondary education.
7. TA to 'underpin delivery of the other six components'.

## W.2.2 Intended complementarities

Between 2004 and 2007, GoPb implemented PESRP, with support from the World Bank. Building on this, the World Bank, DFID, and CIDA provided further support to GoPb through the Punjab Education Sector Project between 2009 and 2012. DFID allocated up to £80 million for the PESP1 programme.

<sup>87</sup> The 11 priority districts (which have been maintained throughout implementation) are Chiniot, Bhakkar, Layyah, Vehari, Muzaffargarh, Dera Ghazi Khan, Lodhran, Rajanpur, Bahawalpur, Bahawalnagar, and Rahim Yar Khan.

In 2012, GoPb requested further support for a second phase of PESRP from the World Bank, DFID, and CIDA. DFID, working with the World Bank and the Government, designed PESP2, and pushed for a programme with a stronger focus on results. The World Bank allocated US\$ 350 million for three years from 2012 to 2015.

Through the PESP2 Business Case, DFID allocated £100 million of SBS from 2013 to 2019, of which £53 million was fully aligned with the World Bank's programme from 2013 to 2015. Funding was released against the achievement of DLIs. To support the delivery of the Chief Minister's 2018 Education Roadmap goals, an additional £70 million was added to the SBS component through a Business Case Addendum in 2015, increasing the total SBS to £170 million. This increase in SBS also aimed to strengthen systems and build institutional capacity and further enhance the ability of DFID to engage, influence, and maintain policy dialogue with GoPb.

DFID's PESP2 programme was designed in conjunction with the World Bank and envisaged CIDA support, with a view to ensuring complementarity, as follows:

13. In 2011, GoPb sought the support of the World Bank, DFID and CIDA in the funding and delivery of PESP 2. The World Bank completed its design work in early 2012, in close collaboration with DFID and CIDA, and its PAD was approved on 26 April 2012. The World Bank has allocated up to US\$350 million through the International Development Association's (IDA) Sector Investment Credit. Based on PSLM data, the World Bank forecasts an increase of 5 percentage points in net enrolment for girls in Punjab by 2015, and maintenance of current enrolment levels for boys.

14. The World Bank's SBS for Punjab includes six areas of eligible expenditure for DFID funds: (i) employee related expenses; (ii) grants for school councils; (iii) PEF; (iv) a stipends programme aimed at encouraging more girls to make the transition from basic to secondary education; (v) a performance based incentives programme for teachers; and (vi) monitoring systems. Learning from the experience of PESP 1, the World Bank has capped employee related expenses at up to 70% of SBS funding, to ensure sufficient resources are available for other areas. After an initial release of \$18 million, further tranches will be released in arrears against the achievement of ten agreed Disbursement Linked Indicators (DLIs).

15. The World Bank's TA for Punjab, which underpins the EEP, is designed to strengthen the PMIU's monitoring and evaluation system including: (i) the production and management of credible data; (ii) strengthening school councils; (iii) decentralisation of financial and management functions to markaz or school level; (iv) information dissemination and communication to stakeholders; and (v) public financial management (PFM) and procurement reforms.'

In addition, the Chief Minister's Education Reform Roadmap was envisaged as 'directly complementing PESP2's work to unlock these, by fostering the political will needed for reform', while the programme was also envisaged as being complementary to DFID's TEP programme, which:


'sought to use political influence to increase the chances of a young boy or girl in Pakistan attending and staying in school and learning more. TEP sought to make education politically relevant so that the elite, politicians and decision-makers

prioritised education reform, acknowledged that there was an education crisis in Pakistan, and took meaningful steps to tackle it.’ (TEP PCR, p. 1)

### W.2.3 The PESP2 theory of change and structure of objectives<sup>88</sup>

The PESP2 Business Case did not set out a fully developed theory of change, but rather presented a diagram (see Figure 4 in section 3.2 above) labelled ‘Overview of programmes under consideration for PESP 2’, which was a summary presentation of the (original) logframe. In subsequent annual reviews, this framework was taken as equivalent to a theory of change, and it has been adjusted as the list of outputs has been revised, and the original activities (components) have also changed during the process of implementation, along with the logframe. Figure 52 shows the representation of the theory of change (in this sense) and the structure of objectives from the latest annual review (February 2020).

**Figure 52: Structure of PESP2 objectives (February 2020)**



## W.3 Main developments during implementation

### W.3.1 Changes to programme components

Over the period from the start of the implementation of PESP2 in January 2013 to the beginning of the evaluation in August 2017, the following main changes took place:

- The period of implementation was extended to March 2020, and the allocation of funding increased to £420.5 million.
- The ATF component (Component 4) was not taken forward. This decision followed a study by TAMO that concluded that the rationale for a credit guarantee model to overcome start-up costs for private schools was not strong, and that a high default rate for start-up schools would limit scalability.<sup>89</sup>

<sup>88</sup> The approach to testing the theory of change in the evaluation is discussed below in Section 4.2.

<sup>89</sup> Access to finance for low-cost private schools (as opposed to the level of subsidy provided for each pupil) does not in practice seem to have been a major constraint on PEF programme expansion, since in the NSP the number of applicants has substantially exceeded the number who were deemed to be qualified.



- After an initial initiative working with CSOs to establish schools under the NSP<sup>90</sup> it was decided to channel the resources identified under Component 5 directly to PEF to support PEF programmes in general, with specific targets being set for the 11 priority districts.
- A component focusing on support to SpED was added, beginning with the PIEP pilot.

By August 2017, the programme was envisaged as consisting of the following nine components:

1. **SBS** to provide funds to GoPb to improve access to and the quality of education in government schools (£170.2 million – this includes an additional £70 million allocated in April 2015 to support the Chief Minister’s 2018 education goals). Up to 2015 disbursement was aligned with the World Bank’s DLIs for its loan-funded support to education. From 2015, disbursement was made against a separate RAF. The final disbursement of SBS was made in 2018.
2. **School reconstruction and rehabilitation** to build additional classrooms and to provide missing facilities in existing government schools; implemented by IMC Worldwide (£92 million).<sup>91</sup>
3. **Financial aid to PEF** to improve access to and the quality of Punjab’s low-fee private school sector, through an EVS, the NSP, and the FAS programme (£68.6 million).
4. **Targeted support to PEF** to tackle social exclusion and inequality by identifying and enrolling OOSC in the lowest-performing 11 priority districts in Punjab (£10 million).<sup>92</sup>
5. **Support to SpED** for an inclusive education programme to provide children with mild disabilities with formal schooling opportunities in mainstream government and PEF schools (£7 million).
6. **Support to PEEF** to provide scholarships for talented female secondary school students from poor households in the 11 priority districts to study at intermediate level; and for male and female students at intermediate level to study at tertiary level (£10.9 million).
7. **Support to LUMS/NOP**. A scholarship programme for talented students from disadvantaged households to study at a leading university (£7.3 million).
8. **A TA component** to deliver the programme and manage key components through TAMO (comprising ASI and McKinsey), providing support to GoPb, the Chief Minister’s Education Roadmap process, and other partners in the PESP2 programme; and US\$ 1 million through the World Bank to GoPb to leverage early implementation of PESP3 (£25.1 million).

<sup>90</sup> This initiative took place in two of the low-performing districts (Muzaffargarh and Rahim Yar Khan) and involved partnering with two CSOs, Ghazali Education Trust and BRAC Pakistan, for the establishment of new schools under the NSP, including providing additional finance (of PKR 150 per child) to target the most vulnerable and marginalised OOSC. In general, the process of negotiation with NGOs (running networks of schools) was found to be too complicated and subsequent phases of the NSP have focused on a single-owner private model.

<sup>91</sup> This has been managed separately from the rest of PESP2 as the Humqadam project, which also operates in KPK.

<sup>92</sup> This component was envisaged as working in partnership with CSOs but was discontinued after 2016/17, with financial resources reallocated to support to PEF under Component 3.

**9. A Performance Evaluation component (£1.5 million)** implemented through a consortium of OPM, IDEAS, and CDPR.

An additional budget item (not included in this list of components) has been a grant administered by the World Bank for EFOs, whose 'objective is to deepen sector knowledge and to provide technical support to the School Education Department in strengthening the design, implementation and evaluations of key sector reform'. This funded a series of studies complementary to the World Bank's Punjab education sector projects. Details of these studies are included in Annex V. This component has not formed part of the evaluation, though the evaluation has drawn on some of the studies produced.

Subsequent to the start of the evaluation in 2017, and up to September 2020, the main further changes have been as follows:

- An additional component, A3G (Siyani Sahelian), focused on 20,000 adolescent girls (who have either dropped out of school with little or no learning or who never enrolled in school) in three of the lowest-performing districts of South Punjab, provided through an accountable grant with the NGO ITA, with a budget of £2.5 million.
- Separate funding following on from PIEP (which was funded using SBS) was not taken forward (so no expenditure against this component is shown in Table 41). Funding was provided to PEF for IVS, while support to SED was funded under SBS and through TA.
- The completion of the ASI contract to supply TA in March 2018, and the McKinsey contract supporting the Roadmap in December 2018. Cambridge Education (in association with Delivery Associates) took over as TA supplier from October 2018 to March 2020. A further TA contract was issued in July 2020 to I-SAPS to cover the period to March 2021.
- A further extension of the programme up to July 2021, but limited to the school infrastructure component, with the new ITA component, the Performance Evaluation, and the additional TA support to be completed by March 2021.

Implementation of all other components was completed by March 2020.

### **W.3.2 Planned and actual spending on PESP2**

The comparison of the planned spending profile in Table 40 with actual spending in Table 41 shows: spending on SBS exceeded the original plan, and happened more rapidly than was originally planned; financial aid to PEF (and spending on scholarships) followed a slightly delayed disbursement pattern; there were substantial delays in spending on infrastructure and TA; the ATF component was not taken forward; and the civil society component in priority districts was also implemented more slowly than planned, before being ended and replaced with the ITA initiative. The delay in school infrastructure spending has meant that it has dominated expenditure over the latter part of the period of implementation, accounting for over 70% of total expenditure in the final three years.

**Table 40: Planned spending profile for PESP2**

| Activity  | 2012/13 | 2013/14 | 2014/15 | 2015/16 | 2016/17 | 2017/18 | Total |
|---|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------|
| SBS to GoPb   | 20      | 17      | 17      | 16      | 15      | 15      | 100   |
| Financial aid for PEF                               | 7       | 11      | 12      | 13      | 15      | 10.6    | 68.6  |
| Pilot ATF component                                 | 0       | 4.5     | 0       | 4.5     | 0       | 0       | 9     |
| Infrastructure component                            | 10      | 26      | 31      | 37      | 0       | 0       | 104   |
| Civil society component in low performing districts | 2       | 3.1     | 3       | 2.7     | 0       | 0       | 10.8  |
| Scholarship component                               | 2       | 3.2     | 3.6     | 4.2     | 4.2     | 1       | 18.2  |
| Sub-total   | 36      | 53.8    | 60.6    | 70.4    | 54.2    | 35.6    | 310.6 |
| TA  | 6       | 7       | 7.2     | 7.5     | 6       | 6       | 39.7  |
| Total   | 42      | 60.8    | 67.8    | 77.9    | 60.2    | 41.6    | 350.3 |

Source: PESP2 Business Case, Table 13, p. 56

**Table 41: Expenditure on PESP2 components (£ thousands)**

|   | 2012/13       | 2013/14       | 2014/15       | 2015/16       | 2016/17       | 2017/18       | 2018/19       | 2019/20       | 2020/21       | 2021/22      | Total          |
|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|----------------|
| Infrastructure: IMC                       |               |               | 2,007         | 7,746         | 8,107         | 8,048         | 7,683         | 8,927         | 2,328         | 1,054        | 45,900         |
| Infrastructure: IMC management            |               |               |               |               | 3,857         | 3,952         | 3,777         | 2,989         | 2,454         | 1,060        | 18,088         |
| Infrastructure: TCF                       |               |               |               |               |               |               |               | 819           | 3,892         |              | 4,712          |
| Infrastructure: PMIU                      |               |               |               |               |               |               |               | 22,000        | 13,000        |              | 35,000         |
| Infrastructure: climate change            |               |               |               |               | 1,250         | 1,250         | 472           | 2,028         |               |              | 5,000          |
| SBS                                       | 20,000        | 45,300        | 32,100        | 10,600        | 25,500        | 24,500        | 9,000         | 3,000         |               |              | 170,000        |
| Evaluation and research                   |               |               |               | 63            |               | 331           | 425           | 476           | 377           |              | 1,671          |
| Targeted support to PEF (for NGOs in NSP) |               |               |               | 639           | 144           |               |               |               |               |              | 784            |
| LUMS/NOP scholarships                     |               | 730           | 1,224         | 1,557         | 2,022         | 1,481         | 54            |               |               |              | 7,068          |
| PEEF scholarships                         |               | 1,500         | 2,300         | 2,400         | 2,300         | 2,000         | 2,111         | 2,779         |               |              | 15,390         |
| Support to PEF                            | 5,000         | 5,000         | 12,000        | 6,000         | 16,000        | 18,000        | 14,600        | 7,400         |               |              | 84,000         |
| TA to GoPb (ASI, McKinsey, CE)            |               | 1,311         | 2,920         | 7,827         | 8,987         | 3,957         | 1,845         | 4,584         | 350           |              | 31,781         |
| I-SAPS TA to GoPb                         |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               | 1,429         |              | 1,429          |
| World Bank EFOs                           |               |               | 300           | 202           | 404           | 202           |               |               |               |              | 1,108          |
| ITA: Girls' education and ASER            |               |               |               |               |               | 235           | 1,384         | 1,899         | 867           |              | 4,385          |
| <b>Total</b>                              | <b>25,000</b> | <b>53,841</b> | <b>52,851</b> | <b>37,035</b> | <b>68,570</b> | <b>63,955</b> | <b>41,351</b> | <b>56,900</b> | <b>24,697</b> | <b>2,114</b> | <b>426,316</b> |

Source: Data from FCDO. Actual expenditure to December 2020. Budget figures (in italics) where components ongoing as at December 2020. UK financial year (Apr–Mar)

## W.4 Indicators and targets

### W.4.1 Logframe indicators

Table 42 shows the original PESP2 logframe (at the time of design in 2012), and Table 43 shows the latest available PESP2 logframe (November 2020). Changes in the logframe indicators over this period included the following:

- At the impact level, the replacement of the indicator relating to mean test score (with learning outcomes now tracked just at outcome level) and the Human Development Index, and the introduction of impact indicators measuring overall literacy rates and provincial GDP growth.
- At the outcome level: First, the replacement of indicators of the total number of pupils in school, NERs, and primary/middle completion rates with participation rates for primary- and secondary-age children, both for the province as a whole and for the 1 priority districts. Second, the consolidation of several learning outcome indicators into one, 'percentage of Grade 3 students that achieve specific SLOs for each subject'. Third, the inclusion of an indicator on pupil attendance rates.
- At the output level, a general move away from overall quantitative indicators of performance for each output area towards indicators related to the implementation of particular reform measures. Exceptions to this relate to the release of NSB (Output 1), measures of infrastructure built under PESP2, with overall sector targets (Output 3.1) having been achieved (Output 3), and targets related to enrolment and scholarships (Output 4).

**Table 42: Original PESP2 logframe Indicators**

| Objective and indicator  | Data source                              | Target change (from 2012/13 to 2017/18)   |
|--|--|---|
| <b>Impact: More educated people in Punjab making a positive social and economic contribution</b>   |  |   |
| Impact 1: Completion rate at secondary school by (i) whole school population; (ii) girls; (iii) low-performing districts (primary participation)                             | PSLM, Nielsen (participation)            | All: 50% to 55%<br>Girls (rural): 43% to 50%<br>Primary participation:<br>All: 85% to 95%<br>Low-performing districts: 41% to 47% |
| Impact 2: Mean test score at Grade 8 by: (i) whole school population; (ii) girls; (iii) low-performing districts<br><br>Total raw score in English, Urdu, maths, and science | SED, PEC (tracked by World Bank)         | All: 188 to 213<br>Girls: tbd<br>Low-performing districts: 194 to 240   |
| Impact 3: Punjab Human Development Index   | United Nations Development Programme (?) | Tbd   |
| <b>Outcome: More children in school, staying longer, and learning more</b>   |  |   |
| Outcome 1: (More children in school) Absolute number of children in school (government and DFID-supported private)   |  | 14.01 million to 19.57 million  |
| Outcome 2: (More children in school) NER primary (6–10), middle (11–13) and secondary (14–15)  | PSLM                                     | Primary: 70% to 80%<br>Middle: 37% to 49%   |

| Objective and indicator   | Data source                                   | Target change (from 2012/13 to 2017/18)  |
|---|---|--|
|   |   | Secondary: 25% to 37%  |
| Outcome 3: (More children staying longer)<br>Completion/transition rates primary to middle  | Punjab MCS                                    | Primary completion: 78% to 90%<br>Transition to secondary: 94% to 95%<br>PCR middle to secondary: 22% to 40% |
| Outcome 5: (More children learning)<br>Percentage of children in rural areas able to read a story at Class 3<br>Score in Urdu, maths, social science at Classes 4 and 7 | ASER  | Reading: 30% to 50%  |
| Outcome 6: (More children learning)<br>Total raw score in English, Urdu, maths, and science Class 5 exams   | PEC exams                                     | 158 to 200   |
| Outcome 7: (More children learning)<br>Independent tests at Grades 5 and 8  | World Bank Learning Assessment Survey         | Tbd  |
| <b>Output 1: Better managed, more accountable education system</b>  |   |  |
| Output 1.1: Functioning School Councils Index   | Index to be developed, PMIU                   | Tbd  |
| Output 1.2: Education Management Index (e.g. merit-based Executive District Officer for education recruitment, coverage of schools by monitoring visits)                | To be agreed with GoPb                        | Tbd  |
| Output 1.3: Real increase in non-salary school expenditures as % total school expenditures  | Finance Department, GoPb                      | 8% to 18%  |
| <b>Output 2: Better teacher performance and better teaching in the classroom</b>  |   |  |
| Output 2.1: % classrooms in which lesson plans are available and being used in government schools   | DFID IRM Survey 2012; later survey by DSD     | Available: 50% to 100%<br>Using: 32% to 80%  |
| Output 2.2: Teacher absenteeism in government schools   | PMIU and World Bank                           | 16% to 10%   |
| Output 2.3: Average number of instructional hours received by learners in government schools  | To be developed with GoPb                     | Tbd  |
| <b>Output 3: Better learning environment in schools</b>   |   |  |
| Output 3.1: Number of schools with missing facilities and additional rooms (male, female, urban, rural)   | PMIU  | 16,000 missing facilities and 27,000 additional classrooms (60% attributed to DFID)                          |
| Output 3.2: Number of schools with regular participation in extra-curricular activities, number of schools with zero corporal punishment                                | PMIU, third-party verification, sample survey | Tbd  |
| Output 3.3: Children's participation and happiness index  | Tbd   | Tbd  |

| Objective and indicator   | Data source                 | Target change (from 2012/13 to 2017/18)       |
|---|-----------------------------|---|
| <b>Output 4: Improved access across Punjab with focus on 11 low-performing districts</b>  |                             |   |
| Output 4.1: (i) Number of new private schools in low-performing districts attributable to DFID; (ii) number of new FAS schools (cumulative) | PEF                         | (i) 950<br>(ii) 3,100                         |
| Output 4.2: Number of new schools accessing finance through A2F initiative (cumulative)   | State Bank of Pakistan/TAMO | 5,000   |
| Output 4.3: Number of PEF educational vouchers attributable to DFID   | PEF                         | 575,000                                       |
| <b>Output 5: Enhanced demand for education</b>  |                             |   |
| Output 5.1: Number of children not in school in low-performing districts tracked  |                             | 400,000                                       |
| Output 5.2: Number of girls' stipends   |                             | 490,000                                       |
| Output 5.3: Number of tertiary-level scholarships for poor boys and girls   |                             | 12,200 (by 2016/17)<br>Boys 800, girls 11,400 |
| Output 5.4: Parental will tracker   | Tbd                         | Tbd   |

**Table 43: Logframe indicators (November 2020)**

| Objective and Indicator   | Data source                                      | Target and actual change (baseline to March 2021)   |
|---|--|---|
| <b>Impact: More educated people in Punjab making a positive social and economic contribution</b>  |  |   |
| Impact 1: Literacy rate (ages 10 and older) and adult literacy rate (ages 15 and older), Punjab   | PSLM survey / Pakistan Labour Force Survey /MICS | 62% to 65%: 64.7% 2019/20<br>Adult 60% to 62%: no data  |
| Impact 2: Transition rate in: a) primary (tracking the whole cohort entering Class 1 and graduating class 5);<br>b) secondary (proxy by students aged 15–16 enrolled in school) | PSES (no longer taking place)                    | Secondary completion:<br>Girls: 63% to 68%<br>Boys: 66% to 70%<br><br>2019/20: Lower secondary completion rate: 56.1% (57.3% for males and 54.8% for females). Upper secondary completion rate: 38.6% (37.8% for males and 39.4% for females) |
| Impact 3: Real GDP growth per capita, Punjab, or level of education by employment   |  | Not possible to measure due to non-availability of govt data on provincial GDP growth rate and level of education by employment. Therefore a target is not being set  |
| <b>Outcome: More children in school, staying longer and learning more</b>   |  |   |
| Outcome 1: (i) Participation rate for primary school-aged population (ages 5–9); (ii) participation rate for primary school-aged population (ages 5–9) in 11 priority districts | PSES, MICS, ASER                                 | (i) Punjab average: 95%<br>Girls: 85.1% to 94%. Boys: 88.4% to 96%  |



| Objective and Indicator   | Data source                                | Target and actual change (baseline to March 2021)   |
|---|--|---|
|   |  | (ii) Priority districts: 74.4% to 87%<br>Girls 85 %. Boys 80% to 89%<br><br>Achieved (Jan 2020):<br>Punjab: 94.9% (males: 95% and females: 94.9%); 11 priority districts: 94.4%   |
| Outcome 2: (i) Participation rate for secondary school-aged population (ages 10-16); (ii) participation rate for secondary school-aged population (ages 10–16) in 11 priority districts | PSES, MICS                                 | Punjab average: 78.5% to 85 %<br>Girls: 76.2% to 83%. Boys: 80.8% to 87%<br><br>Priority districts: 66.3% to 75%<br>Girls: 61.0% to 71 %. Boys 71.6% to 78%<br><br>Achieved:<br>Punjab: 79.1% (male: 79.4% and female: 78.7%)<br>11 priority districts: 73% |
| Outcome 3: Percentage of Grade 3 students that achieve specific SLOs for each subject (English, mathematics, Urdu) disaggregated by public and private                                  | DFID 6MA Grade 3 assessment, ASER, and LND | Punjab average: 83%<br>Maths: 85%; English: 78%; Urdu: 84%<br><br>(March 2015 baseline:<br>Punjab average: 58.6%; maths: 67%; English: 53%; Urdu: 56%)<br><br>Achieved:<br>Punjab average: 82%<br>Maths: 84.8%; English: 77.6%; Urdu: 83.6%                 |
| Outcome 4: Student attendance   | PMIU                                       | 90% to 94%<br>93% for boys and girls (excluding June, July, and August)   |
| <b>Output 1: Strong leadership and accountability</b>   |  |   |
| Output 1.1: Numbers of districts with performance management  | PMIU                                       | Indicators and targets frequently changed, once performance management system established. March 2021:<br>At least 12 districts implementing SIF and actions management system  |

| Objective and Indicator   | Data source            | Target and actual change (baseline to March 2021)   |
|---|------------------------|---|
| Output 1.2: Frequency of MEA visits and reliability of data collected   | To be agreed with GoPb | 90% MEA school visit rate maintained in all districts (12 month average)<br><br>Maximum variation between audit data (from DFC spot checks or third-party verifications) and MEA data for the same schools should be within +/- 10 %<br><br>Met: system already established at baseline |
| Output 1.3: Timely release and efficient utilisation of school NSB  | PMIU monthly data      | 70% utilisation at district level (releases to schools), of NSB released to districts from July to March 2021.<br>Achieved: 56.7% utilisation by December 2019  |
| <b>Output 2: Better teacher performance and better teaching</b>   |                        |   |
| Output 2.1: Development, dissemination, and use of new textbooks and teacher guides for primary grades  | PCTB                   | Targets have been based on preparation and dissemination of textbooks by PCTB. No current target  |
| Output 2.2: Improved reporting, analysis, and dissemination of PEC exam results   | PEC                    | Targets have related to PEC performance. No current target  |
| Output 2.3: Quality and delivery of teacher training and mentoring  | QAED                   | Relating to DSD/QAED performance. Currently: a) multi-grade teaching and policy and implementation plan developed and acknowledged by the department; b) framework developed for CPD of teachers at elementary level  |
| Output 2.4: Quality, transparency, and timeliness of teacher recruitment and deployment   | PMIU monthly data      | Teacher attendance rate: 92% to 95% (achieved)<br>Previous targets related to numbers of teachers deployed (four per school)  |
| <b>Output 3: High-quality school infrastructure</b>   |                        |   |
| Output 3.1: Improved availability and functioning of basic school facilities (toilets, boundary wall, drinking water, electricity) in all districts | PMIU                   | Milestones met by January 2019 (95% coverage)   |
| Output 3.2: Number of fit-for-purpose classrooms and toilet cubicles constructed under SCRP (disaggregation by gender, disability)                  | TACE MIS               | March 2021: Completion of construction: classrooms: 4,501; toilets: 1,990. Construction completed by December 2020; IMC completes handover of at  |

| Objective and Indicator  | Data source | Target and actual change (baseline to March 2021)   |
|--|-------------|---|
|  |             | least 950 schools by March 2021 in Punjab   |
| Output 3.3: Percentage decrease of failed construction inspections per quarter (where percentage is calculated as number of failed inspections divided by the sum of passed and failed inspections)<br>Indicator changed 9 October 2020:<br>Quality issues identified through inspection visits (TPV inspections/others) are rectified by IMC as per workplans | TACE MIS    | March 2021: IMC meets at least 80% of KPI targets related to quality on a monthly basis between October and March 2021  |
| <b>Output 4: Improved access to schools, especially in priority districts</b>  |             |   |
| Output 4.1: Number of OOSC enrolled in priority districts through PEF and CSOs   | PEF, ITA    | Initially focused on enrolment through CSO initiative in two districts, then total numbers in PEF programmes, then numbers in A3G programme   |
| Output 4.2: Number of children in school supported through PEF (cumulative): i) EVS; ii) NSP; iii) FAS   | PEF         | Completed: met expectations:<br>total: 2,636,528 students   |
| Output 4.3: Number of additional children with SEND enrolled and supported.  | SpED        | Achieved: additional enrolment of 1,911 children in SpED facilities   |
| Output 4.4: Number of scholarships for poor and able students disaggregated by sex   | LUMS/PEEF   | Substantially exceeded (PEEF): 23,152 intermediate-level scholarships provided to girl students by end of January 2020, and additional 1,848 girl students will be disbursed by end of March 2020               |
| <b>Output 5: Top political leadership engaged on education reform agenda in Punjab</b>   |             |   |
| Output 5.1: Data analysis and performance management routines  |             | Review and Stocktake meetings (ceased from 2019)  |
| Output 5.2: Roadmap transition planning and handover   |             | Completed   |
| <b>Output 6: High-quality TA delivered to government stakeholders that builds sustainable systems and processes</b>  |             |   |
| Output 6.1: High-quality TA to GoPb  |             | Implementation of workplan  |
| Output 6.2: Capacity-building and transfer of knowledge, skills, and practices to SED and PMIU   |             | All knowledge products, progress reports, and proposed way forward handed over to DFID and SED<br><br>March 2021: Capacity of SED officials developed in at least 12 districts to be responsive to the emerging |

| Objective and Indicator | Data source | Target and actual change (baseline to March 2021)              |
|-------------------------|-------------|--|
|                         |             | structures and functions of education delivery under PLGA 2019 |

## W.4.2 Commentary on indicators

### W.4.2.1 Impact and outcome indicators

The 2020 annual review reported progress against impact (Table 44) and outcome (Table 45) targets.

**Table 44: Progress against impact targets (February 2020)**

| Impact  | Target                    | Achievement   |
|---|---------------------------|---|
| Literacy rate (ages 10 and older); and            | 64%                       | 64.7%   |
| Adult literacy rate (ages 15 and older)           | 61%                       | 57.4%   |
| Transition rate in:<br>A) primary<br>B) secondary | 68% (boys)<br>70% (girls) | 79.1% (boys and girls)<br>79.4% (boys)<br>78.7% (girls) |
| Real GDP growth per capita                        | 5%                        | 5.3% (2019)   |

**Table 45: Progress against outcome targets (February 2020)**

| Outcome indicator(s)  | Target  | Achievement   |
|---|---|---|
| Participation rate for primary school-aged population (ages 5–9)                              | Punjab average: 95%                                     | Punjab average: 94.9%   |
| Participation rate for primary school-aged population (ages 5–9) in 11 priority districts     | Priority districts: 87%                                 | Priority districts: 94.4%   |
|   |   | (MICS 2017/2018)  |
| Participation rate for secondary school-aged population (ages 10–16)                          | Punjab average: 85%                                     | Punjab average: 79.1%   |
| Participation rate for secondary school-aged population (ages 10–16) in 11 priority districts | Priority districts: 75%                                 | Priority districts: 73%   |
|   |   | (MICS 2017/218)   |
| SLOs:<br>% students achieving specific SLOs   | Punjab average: 75%                                     | Punjab average: 82%   |
|   |   | (PMIU, December 2019)   |
| Student attendance  | 92% attendance rate every month<br>(92% boys 92% girls) | On or above 90% every month<br>12-month rolling average: 94%<br>(PMIU, December 2019) |

There are several respects in relation to which the ultimate choice of indicators (in Table 43) may be queried – relating both to conceptual appropriateness and measurability.

First, at the impact level, the secondary completion rate (there seems to be some lack of clarity about the extent to which the focus is on measuring transition between stages of schools and completion) can be seen as a partial measure of what the education system is producing, but it does not measure impact in the sense of changes in lives. Both the provincial GDP and the literacy rate are plausibly likely to be affected substantially over the longer term by improved performance of the education system. However, even over the relatively long programme period of PESP2 there does not appear to be a realistic causal route by which the amount of improvement in human capital resulting for the cohort whose education has both been improved by actions supported by PESP2 (most of whom should still be in school by the end of the programme) and who have entered the labour market will be substantial enough to have a measurable impact on growth or the labour market as a whole. Indeed, one of the benefits of improved education sector performance should be to delay entry into the labour market, as children stay longer in education. Annual GDP growth will anyway be dominated by short-term macroeconomic factors. Similarly, the plausibly anticipated impact on overall literacy rates will be very small (as reflected in the modest targets), and almost certainly within any plausible measurement error.

A more appropriate approach to measuring programme impact (with a clearer and shorter causal route to the programme) would have focused on evidence of improvement in the life chances for cohorts completing (school) education during the programme. This could have included: (i) the proportion of the cohort going on to further education or training; (ii) delays in marriage and child-bearing for girls; (iii) measures of employability; and (iv) psychosocial measures of benefits of education, such as improved self-esteem.

Second, at the outcome level the focus on participation rates is appropriate but provides only a partial measure of success in getting children into, and keeping them in, school. As noted, evidence suggests that while there has been improvement in participation rates, this has not been matched by improvements in NERs, while measures of school completion may be more appropriate as an outcome measure than as an impact measure. The focus on a single indicator of learning outcomes relating only to Grade 3 performance – rather than, for instance, a composite indicator covering more stages in the education system – may also be queried.

The choice of outcome measures appears therefore to be conceptually appropriate but potentially narrower than would have been desirable. A further problem, however, relates to their measurability. For learning outcome indicators, there have been substantial fluctuations over time – which are likely to have been exacerbated by reliance on a single indicator. The analysis in the RESP has found substantial differences in measures of the same indicators relating to participation and enrolment rates from different survey sources, while noting some reservations about coverage and comparability over time, including the fact that not all sources are available annually. For the sources indicated for the participation outcome measures, the last round of the PSES was in early 2017, and the latest MICS survey was in 2017/18. The following section reviews participation statistics from the ASER, PSLM, and EMIS datasets related to the priority districts, noting that only incomplete measures are available.

### W.4.2.2 Data on participation in priority districts

#### ASER dataset

The ASER exercise provides a largely rural dataset, which also contains data on selected urban areas. Issues due to changes in the sampling frame after the 2017 population census are discussed in detail in the RESP report.

There have been certain changes in the sample of 'priority districts' over the years. In 2014 and 2015, for instance, both the urban and rural areas of Bahawalpur and Rahim Yar Khan were surveyed. Hence the 'priority district' statistics for these two rounds also reflect these urban areas. Another point to note is that Dera Ghazi Khan was not sampled in 2014 and Muzaffargarh was not sampled in 2016.

**Table 46: ASER data on participation rates, including in PESP2 priority districts**

| Primary school (5–9 years; %) |         |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
|-------------------------------|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
|                               |         | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2018 | 2019 |
| Punjab average                | Overall | 87.6 | 88.8 | 89.4 | 89.2 | 89.2 | 92.0 | 94.2 |
|                               | Boys    | 90.0 | 90.7 | 90.7 | 90.8 | 90.2 | 92.8 | 94.5 |
|                               | Girls   | 84.7 | 86.6 | 87.8 | 87.2 | 88.0 | 91.0 | 93.8 |
| Priority districts            | Overall | 80.6 | 81.4 | 80.8 | 83.3 | 83.8 | 88.3 | 91.3 |
|                               | Boys    | 84.6 | 85.3 | 83.7 | 86.3 | 86.4 | 89.8 | 91.7 |
|                               | Girls   | 75.2 | 76.3 | 77.2 | 79.1 | 80.9 | 86.4 | 90.7 |

| Secondary school (10–16 years; %) |         |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
|-----------------------------------|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
|                                   |         | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2018 | 2019 |
| Punjab average                    | Overall | 80.2 | 80.9 | 82.7 | 81.3 | 82.7 | 85.9 | 90.1 |
|                                   | Boys    | 83.4 | 83.5 | 85.1 | 84.0 | 85.5 | 87.2 | 91.3 |
|                                   | Girls   | 75.8 | 77.3 | 79.3 | 77.6 | 78.8 | 84.1 | 88.8 |
| Priority districts                | Overall | 69.7 | 71.0 | 73.3 | 73.8 | 73.7 | 80.8 | 86.3 |
|                                   | Boys    | 75.8 | 75.7 | 77.7 | 79.0 | 79.2 | 82.8 | 87.9 |
|                                   | Girls   | 60.5 | 63.9 | 67.1 | 66.2 | 66.1 | 78.1 | 84.3 |

#### PSLM dataset

The PSLM data samples both urban and rural areas, but adopts a different sampling strategy for each area. More specifically, in 2012/13, 2013/2014, and 2014/15 a district-level sampling strategy was adopted for both rural and urban areas. In 2015/16 and 2018/19, however, the urban stratum consists of administrative divisions and major cities (not administrative districts) in Punjab. This essentially means that 'priority district' statistics from 2012/13, 2013/14, and 2014/15 reflect both urban and rural areas, while those from 2015/16 and 2018/19 reflect rural areas only.

**Table 47: PSLM data on participation rates, including in PESP2 priority districts**

| Primary school (5–9 years, %) |         |         |         |         |         |         |
|-------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
|                               |         | 2012/13 | 2013/14 | 2014/15 | 2015/16 | 2018/19 |
| Punjab average                | Overall | 79.2    | 78.7    | 79.7    | 79.6    | 85.0    |
|                               | Boys    | 82.0    | 81.9    | 82.4    | 82.2    | 86.1    |
|                               | Girls   | 76.3    | 75.4    | 76.8    | 76.8    | 83.9    |
| Priority districts            | Overall | 66.2    | 62.7    | 66.4    | 68.1    | 70.6    |
|                               | Boys    | 71.3    | 68.8    | 71.3    | 74.4    | 73.9    |
|                               | Girls   | 60.6    | 56.5    | 61.2    | 61.4    | 67.2    |

| Secondary school (10–16 years, %) |         |         |         |         |         |         |
|-----------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
|                                   |         | 2012/13 | 2013/14 | 2014/15 | 2015/16 | 2018/19 |
| Punjab average                    | Overall | 71.0    | 69.0    | 70.4    | 69.2    | 74.3    |
|                                   | Boys    | 75.1    | 74.9    | 74.3    | 75.2    | 77.6    |
|                                   | Girls   | 66.6    | 62.9    | 66.4    | 63.1    | 70.9    |
| Priority districts                | Overall | 57.9    | 55.2    | 56.1    | 54.0    | 60.1    |
|                                   | Boys    | 66.1    | 66.2    | 64.3    | 66.9    | 71.7    |
|                                   | Girls   | 48.9    | 43.5    | 46.9    | 39.0    | 48.4    |

## EMIS

School enrolment numbers from 2020/21 are based on provisional results shared by PMIU.

**Table 48: Enrolment in government schools, 2020/21, including priority districts**

| Government school enrolment (number of students) |                    |           |             |
|--|--------------------|-----------|-------------|
|  |                    | 2019/20   | 2020/21 (P) |
| Primary (Katchi – Class 5)                       | Overall            | 7,647,498 | 7,002,824   |
|  | Priority districts | 2,385,234 | 2,161,484   |
| Middle (Classes 6–8)                             | Overall            | 2,513,867 | 2,572,791   |
|  | Priority districts | 550,759   | 564,950     |
| High (Classes 9–12)                              | Overall            | 1,565,310 | 1,624,185   |
|  | Priority districts | 344,797   | 359,995     |

### W.4.2.3 Output indicators

As noted, most of the output indicators have increasingly focused on tracking progress in the implementation of specific reforms and other measures. They have indeed moved away from the approach shown originally in Table 42, where envisaged indicators for Output 1 (sector governance) and Output 2 (teaching) and to some extent Output 3 (learning environment) have more emphasis on making an overall assessment of system performance in the specified area: for instance, the extent to which lesson plans were being used (as an indicator of teaching quality).



As a result, particularly viewed in the light of the conceptual framework used for the evaluation (Figure 7), but also the underlying logic set out in the Business Case, the PESP2 results framework does not pay sufficient attention to seeking to measure the extent to which the key ingredients of school-level learning are being delivered, but focuses instead on partial elements of these, and the implementation of measures that are intended to bring about improvements. To some extent this reflects the limitations of a logframe model with only a single level of outputs and outcomes, given that one purpose of the logframe is to track the delivery of what is under the programme's relatively direct control. Use of the conceptual framework suggests that it would be desirable to develop and track indicators of the effectiveness of school management and governance, teaching quality, and the learning environment (including the supply and use of learning-focused inputs) that capture the core requirements for supporting effective learning. For instance, a measure of teaching effectiveness should encompass a teacher's subject knowledge and use of good instructional practice. Measures of the learning environment would include infrastructure but also access to and use of learning resources (books, lesson plans, computer hardware and software etc.), and also measures of pupil engagement and motivation.

## **W.5 PESP2 and VFM**

### **W.5.1 Approach to VFM in the Business Case**

The economic case for the PESP2 programme, as set out in the 2012 Business Case, was based on estimating (p. 41) the 'incremental lifetime earnings that graduates from primary, elementary and secondary levels of education are expected to achieve'. The preferred option reflected in the proposed design (based on it achieving the highest number of additional enrolments) was estimated to have a benefit to cost ratio of 1.5, and an internal rate of return of 12.6%. The Business Case noted that this calculation was restricted to private benefits (resulting from improved lifetime earnings), while likely additional social benefits could also be identified (for instance, through improved child health and reduced fertility resulting from higher levels of education for women).

It was noted also that competitive international procurement of consultants to manage TA (for SED and infrastructure) would 'give DFID Pakistan access to a strong network of international and national expertise for both TAMO and TACE, combined with an efficient approach to exercising fiduciary control, particularly in managing risk and ensuring interventions deliver both effective and high quality outputs, and demonstrate value for money' (p. 52).

### **W.5.2 Assessing VFM in the 2020 annual review**

The 2020 annual review<sup>93</sup> noted that 'previous reviews had assessed most components to be delivering good VFM, except for the infrastructure component and this largely remains the dominant narrative over this last year'. In relation to each of the main components, the review concluded as follows:

**'Student enrolment:** VFM is being attained. Increasing the supply of education opportunities was a central PESP II objective. This would manifest in higher student enrolment in the public and publicly-funded education system and reduce the number of out-of-school children (OOSC). There are now about 52,500 Government schools filled with 12.6m children - up 1.95m over Life Of Project (LOP) - being educated by

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<sup>93</sup> DFID (2020) Section D.

391,800 teachers (increase of 59,600); with a general student-teacher ratio of 32:1. Of every 100 students, 52 are female (46 at project-start). The rate of enrolment has increased at an annualised rate of 2.84%, above the rapid population growth rate of 2.4%. This suggests that government school enrolment over LOP has absorbed natural population growth and contributed the equivalent of a 280,000 dent into the OOSC population. PESP II provided £3m in financial aid in 2019 to continue supporting GoPb with increasing access to education.

The low-cost, publicly-funded, Punjab Education Foundation schools continue to play a crucial role in access to education. DFID's £7.4m grant in 2019 to PEF constitutes one-eighth of the PEF budget. DFID's contribution supported 333,700 students learning for a year at a cost of c. PKR 7,075 (£37) per student. PEF schools educate 2.64m children bringing the enrolment total (Kachi included) to 15.2m in Punjabi publicly-funded schools; private (fee-paying) schools educate another 2.6m. DFID has driven the expansion of PEF (285,000 new students enrolled over LOP) into priority districts of (mostly) southern Punjab. The quality of education received in PEF schools is leading to student outcomes that are comparable with the many times more expensive public system and play a vital role in reducing OOSC numbers.

**Scholarships:** PEEF scholarships have provided good VFM. Over this year, DFID's £2.78m funding contribution to PEEF supported over 23,000 girls in intermediate-level scholarships at an annual unit cost of £120 (all these were additional to the BC estimates, made possible by supporting more non-boarders and foreign exchange movements. This year's evaluation of PEEF highlighted that 98.5% of beneficiaries completed their education course and 73% finishing higher education (where most of the social gains linked to higher age of marriage, fertility rates and investment in children are derived).

**Infrastructure:** Classroom construction has been the weakest performing component of PESP II in VFM terms with the classrooms constructed by IMC at a considerable higher cost than initially estimated. Design problems identified over this year added safety concerns to existing issues. Additional DFID staff have been deployed to manage this component and partner performance is under constant review. IMC have continued to represent poor VFM with just 51% of expected classrooms completed at this stage. The classroom equivalent unit cost (for the projected 4,508 classrooms and 1,989 toilets) is now projected at £11,750 with a very high TA to construction works ratio of 0.46:1. Significant shares of the construction work budget have been redirected to other implementing partners. The Government of Punjab was provided with £22m in FY19/20 and this has been used efficiently with 1154 classrooms constructed to mid-point (50% of works) and construction started on another 850 classrooms (the projected unit cost is £8000). Plans for upgrading other facilities have also been completed – this represents a welcome step-change in construction pace from earlier years. An accountable grant to TCF is under review with poor VFM currently, marked by downward revisions to construction estimates and a pause on construction since October.

**SED and Budget support:** The VFM of financial aid depends on both quantitative as well as qualitative parameters like influencing merit-based recruitments or better financial management; non-salary budget execution improved this year but remains below targets. Service delivery is implemented at the district level, with remuneration for the public system's 391,000 teachers constituting the biggest cost driver (91% of

expenditure). The attendance rates of these teachers continue to improve (95%) and have contributed to the general improvement in student outcomes (as per PESP testing). DFID's support to SED of £3m in FY18-19 means that DFID financed 0.2% of SED and allied departments current budget expenditure (DFID funds calculated at PKR 190:1 GBP were PKR 570mn). This financing would support 23,000 students in grades 1-10, at an annual cost of £114 per Government school student. For reference, the latest data (IFS, 2017) of the cost of educating a UK child for a year (2016) in primary school is £4,900 – this means that 43 students are being educated in GoPb schools at the same cost as one child in UK.

**Technical Assistance (TA):** The substantial churn in secretaries of Education has contributed to the decrease in value of technical assistance. TA workplans are aligned with the new GoPb priority areas and performance has been largely good. However, the interruption to the roadmap process has diminished the overall effectiveness of TA, as the previous focus provided by the roadmap monitoring and stocktakes is not being utilised. TA needs to continue to persist on the delivery routines to improve performance management.'

### W.5.3 Factors influencing VFM in PESP2

The following factors are relevant for assessing the extent to which each component of PESP2, and the programme as a whole, is likely to be achieving VFM (in the sense of overall cost effectiveness):

- the timeliness of implementation;
- the extent to which each component leads to an increase in enrolment, retention, and completion of school;
- the extent to which each component contributes to increasing the quality of education to improve learning outcomes for those in school;
- the size of the earnings premium and other social benefits associated with increased schooling and learning; and
- in relation to equity, the extent to which the benefits accrue to disadvantaged people.

Critical issues in determining how far components achieve their planned results and contribute to VFM will include the extent to which financial support (e.g. intended to fund increased enrolment) is in fact additional (rather than being offset, for example, by reductions in government expenditure); how the additional funds are in fact used; and the effectiveness of contract management. A further consideration (where specific local evidence is not available) can be well-founded evidence from similar initiatives elsewhere. The 2020 annual review argues that:

**'Development Best Buys:** DFID published sectoral papers in 2019 that reviewed all the available evidence for a wide range of interventions across multiple sectors and attempted to 'grade' these interventions in terms of cost-effectiveness (value for money). A mapping of PESP II interventions against the education development best buys (DBB) spectrum proves favourable. Working on systems change (to set learning goals, curriculum, textbooks and teaching at more appropriate levels) is core PESP activity and is considered a DBB 'Mega Buy'; the most cost-effective category. 'Great Buys' included in PESP interventions are: (i) structured lesson plans with linked materials with ongoing teacher monitoring and training, (ii) targeting of teaching

instruction by learning level, (iii) Community schools where schools do not exist, and (iv) merit-based scholarships.’

There are some information gaps that restrict the extent to which an overall assessment of cost effectiveness can be made for PESP2. These include a lack of quantitative impact evaluation information, which could in principle have been designed as a part of the implementation of some components (for instance, the scholarships and school infrastructure components) but which could not be addressed through *ex post* evaluation alone. A more fully articulated theory of change would also have been helpful for making firmly empirically grounded assessments of the contribution to results achieved – for instance, for assessing the additionality of SBS.

Noting these limitations, the following observations relating to the VFM of specific components can be made:

- For SBS, the critical factor is the extent to which the financial resources provided to the Government did in fact lead to increased spending, and what this spending was on. High VFM would be associated, for instance, with SBS leading to increases in especially effective forms of non-salary (including development) expenditure to target key constraints on access and learning, and with successfully encouraging the implementation of key reforms. If SBS led to an increase in overall expenditure (e.g. including proportional increases in spending on teachers) this could have strong VFM insofar as the system as a whole was cost effective in encouraging enrolment and learning. VFM would be limited to the extent that SBS offset government spending or did not lead to further reform implementation.
- Similar considerations apply in principle for direct financial support for programmes such as the scholarships and PEF. In both of these cases, it does seem clear that PESP2 funding increased overall programme funding relative to what would have occurred otherwise. Funds were used to increase access to programmes, but there was relatively little success in strengthening overall programme management (except for LUMS/NOP).
- While the Business Case emphasised the use of international procurement as a way of achieving good VFM for TA and the proposed approach to school infrastructure, in both of these cases there were initial significant delays, meaning that implementation of both components began later than intended, and after implementation of other components to which they were supposed to be complementary had begun. There were also problems with the quality of management and performance of both the TACE and TAMO contractors, which required subsequent review and action before being addressed.
- In relation to international experience on smart buys for learning, Table 49 includes an assessment of the extent to which each area of action identified in World Bank/FCDO (2020) was emphasised in GoPb policy and addressed by PESP2 components. A fuller assessment would need to focus on the extent to which expenditure was allocated to each area, rather than just its inclusion. In this regard it should be noted that in the last period of the PESP2 programme spending has been dominated by school infrastructure, which risks (unless other priorities are being addressed) being considered a ‘bad buy’.

**Table 49: Assessment of PESP2 components against ‘smart buys’ for learning**

| Area of action   | Emphasised in GoPb policy  | Addressed by PESP2 component   |
|--|--|--|
| <b>Great buys: highly cost effective because of large benefits or low cost</b>   |  |  |
| Giving information (to parents) on the benefits, costs, and quality of education   | Demand-side aspects of enrolment drives Education quality information for school system management rather than parents | Support to information for school system management (Stocktake, SIF), rather than direct to parents                          |
| <b>Good buys: cost effective in many contexts</b>  |  |  |
| Structured lesson plans with linked materials and ongoing teacher monitoring and training  | ALP and QAED CPD   | TA support to QAED ALP   |
| Targeting teaching instruction by learning level not grade   | Included in QAED CPD approach  | TA support to QAED   |
| Reduced travel times to school   | Support to PEF NSP   | Support to PEF NSP   |
| Giving merit-based scholarships to disadvantaged children and youth  | PEEF scholarships  | PEEF scholarships; LUMS/NOP scholarships   |
| Using software that adapts to the learning level of the child (where hardware is already in schools)   | No information available   | No information available   |
| Pre-primary education (ages three to five)   | ECE policy (to be implemented)<br>Katchi enrolment   | Not direct focus of support  |
| <b>Promising but low evidence: testing required before scale-up</b>  |  |  |
| Early childhood stimulation programmes (for ages zero to two) targeting parents  | ECE policy (to be implemented)   | Not direct focus of support  |
| Teacher accountability and incentive reforms   | One focus of QAED  | TA support to QAED   |
| Community involvement in school management   | Envisaged increased role for school councils   | Not direct focus of support  |
| <b>Bad buys: repeated evidence that not effective, or not cost effective</b>   |  |  |
| Additional inputs alone when other issues not addressed, including: textbooks, additional teachers to reduce class size, school buildings, grants, salary, libraries | Potentially school buildings and some other inputs   | School infrastructure component (in that not directly linked to e.g. school performance or implementation of other measures) |
| Investment in laptops, tablets, and other computer hardware alone  | Potentially (depending on resources for effective use)   | No   |

| Area of action   | Emphasised in GoPb policy                                  | Addressed by PESP2 component                      |
|--|--|---|
| Cash transfers (as a tool for improving learning)  | No   | No  |
| <b>Areas where action required but evidence on what is effective is limited</b>                      |  |   |
| In-service teacher training on general skills  | CPD developed by QAED                                      | Support to CPD                                    |
| Selection and allocation of teachers   | Reforms through QAED                                       | TA support to QAED                                |
| Differentiating support by gender (potentially effective where one gender is strongly disadvantaged) | Programmes focused on girls                                | PEEF intermediate scholarships; ITA A3G programme |
| Targeted support for children living with disabilities   | IES and SEP  | Support to special and inclusive education        |
| Interventions to safeguard students from violence  | Corporal punishment in schools not illegal but discouraged | No  |



## W.6 Quality of programme management

### W.6.1 Effectiveness of GoPb ownership of PESP2 and adaptation to changing objectives

Key informants considered that GoPb ownership of, and direction to, the programme was very strong up until 2017, driven by the Chief Minister's interest in and commitment to direct engagement. In the run up to the 2018 elections, key informants considered that direct involvement from the Chief Minister was reduced. The Roadmap and Stocktake process was highly effective in driving performance against narrowly defined targets, such as enrolment, but was less successful for pursuing more complex learning-focused objectives. The initial success was highly dependent on the relationship between the Chief Minister and the UK representative, Sir Michael Barber, and on the McKinsey team to support and drive the Roadmap process, as well as on two effective Secretaries of SED who were in post over most of the period. The approach was effective in driving results but also tended to create a parallel management system, with the role of PMIU and directors within SED being marginalised.

In the initial period following the 2018 elections there was less clarity as the new government developed its programmes in education, and due to the high rate of turnover of key staff, particularly in the post of Secretary of SED (as shown in Table 50) and Managing Director of PEF. Subsequently, there has been clearer direction from the Minister of Education and his advisory team in highlighting key objectives, and the PESP2 TA team has been able to provide more effective support. The recognised value of the TA support, along with the reallocation of infrastructure funding to be managed through PMIU, appears to have increased GoPb ownership of the programme in its final phases.

**Table 50: Tenure of Secretaries of SED during PESP2<sup>94</sup>**

| Name                           | Period               | Months in post (approximate) |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|
| Ms. Sarah Aslam                | Apr 2020 –           | 6*                           |
| Muhammad Sheheryar Sultan      | Dec 2019 – Apr 2020  | 4                            |
| Ms. Irum Bukhari               | Oct 2019 – Nov 2019  | 1                            |
| Capt. (Retd.) Muhammad Mahmood | Feb 2019 – Oct 2019  | 8                            |
| Zafar Iqbal                    | Nov 2018 – Feb 2019  | 2                            |
| Imran Sikandar Baloch          | Sep 2018 – Oct 2018  | 1                            |
| Ambreen Raza                   | June 2018 – Sep 2018 | 3                            |
| Dr Allah Bakhsh Malik          | 2017 – Jun 2018      | 12**                         |
| Abdul Jabbar Shaheen           | 2013 – 2017          | 48**                         |
| Aslam Kamboh                   | Sep 2009 – Jun 2013  | 45                           |

\* Still in post at October 2020; \*\* Estimated

The main changes to priorities over the period of PESP2's implementation have related to the increasing focus on learning outcomes relative to enrolment and access, and the abandonment of the Roadmap and Stocktake process by the new government after 2018, as well as a change in priorities, as reflected in the New Deal document. Key informants considered that there was only partial success in reorienting PESP2 towards a greater focus on learning outcomes, since its key components and the Roadmap approach were principally

<sup>94</sup> Source: SED website.



driven by access considerations. TA has been used effectively to provide support to some key initiatives (for instance working with QAED) but a more fundamental restructuring of the approach may have been required, and will be required for follow up programmes.

## **W.6.2 Programme management arrangements**

### **W.6.2.1 DFID/FCDO policy and staffing**

Changes in DFID/FCDO policies over the period of implementation of PESP2 were not considered to have directly affected the programme, although DFID's increased focus on disability and inclusion did prompt increased attention to this issue. Key informants considered that the relatively high level of continuity in staffing from the DFID team during implementation facilitated effective management, and that DFID was able to deploy appropriate technical and managerial resources (except in relation to the school infrastructure component). However, especially after DFID stopped (in 2018) having a dedicated staff member working on the programme based in Lahore, key informants from DFID staff, TA providers, and GoPb partners considered that DFID became increasingly reliant on TA teams to manage relationships with SED and other key stakeholders (the McKinsey team having played an important role in doing this throughout), while over time the role of DFID staff focused more on programme management, rather than their having technical engagement with the issues. Some key informants from TA providers considered that DFID could have done more to leverage its influence with the Government.

In relation to lessons emerging from the programme and taken forward by DFID, key informants considered that PESP2 showed that a delivery model could work but had significant limitations as a vehicle for taking forward more complex reforms. Experience in Punjab influenced DFID programmes (for instance in Tanzania and Ethiopia, as well as the engagement in KPK), though other key informants considered that DFID/FCDO's capacity and willingness to learn had been restricted by the focus on programme management, rather than technical engagement.

### **W.6.2.2 Relationship with SED**

Over the bulk of the period of PESP2's implementation, both DFID and other key informants considered that there was effective collaboration between DFID and SED, reflecting the strong GoPb ownership of the Roadmap, and the effective formal and informal cooperation and information-sharing between SED, DFID, and the TA consultants. However, the strong focus of the Stocktake process on reporting against specific targets tended to militate against wider discussion and knowledge-sharing – in particular to strengthen the focus on learning outcomes. The high capacity and dominant role of the McKinsey team was also seen as militating against SED ownership – for instance, the McKinsey team was seen as having taken an important lead in seeking to re-orient the Roadmap approach towards learning, but this change was not owned by SED. A lack of SED ownership of the element of PIEP which was intended to pilot improved approaches to addressing special educational needs in mainstream government schools was also considered to have contributed to its lack of success, while DFID was slow to address and resolve problems with the school infrastructure component, despite concerns expressed by SED.

The relationship with SED weakened in the latter part of the programme, reflecting the break that the new government wished to make with the previous government's Roadmap approach, the lack of a dedicated DFID presence in Lahore, and reduced travel by the Islamabad-based

DFID team, as well as the high level of turnover of sector management staff (notably as Secretary of SED).

Several key informants also criticised the RAF and Joint Results Framework as a programme management model, since it was considered to be insufficiently aligned with the World Bank's support, and not to provide effective incentives for GoPb action and engagement, especially since it was not effectively aligned with the budget cycle, and not effectively co-owned between GoPb, DFID, and the TA providers (TAMO and McKinsey). For instance, one key informant considered that 'Government was very relaxed on their delivering against the results framework as the DFID funds went into the general bloodstream of the Government and there was no incentive for the departments to deliver'.

As noted above, a recognition of the value of the PESP2 TA and the funding of infrastructure through PMIU has improved relationships in the last phase of the programme.

A more general criticism of the DFID programme management approach from some key informants contrasted the DFID programme with the World Bank, noting that the latter was jointly designed from the start, which led to clear agreement on all elements of the programme with the Government. In contrast, GoPb was not closely involved in key steps in the DFID process, including the drafting of the Business Case, taking subsequent decisions involving substantial changes to programme components, or the selection of TA contractors (who, initially at least, lacked sufficient local knowledge), and with little clear accountability when the programme was off-track to achieve its objectives (for instance in relation to school infrastructure). One key informant characterised the DFID management approach as 'informal but top-down', and hence as militating against structured government engagement and ownership.

### **W.6.3 Engagement with civil society**

Key informants considered that the level of engagement with civil society and other non-government stakeholders through PESP2's implementation was less than desirable. The original design of PESP2 involved a significantly enhanced role for school councils (for instance in implementing the infrastructure component), and working with NGOs to establish new private schools (to be funded under the PEF NSP) in the priority districts. The former model was abandoned during the inception phase of Humqadam-SCRIP, while the latter was not taken further forwards after an initial initiative, as neither PEF nor the NGOs found the contract arrangements satisfactory. Subsequently, the main direct involvement of a CSO in PESP2 was ITA's involvement in funding ASER (after the closure of TEP), and in implementing the A3G programme.

Within the DFID education portfolio, direct engagement with CSOs on advocacy and policy issues was seen as principally the domain of the TEP project (including the Alif Ailaan initiative) and the Ilm Ideas project (which aimed to engage players from outside the education sector, primarily the private sector, to develop innovative approaches to improving the quality of education or increasing access to education in Pakistan). As a result, PESP2 operated principally on the supply side of education, rather than the demand side. Some key informants considered this separation to be a design weakness which reflected divisions of responsibility between education and governance teams within DFID.

There was also a limited appetite of the PML-N government for active involvement of civil society in discussions about education sector management, and a focus on the top-down and

centralised model of accountability and control embodied in the Roadmap, rather than an emphasis on strengthening local-level and wider social accountability. CSOs were involved in the Roadmap and Stocktake process in so far as they played a role in implementing programmes, but key informants considered CSOs were hesitant to openly criticise the process given the strength of backing for it from the Chief Minister.

Key informants from civil society considered that GoPb had throughout the PESP2 period engaged civil society in the process of policy development and research, but had not been willing to use civil society as an effective partner in implementation, while the Free and Compulsory Education Act passed in 2014 remained to be notified, and there had been little progress in effectively empowering community and civil society through improving accountability of schools to communities and effective scrutiny of education expenditure. In addition, delays in payments to private sector and NGO partners due through PEF and PEIMA from 2020 had undermined morale and relations with government, while the high turnover of SED Secretaries since 2018 had made effective engagement with SED by CSOs more difficult.

#### **W.6.4 Engagement with the World Bank and other development partners**

Key informants stressed that there was a strong and effective working relationship between DFID and the World Bank throughout the programme, beginning from the original joint design process, which coordinated the support to education in Punjab from both agencies. It was stressed that there have been good working relations between the education teams from DFID and the World Bank throughout the period of the programme, even where there were some disagreements in approach (for instance, about the Roadmap process). DFID provided funding for TA to support the World Bank's PESP3 when there was a delay in approval of other sources of funding for this. There has been active coordination between the World Bank's PESP3 TA (under PMIU) and the TA provided by PESP2 to ensure complementarity. Other development partners generally played a limited role.

#### **W.6.5 Key informant perspectives on what could have been done better**

Suggestions from key informants on what could have been done better in the design and implementation covered the following:

- There was a strong consensus that the school infrastructure component should have been a separately managed project, embedded in and owned by the Government, and that it should have sought to build capacity, rather than being managed through an external contractor. When the problems with implementation became clear, the component should have been terminated in its original form.
- The focus on the Roadmap and the delivery approach, and hence the achievement of 'results' (mainly in the form of increased enrolment), while reflecting government objectives, led to the programme putting insufficient emphasis over most of the period of implementation on system-level improvement (especially in relation to teaching, assessment, and curriculum). Funding programmes encouraged a focus on 'low-hanging fruits', rather than a strong focus on the most marginalised children and improving critical parts of the education system to encourage quality and learning.
- The programme timing should have remained tied to the political cycle. Some key informants suggested the programme should have been ended in line with the originally envisaged timetable in 2018, or significantly re-designed at that point for its remaining

implementation. More generally, the need for structured processes of programme review (for instance a full mid-term review) in long and complex programmes was identified, as well as the need for more structured use of evidence to guide decisions.

- The design of SBS should have involved a stronger relationship between the achievement of agreed targets and the release of funding, and full alignment with the government budget process and timetable.
- There was a strong view from GoPb stakeholders that TA needed to be located in SED, with SED playing a key role in the selection and management of the TA provider, and with a stronger focus on drawing on local capacity and better procurement of expertise, and with more direct GoPb engagement in key programme decisions.